Philosophical Psychology Research Articles

A Troubled World and the Practice of Psychotherapy

Human science psychologies have recognized that a significant dimension of the distress that clients bring to psychotherapy arises from living in a disordered world. Drawing on insights from philosophical hermeneutics (Cushman), phenomenology (van den Berg), and archetypal psychology (Hillman), this essay considers the virtuous (Illich and Schwartz) practice of psychotherapy in a world increasingly inhospitable to human dwelling.

A Critical Essay on the Main Objective of Philosophical Investigations with Reference to Wittgenstein’s Quotation of Augustine’s Confessions

Philosophical Investigations comes under the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. It is based on two major themes, which can be called as the philosophy of language and philosophical psychology. It can be also named as a grammatical investigation since he stated that philosophy is based on some misunderstandings of our language. This book is also hierarchically numbered remarks. Most of the remarks are composed as conversations between Wittgenstein and an interlocutor that consists with the reality and sometimes consists of imaginary examples. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein, describe how language is used, notion of language games, the notion of family resemblance, philosophy as a therapy, ‘meaning in use’ etc. The important thing is Wittgenstein does not merely argue on what he believes to be the truth. Nevertheless, the reader is influenced to conclude certain conclusions. Saint Augustine composed a collection of thirteen books after he became a church father that is named as Augustine’s Confessions. Wittgenstein selected a quotation from Augustine’s confessions for the opening of Philosophical Investigations. It is imperative to check out the reason why Wittgenstein selected above mentioned quotation. Therefore, the objective of this study would be to examine why Wittgenstein selected a quotation from Augustine’s Confessions to the opening of Philosophical Investigations. Textual analysis, comparative, analytical and critical methods have been used in this study.

On the origin of mental representations

The symbol grounding problem raises its head in the fields of the philosophy of AI, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of cognitive sciences. The solution to the symbol grounding problem must account for the genesis of mental representations in the world. It has to offer a strategy for grounding mental representations in the objective domain. Orthodox representationalist theories do not provide a satisfactory reply to the symbol grounding problem. On the other hand, there are embodied-enactivist approaches that dissolve the problem but only at the cost of representations and internal phenomenal states. The code model of biosemiotics provides a biologically viable (i.e., mechanistic) venue for developing a new solution to the problem. For the same reason, it could reconcile representationalism to the embodied approach.

Elizabeth Anscombová: filosofická psychologie a gramatika v sapienciální perspektivě

Elizabeth Anscombe places an emphasis on the importance of philosophical psychology and depth grammar. Her philosophy rediscovers the basic predispositions for a Christian vision of the human act. Human beings are the cause of their intentional acts, which is why it makes sense to speak about sin. We cannot, however, have a deeper knowledge of sin but in the light of Christian Revelation. Philosophy is supposed to be compatible with this Revelation and help for its understanding needs to be supported by an adequate renewal of methodology in which disciplines such as grammar, psychology or the philosophy of nature are interconnected.

Diagnostic Concepts of the Unconscious as a Foundation of Romanticist Identity: Maine de Biran’s Psycho-Physiological and Psycho-Pathological Self-Investigations

ABSTRACT The foundations of psychoanalysis in the German idealist concepts of the reflexive human self have been the subject of detailed investigations devoted to the intertwined processes of introspection, consciousness, and the unconscious. Much less consideration has been given to the contemporary French spiritualist philosopher Maine de Biran (1766–1824), whose physiologically-oriented philosophical psychology was (partially) known in its essence by some of the founding thinkers of psycho-analysis. According to Biran’s explicitly anti-Cartesian notion of individual identity, consciousness is constitutively generated through voluntary corporeal effort—by the resistance implied in the act of (ap)perception. Biran’s shift from an empiricist and sensualist outward perception to a spiritualist introspection (sens intime) marks the turn from Enlightenment to Romanticism. In his chef d’oeuvre, the Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie (1811–ca. 1813), he distinguishes four concentrically layered, heterogeneous spheres or systems of consciousness. At its core is the instinctively motivated système affectif (shared by both animals and humans), followed by the système sensitif that is still subordinated to affections, albeit interconnected with consciousness. The système perceptif involves the tactile and visual senses of attention, while the outer système réflexif of communication via cultural signage is critically interconnected with terminology-based experimental sciences. Departing from Biran’s crucial transformation of Leibniz’s term “petites perceptions” (1704/1714) to “impressions affectives” (1807), this article examines the functioning of the affective unconscious, as analyzed in Biran’s diary, his first treatise (1799-1802), and a speech on obscure perception (1807), delivered during sessions of the Société Médicale de Bergerac.

Интегративные подходы в современной практической психологии – методика мари как комплексный инструмент диагностики и консультирования

The article deals with the current trends in the integration of methodological approaches in theoretical and practical psychology. In the applied aspect the MARI technique is considered as a research and transformation technique. The structure of the method is described, the characteristics of the stimulus material and interpretations are given, the mechanism of the method as a research technique and psychocorrection tool is revealed. The article deals with the concept of archetype and symbol in the context of research and Advisory work. The substantiation of the technique as an integrative tool that allows to overcome the faults in the psychological knowledge at the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal levels in terms of the integrative methodology of Yurevich.

Editorial

This issue of Liberabit, Peruvian Journal of Psychology offers the academic community new contributions in empirical and theoretical psychology research from authors whose articles are mentioned hereinbelow.

INTERNET COMMUNICATION TOOLS: THE WAY OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY OR FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE

With the introduction of almost every sphere of human activity computer technologies, there is a need for the formation of holistic scientific position in determining further cultural development of the human being. An assumption has been made, that a resourceful basis for communication research via the Internet are philosophical categories and cultural-historical psychology, because its statements allow to conceptualize the Internet communication tools as indirect activity. The specific features of electronic interactions, which have a significant impact on development of the of the personality have been highlighted and analyzed in the article: a lack of tactile sensations, increasing the volume and speed of information transfer, the introduction of artificial intelligence in communication tools.

No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention.

In their paper “Why we may not find intentions in the brain,” Uithol et al. (2014) convincingly argue that “the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for.” Their paper could be seen as a critical note to the widespread tendency to search for identifiable neurocorrelates of mental concepts. Their more specific suggestion is that the absence of clear neural correlates undermines the traditional understanding of intention. In this paper I will try to take their argument a step further. First of all, I will argue that our folk psychology leaves room for various understandings of intentions, and that the concept of intention discussed by Uithol et al. is an academic concept that has its roots in the causal theory of action and in functionalist approaches to cognition. I will argue that both these paradigms are contested, and that there seems to be theoretical wiggle room for alternative understandings of intention. Subsequently I outline such an alternative perspective based on Wittgensteinian philosophy of psychology, emphasizing the regulative role of intention talk. However, the proposed understanding raises the question how to think about neural realization: is intention talk “just” talk, or do intentions really exist? I will propose that intention talk should be understood as a form of pattern recognition, and that the patterns involved are extended in both space and time. The conclusion outlines some important implications for the neuroscientific investigation of intentions.

Sartre’s critique of Husserl

ABSTRACTThis paper articulates a new understanding of Sartre’s philosophical methodology in his early publications up to and including Being and Nothingness. Through his critique of Husserl across these works, Sartre develops an original and sophisticated variety of transcendental phenomenology. He was attracted to Husserl’s philosophy for its promise to establish the foundations of empirical psychology but ultimately concluded that it could not fulfil this promise. Through the analyses that led him to this conclusion, Sartre formulated a new kind of phenomenological reduction and a distinctive kind of transcendental argument to draw conclusions about mind-independent reality from phenomenological premises. His aims were to dissolve the traditional distinction between mind and world, to establish that the mind is accessible to empirical study, and to formulate the conceptual framework required to study the mind systematically. Sartre’s philosophy of psychology, therefore, drove the philosophical development of the methodological foundation of his philosophical project.

Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy by Robert B. Pippin

Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy by Robert B. Pippin

Authentic Self: Personal Identity Conceptualizations for Leaders and Followers (An Interdisciplinary Study)

The current study offers an interdisciplinary review of more than 100 scholarly articles and books on personal identity theories from primarily philosophical, psychological, and philosophical psychology literature to understand how the leader and the follower identities are formed and sustained over time. The study also aimed to bring the literature on personal identity theories and leadership studies together to better conceptualize the dynamic and interconnected nature of identity construct for leaders and followers from interdisciplinary perspectives. The review revealed that personal identity theories had not been fully integrated with or utilized by the interdisciplinary studies of leadership and followership. The study also noticed patterns and themes within identity research that have significant overlap with the leadership studies in the area of process-based understanding of the self and the leadership process. Recommendations are made to more fully integrate the dynamic and process-based identity theories, which steam primarily from process philosophy, with current understanding of process-based leader follower-ship research. This study is limited to the review of person and personal identity theory literature. Due to the magnitude of the task, the role and social identity theories have not been included in this study.

Історико-психологічний аналіз ключових уявлень представників київської школи філософської психології про психіку людини кінця ХІХ- початку ХХ століття

Історико-психологічний аналіз ключових уявлень представників київської школи філософської психології про психіку людини кінця ХІХ- початку ХХ століття

Theoretical psychology at the University of Alberta as social science during the Cold War.

We examine the University of Alberta's Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology (1965-1990) in the context of social science conducted during the Cold War. We begin by considering the center with respect to three important properties of social science at this time: an emphasis on interdisciplinarity, a focus on theory, and a preference for quantitative methods. Our analysis suggests that center activities also exhibited these characteristics. They were highly interdisciplinary, they were concerned with the development of psychological theory, and center members were experts in a variety of formal, mathematical, or statistical techniques. We then discuss the center in relation to a subdomain of research known as Cold War social science, which also was interdisciplinary, theoretical and quantitative, but in addition focused on research that contributed to national security against the rise of communism. Center members also believed that their research had social implications, but these were related to a humanistic psychology that served as a positive social force, and diverged from typical Cold War applications. We end by considering the center as an example of a different kind of Cold War science that emerged from a unique set of contextual influences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Philosophy without Psychology: a case of wishful thinking?

The topic of this lecture is the relation between Wittgenstein’s thought and Wittgensteinian philosophy on the one hand, psychology and psychologism on the other. It will start by clarifying how the label ‘psychologism’ should be understood in this context, opting for a neutral rather than derogatory conception. Next it discusses the relation between Frege’s anti-psychologism and that of the early Wittgenstein. The main focus will be on Wittgenstein’s denial that assertion and judgement are of logical relevance. The final sections turn to Wittgenstein’s later thought. Can it avoid the intrusion of psychology concerning the following areas: – meaning – philosophical psychology – philosophical method? Giving short shrift to psychological notions like understanding, perception, judgement and belief is impossible even in philosophy of language and epistemology, given their connections to notions like meaning and knowledge. If Wittgensteinian philosophizing were a kind of psychotherapy, it would also be wholly irresponsible to ignore psychological theories. Fortunately it isn’t. Nevertheless it is neither feasible nor desirable to insulate the clarification of philosophical problems and contested concepts against empirical considerations. I shall substantiate this claim by looking at the problem of animal minds and the role that abilities play for mental and epistemic phenomena. If conceptual analysis is to serve as an instrument of critical thinking, it had better be impure.

Multimodality, visual methods and lived experience

Paula Reavey is Professor of Psychology and Mental Health at London South Bank University. This interview took place at the Qualitative Methods in Psychology (QMiP) and History & Philosophy of Psychology (HPP) joint 2019 conference at Cardiff Metropolitan University, where Paula led a workshop on visual methods and delivered a keynote speech. Best known for her pathbreaking work on visual methods and multimodality (Reavey, 2011), she has also distinguished herself with her innovative, interdisciplinary work in the field of mental health, space and embodiment. Susanne Langer (Senior Lecturer in Psychology, MMU) and Deborah Bailey-Rodriguez (Lecturer in Psychology, Middlesex University), who are both associate editors of the QMiP Bulletin asked the questions.

Paying Attention to Buddhaghosa and Pāli Buddhist Philosophy

Paying Attention to Buddhaghosa and Pāli Buddhist Philosophy Sean M. Smith (bio) The value of Jonardon Ganeri's work to cross-cultural philosophy is beyond comparison. He has been and continues to be a singular and unrepeatable force of philosophical creativity. His new monograph Attention, Not Self (AnS) is another deep contribution. AnS is of special importance because it engages so seriously with the work of Buddhaghosa, a much-neglected fifth-century Buddhist philosopher whose commentarial works form the intellectual backbone of the Pāli tipiṭaka of Theravāda Buddhism.1 I cannot hope to treat all the nuance and depth of Ganeri's newest offering here. The book is, quite frankly, dizzying in the density and extensiveness of its argument, even for an expert. Nevertheless, I shall try to comment on several parts of the text in some detail and say something more holistic about its place in Ganeri's corpus as well as in the context of cross-cultural philosophy more generally. My main argument is that Ganeri attributes views to Buddhaghosa that the latter does not hold. Embedded in this complaint is the assumption that we should try to get a thinker right and on their own terms as a precursor to seeing how their views interface with those of others. It is an assumption I will rely on throughout. Though my remarks will be critical, AnS is important because of its originality and depth of treatment. It represents an important step in trying to do cross-cultural philosophy, and it should be carefully studied. In the opening section, I provide some critical remarks about the extent to which different models in Buddhaghosa's philosophy map onto contemporary [End Page 1125] categories in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I then turn to some issues of translation and hermeneutical ambiguity in section 2, focusing on the sutta literature. In section 3, I analyze Ganeri's attempt to argue that Buddhaghosa was a non-reductive theorist of persons (puggala). Finally, I conclude with some methodological reflections on the distinction between comparative and cosmopolitan philosophy. I. Models and Maps A steady feature of the contemporary discourse on Buddhism has been an overwhelming emphasis on the various ways that certain facets of Buddhist philosophical psychology seem to converge with the project of contemporary philosophy of mind (Ganeri 2001; Ganeri 2012; Siderits 2007; Garfield 2015; Thompson 2015a). In this section, I explore two claims that Ganeri makes about model overlap. The first pertains to the five aggregates in Buddhism and the phenomenal/access-consciousness distinction in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The second concerns Ganeri's claim that Buddhaghosa's two Abhidhammic models of mental function overlap with the doxastic/sub-doxastic distinction or between a fully personal level of processing that is both phenomenal and intentional on the one hand, and a cognitive-scientific causal story about how such states are realized on the other. The Five Aggregates and Contemporary Cognitive Science Ganeri sees an overlap between two categories of the five aggregates model and the phenomenal/access-consciousness distinction. Ganeri claims that "It will transpire that Buddhists fully appreciate the distinction between p-consciousness and a-consciousness, which arises in connection with their distinction between felt evaluation (vedanā) and identificatory labeling (saññā)" (AnS, p. 49; see image 2.1 in AnS, p. 41). Phenomenal consciousness refers to experience or the quality of there being something it is like to be in certain kinds of mental states (Nagel 1974). Access consciousness is that type of awareness that facilitates certain types of intentional behavioral output on the basis of content being available to the system. According to Ganeri, Buddhaghosa's understanding of vedanā overlaps with phenomenal consciousness, and saññā is connected with access consciousness. I don't think things are so straightforward. That is, I will argue that the distinction between p-consciousness and a-consciousness does not arise primarily in connection with the distinction between vedanā and saññā but also includes the other two mental aggregates, viññāṇa and saṅkhāra. My proposal is that 'phenomenal consciousness' can be seen in both the viññāṇa and vedanā aggregates. So also, what philosophers call 'access...

The Right to Believe that only one Religion is true

Some philosophers claim to show that religious diversity should lead rational beings to find some conciliation between them. They say that diversity should mean that no one could pretend to hold the truth. We must therefore renounce alethic exclusivity, the claim that a certain religion possesses by itself the truth. This encourages religious scepticism, because when well-informed and reasonable people disagree about their religious or anti-religious beliefs, their confidence in the justification of their beliefs must be reduced or diminished even if that belief were true – to the point that these people are intellectually reconciled. Let us call this claim the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation. I will first claim that it is not a sound principle of intellectual ethics. For that, I will first show that if this Principle claims to sceptically conclude to the plurality of religions, it is, in reality, a reasoning from a sceptical dogma, and not only a reasoning that leads to scepticism. I mean that it is a hidden atheistic argument disguised as an honest neutral reasoning. As it calls for an ethical requirement of rationality, without being then so transparent that it seems, it is important to show that this Principle borders on deception. I am secondly going to show that, even if one accepts to allow oneself to be conciliated by reasoning, the Principle has serious flaws, especially with regard to the philosophical psychology of religious faith. My conclusion will be that it is wrong that we should suspend any religious belief that an alleged epistemic peer does not share as soon as we become aware that he does not share it. It is not true that it is rational in any case to respect the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation, and that another attitude would always be irrational and morally disgusting.

Psychology as the science about the psyche and psychic development in the course to the reading representative of the Kyiv school of philosophical psychology Silvestr Silvestrovich Gogotsky

Psychology as the science about the psyche and psychic development in the course to the reading representative of the Kyiv school of philosophical psychology Silvestr Silvestrovich Gogotsky

Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford

Reviewed by: Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford Anthony T. Flood Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), x + 280 pp. For Thomists and other Aristotelians working within the analytic tradition, the rise of contemporary virtue ethics (CVE) in current philosophical discussion seems like occasion for rejoicing. A rejection of deontology and consequentialism in the name of virtue by top members of the field leaves one thinking: "What is not to like?" But then, when we read the literature, something seems amiss, even to the point where we wonder if CVE is a coherent approach and if it has anything in common with what Aristotle and Aquinas mean by "ethics." Jonathan Sanford has clearly pondered these same questions and given Before Virtue to us as a result. [End Page 953] Sanford has performed a great service in offering a painstaking analysis of CVE and a sober assessment of its status as a viable normative ethical theory. This is no small task. To what CVE even refers is the source of much discussion. Seeking to include the wide array of thinkers and cover their viewpoints that make up the movement, Sanford offers the following characterization: "A contemporary virtue ethicist is an academic philosopher who subscribes to some of the principles shared by some virtue ethicists and who self-identifies with this movement" (89). Due to the wide extension of this description, he treats the multitude of thinkers self-identifying according to this characterization. In terms of Sanford's analysis of CVE, at no point does he reject the movement out of hand or fail to see the positive contributions many of its authors have made to contemporary discussion. Nonetheless, he makes a compelling case that it is a movement in disarray, in large part due to its rejection of key Aristotelian principles. Aristotle performs the central role in Sanford's case for three reasons: (1) the function G. E. M. Anscombe assigns to him in her analyses; (2) Aristotle serving as a common denominator in subsequent CVE literature; and (3) Sanford's contending that the framework of Aristotle's ethics is superior to the alternatives. Sanford's assessment of the CVE movement begins with Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy." In this article, Anscombe diagnoses the shortcomings of modern moral philosophy and suggests that it ought to be scrapped in favor of an ethics revolving around the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis and its place in the good life. Since subsequent virtue ethicists credit this article as the origin of CVE, Sanford thinks it legitimate to use Anscombe's principles as the standard of evaluation of the CVE movement. Against this measure, he thinks CVE ultimately fails to distinguish itself from the common framework of contemporary moral philosophy. The movement "has in many respects betrayed the recommendations of its mother" (183). Key to the fabric of what Anscombe thinks a suitable moral theory are both an affirmation of ethical absolutes and an adequate philosophical psychology. She points to Aristotle for addressing both considerations. Sanford posits three questions, the answers to which would constitute an adequate psychology: (1) What is human nature? (2) What is the purpose of human life? (3) And by what means can we judge progress made toward achieving the goal of human life? The raising of and providing answers to these questions constitutes the heart of the book. Attempting to employ the notion of virtue as the basis of an ethical theory without addressing these questions is likely either to fail or to be rife with confusion. As I read Sanford, CVE is plagued by attempt after attempt to treat virtue as [End Page 954] removed from the broader context in which it is intelligible. Before virtue, we must address foundational questions of moral philosophy and understand virtue as nested within this context. The book could stand on its own as a worthwhile critique of an important contemporary ethical movement; however, Sanford goes further by offering a second part, which I found to be the most compelling aspect of the work. He offers an overview of Aristotle and Aquinas that, while providing...