Philosophers Of Logic Research Articles

THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATION SHIP BETWEEN PRONUNCIATION AND MEANING IN THE ISLAMIC RHETORIC FIELD

This research aims to shed light on the problem of the relationship of the word with the meaning in the Islamic rhetoric field, because it is the basic epistemological linguistic problem that occupied the forefront in the rhetoric cognitive system, and it has worked to crystallize it since the era of codification, as this dilemma was a subject of dispute among scholars with their various references in the deliberative Islamic field, but in the history of mankind as a whole, which extends through times and epochs, this problem was raised in the Greek era by the poles of Greek philosophy as an integral part of the study of ontology, as the philosophy of language that concerned itself with language in its general and abstract concept was not a self-contained philosophy for them. Pioneers of Greek philosophy who are credited with developing linguistic and logical studies. It has been associated with Islamic thinkers, especially among jurists, with understanding the Qur’anic text and determining its true and intended meaning, which requires that the truth matches between human understanding or human knowledge on the one hand and the intended divine meaning expressed in the Qur’anic text on the other hand. They defend it against the anti-Islam sects, as they add to this problem a metaphysical dimension, which is organically related to the issue of "creating the Qur'an", and it was not confined to linguistics and forensic sciences only, Rather, it was strongly present among the logical philosophers who were influenced by Greek philosophy to the point of fascination, and the positions of the rhetoricians differed according to their different starting points.

The philosophy of logical practice

While we now have an increasingly detailed understanding of the varied goals and methods that constitute the sciences and mathematics, our understanding of logic as a research area lags behind. A significant reason for this deficiency is that, unlike in the philosophies of science and mathematics, philosophers of logic have yet to embrace a practice‐based approach to their field, re‐orientating their attention towards logic as it is actually practised by logicians. This paper makes the case for a new area of research, the philosophy of logical practice, to sit alongside traditional philosophy of logic and systematically investigate logic's aims and methodologies using the practice‐based approach.

Higher‐order metaphysics

AbstractSubverting a once widely held Quinean paradigm, there is a growing consensus among philosophers of logic that higher‐order quantifiers (which bind variables in the syntactic position of predicates and sentences) are a perfectly legitimate and useful instrument in the logico‐philosophical toolbox, while neither being reducible to nor fully explicable in terms of first‐order quantifiers (which bind variables in singular term position). This article discusses the impact of this quantificational paradigm shift on metaphysics, focussing on theories of properties, propositions, and identity, as well as on the metaphysics of modality.

The cost of closure: logical realism, anti-exceptionalism, and theoretical equivalence

Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world) make trouble for this commitment, as well as a closely related commitment to theories being closed under logical consequence. I provide three arguments. The first two show that anti-exceptionalism about logic provides an epistemic challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims; the third shows that logical realism provides a metaphysical challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims. Along the way, I show that there are important methodological upshots for metaphysicians and philosophers of logic, in particular, lessons about certain conceptions of naturalism as constraining the possibilities for metaphysics and the philosophy of logic.

MODAL PROPERTIES OF PAREMIOLOGICAL UNITS

В данной статье рассматриваются модальное значение паремий - пословиц и поговорок. Приведены результаты лингвокультурологического и когнитивно-дискурсивного анализа паремий с компонентами модальности в русском и турецком языках. Исследование вносит определенный вклад в познание мировидения языков, позволяет выявить особенности национального мировосприятия. Неиссякаемым источником паремий нетерминологического происхождения являются традиции, обычаи,культура, поверья, реалии, предания, былины, исторические факты, они одновременно несут в себе как общечеловеческое, так и специфически национальное. Особый интерес представляет изучение паремиологической картины мира одного языка на фоне другого, позволяющее установить общие и различные черты в постижении мира разными народами и отображении этого мира в пословицах и поговорках, сопоставить проявляющийся в паремиях менталитет народов.Пословицы - непростые образования: являются логическими единицами, содержащими определенные суждения, заключения, представляют художественные миниатюры, в которых в яркой, сжатой форме отражаются факты живой действительности того или иного народа, по этой причине пословичные изречения привлекают к себе внимание языковедов, философов-логиков и фольклористов.Своеобразие паремий заключается в том, что они отражают суть минимальных текстов. Указанные особенности проявляются в характере информативности, семиотической структуры и семантической мотивации паремий.Необходимо подчеркнуть, что пословицы и поговорки обладают эмоциональной и стилистической окраской, благодаря чему они совершенствуют коммуникативную функцию языка. Итак, будучи предложениями, то есть единицами с замкнутой структурой, пословицы и поговорки обладают смысловой и интонационной завершенностью, категориями предикативности и модальности, что отличает их от фразеологических единиц, которые чаще всего выражены словом или словосочетанием.

Invariance and Definability, with and without Equality

The dual character of invariance under transformations and definability by some operations has been used in classical works by, for example, Galois and Klein. Following Tarski, philosophers of logic have claimed that logical notions themselves could be characterized in terms of invariance. In this article, we generalize a correspondence due to Krasner between invariance under groups of permutations and definability in L∞∞ so as to cover the cases (quantifiers, logics without equality) that are of interest in the logicality debates, getting McGee’s theorem about quantifiers invariant under all permutations and definability in pure L∞∞ as a particular case. We also prove some optimality results along the way, regarding the kinds of relations which are needed so that every subgroup of the full permutation group is characterizable as a group of automorphisms.

How and why I arrived at a topsy-turvy account of Even-Ifs

Most philosophers of logic reject the prima facie plausible view that Even-If conditionals entail their consequents, and settle instead for accounts on which Even-Ifs entail the corresponding If-conditionals. In this paper, I provide fresh motivation for the rejected, consequent-entailing, view and sketch a pragmatic strategy to explain away seemingly proper, but apparently countervailing, uses.

Why the Logical Hexagon?

The logical hexagon (or hexagon of opposition) is a strange, yet beautiful, highly symmetrical mathematical figure, mysteriously intertwining fundamental logical and geometrical features. It was discovered more or less at the same time (i.e. around 1950), independently, by a few scholars. It is the successor of an equally strange (but mathematically less impressive) structure, the “logical square” (or “square of opposition”), of which it is a much more general and powerful “relative”. The discovery of the former did not raise interest, neither among logicians, nor among philosophers of logic, whereas the latter played a very important theoretical role (both for logic and philosophy) for nearly two thousand years, before falling in disgrace in the first half of the twentieth century: it was, so to say, “sentenced to death” by the so-called analytical philosophers and logicians. Contrary to this, since 2004 a new, unexpected promising branch of mathematics (dealing with “oppositions”) has appeared, “oppositional geometry” (also called “n-opposition theory”, “NOT”), inside which the logical hexagon (as well as its predecessor, the logical square) is only one term of an infinite series of “logical bi-simplexes of dimension m”, itself just one term of the more general infinite series (of series) of the “logical poly-simplexes of dimension m”. In this paper we recall the main historical and the main theoretical elements of these neglected recent discoveries. After proposing some new results, among which the notion of “hybrid logical hexagon”, we show which strong reasons, inside oppositional geometry, make understand that the logical hexagon is in fact a very important and profound mathematical structure, destined to many future fruitful developments and probably bearer of a major epistemological paradigm change.

Historians and Philosophers of Logic: Are They Compatible? The Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem as a Case Study

This paper combines personal reminiscences of the philosopher John Corcoran with a discussion of certain conflicts between historians of logic and philosophers of logic. Some mistaken claims about the history of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem are analyzed in detail and corrected.

Considérations logico-philosophiques sur la synonymie

One observes a certain scepticism among most philosophers of logic regarding synonymy. This is perhaps because they are generally too demanding in the determination of a criterion of synonymy. Should the relation of synonymy thus be weakened or else should its domain of application be restricted to certain contexts, certain language games or certain possible worlds ? This, it would seem, is the fundamental question today.

Quine's theory of logic

No philosopher of logic can afford to ignore Quine's work. Like most great philosophers, Quine has been influenced by different and even seem? ingly incompatible perspectives. From the point of view of influence Quine, I believe, is really two philosophers ; a combination of Frege on the one hand, and Dewey on the other. In this paper I want to consider the influ? ence on Quine's theory of logic of Frege's logicism, particularly his uni? versalist theory of logic, and of Dewey's pragmatism or instrumentalism. I want this paper to serve as a prelude to a much more thorough-going pragmatist or instrumentalist theory of logic and mathematics than Quine's. I shall use the terms 'pragmatist' and 'instrumentalist' interchangeably. Quine's views will be subject to criticism from this more radical perspective. An assumption behind this paper is the view that conceptions of, or better, theories of, logic are as a controversial a matter as specific issues in the philosophy of logic. With this, of course, Quine would agree.

Jørgen Jørgensen as a Philosopher of Logic

Jørgen Jørgensen as a Philosopher of Logic

Psychologism in logic: Husserl's critique

Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations. This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not convincing, partly because he does not take the theory in its most plausible form and partly because he ignores certain important distinctions (for example, between what a statement is about and what it is true in virtue of). Then I raise two new objections to the psychologistic theory. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the psychologistic theory remains an important and serious position from which we can learn much about the status of logic.