Critical Philosophy Research Articles

The Moral Difference between Faces & FaceTime.

Although the technology for telemedicine existed before the Covid-19 pandemic, the need to provide medical services while minimizing the risk of contagion has encouraged its more widespread use. I argue that, although telemedicine can be useful in certain situations, physicians should not consider it an adequate substitute for the office visit. I first provide a narrative account of the experience of telemedicine. I then draw on philosophical critiques of technology to examine how telemedicine has epistemic and ethical effects that make some of the goods of medicine unavailable. Telemedicine rules out an embodied encounter between physician and patient, in which the sense of touch has special importance. The individualized attention facilitated by the in-person visit may better sustain a caring physician-patient relationship. Physicians should criticize attempts by administrators, insurers, or other parties to incentivize the wholesale replacement of traditional office visits with telemedicine.

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in Our Times: How al-Ghazali is Interpreted and Transmitted in the Contemporary Turkish Context

Whether Abu Hamid al-Ghazali contributed to the decline of rationalist and scientific tradition in the Muslim world is a grand debate in Islamic studies. However, the literature on this question ventures only to construct a historical debate. Though al-Ghazali died in 1111, his opinions still influence Muslims today. So this research, rather than contribute to that historical debate, studies how al-Ghazali is interpreted in contemporary Turkey, and what this inter­pretation reveals about approaches to natural law, knowledge and philosophy (essentially, the study of conceptual lucidity and the valid procedures of reaso­ning). These three disciplines are chosen because al-Ghazali is accused of contributing to the decline of the scientific tradition in the Islamic world beca­use of his criticism of philosophy, his occasionalist view of causality, and his incorporation of inner knowledge into Sunnism. The research aims to answer ques­tions like: ‘Are al-Ghazali’s works referenced today to justify a hostile stance on philosophy?’ To achieve this goal, the research studies how al-Ghazali is interpreted by two Islamic social movements in Turkey: Işıkçılar and Erenköy. Studying these cases, the paper concludes that how al-Ghazali is interpreted and transmitted in Turkey contributes to (i) a highly sceptical stance on natural law, (ii) a deep suspicion of rational knowledge and the consequent belief in inner knowledge, and (iii) a highly critical stance on philosophy.

A Researcher With Conclusions in Search of Questions: On Wandering Toward Ignorance

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provoke new understandings of the roles and uses of research. Specifically, I argue for the productive and creative potential of ignorance in educational research. Design/Approach/Methods This conceptual paper undertakes a playful experiment, beginning with conclusions and working backward to create a paper within a paper based on these conclusions. The paper then offers philosophical critiques on the generation and use of research. Findings It is a thinkable discourse that educational research begins with conclusions and works backward to justify those prefigured conclusions. It would make sense, therefore, to suggest a re-centering of inquiry. Yet, this approach to research remains grounded in stable understandings of knowledge. Rather than the transcendent approach to research, which moves from ignorance toward knowledge, this paper finds that ignorance resides in a plane of immanence, situated within and pursuing new questions. It calls for ignorance not as a means of research but as an ends. Originality/Value The paper contributes new understandings of how research can be conducted and used, welcoming new playful understandings of research, attending to shifting roles, and blurring the lines drawn between the researcher and research subjects or academic research and creative projects.

“Strong Anthropic Principle”(SAP) Examined in The View of Kant’s Critical Philosophy

“Strong Anthropic Principle”(SAP) Examined in The View of Kant’s Critical Philosophy

Philosophical Criticism Applied to Kassandra’s Brand Novel by Ch. Aitmatov

Philosophical Criticism Applied to Kassandra’s Brand Novel by Ch. Aitmatov

Bewußtseinslust. Das freie Spiel der Vermögen in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als transzendentales Verhältnis

Kant´s critical philosophy as a whole operates on the condition of possibility that the faculties of pure reason can be isolated analytically in order to evaluate them, while at the same time they work together in various effective forms of inter-play. As one of these forms, Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgment introduces the "free play of imagination and understanding", which plays an important role in setting together the four moments of the aesthetic judgement. Within the last two decades or so it has been discussed widely how this cooperation between these two faculties works, but it barely has been reflected on the question how to address the "free play" properly in terms of a methodological classification. This paper follows the various contexts in which the "free play" is referred to, focusses primarily on the dysfunctional cases in which the cooperation between the two faculties fails or comes to a halt and thus evaluates the basic structure of the "free play" under the perspective of theoretical technique on the horizon of transcendental philosophy. The aim is to eventually propose a more precise title of the free play or alternatively give a reason why such a labelling could not be possible after all.

O filosofo crítico é um gênio

This article intends to show first that the systematic demands placed in the Preface to Criticism of the faculty of judging impose a restriction on the concept of genius to artistic activity; second, it provides an interpretation of the complementarity of the receptive moment and the creative moment in the case of the work of art. In the concluding part, it brings together some characteristics of genius to the critical philosopher on the basis of some significant analogies: the legislative activity of genius and that of reason, the analogy with the function of making a technical activity compatible with an organic vision and the necessary complementarity between receptive and creative / communicative moments in art and philosophy.

Youth Deradicalization Through Educational Institutions: Philosophical Perspective

This article aims to discuss the deradicalization of youths and the important position of educational institutions. The perspective used in this paper is the philosophy of ideological criticism of Jurgen Hubermas. This analysis is used to examine more deeply the ideology and character of the radicalism movement and deradicalization programs carried out by various elements of the nation. By critiquing ideology, we can understand the background of the emergence of radicalism. We can also analyze all forms of expression of resistance to the ideology of radicalism through deradicalization programs, especially through youths. Youths are important to be involved because they are a group that is very vulnerable to exposure to the ideology of radicalism. This paper concludes that to carry out deradicalization, the most important thing is to understand the character and ideology of radicalism movements. This strategy is important because in reality incidents of radicalism continue to occur. Even though the security forces have arrested and detained, even shot dead, the perpetrators of radicalism. This reality shows that radicalism has become a growing ideology among its followers, especially youths. By understanding the character and ideology of the radicalism movement, deradicalization programs among youths through educational institutions will be more effective. Deradicalization programs must also be carried out in a dialogical and humane manner. It is in this context that cultural dialogue involving youths across ethnicities and religions must be carried out in a sustainable manner.

White Settler-colonialism and Epistemic Violence in “Post-apartheid South Africa”: An Azanian Philosophical Analysis

This article is a critical attempt to problematise the notions of European Modernity and Rationality. It is fundamentally an Afrikan philosophical critique of epistemic violence that comes with European Modernity and Rationality. It argues that European Modernity triumphed in “South Africa” following unjust conquest of the Indigenous people since 1652, which was characterised by loss of sovereignty and epistemicide. This resulted in the violent imposition of the law and jurisprudence of White settlers, which are antithetical to Afrikan law and jurisprudence. This epistemicidal nature of White settler colonialism manifests itself through the legal technicalisation of issues of historical injustice.

Decolonising Sinology: on Sinology’s weaponisation of the discourse of race

ABSTRACT The previous generation of Sinologists were of the overwhelming consensus that race consciousness did not exist in pre-modern China. However, in recent decades there has been a revision of this consensus. This paper frames this shift in terms of Sinology’s complicity with white supremacy, imperialism and the military-industrial-academic complex. Contemporary Sinology sets itself up as exposing a colonial mentality in pre-modern China. The irony is that it is contemporary Sinology which is complicit with white supremacy and itself is in need of decolonisation. This paper will analyse the most prominent example of this sea-shift in the Sinological consensus on race in China: Frank Dikötter’s The Discourse of Race in Modern China. That such scholarship, deficient in the most basic scholarly standards, was overwhelmingly feted upon its publication, continues to be cited as an authority and to receive inordinate recognition reveals Western academia’s problematic attitudes towards China and the issue of racism. This paper will show how all of the above phenomena can be understood in terms of the “epistemology of ignorance.” By misappropriating the discourse of the critical philosophy of race, Sinology’s epistemology of ignorance universalises Western racism. Sinology has weaponised the discourse of race.

Including the Caribbean. A commentary on David Chandler and Jonathan Pugh's ‘Abyssal geography’.

Including the Caribbean. A commentary on David Chandler and Jonathan Pugh's ‘Abyssal geography’.

Ежен Дюпреель і Хаїм Перельман: нормативно-критичні засади «риторичного повороту» в сучасній філософії. Частина ІІ

The purpose of the article is, firstly, to explicate and give a critical assessment of the methodological, epistemological, and philosophical foundations that led to the “rhetorical turn” in modern philosophy, and, secondly, to answer the question of how justified the grounds for such a “rhetorical turn” are. The answer proposed is based on a reconstruction of Eugene Dupréel’s critical arguments that were directed against the “classical philosophy” and their reception in Chaim Perelman’s works during his “turning point” period (1947 – 1949). The article proves that these two scholars’ critique of classical philosophy proceeds from a realistic position, therefore it does not apply to the epistemological principles of idealistic philosophy. Their criticism of the classical theory of progress and the ideal of universally valid knowledge is “axiological” in nature and boils down to a reassessment of all traditional values. As a result of this reassessment, the methodological principles of sophistry (subjectivism, pragmatism, pluralism, relativism, conventionalism, etc.) are actually rehabilitated. The criticism of philosophy that appeals to spoken language and everyday knowledge, is not justified, since it is based on a misunderstanding of the conceptual and constructive nature of the philosophical language. Although the rhetorical analysis of philosophical texts should be recognized as fruitful and useful, rhetoric cannot be an instrument of philosophizing, since the interpretation of values depends on their understanding, which is given by “classical philosophy”.

Nietzsche's Ecce Homo and the Revaluation of All Values: Dionysian Versus Christian Values by Thomas H. Brobjer

Reviewed by: Nietzsche's Ecce Homo and the Revaluation of All Values: Dionysian Versus Christian Values by Thomas H. Brobjer Charles P. Rodger Thomas H. Brobjer. Nietzsche's Ecce Homo and the Revaluation of All Values: Dionysian Versus Christian Values. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. Pp. viii + 210. Hardback, $115.00. It is difficult to review a book so rich in consequences and seemingly sui generis. To categorize it as the work of a "lumper" or "splitter," for example, would only confuse matters. Granted, Brobjer dismisses The Will to Power as the tendentious forgery of Nietzsche's sister. Methodologically, he also appears as a "moderate" splitter who provides a close textual reading and draws on the Nachlass only so far as this serves to elucidate the claims Nietzsche made in his published works. Nonetheless, Brobjer's central hypothesis might, albeit falsely, suggest that he is an old-fashioned lumper, for he holds that Mazzino Montinari was wrong to claim Nietzsche abandoned his plans for a Hauptwerk ("Nietzsches Nachlaß von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in Nietzsche Lesen [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982], 92–119). Granted, Montinari admitted that after abandoning plans for The Will to Power, Nietzsche did, in the fall of 1888, entertain a new plan for a four-volume Hauptwerk titled The Revaluation of All Values. According to these plans, The Antichrist would be its first volume, followed by The Free Spirit, containing a critique of philosophy as a nihilistic movement; The Immoralist, containing a critique of morality and its dangers; and Dionysos Philosophos. Nonetheless, Montinari claimed, these plans also collapsed when, sometime after mid-November 1888, Nietzsche decided to make The Antichrist into the whole of The Revaluation of All Values. Indeed, Montinari's hypothesis was that Nietzsche finally realized, at the last minute, that the work of the past five years and what he had previously regarded as his life task was untenable and, having published everything he could salvage from his failed Hauptwerk project, "Nietzsche's collapse in Turin came when he had literally finished with everything" (12, emphasis in the original). To Brobjer, however, "this claim seems both psychologically improbable and, in regard to Nietzsche's intention to write a Hauptwerk, simply wrong" (12). Yet despite Brobjer having demonstrated in a number of articles published over the past decades that the evidence is not only too thin and ambiguous to sustain Montinari's hypothesis, but that it contradicts his timeline (92–94), scholars continue to treat Montinari's conclusions as established fact, and moreover treat all "discussions and considerations of a magnum opus … as hypothetical and old-fashioned" (12). But if so, why should the present study, wherein Brobjer advances this same thesis, not also fall on deaf ears? The answer is surprising: Ecce Homo. The Druckmanuskript shows that both the final chapter headings and the majority of the final text of Ecce Homo were established prior to mid-November, and, while Nietzsche continued to make additions and alterations to Ecce Homo up until a day before his collapse, his revisions to the completed portions of the text were only "minor" (21). Since, even according to Montinari's timeline, the vast majority of Ecce Homo was thus written at a time when Nietzsche still incontrovertibly intended that The Antichrist would constitute only the first volume of The Revaluation of All Values (47), nothing can possibly speak against examining whether Ecce Homo might retain at least traces of Nietzsche's original plans for his Hauptwerk. To the contrary, a great deal speaks for it. After all, the conventional interpretation of Ecce Homo as a "backward-looking autobiography" (5) has hardly borne fruit; read as a summary of Nietzsche's life and writings, Ecce Homo is so "elliptic, paradoxical, absurd" (48), and so contorted by excessive self-praise and praise for Thus Spoke Zarathustra, that the text is incoherent and unusable for its supposed purpose. Yet Nietzsche explicitly told his publisher that his intention was merely to tell of his life and works "in snatches" (3), and that Ecce Homo was being composed with the "intention to give this work the same form and appearance which that magnum opus [Hauptwerk] will have, to...

Philosophical Pragmatism and the Challenges of Information Technologies

Philosophical Pragmatism and the Challenges of Information Technologies

A transactional model of moral learning – how to challenge unsustainable denials

This article draws on a philosophical critique of the problems of denial in the face of the climate crisis and the call for an education that deals with the root causes of social and environmental injustice in depth. To respond to this radical critique in concrete educational practice, there is a need for an understanding of moral learning that also considers the problems of denial and the role of the teacher in these learning processes. We therefore propose a transactional model grounded in Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy that explains how denial hinders the process of moral learning but also describes how teachers can offer moments of resistance that interrupt denial and challenges and transform moral habits. Finally, we discuss the implications of a transactional perspective and the need for making moral progress by reflectively revising our moral habits in the face of overlapping environmental and social injustice crises.

On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative

Abstract In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve; and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce developed his epistemological realism in response to the difficulties of Kant’s transcendental epistemology, especially that of his three Critiques. It seems that in his late research Kant tries to follow Spinoza in the distinction between the causality in nature and the human inner causality as one’s Moral freedom and yet for Kant they operate in different domains to keep human freedom absolute, while the Spinozist conception of human freedom is in Nature and relative to human knowledge of reality and one’s relative power in Nature. Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is a continuation of his Transcendental critical philosophy, but also his intended empirical epistemology by which to develop a practical deviation from his Copernican Revolution in the direction of the Peircean contra-revolution in Pragmaticist epistemology.

The Dissatisfied Skeptic in Kant’s Discipline of Pure Reason

Abstract Why does Kant say that a “skeptical satisfaction of pure reason” is “impossible” (A758/B786)? I answer this question by giving a reading of “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of Its Polemic Employment.” I explain that Kant must address skepticism in this context because his warning against developing counterarguments to dogmatic attacks encourages a comparison between the critical and the skeptical methods. I then argue that skepticism fails to “satisfy” [befriedigen] reason insofar as it cannot “pacify” reason’s tendency to go beyond its own boundaries. The skeptical method reveals the past failures of dogmatic metaphysics but cannot rule out future successes. Only critical knowledge of reason’s proper bounds can do this, thereby pacifying our restless reason. I close by arguing that Kant’s discussion implies that a skeptic must feel dissatisfied with her renunciation of metaphysics, and that this dissatisfaction can lead her to take interest in Kant’s critical philosophy.

On Law, Ideology, and Violence: A Reply to Maciej Pichlak

The present paper is a reaction to Maciej Pichlak’s article "Law in the Snares of the Political: Addressing Rafał Mańko’s Critical Philosophy of Adjudication" which was published in this journal (“The Critique of Law” 2020, 12(3), pp. 109–125). The present response addresses selected issues raised in Pichlak’s critique, focusing on three aspects: law and the political, the importance of justice in the critical project, and finally the question of adjudication and ideology. On a more general note, the polemic reveals the importance of philosophical, political and ideological commitments and presuppositions of legal theorists and poses the question of the limits of the autonomy of jurisprudential debates vis-à-vis such commitments.

A Jihadi Critique of the Modern State: Abū Qatāda in Conversation with Decolonial and (neo-)Marxist Thought

This paper analyzes the reception of decolonial and neo-Marxist thought in a jihadist critique of the modern state. The author argues that a study of Abū Qatāda al-Filisṭīnī, a prominent theorist of modern Jihadism and Salafism, reveals his nuanced interaction with theories of hegemony, ideology, and decolonization. An examination of Abū Qatāda’s critique of modern state institutions and ideology shows that he engages with philosophical critiques of sovereignty, hegemony, capitalism, and the nation-state and utilizes both neo-Marxist and decolonial thought. This paper explores how Abū Qatāda theorizes the modern state as a colonial project, leading him to rationalize jihad, or violent resistance, as the only solution to realize paradigmatic change. It further shows how Abū Qatāda justifies opposition to the modern state and hegemony with seamless deployment of scripture and Islamic jurisprudence and insists that his political project builds on premodern Islamic theories of knowledge and government necessary for decolonization, albeit often without offering details. This study reveals a feature of jihadist thought that has remained largely unnoticed in the literature and is the first to explore the interactions between Salafism and critiques of the modern state.

Cтратегия познания Гу Янь-у

This article is devoted to the views on the goals and objectives of cognition of Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), the founder of the critical philosophy in China. These views, originally associated with the military-political projects of the Chi­nese elite of the Ming era and reflecting the strategy of the struggle for national sovereignty during the Manchu conquest of China, had a serious impact not only on the Confucian tradition of the following centuries, but also on modern Chi­nese studies. The concepts by Gu Yanwu were formed in the conditions of the emergence of new ideas about the world associated with the penetration of European knowledge and inventions into China. Because of his research con­cerning cognitive processes in the era of the collapse of the former Chinese and the emergence of the new Manchu official ideology, Gu Yanwu was able to ra­tionally explain the evolution of the Confucian tradition. His rejection of neo-Confucianism and the search for other orientations of intellectual activity were derived from the desire to preserve the Confucian heritage after the death of the Ming Dynasty. The former neo-Confucian attitude to the synthesis and con­sistency of knowledge, which has a practical application in eliminating differ­ences in descriptions of phenomena and events, has been replaced by an attitude to the analysis of knowledge and verification of the reliability of its source, also implying the verification of knowledge by practice. Gu Yanwu was the first to include field studies of geographical objects in essays on the standard Confucian issues of political culture and public administration. The idea of Yijing studies as the frameworks of Confucian tradition is fundamental to Gu Yanwu’s critical theory of cognition.