Philosophical Debate Research Articles

Breaking through the doors of perception, consciousness, and existence: to what extent does psychedelic phenomenology ontologically depend on external factors?

AbstractAs reliable facilitators of characteristically unique altered states of consciousness that are notoriously difficult to comprehend, psychedelics naturally attract a multidisciplinary scope for their research, with direct relevance to neuroscience, pharmacology, psychology, as well as philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and epistemology — disciplines united by the common inquiry into the nature of conscious experience. Accordingly, the central focus of this paper concerns the metaphysical debate between internalism and externalism about whether psychedelic phenomenology — in particular, its ‘breakthrough’ level — could be said to directly ontologically depend on external factors, as well as the interpretive implications arising from each of those positions. The main contributions of the author of this paper include the provision of a coherent account of the essential phenomenal characteristics of psychedelic experiences, the integration of relatively fragmented philosophical debates on psychedelic phenomenology into the traditional internalist-externalist framework in metaphysics, as well as the exploration of the extent to which the externalist position on psychedelic phenomenology — traditionally associated with non-naturalism — is compatible with naturalistic explanatory frameworks. In Part 1, psychedelic phenomenology will be outlined first, after which the central inquiries of this paper will be contextualised and qualified. In Part 2, the internalist position on psychedelic phenomenology — both its strong and weak versions — will be discussed. In Part 3, the externalist position will be explored, which will be followed by a final evalutation between the three positions presented in this paper. The paper will conclude in favour of the weak internalist position, and that whilst the externalist position remains significantly more speculative than both the strong and the weak internalist positions, the externalist position cannot be rejected altogether until further progress in consciousness research is made.

New Mechanistic Explanation: Can It Be Interesting for a Theologian

ABSTRACT “Mechanism” is one of the crucial concepts that have deeply influenced the evolution of scientific disciplines and philosophical systems. For the last few decades, this concept has again found itself at the center of the philosophical debate about science and scientific methods with the emergence of the new mechanical philosophy (NMP). The aim of this paper is to counter the argument that there is or should be an essential conflict between the modern mechanical philosophy (MMP) or the NMP and Christian theology.

Epistemic Authorities and Skilled Agents: A Pluralist Account of Moral Expertise

This paper explores the concept of moral expertise in the contemporary philosophical debate, with a focus on three accounts discussed across moral epistemology, bioethics, and virtue ethics: an epistemic authority account, a skilled agent account, and a hybrid model sharing key features of the two. It is argued that there are no convincing reasons to defend a monistic approach that reduces moral expertise to only one of these models. A pluralist view is outlined in the attempt to reorient the discussion about moral expertise.

Suicide across time and cultures: from a philosophical debate to network analysis

Introduction Suicide is a multifaceted subject that encompasses a broad spectrum of perspectives, spanning philosophy, the arts, social sciences, neuroscience, neuropsychiatry, and public health. The history of suicide is intricately intertwined with the history of humanity itself, and examining the shifting attitudes towards suicide holds significant implications for the field of suicide prevention.ObjectivesThe objective of this paper is to offer a timeline of the social perspectives about suicidal behavior throughout history in order to showcase the influence of cultural and contextual factors.MethodsThis poster is based on the Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) “Focus on Suicidal Behaviour” provided by the European Psychiatric Association. We performed a brief overview of the chapter on history of suicide and updated data on this topic with recent literature findings.ResultsIn antiquity, suicide was sometimes regarded as justifiable, whether to preserve honor or protest injustices. However, during the Middle Ages, suicide was primarily seen as a criminal act, violating the rules of the Christian religion. The Renaissance brought about a shift in the perception of suicide, as it began to be depicted in art as a heroic or philosophical act. Moving into the Romantic period, suicide took on a tragic and noble connotation, often seen as an escape from unbearable suffering.The 19th century marked a significant turning point when the social context started being recognized as a crucial factor in the development of suicidal behavior. In the 20th century, suicide was increasingly considered a public health problem. In the 21st century, the discourse on suicide has become multifaceted. On one hand, network analysis has enabled the development of an integrated model of suicide, emphasizing the complex interactions among various risk and protective factors. On the other hand, ethical and moral debates persist regarding assisted suicide and its indications.This summary primarily centers on the historical context of suicide within Europe. However, attitudes toward suicide vary significantly across cultures. For instance, in China, suicide rates are higher for women than for men, while Japan has historically displayed a relatively tolerant attitude toward suicide, particularly within the military. In contrast, Islamic countries consider suicide a major sin and implicitly associate it with stigma.Conclusions The understanding of suicide evolves over time and is deeply influenced by cultural contexts. Familiarizing ourselves with the historical perspectives on suicide is essential for comprehending this complex social and personal phenomenon. Such knowledge forms the foundation for the creation of effective prevention strategies.Disclosure of InterestNone Declared

Experiment-driven rationalism

Philosophers debate about which logical system, if any, is the One True Logic. This involves a disagreement concerning the sufficient conditions that may single out the correct logic among various candidates. This paper discusses whether there are necessary conditions for the correct logic; that is, I discuss whether there are features such that if a logic is correct, then it has those features, although having them might not be sufficient to single out the correct logic. Traditional rationalist arguments suggest that the necessary conditions of thought are necessary and sufficient conditions singling out the correct logical and mathematical theories. In the contemporary debate, Chalmers advocates a view along this line. Jago, analogously, suggests that the necessary conditions for thought—or, as he calls them, our basic epistemic expectations—single out a family of logical and mathematical theories. Warren and Williamson, on the other hand, argue that there are no necessary conditions of thought. I argue that there are necessary conditions for thought, and these are necessary but not sufficient conditions to be the correct logic; indeed, these are features that all logics—correct or incorrect—share. No view we can understand is ruled out by the necessary conditions for thought, but we cannot understand quite any view. Human linguistic and conceptual abilities are genetically constrained, and these constraints are our best guide to the boundaries of logic. Arguing for this, I tackle two dogmas of modern rationalism: namely, the view that the biological constraints of human cognition have no bearing on the boundaries of the epistemic space, and the view that the boundaries of thought coincide with the boundaries of language.

Too Much Self-Control?

AbstractAlthough it seems commonsensical to say that one cannot merely have too little, but also too much self-control, the philosophical debate has largely focused on failures of self-control rather than its potential excesses. There are a few notable exceptions. But, by and large, the issue of having too much self-control has not received a lot of attention. This paper takes another careful look at the commonsensical position that it is possible to have too much self-control. One key insight that will emerge is that there are certain important confusions surrounding this view. Once these are removed, however, we are led to the conclusion that there need not be anything intrinsically problematic about being a paragon of self-control.

The Origins of the Christian Idea of Trinity: Answering Jewish Charges of Heresy; Exhorting Pagans against Polytheism; Countering False Gnostics

In this essay I explain that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity was first developed as a response to Jewish claims of Christian apostasy and polytheism. At the beginning of Christianity, most of its converts were observant Jews. The Jewish authorities took steps to reclaim their lost sheep and to stem the flow of departures. Their primary intellectual ammunition in that effort was the claim that the Christians were polytheists, because they claimed to believe in two Gods–the Father and His Son, Jesus Christ. The Christians’ apostasy was manifest by simple referring to the Mosaic commandment that righteous Israel should have only one God. This Jewish accusation of polytheism also neatly answered the inflammatory Christian charge that the Jews had crucified God and raised significant doubt about their claims of a special resurrection. The doctrine of the Trinity answered all those criticisms. God and Jesus Christ together were the one true God. But the nature of that oneness took some time to work out, and it is within a process of contending with pagan philosophical arguments and intra-Christian heretical positions, that a Christian doctrine of the Trinity begins to congeal. The work of Ante-Nicene Fathers—Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Novatian, and others—whose voices we allow to be heard below—contain a trajectory of ideas that explain how the tri-unity is expressed in the momentous Creeds of Nicaea (AD 325) and Constantinople (381).

Philosophy Moves

ABSTRACT In this paper, I introduce the notion of ‘philosophy moves’: prominent tropes featured in contemporary academic philosophy. Moves are more than patterns—they are tools for advancing and enriching philosophical debates. By recognizing these patterns in the philosophical literature, we collect an ensemble of moves for deployment in novel contexts, each with the potential to forge new paths of philosophical investigation through a given topic. The moves featured in this paper are constructive and progressive, with the potential to push past stalemates and open a wider conceptual landscape. Following a presentation of five exemplars taken from the philosophy of biology literature, I show how different moves could be made within a current interdisciplinary debate. Overall, I aim to demonstrate that recognizing these patterns is insightful pedagogically and potentially useful when used as part of one’s philosophical methodology.

It's time we put agency into Behavioural Public Policy

Abstract Promoting agency – people's ability to form intentions and to act on them freely – must become a primary objective for Behavioural Public Policy (BPP). Contemporary BPPs do not directly pursue this objective, which is problematic for many reasons. From an ethical perspective, goals like personal autonomy and individual freedom cannot be realised without nurturing citizens’ agency. From an efficacy standpoint, BPPs that override agency – for example, by activating automatic psychological processes – leave citizens ‘in the dark’, incapable of internalising and owning the process of behaviour change. This may contribute to non-persistent treatment effects, compensatory negative spillovers or psychological reactance and backfiring effects. In this paper, we argue agency-enhancing BPPs can alleviate these ethical and efficacy limitations to longer-lasting and meaningful behaviour change. We set out philosophical arguments to help us understand and conceptualise agency. Then, we review three alternative agency-enhancing behavioural frameworks: (1) boosts to enhance people's competences to make better decisions; (2) debiasing to encourage people to reduce the tendency for automatic, impulsive responses; and (3) nudge+ to enable citizens to think alongside nudges and evaluate them transparently. Using a multi-dimensional framework, we highlight differences in their workings, which offer comparative insights and complementarities in their use. We discuss limitations of agency-enhancing BPPs and map out future research directions.

Joint Attention in Team Sport

This paper explores how the phenomenon of Joint Attention (JA) drives certain core features of team sport and how sport illuminates the nature of JA. In JA, two or more agents focus on the same object in mutual awareness that the content of their experience is thus shared. JA is essential to joint sporting actions. The sporting context is particularly useful for illustrating the phenomenon of JA and provides a valuable lens through which to examine rival theoretical accounts of its workings. This paper draws novel connections between the respective philosophical literatures on JA and sport, suggesting prospects for mutually advantageous cross-pollination. I contend that the workings of JA within joint sporting action are misconstrued on intellectualistic and individualistic theories which posit reductive explanations in terms of the contents of individual minds. The best evidence and strongest philosophical arguments support ‘relational’ accounts whereby joint sporting actions exceed the sum of their parts. I reject the ‘extensionalist’ contention, associated with ‘lean’ versions of the relationalist approach, that objects of JA are individuated in terms of causal properties not sensitive to how they are perceived. Siding instead with ‘rich’ versions of the view, I argue that team collaboration depends on convergence in terms of the ‘aspectual shape’ of the objects of JA. Finally, a further possible application for these ideas is suggested: that JA plays a central role in the constitution of sport-specific kinds. On this proposal, JA facilitates collective perceptual recognition of particular objects and situations as embodying the general types described in the rulebook, playing an important role in creating and sustaining the public ‘social space’ of sporting competition.

The Common Good According to Whom?

Abstract Alex John London’s new book, For the Common Good: Philosophical Foundations of Research Ethics highlights the fact that establishing just social arrangements is not only a matter of incentivizing popular will to act for the common good; it also requires filling in informational gaps about which policies, arrangements, and interventions will advance the basic interests of members in an equitable, effective and efficient manner. Promoting justice requires, in part, acquiring the knowledge for how to do so. In developing this point, London carefully traces these missteps in the main philosophical debates and then resuscitates the importance of questions of justice at the heart of research ethics. In doing so, it provides a transformative corrective for the field. This review critically examines one of the central pillars of London’s egalitarian research imperative approach: the way in which the social value of research is closely linked with minimizing uncertainty among reasonable experts.

Doxography and Eschatology in Clement of Alexandria

Abstract In strom. V.9.1 and strom. V.14.103–106, Clement of Alexandria presents opinions (doxai) of Greek philosophers regarding ‘eschatology’. By making use of so-called doxographies (i.e. the collection of philosophical opinions on a particular topic), Clement employs a popular method in contemporary philosophical debate. In this article, I will show how Clement reinterprets philosophers’ opinions and modifies them to construct a philosophical proof for (Christian) eschatology. It allows him to make controversial topics such as ‘final judgement’ and ‘resurrection’ more plausible to his philosophically educated readers, as according to him, these ideas have already been discussed and confirmed by several well-known philosophers (Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato and the Stoics).

The truth is in there: Belief processes in the human brain.

Belief, defined by William James as the mental state or function of cognizing reality, is a core psychological function with strong influence on emotion and behavior. Furthermore, strong and aberrant beliefs about the world and oneself play important roles in mental disorders. The underlying processes of belief have been the matter of a long debate in philosophy and psychology, and modern neuroimaging techniques can provide insight into the underlying neural processes. Here, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study with N = 30 healthy participants in which we presented statements about facts, politics, religion, conspiracy theories, and superstition. Participants judged whether they considered them as true (belief) or not (disbelief) and reported their certainty in the decision. We found belief-associated activations in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left superior parietal cortex, and left lateral frontopolar cortex. Disbelief-associated activations were found in an anterior temporal cluster extending into the amygdala. We found a larger deactivation for disbelief than belief in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex that was most pronounced during decisions, suggesting a role of the vmPFC in belief-related decision-making. As a category-specific effect, we found disbelief-associated activation in retrosplenial cortex and parahippocampal gyrus for conspiracy theory statements. Exploratory analyses identified networks centered at anterior cingulate cortex for certainty, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex for uncertainty. The uncertainty effect identifies a neural substrate for Alexander Bain's notion from 1859 of uncertainty as the real opposite of belief. Taken together, our results suggest a two-factor neural process model of belief with falsehood/veracity and uncertainty/certainty factors.

Mindfulness and Religiosity: Four Propositions to Advance a More Integrative Pedagogical Approach

AbstractIn this commentary article, we critically discuss the need for greater understanding of intercultural and interreligious competence when teaching and applying the practice of mindfulness and contemplative meditation. We start by considering the predominant religious and belief systems that exist worldwide, how each system utilises meditation, and how this meditative practice can be linked to the experience of mindfulness. We then consider how mindfulness can be discussed when taught, through the cultivation of intercultural and interreligious competence. To create a clearer direction in the teaching of mindfulness within the context of interreligious competence, we present four propositions or considerations. We have also put forward a model that suggests mindfulness is a means to achieving greater understanding of self and, thus, more than a clinical tool for ameliorating observable malaise. Moreover, we assert that mindfulness and contemplative meditation practices lie on a continuum that provides the opportunity for self-realisation and optimal states of wellbeing. Our aim is to extend previous discussions on intercultural and interreligious competence as this relates to the practice of meditation. In addition, we continue the philosophical and pedagogical debate to enable teachers and students to optimise the full potential of meditation. In doing so, we create an expansive dialogue to enable teachers and students to engage in a richer and more accepting learning landscape.

Incarnating Kannon: Eshinni, Shinran, and the Other-Power of Philosophy

Abstract Here the relationship between Shinran and Eshinni, founding family of the largest Buddhist sect in Japan, serves as a methodological model for philosophical engagement. Though the Pure Land notion of “easy practice” (Jp. igyō 易行) may be seen as Zen’s less rigorous counterpart, Shinran’s turn toward “other-power” (tariki 他力) is driven by the same philosophical debates over practice and liberation that occupied contemporaries such as Dōgen. The answers to such debates, which Shinran and Eshinni enacted concretely via their lifestyle choices, help us rethink both academic practices and the role of philosophers as engaged intellectuals today.

The Moral Value of Social Shame in Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Central to the debate on the moral relevance of shame is whether we take others’ assessments of our moral shortcomings seriously. Some argue that viewing shame as a social emotion undermines the moral standing of shame; for a moral agent, what is authoritative are his own moral values, not the mere disapproval of others. Adam Smith's framework sheds some light on the contemporary debates in philosophy on the moral value of shame. Shame is mostly a social emotion but has moral value for Smith. This is because we desire sympathy and share an ongoing social practice of morality with others. Smith developed the underpinnings of an account for a sympathetic basis of shame. An agent is evaluated through the sympathetic process to determine whether he/she has lived up to shared norms and morality. Shame emerges from the understanding that we ought not to be favorably thought of by others, the impartial spectator, or by our own conscience. We want to avoid shame for two reasons: first, we want to receive praise which gives pleasure, blame and blameworthiness operate by giving pain. Secondly, we are pleased with the sympathy of others. According to Smith, shame is a very painful emotion. Given our dread of pain and love of pleasure, we are motivated to be not blamed or blameworthy. We want to be favorably thought of so as not to be, or feel, shamed. Our dread of blameworthiness and our desire for sympathy motivates us to be a person who acts according to the norms and morality of society. Shame has a moral value both as a social emotion and when it arises from our conscience; however, Smith was also aware that there are limits to shame as a moral value, which arises from misjudgments of spectators.

The Fundamental Underpinning of Biological Theory of Spontaneous Generation in Biology

The concept of spontaneous generation, originating from ancient philosophical and theological debates, has persisted through scientific inquiry and paradigm shifts. This article explores the historical trajectory of spontaneous generation theory from its roots in Aristotelian philosophy to its refutation by pivotal experiments in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Through an examination of key figures such as Louis Pasteur and Francesco Redi, the evolution of scientific understanding regarding the origin of life is elucidated. Pasteur's contributions to germ theory and experimental microbiology, including his famous swan-neck flask experiment, played a decisive role in discrediting the notion of spontaneous generation. Moreover, Redi's controlled experiments with meat and flies provided empirical evidence against the spontaneous generation of maggots. The article also delves into the broader socio-political context surrounding these scientific debates, highlighting the influence of societal authorities and shifting scientific paradigms on the acceptance of new ideas. Additionally, it discusses the role of advancements in microbiology and biochemistry in shaping contemporary perspectives on the origin of life, emphasizing the interdisciplinary nature of scientific inquiry in this field. Ultimately, the narrative underscores the pivotal role of empirical evidence and scientific rigor in overturning long-standing beliefs, illuminating the complex interplay between social context, scientific progress, and the quest for understanding life's fundamental processes. Investigations into the spontaneous production of hydrogen peroxide from pure water micro droplets highlight the complexity of spontaneous chemical reactions. Historical perspectives on spontaneous generation, offer valuable insights into the evolution of scientific thought. Synthesizing recent findings with historical context provides a comprehensive understanding of spontaneous generation's implications across diverse research fields.

The Metaphysics of Meaning: Aquinas and the Meaning of Life

Abstract While ‘the meaning of life’ has grown in prominence as a topic of philosophical inquiry, few Thomists have addressed it. Joshua Hochschild has recently offered a plausible explanation, arguing that ‘the meaning of life’ is a late modern ‘invention’, at home in a conceptual framework both philosophically problematic and incompatible with the principles of St. Thomas’ thought. He, therefore, counsels Catholic intellectuals to avoid the question of life’s meaning. I argue in contrast that St. Thomas offers the kind of metaphysical perspective that originally made ‘the meaning of life’ intelligible. First, I show that closer attention to the context in which the phrase emerges (that of German Romanticism) can clarify why much of the modern discourse on ‘the meaning of life’ succumbs to Hochschild’s critique. I then show that, even in the writings of its earliest modern proponents, we find compelling reasons to hold that ‘the meaning of life’ was always more at home within a Christian conceptual framework. Finally, I argue that St. Thomas’ account of providence and divine art in particular explain the purposefulness and significance of the world, such that Thomists who appeal to these notions are well positioned to address the question of life’s meaning in contemporary philosophical debates.

What Do Prospective Parents Owe to Their Children?

I consider the question of what moral obligations prospective parents owe to their future children. It is taken as an almost axiomatic premise of a wide range of philosophical arguments that prospective parents have a moral obligation to take such steps as ensuring their own financial stability or waiting until they are emotionally mature before conceiving. This is because it is assumed that parents have a moral obligation to lay the groundwork for their children's lives to go well. While at first glance such a premise seems benign, I will argue that when it is applied to arguments in assisted reproductive technology, as it is in Julian Savulescu's procreative beneficence argument or as it is in Daniel Groll's recent argument for open gamete donation, we see problems with this premise. Problems in Groll's argument also become apparent when it is scrutinized in connection with this premise.

Intuition Talk and Reasoning Markers: A Corpus-Study from the Philosophy of Language

Cappelen (2012) argues against the Thesis of Centrality, that is, against the idea that analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidential support for their theories. Cappelen challenges this notion by targeting the “Argument from ‘Intuition’-Talk”, i.e., the idea that intuitions must play a decisive role in the arguments of analytic philosophers because they use intuition talk profusely. This paper empirically examines this claim by assessing the prevalence of intuition talk in critical parts of the arguments. Specifically, it explores whether intuition talk coincides with reasoning markers signifying premises and conclusions. To accomplish this, I will first compile a corpus of articles on taste disagreements. Then, I will conduct two types of analysis: a frequency list analysis, and an analysis of the dispersion of both types of vocabulary along the corpus.