Philosophical Disputes Research Articles

Statistical estimation

The rules of deductive logic are inculcated throughout our intellectual education. They are universally accepted. They provide firm standards of judgement for many aspects of academic study, research, and of our daily work. It is from some points of view perhaps a matter of regret—and from others of challenge–that their scope is not all-embracing, and that a wide range of problems, both of practical affairs and of intellectual inquiry, is beyond their jurisdiction. These problems, of which the subject-matter of this essay is one, involve the process known as induction, or inductive logic. Rules, standards of judgement, do exist in this field, but few have won universal acceptance and many are the subject of vigorous philosophical dispute.

On Universals

The philosophical dispute over whether there are universale, or abstract entities, is not a dispute over the admissibility of general terms. Both sides will agree that general terms, e.g. ‘man,’ and perhaps even abstract singular terms such as ‘mankind’ and ‘7’, are meaningful, in the sense at least of participating in statements which as wholes are true or false. Where the platonists (as I shall call those who accept universale) differ from their opponents, the nominalists, is in positing a realm of entities, universals, corresponding to such general or abstract words.The platonist is likely to regard the word ‘man’ as naming a universal, the class of men or the property of being a man, much as the word ‘Caesar’ names the concrete object Caesar. Actually, however, this is an extraneous detail. The platonist could equally well concur with the nominalist in the view that general terms, though meaningful in context, are not names at all.

Language, Truth and Logic.

Classic introduction to objectives and methods of schools of empiricism and linguistic analysis, especially of the logical positivism derived from the Vienna Circle, [i]Language, Truth, and Logic[/i] is a work of philosophy by Alfred Jules Ayer, published in 1936 when Ayer was only 26 (though it was in fact completed by age 24). It was crucial in bringing some of the ideas of the Vienna Circle and the logical empiricists to the attention of the English-speaking world. – This book defines, explains, and argues for the verification principle of logical positivism, sometimes referred to as the "criterion of significance" or "criterion of meaning". It explains how the principle of verifiability may be applied to the problems of philosophy. – Eight chapters: – I. The Elimination of Metaphysics; – II. The Function of Philosophy; – III. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis; – IV. The [i]A Priori[/i]; – V. Truth and Probability; – VI. Critique of Ethics and Theology; – VII. The Self and the Common World; – VIII. Solutions of Outstanding Philosophical Disputes.� M.-M. V.

Pluralism: A Point of View

It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that the terms monism and pluralism have been injected into the discussion of political theory and doubly unfortunate that they have been put forward as rival theories between which we are expected to choose. Both words are in fact very general, both are capable of many meanings and both have about them the connotations of centuries of philosophical dispute. And yet the one clear lesson from these disputes is that both monism and pluralism are inescapable aspects of our world and as such can neither of them be neglected. An effort to set the two in opposition, to picture them as incompatible, and to force a choice between them is surely wasted. The truth is that monism and pluralism are not theories but points of view or modes of attack, and any reasonable political theory will have to take account of both and both will have to be interpreted in such a way that they can be joined in one theory. It is not the purpose of this paper to undertake so large a task as this final reconciliation; but merely to state as exactly as may be what is connoted by such phrases as “a monistic theory of the state” and “a pluralistic theory of the state,” in order that the different points of view may be made as clear as possible and may be compared.By political monism I understand a theory which holds that the state is ultimately a single indivisible authority, not subject to any other authority and therefore able itself to fix the limits and the content of the obligations to which it gives rise.