Philosophical Logic Research Articles

التداخل اللغوی فی المنطق عند فلاسفة الإسلام

(التداخل اللغوي في المنطق عند فلاسفة الإسلام) يتطرق هذا البحث إلى التداخل بين اللغة والمنطق في الفلسفة الإسلامية و بيان التوفيق بين حکمة اليونان وحکمة الإسلام في المنطق واللغة، فاستخدام قوانين اللسان مع الفلسفة له أثر في التوافق مع الفلسفة واللغة التي نزل بها القرآن الکريم، فضلا عن إبداع حکماء الإسلام في تأسيس منطق قائم على الحکمة ولغة العرب، وللفلاسفة اجتهاداتهم في توفيق اللغة مع المنطق، وهذا يدل على أن المسلمين لم يکونوا مقلدين للفلاسفة اليونانيين رغم وجود جذور لغوية في الفلسفة اليونانية، بل إنهم طوروا المنطق واستحدثوا ألفاظا تتوافق مع الازدهار الفلسفي والمنطقي عند فلاسفة الإسلام. ومنهجي في البحث وصفي وتحليلي، وقسمته إلى مبحثين وخاتمة: المبحث الأول: جاء باسم استهلال حول المنطق واللغة، وفيه: أولا: التعريف بالمنطق وأصوله ثانيا: علاقة المنطق باللغة واللغة بالمنطق ثالثا: مع فلاسفة اليونان.. أصول البحث اللغوي المبحث الثاني جاء باسم: مداخلات البحث اللغوي في منطق فلاسفة الإسلام. Abstract: In this research which is entitled Linguistic Interrelationship in Logic for Islamic philosophers، there searcher deals with linguistic interrelationship in inIslamic philosophy، attempting to show reconciliation between Greek and Islamic wisdom in language and logic. The use of rules of tongue in philosophy has animpact on reconciling philosophy to language that is used by Holy Qur'an. The other thing worth mentioning is creativity of Muslim wisemen in establishing that is based on wisdom and Arabs' language. Philosophers have their own ways in reconciling to language، matter which indicates that Muslims were by no means just imitators of Greek philosophers. Despite existence of language roots in Greek wisdom، Muslims developed and invented concepts and terms that got along with logical and philosophical prosperity for Muslim philosophers.The approach followed here in research is descriptive /analytical. The paper is divided into two sections and a conclusion. The first section that is entitled Introduction tophilosophy and logic consists of (first) a definition of and its origins; (second) relationship between and language and vice versa; and (third) origins of language research for Greek philosophers. The second section comes under thetitle: the interrelationships of linguistic research with of Islamic philosophy.

Bad Logic: Reasoning about Desire in the Victorian Novel, by Daniel Wright

Reviewed by: Bad Logic: Reasoning about Desire in the Victorian Novel by Daniel Wright Jesse Rosenthal (bio) Bad Logic: Reasoning about Desire in the Victorian Novel, by Daniel Wright; pp. ix + 219. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018, $54.95. It is hard enough to put erotic desire into words. Reasoning about it would seem nearly impossible. Yet in Bad Logic: Reasoning about Desire in the Victorian Novel, Daniel Wright shows that this is precisely what Victorian novelists, in their own odd ways, tried to do. Deploying a confident command of philosophical logic alongside an ear well attuned to moments of textual vulnerability, Wright offers a compelling account of the ways we twist the language of reason when "we're called up to make our erotic impulses intelligible to others or to ourselves" (12). Bad Logic argues that the sorts of logical mishaps that we tend to associate with banality or absurdity offered, for Victorian novelists, a "vocabulary of . . . erotic life" (184). Through examinations of contradiction (in Charlotte and Emily Brontë), tautology (in [End Page 482] Anthony Trollope and George Meredith), vagueness (in George Eliot), and generality (in Henry James), Wright locates the places where a lack of logical clarity becomes an enabling language for sharing and understanding the most personal and guarded of experiences. Patient and illuminating close readings are set against analyses of philosophical logic (the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, George Boole, John Stuart Mill, and G. W. F. Hegel, to name a few). The relations among philosophers, critics, and novelists are unusually giving: none offers a template into which the others must fit. Rather, the effect is accumulative. Over its chapters, Bad Logic builds a lexicon and teaches a sensitivity toward a literary language of desire. Bad Logic is not a book that will teach much about erotic experience, as such. And, other than its philosophical touchstones, it does not offer much in the way of historicization. It is instead a book about the ways in which Victorians tried to communicate and think through their experiences and identities. Bad Logic is, at its core, a book of deep generosity. Where I had often seen stammer and bluster, or overly pat aphorism, Wright hears searching, and scared, attempts to communicate. Beyond just offering readings, Bad Logic teaches how to listen. Though Wright speaks about logic in fairly general terms, there does seem to be one figure that is given priority: tautology. Wright in his introduction offers tautology as the seed of his thought on the subject. The book ends with tautology as well: "Whether one hears me or not, whether one acknowledges the self-evidence of my claim . . . I am what I am" (184). Both of these moments are emblematic of the book's refreshing critical honesty: the author always seems present, not directing but rather thinking with us. Just as importantly, though, they suggest that logic, as it develops in this argument, is intimately related with this sort of subjective tautology, the relation of "I" as subject and "I" as predicate. Wright suggests that his thinking on tautology "led . . . to its opposite: contradiction" (5). Though the chapter on contradiction comes before the chapter on tautology, it does seem to develop out of it. "I am not what I am" lies at the heart of his interest in contradiction, as exemplified by Catherine Earnshaw's famous exclamation, "Nelly, I am Heathcliff" (Brontë qtd. in Wright 33). This is all to say that contradiction and tautology come to seem two sides of the same coin: the relation between the self as subject of knowledge and the self as object of knowledge. The discussion of "vagueness" in Eliot touches on the fuzzy limits of definition and categories, but it is most concerned with "the difficult relationship between formal reflection and embodied immediacy" (120). It offers, in other words, another version of the difficulties of thinking with certainty about our own uncertain selves. One of the most unexpectedly rewarding features of Bad Logic is the mirror it holds up to the current post-critical turn in literary studies. Wright, though often writing with a disarmingly personal touch, is never overbearingly reflexive about the nature of literary criticism. Yet the axes that...

Sua queda é sua dignidade: Eric Weil e Agostinho sobre a “felix culpa”

O artigo propõe uma aproximação entre a concepção agostiniana do pecado original e a concepção weiliana da atitude da fé na categoria Deus da Lógica da filosofia. Na tradição latina, Agostinho, a quem se atribui equivocadamente a fórmula “felix culpa”, situa-se na origem de uma concepção do pecado original que será determinante na concepção de ser humano da antropologia e da moral cristãs. Na Lógica da filosofia de Eric Weil (1904-1977), na exposição da atitude da fé a que corresponde a categoria filosófica Deus, a expressão “sua queda é sua dignidade” parece fazer eco à fórmula supostamente agostiniana. A presente reflexão parte da tese de que a leitura weiliana de Santo Agostinho subjaz à formulação da categoria Deus da Lógica da filosofia, o que permitiu a Weil formular adequadamente a atitude do crente. O artigo sustenta que as linhas fundamentais da concepção de ser humano subjacente à atitude da fé na Lógica weiliana concordam com a concepção antropológica agostiniana decorrente da sua teologia do pecado das origens. Finalmente, o texto sugere que a concepção antropológica agostiniana está presente em filigrana na concepção weiliana do ser humano como finito e livre, claramente de inspiração kantiana.

지중해 연안 중세철학사에 대한 철학적 연구 고찰 -‘의도적 익명화’를 통한 ‘단수’의 중세철학에서 ‘복수’의 중세철학‘들’로 |

For a long time, medieval philosophy on the Mediterranean coast was remembered for its limited medieval philosophy in Western Europe. More strictly, in time, he has drawn a single medieval philosophy centered on the 13th century, spatially centered on the University of Paris in Western Europe, and in philosophy centered on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. So was the philosophy of Islam, Judaism, and Byzantine at that time on the outskirts of Western European philosophy? Many researchers describe these philosophy as being set for Western European philosophy, but in fact no philosopher is philosophical to be the background of another philosopher. Each philosophy works with its own philosophical center. For this purpose, this paper proposes a methodology to look at the philosophy of the philosophers in the Mediterranean region, not the philosophy but the logic of philosophy itself, by ‘the intentional anonymization’. Through this proposal, this paper will show that various medieval philosophy is possible, not a single medieval philosophy. Thomas Aquinas, a man’s philosophy, exists in plural forms without being single. Then, for a thousand years, philosophy from various parts of the Mediterranean can not be made one by one, which results in ignoring the individuality of each philosophy. This thesis is an effort to correct such problems.

When Do Introspection Axioms Matter for Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning?

The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about "introspection axioms" such as the 4 and 5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about what agent B believes about what agent A believes; but it is rarely important to reason just about what agent A believes about what agent A believes. This raises the question of the extent to which single-agent introspection axioms actually matter for multi-agent epistemic reasoning. In this paper, we formalize and answer this question. To formalize the question, we first define a set of multi-agent formulas that we call agent-alternating formulas, including formulas like Box_a Box_b Box_a p but not formulas like Box_a Box_a p. We then prove, for the case of belief, that if one starts with multi-agent K or KD, then adding both the 4 and 5 axioms (or adding the B axiom) does not allow the derivation of any new agent-alternating formulas -- in this sense, introspection axioms do not matter. By contrast, we show that such conservativity results fail for knowledge and multi-agent KT, though they hold with respect to a smaller class of agent-nonrepeating formulas.

Philosophy of Fuzzy Logic as Fundamental of Decision Making Based On Rule

The logic of talking about rules of thought so that these rules can draw correct conclusions, but in reality in everyday life many things are found that cannot be stated that something is absolutely true or absolutely false. This study aims to explain that the philosophy of fuzzy logic is the basis for decision making based on IF-THEN rules. Related to the role of philosophy of science as the basis for the development of fuzzy logic, it cannot be separated from ontology, epistemology and axiology. The findings of this study are Ontology covering decision making and rules for decision making. Decision making is an election based on certain criteria for two or more possible alternatives while decision making rules are fuzzy rules in the form of IF-THEN. While epistemology of fuzzy logic is related to how the process to get output, how are the stages to take decisions. The process of getting output consists of fuzzification and inference. The output obtained by the Z ∗ value of 38541.67 and the rule-based fuzzy logic axiology in giving restaurant waiter tips is useful to be able to determine the total cash of tips that will be given to the restaurant waiter. The total cash of appropriate tips given based on service and food to the restaurant waiter is Rp.38.541.

From Conceptual Content in Big Apes and AI, to the Classical Principle of Explosion: An Interview with Robert B. Brandom

In this Interview, Professor Robert B. Brandom answered ten detailed questions about his philosophy of Rational Pragmatism and Semantic Expressivism, grouped into four topics. 1. Metaphysics and Anthropology, 2. Pragmatics and Semantics, 3. Epistemic Expressivism and 4. Philosophy of Logic. With his careful answers Professor Brandom offers many additional insights into his rigorously constructed account of the relationship “between what we say and think, and what we are saying and thinking about” around the human practice of asking for and giving reasons. A final, additional question pointed at a principal motivation for putting together the present issue: how to reconcile Wittgenstein’s assertion that philosophy must not proffer any theories with the very explicit system of explanations Brandom has constructed. This same issue is addressed to some extent already in Professor Brandom’s new article contained in this issue, but his answer, asserting that he does not proffer a theory but only makes explicit what is already there, might be seen as an unambiguous statement of the continuous presence of a contested Wittgensteinian principle in Brandom’s work.

Philosophy of Law in the System of Philosophy and Jurisprudence

The article seeks to substantiate the philosophical and legal approach to the law. The article deals with the problems of jurisprudence from the standpoint of the philosophy of law. The author considers historical-methods aspects of development of philosophy of law as the most important moment of formation of the European liberalism conditioned by the genesis thereof.The aim of the article is to describe the inf luence of the philosophy of law on the formation and development of a legal worldview.In the present article author researches questions of philosophy of law impact on the law. Among the philosophical and jurisprudential schools and disciplines, which significantly affected the establishment and transformation of legal philosophy the decisive role belonged to the entire philosophical system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, including philosophy of law, history, religion, and logic. The question of what was the impact of philosophical system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel for the formation of teaching on law is considered in the article.That is why, “Philosophy of Law” by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is of high value in the history of political and legal though, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel should take a worthy place among the patriarchs of the philosophy of law.These problems identified the subject of the study conducted in the article. The identification of certain features of succession with regard to Hegelian philosophy allowed us to indicate ways of enriching jurisprudence with the philosophy of law.The methodological basis of the research is a set of methods of scientific knowledge, among which the main place is occupied by the methods of historicism, comparative-legal, as well as formal-legal and systemic approach.Its provisions can be used in further studies on issues of philosophy of law and jurisprudence.

Perspectives on the Logical Study of Language

Published originally as “Loogisen kielentutkimuksen nakoaloja”, Ajatus 19, (1956), pp. 81–96, the following piece by Jaakko Hintikka is the first essay he published in his mother tongue of Finnish. It is seen to provide both a state-of-the-art review of current topics emerging in the philosophy of language in the mid-1950, as well as outlines of Hintikka’s own evaluation of major theses of that era, in particular those of Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s concerning language use. Hintikka evaluates contributions that the logical study of language use can make to the solving of philosophical questions. Published in 1956 in Ajatus: The Yearbook of the Philosophical Society of Finland, Hintikka’s essay served to introduce these topical issues to the Finnish-speaking audience soon after the original works had appeared in print. It also puts the theses into the perspectives of Hintikka’s own fledgling logical philosophy. One can see the germs of game-theoretical semantics is his comments on Wittgenstein’s notion of a language-game, and his remarks on general habits of action anticipate the importance of strategic rules in Hintikka’s mature, inquiry-led and ‘action-first’ epistemology. This is manifest in Hintikka’s characteristic approach to the methodology of philosophy of science and mathematics as an attempt to understand the nature of scientific and mathematical practices and operations through the logical analysis of their central concepts. Topics indicated below thus became the hallmarks of Hintikka’s next sixty years of work, which saw the development of a range of logical methods by which language and its use can be studied, and in particular in such a way that progress can be made in solving problems of genuinely philosophical nature that one encounters across various fields of science. This piece was very briefly summarized in English in 1963 by Arto Salomaa (The Journal of Symbolic Logic 28(2), 1963, p. 165), and it is translated from the original Finnish by Jukka Nikulainen and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. [A.-V. P, J. N.]

How to Make Content out of Form: Towards a Hegelian-Saussurean Theory of Non-Linear Structures of Possibility

AbstractIn this article I argue that Hegel and Saussure both discovered a new mode of theorization that I propose to call ‘structural explication’. This is distinct from the generally dominant ‘linear’ mode of theorization—i.e., causal and quasi-causal explanations. I also argue that the standard criticisms usually directed against Hegel and Saussure stem from a failure to appreciate the nature of structural explication. For example, both Hegel and Saussure argue that—in some deep sense—form can generate content. But this must be comprehended in a strictly non-linear way. A linear interpretation of such arguments will lead to absurdities. I propose to call such deep generative structures (with a nod to Kant) the ‘necessary structures of possibility’. By comparing Hegel's thoughts on the science of a philosophical logic and Saussure's thoughts on the science of a general linguistics it is possible to discern a deep ‘scientific’ affinity. Furthermore, I argue that the structural level cannot be accounted for in any linear way. On the contrary, the linear explanation is fundamentally dependent on a structural explication of the genesis of the basic terms it assumes as ‘given’. A possible reason for the pervasiveness of the linear explanation (besides, perhaps, the success of causality-oriented natural sciences) is that discursive language is linear and our lived experience in time is linear. Thus, a structural explication will inherently appear less intuitive, and maybe also less ‘satisfying’, than a linear explanation. Finally, I also bring the distinction between the linear and the structural to bear on Robert Brandom's normative pragmatist reading of Hegel's ‘semantic holism’.

Modality and folk psychology

The connection of the modern psychology and formal systems remains an important direction of research. This paper is centered on philosophical problems surrounding relations between mental and logic. Main attention is given to philosophy of logic but certain ideas are introduced that can be incorporated into the practical philosophical logic.
 The definition and properties of basic modal logic and descending ones which are used in study of mental activity are in view. The defining role of philosophical interpretation of modality for the particular formal system used for research in the field of psychological states of agents is postulated. Different semantics of modal logic are studied. The hypothesis about the connection of research in cognitive psychology (semantics of brain activity) and formal systems connected to research of psychological states is stated.

Hintikka Memorial Issue: Introduction and Remarks on Jaakko Hintikka’s Logical Philosophy

Introduction to the Special Issue in Logica Universalis on Jaakko Hintikka’s Logical Philosophy, with biographical and bibliographical remarks.

On Hierarchical Propositions

There is an apparent dilemma for hierarchical accounts of propositions, raised by Bruno Whittle (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 215–231, 2017): either such accounts do not offer adequate treatment of connectives and quantifiers, or they eviscerate the logic. I discuss what a plausible hierarchical conception of propositions might amount to, and show that on that conception, Whittle’s dilemma is not compelling. Thus, there are good reasons why proponents of hierarchical accounts of propositions (such as Russell, Church, or Kaplan) did not see the difficulty Whittle raises.

Revolution is a Force of Guardian: Mikhail Lifshitz and Andrey Platonov

In the introduction of the article, there is an inspired by Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right proposition that the Russian revolution was in world history the second attempt after the French revolution to build the real and, consequently, reasonable state. At the same time, unlike French one, the Russian revolution relied not on subjective opinion of crowd but on objective scientific research – on political economy of Karl Marx. In the process of revolution the people of Russia, having taken the power in their own hands, started conscious transformation of a way of life and, in a short period of time, achieved such a level of education that any people in the world had not achieved before. That gave ground to Mikhail Lifshitz and Andrey Platonov to treat the revolutionary events that started in Russia with the revolution of 1917 as the great national revolution. The article demonstrates a fundamental difference between reactionary and revolutionary conservatism. Based on the works of Lifshitz and Platonov, it is proved that they were revolutionary conservatives. For this reason, they understood revolutionary denial of the old regime as a way of conservation of positive achievements of world and Russian culture. In the conclusion, the author reveals the reasons of curtailment of Russian national revolution in the 1990s. The author argues that the continuation of reunion of high and popular cultures in Russia is impossible without education system that needs to be created on the basis of logical philosophy as a result of the historical development of classical philosophical thought from Thales to Hegel.

Thomistic Logic in Renaissance Italy: Girolamo Savonarola, Paolo Barbò, Crisostomo Javelli

This paper is devoted to the formation of a ‘Thomist logic’ in Renaissance Italy. After having expounded the principles that should inspire any logic ad mentem Divi Thomae, the article focuses on three textbooks of ‘Thomist logic’: Girolamo Savonarola’s Compendium Logicae, Paolo Barbò’s Expositio in Artem veterem, and Crisostomo Javelli’s Compendium Logicae. I show that these textbooks display common features, such as the presentation of logic according to the order of the books traditionally included in the Organon.Savonarola maintained that propositions can only be in the present tense and cannot generate insolubilia. Barbò’s contributions to philosophy of logic are conspicuous and include an original discussion of the subiectum of logic and of the doctrine expounded in the Categories. Under the possible influence of Renaissance humanism, Javelli’s textbook includes a history of logic and historical and philological analyses.

Dimensions of Peircean diagrammaticality

Abstract Taking its point of departure in the origin of the notions of “diagram” and “iconicity” in Peirce’s philosophy of logic, this paper reviews and discusses a series of dimensions along which such diagrams may be compared, measured and subdivided: diagrams versus images and metaphors, operational versus optimal iconicity in diagrams, diagram tokens versus diagram types, diagrams as general signs; corollarial versus theorematic diagram reasoning; pure versus applied diagrams; logic diagrams versus diagrams facilitating logical inferences; continuous versus discontinuous diagrams; diagrams in non-deductive reasoning. Most of these developments occur in the mature Peirce after the turn of the century and thus form an important part of his mature semiotics – yet, they do not relate in any simple or straight-forward manner to his attempts at enlarging his combinatorial semiotics from its bases in the three-trichotomy theory of the 1903 Syllabus over the six-trichotomy theory of 1904–1906 to the sketchlike ten-trichotomy version of 1908, where diagrams rarely figure in the names of sign-types discussed – why?

Foundational Holism, Substantive Theory of Truth, and A New Philosophy of Logic: Interview with Gila Sher BY Chen Bo

The Philosophical ForumVolume 50, Issue 1 p. 3-57 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Foundational Holism, Substantive Theory of Truth, and A New Philosophy of Logic: Interview with Gila Sher BY Chen Bo† Gila Sher, Gila Sher University of CaliforniaSearch for more papers by this authorChen Bo, Chen Bo Peking UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Gila Sher, Gila Sher University of CaliforniaSearch for more papers by this authorChen Bo, Chen Bo Peking UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 08 March 2019 https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12208 †This article is supported by the major research project “Studies on the Significant Frontier Issues of Contemporary Philosophy of Logic” (No. 17ZDA024) funded by the National Foundation of Social Science, China. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume50, Issue1Spring 2019Pages 3-57 RelatedInformation

N-valued maximal paraconsistent matrices

ABSTRACTThe articles Maximality and Refutability Skura [(2004). Maximality and refutability. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 45, 65–72] and Three-valued Maximal Paraconsistent Logics Skura and Tuziak [(2005). Three-valued maximal paraconsistent logics. In Logika (Vol. 23). Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego] introduced a simple method of proving maximality (in the two distinguished senses) of a given paraconsistent matrix. This method stemmed from the so-called refutation calculus, where the focus in on rejecting rather than accepting formulas. The article A Generalisation of a Refutation-related Method in Paraconsistent Logics Trybus [(2018). A generalisation of a refutation-related method in paraconsistent logics. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 27(2). doi:10.12775/LLP.2018.002] was a first step towards generalising the method. In it, a number of 3-valued paraconsistent matrices were shown maximal. In this article we extend these results to cover a number of n-valued (n>2) paraconsistent matrices using the same method.

ОБУЧЕНИЕ ГРАФАМИ — ДИАГРАММЫ Ч. С. ПИРСА И ПРЕПОДАВАНИЕ ЛОГИКИ

The paper explains how Peirce’s Existential Graphs theory can be fruitfully used in logic classes. This theory is the last logical project of the American philosopher that allows to observe logical relations. In other words, it provides a new perspective of logical analysis. First, I offer a brief introduction of the theory, which is more philosophical than technical. After that, I cite some opinions of scholars who have applied these ideas in their classes (logic for philosophy or computer science departments). The paper demonstrates both the proper logical and philosophical advantages of the theory. However, the philosophical part concerns the questions of philosophy of logic. Finally, I mention some obviously perplexing features of the approach which point to the limits of its applicability.

Simplified Tableaux for STIT Imagination Logic

We show how to correct the analytic tableaux system from the paper Olkhovikov and Wansing (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 47(2), 259–279, 2018).