Philosophy Of Social Science Research Articles

The Social Science of Democracy?

Alexis de Tocqueville, the First Social Scientist. By Jon Elster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 212p. $80.00 cloth, $22.99 paper.Alexis de Tocqueville is surely one of the most widely cited, discussed, and celebrated political theorists in the world. Jon Elster's book,Alexis de Tocqueville: the First Social Scientistproceeds from a provocative premise: that Tocqueville's major works were lacking in “system” and were “hugely incoherent,” and that Tocqeuville himself “was not a major political thinker” (xi). Elster argues that instead Tocqueville ought to be viewed as a penetrating historical sociologist and an exemplary social scientist who might well be considered the first true social scientist. Elster's argument is important for at least two reasons: first, because it offers a striking and challenging reading of Tocqueville; and second, because it expands on Elster's own contributions in the philosophy of social science, and develops interesting understandings of “causal mechanisms,” methodological individualism, and social explanation more generally. As Elster writes in his Introduction, “the main task of this book is to argue for the relevance of Tocqueville for social science in the twenty-first century (p. 5).” The purpose of this Perspectives symposium is to assess Elster's argument in broad terms. What are the strengths and limits of Elster's reading of Tocqueville? How ought we to assess Elster's understanding of Tocqueville's deficiencies as a “political theorist?” What is the relevance of Tocqueville for contemporary social science? And, most importantly, what are the challenges and possible trajectories facing social science in the twenty-first century, and to what extent does Elster's essay point us in the right direction?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

The Social Science of Democracy?

Alexis de Tocqueville, the First Social Scientist. By Jon Elster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 212p. $80.00 cloth, $22.99 paper.Alexis de Tocqueville is surely one of the most widely cited, discussed, and celebrated political theorists in the world. Jon Elster's book,Alexis de Tocqueville: the First Social Scientistproceeds from a provocative premise: that Tocqueville's major works were lacking in “system” and were “hugely incoherent,” and that Tocqeuville himself “was not a major political thinker” (xi). Elster argues that instead Tocqueville ought to be viewed as a penetrating historical sociologist and an exemplary social scientist who might well be considered the first true social scientist. Elster's argument is important for at least two reasons: first, because it offers a striking and challenging reading of Tocqueville; and second, because it expands on Elster's own contributions in the philosophy of social science, and develops interesting understandings of “causal mechanisms,” methodological individualism, and social explanation more generally. As Elster writes in his Introduction, “the main task of this book is to argue for the relevance of Tocqueville for social science in the twenty-first century (p. 5).” The purpose of this Perspectives symposium is to assess Elster's argument in broad terms. What are the strengths and limits of Elster's reading of Tocqueville? How ought we to assess Elster's understanding of Tocqueville's deficiencies as a “political theorist?” What is the relevance of Tocqueville for contemporary social science? And, most importantly, what are the challenges and possible trajectories facing social science in the twenty-first century, and to what extent does Elster's essay point us in the right direction?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte: A trans-cultural comparative epistemology of the social sciences

The paper begins by outlining the approaches to the development of a philosophy of social science in the work of Bourdieu, Passeron, and Habermas. The discussion of the positions of Comte and Mill which follows is an historical case-study of the tensions between competing stances adopted in the 1960s — between the tendency to formulate a logic of the social sciences and the tendency to ground a philosophy of social science in ontology or in the socio-political conditions of its production. The method adopted to compare the contributions to the philosophy of social science made by Comte and Mill displays sympathy with Bourdieu’s inclination to analyse the social conditions for the genesis of theory. The paper first considers comparatively the contexts in France and England for the emergence of social science and philosophy about social science. It then examines separately the developments of the projects of Comte and Mill before turning to an articulation of the contrasts between their positions, focusing on aspects of their correspondence as subsequently published and introduced by Lévy-Bruhl. The purpose of the paper is to raise the general question whether international intellectual exchange in relation to the analysis of society can occur within a universal discourse possessing a priori validity or through socio-cultural exchanges which assist the construction of universality through the mutual recognition of difference.

Carlas Schmittas ir mokslo karų pateisinimas

From time to time in the fields of philosophy and sociology of science the political vocabulary is employed. Certain processes, which take place in science, are described using military notions such as “conflict”, “war”, “revolution” etc. This article concentrates on question, whether the vocabulary and instruments of political theories could enable more adequate understanding of the scientific processes that are socially influenced? In order to answer the latter question, Carl Schmitt’s political theory (concept of the political, friend-enemy distinction, notions of war and exception) is employed. The main objective of this article is to figure out possible benefits of the Schmitt’s ideas for current discussions in the field of philosophy of social sciences and humanities.

Is Waltz a Realist?

In the opening chapter of Theory of International Politics Waltz makes an interesting distinction between scientific laws and theory construction. Recent special issues of this journal have suggested that this distinction allows Waltz to be read in different ways — for example, as a scientific realist who conceives of unobservable entities, or as a constructivist interested in how we create models. This contribution argues against both these interpretations by analysing the first chapter of Waltz’s book and suggesting that his distinction between theories and law-like statements is fully consistent with mainstream discussions in the philosophy of social science. It argues that Waltz’s position still depends on the identification of empirical regularities, something that makes him an empirical realist, but which undermines the claim that he is a scientific realist.

Is There a Place for Philosophy in the Social Sciences?

The article deals with the problem of relationship between social sciences and philosophy. In contemporary social sciences this relationship is denied by not ascribing to philosophy the status of autonomous discipline, which could be considered as being separate from social sciences and yet fruitfully collaborate with them. The positivist tradition of the social sciences denies the importance philosophy, considering it as a merely speculative enterprise, which is not worthy of attention of social scientists oriented towards the increase of empirically verified scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the interpretive tradition of the social sciences tends to incorporate philosophy into social sciences as an integral part of social theory. However, claims the author, the divide into two traditions itself shows the importance of philosophy, since both of these traditions already depend on the philosophical presuppositions of their exponents. The article argues that philosophy of social sciences should be considered as a separate and autonomous discipline, because of the objects it studies and the methods it uses, which differ from those of social sciences. However philosophy can (and actually does) fruitfully collaborate with social sciences by formulating their methodological basis.

Hacia un relacionalismo metodológico pragmático. De la filosofización de la sociología a la sociologización de la filosofía

En el presente artículo se analizan los enfoques relacionalistas de las ciencias sociales en términos de una distinción conceptual entre la “filosofización de la sociología” y la “sociologización de la filosofía”. Estos marcan dos actitudes diferentes con respecto a la metafísica filosófica y sus compromisos ontológicos. El pragmatismo de los autores tiene su origen en el relacionalismo metodológico de Dewey, el cual se compara con los enfoques realistas con un compromiso ontológico, así como con el relacionalismo metodológico de Bourdieu. Se argumenta que la filosofía pragmática de las ciencias sociales es una herramienta adecuada para ayudar a los científicos sociales en su labor metodológica, en particular en lo que respecta a los estudios de casos basados en problemas.

Hacia un relacionalismo pragmático metodológico: de una filosofización de la sociología a una socialización de la filosofía

En este artículo se analizan los enfoques relacionalistas en ciencias sociales en términos de una distinción conceptual entre ¿filosofizando la sociología¿ y ¿sociologizando la filosofía¿. Estos marcan dos diferentes actitudes hacia la metafísica filosófica y sus compromisos ontológicos. El pragmatismo de los autores tiene origen en el relacionalismo metodológico de Dewey, el cual es comparado con los compromisos ontológicos de los enfoques realistas, así como con el relacionalismo metodológico de Bourdieu. Se argumenta que la filosofía pragmática de las ciencias sociales es una herramienta adecuada para ayudar a los científicos sociales en su labor metodológica, especialmente en lo que respecta a los estudios de caso basados en problemas.

Saving identity from postmodernism? The normalization of constructivism in International Relations

International Relations's (IR's) intellectual history is almost always treated as a history of ideas in isolation from both those discursive and political economies which provide its disciplinary and wider (political) context. This paper contributes to this wider analysis by focusing on the impact of the field's discursive economy. Specifically, using Foucaultian archaeologico-genealogical strategy of problematization to analyse the emergence and disciplinary trajectories of Constructivism in IR, this paper argues that Constructivism has been brought gradually closer to its mainstream Neo-utilitarian counterpart through a process of normalization, and investigates how it was possible for Constructivism to be purged of its early critical potential, both theoretical and practical. The first part of the paper shows how the intellectual configuration of Constructivism and its disciplinary fortunes are inseparable from far-from-unproblematic readings of the Philosophy of Social Science: the choices made at this level are neither as intellectually neutral nor as disciplinarily inconsequential as they are presented. The second and third parts chart the genealogies of Constructivism, showing how its overall normalization occurred in two stages, each revolving around particular practices and events. The second part concentrates on older genealogies, analysing the politics of early classificatory practices regarding Constructivism, and showing how these permitted the distillation and immunization of Constructivism – and thus of the rest of the mainstream scholarship which it was depicted as compatible with – against more radical Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques. Finally, the third part focuses attention on recent genealogies, revealing new attempts to reconstruct and reformulate Constructivism: here, indirect neutralization practices such as the elaboration of ‘Pragmatist’ Constructivism, as well as the direct neutralization such as the formulation of ‘Realist’ Constructivism, are key events in Constructivism's normalization. These apparently ‘critical’ alternatives that aim to ‘provide the identity variable’ in fact remain close to Neo-utilitarianism, but their successful representation as ‘critical’ help neutralize calls for greater openness in mainstream IR. Rather than a simple intellectual history, it is this complex process of (re)reading and (re)producing that counts as ‘Constructivism’, which explains both the normalization of Constructivism and the continued marginalization of Postmodernist/Post-structuralist approaches in mainstream IR's infra-disciplinary balance of intellectual power.

Jurisprudence Between Science and the Humanities

For a long time philosophy has been unique among the humanities for seeking closer alliance with the sciences. In this essay I examine the place of science in the context of jurisprudential debates, in particular in the context of the idea known as legal positivism. I argue that historically legal positivism has been advanced by theorists who were also positivists in the sense the term is used in the philosophy of social science, i.e. they were committed to the idea that the explanation of social phenomena should be conducted using similar methods to those used in the natural sciences. I then argue that around the 1960’s jurisprudence and in particular legal positivism have undergone change towards anti-positivism. Central to this trend was the idea that proper jurisprudential inquiry must be conducted from the “internal point of view.” What this view amounted to was an attempt combine a scientific-like aim of neutral description with a humanistic method of inquiry. It thus did not entirely abandon its links with scientific inquiry, but has radically changed their nature. I show that this stance had a negative impact of narrowing down the range of issues discussed and of the kind of method considered appropriate for discussing these questions, I then argue that to counter current these isolationist trends jurisprudence would benefit from reorientation of its midway position between science and the humanities in the opposite direction: its aims should be those traditionally associated with the humanities but its methodology should be much closer to that of the sciences.

Soft systems methodology and ‘soft’ philosophy of science

AbstractSoft systems methodology is very important in systems research. It closely joints with and interacts with philosophy of science. The paper first analyses the philosophical basis of soft systems methodology (SSM) and the change of the philosophical paradigms underpinning the change from classical systems engineering to SSM. It then explores how SSM, as applied hermeneutics and constructivism, partially influences the development of philosophy of natural science and philosophy of social science. It finally arrives at the conclusion that the relationship between hard systems methodology (HSM) and SSM is inter‐exclusive and inter‐complementary in different aspects at the same abstract level rather than the relationship between the universal and the particular at different language levels. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Towards a 'Picture Theory' Philosophy of Science

In this paper we espouse the position that the picture theory of meaning may or may not have failed as a theory of language but seems remarkably useful as a meta theory of science. We start with an exposition of a recent critic of the theory. We provide a brief exposition of the real Picture Theory as introduced by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (1922). We examine two possible readings of the theory that do not entail the commitments most commonly criticized and defend one of them (Griffin, 1964) as both viable and immune to that criticism. We then submit the real Picture Theory as a viable new philosophy of social sciences that in our view is well overdue. The center piece of this approach is the endorsement of visualizing tools to construct pictures of empirical evidence that enable rigorous tests of theoretical arguments by visual inspection and sophisticated statistical techniques. This new justification for empirical research rejects the commonly accepted rationale for empirical research in the social sciences, that is based on a naive interpretation of Popper’s (1958) Logic of Scientific Discovery, and the notion of hypotheses testing as untenable. It endorses, instead, Wittgenstein’s real Picture Theory as a philosophy of science that is capable of bringing theory and evidence together in the service of advancing scientific knowledge. To provide a better idea of the implications of this philosophy of science to the daily practice of scientific research an example is drawn from a recent piece of research on decision-making and legislative politics.

Towards a Truly Pragmatic Philosophy of Social Science

The dominant schools in the philosophy of social science, as they are presented in a variety of articles, textbooks, and monographs, are often broken down analytically along three lines. These schools are given different names but are roughly grouped under naturalist, interpretive, and critical headings. However, there are also a growing number of attempts to go beyond these established categories and offer something novel in the philosophy of social science and Patrick Baert's Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Towards Pragmatism can be seen as such an attempt (Baert 2005). His call for a pragmatist philosophy of social science is in part a reading of a variety of main conceptual positions in the philosophy of social science and a recommendation given the problems and shortcomings of each of the programs he discusses. In these remarks

Research with a Purpose: A Reply to My Critics

I would like to thank Brendan Hogan and the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy for organising a session around my book at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division) in San Francisco in 2007. The articles in this symposium are revisions of the contributions to that session. My book fits the agenda of the society in that it 'advances' a position which is at least partly indebted to American pragmatism. It is also, to a lesser extent, indebted to Gadamer's hermeneutics, but the influence of neo-pragmatism looms large. This does not mean, however, that my position is compatible with classical pragmatism, and indeed some of the contributors to this symposium claim, rightly I think, that my position is in some respects at odds with that of Dewey's. Before I deal with the various criticisms, it might be appropriate to put my pragmatist-inspired proposal in the context of my own intellectual trajectory in order to make sense of the rationale of the proposal and explain its distinctiveness. Unlike a substantial number of philosophers of social science, I was trained not just in philosophy but also in a social science, have actually carried out social research, am based in a sociology department and teach in an interdisciplinary social and political sciencepr programme. This has given my work in the philosophy of social science quite a distinctive angle in comparison to the armchair philosophy of social science that is prevalent these days. Whereas the content of philosophy of social science used to be tied to the emergence and establishment of new social scientific disciplines like sociology (Baert and Dominguez Rubio 2009), it has in the course of the twentieth century become an increasingly autonomous intellectual enterprise. I have been particularly struck by how generations of philosophers of social science

Can there be a Pragmatist Philosophy of Social Science?

Many, and perhaps most, American philosophers will, if pressed, say that they are pragmatists. What they typically mean by this is that they think there is some class of philosophical questions that can't be answered philosophically. If you don't think that in the end philosophical arguments can possibly settle metaphysical questions, pragmatism is an appealing response. Pragmatism becomes a kind of default position which one reverts to when one removes a topic from the list of topics that can be reasonably addressed using philosophical methods. When Richard Rorty characterized himself as a pragmatist, he meant that he was in favor of removing topics from philosophy on a wholesale basis, which implied for him the end of philosophy at least as traditionally conceived. Philosophical students of pragmatism weren't very happy with this formulation, not so much for its conclusions, but because it omitted the content of the default that John Dewey himself had in mind, namely something like the scientific method, or the scientific method understood and generalized as something like an experimental approach (Dewey 1946, p. 179). The people who thought Rorty had travestied pragmatism focused, correctly, on the difference in their attitudes toward science. Patrick Baert has written a very interesting textbook on the philosophy of social science which winds up embracing at least the term pragmatism and reflecting on Rorty in a way that arrives at a novel position. As his concluding argument is the most original part of the book and the one that is most relevant in this setting, I shall confine my comments to the question of what both a pragmatist approach to social science and to a "philosophy" of social science might be, and further confine it to the Deweyan and Rortyian variations on this general theme.

Infallibilism and Human Kinds

Infallibilism and apriorism are still influential in the philosophy of social science. Infallibilists about human kinds claim that there are features of institutional entities about which we cannot possibly be wrong. But infallibilism is not implied by the theory of collective intentionality that supposedly grounds it. Moreover, it fails to account for the mode of existence of important institutional kinds, including the paradigmatic example of money.

Facts and values in politics and Searle's Construction of Social Reality

Contemporary political theory is fractured in its account of ontology and methods. One prominent fault line is between empirical and normative theory – the former usually called ‘philosophy of social science’, or ‘social-science methodology’, and not ‘theory’ at all. A second fault line exists between analytical and post-modern (or ‘late-modern’) political theory. These fractures prevent political researchers who engage with the same substantive issues, such as the right of same-sex couples to marry, from speaking to one another in a common language. This paper’s first section discusses the history of the fact-value divide in political studies: a history that led to the contemporary state of the discipline. The second section argues that Searle’s philosophy provides tools that can bridge this divide. The third section raises normative objections that limit the extent to which one can accept Searle’s theory as a fully general account of social and political reality. Although limited in scope, Searle’s argument should be welcomed as an attempt to provide a common set of important tools for political researchers on all sides of these debates.

Social Science and the Moral Life

In Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, William James famously remarks, science is just like physical science, and instead of being deducible all at once from abstract principles, must simply bide its time, and be ready to revise its conclusions from day to day. The consequence of this is that everywhere the ethical philosopher must wait on (James 1978, 625). James's claim is that we should apply the same epistemological rigor in our investigation of ethical claims that we apply to our investigations of any other empirical claims. It goes beyond his well-known statement that facts are with values to insist that our values are shot through with claims about facts. This argument places James, and pragmatism more generally, squarely within one of the central debates in the philosophy of social science, understand ing the extent to which scientific investigation should shape values. The position one takes on this matter colors one's entire understanding of the role of the social scientist. On the one hand is the social scientist as engineer, uncovering the rela tions between causes and effects in the social realm. On the other hand is the social scientist as social critic, using empirical inquiry to uncover not just how relationships are but how they might be better. This article does not deny the obvious difference between stating P exists and P ought to exist. It does, however, reject some prevailing views regarding what follows from this difference. Two views are of special concern.1 First is the view that facts or experience have no evidential bearing on intrinsic value judg ments and hence are irrelevant to the justification of noninstrumental practical principles. Thinkers as diverse as David Hume, Max Weber, and the pragmatist Patrick Baert have alleged that the difference between facts and values is so fundamental that to appeal to one in support of another is considered a logical fallacy. This view gives us a doubled epistemology, with one set of criteria for warranting belief about facts and another set of criteria for warranting belief about values. The second view is that ethical principles cannot be relevant to the justifi cation of social scientific theories. This is the converse of the naturalistic fallacy, that statements about facts cannot draw support from statements about values. Our interests in having the world be one way or another have no bearing on whether our statements about the world are actually true. This is the notion that facts are

Understanding Comparison in Criminal Justice Research

This article explores some implications of interpretive philosophies of social science, developed by thinkers such as Max Weber and Peter Winch, for conducting comparative research in criminal justice. These address the meaningful character of human activities but, unlike constructionism and postmodernism, respect the objective and constraining character of institutional realities. Drawing on American empirical studies that employ qualitative methods to explain statistical variation, the article shows how interpretive traditions often find it difficult freeing themselves from positivist assumptions and fall short of investigating how social actors understand and engage in comparison in their everyday lives. A discussion of data collected in an ethnographic study of children's courts in Australia demonstrates how a more thorough-going and consistent approach to comparison is possible within this interpretive framework.

Realist Ontology and Epistemology for Rural Research

In this paper, realist findings from the philosophy of social science are summarised and implications for rural research methodology are drawn out. Four specific ontological claims are fleshed out. These ontological claims act as grounding assumptions for social research and knowledge, but are not foundational in the essentialist sense. Examples are used to illustrate realism in action in empirical research in India. Then several epistemological themes underlying realist village research are also spelt out. The paper offers a very explicit introduction to a range of sophisticated themes in realist social research. Overall the paper contributes an original line of argument to the debate about realist research methodology and techniques.