Quine's theory of logic

Abstract

No philosopher of logic can afford to ignore Quine's work. Like most great philosophers, Quine has been influenced by different and even seem? ingly incompatible perspectives. From the point of view of influence Quine, I believe, is really two philosophers ; a combination of Frege on the one hand, and Dewey on the other. In this paper I want to consider the influ? ence on Quine's theory of logic of Frege's logicism, particularly his uni? versalist theory of logic, and of Dewey's pragmatism or instrumentalism. I want this paper to serve as a prelude to a much more thorough-going pragmatist or instrumentalist theory of logic and mathematics than Quine's. I shall use the terms 'pragmatist' and 'instrumentalist' interchangeably. Quine's views will be subject to criticism from this more radical perspective. An assumption behind this paper is the view that conceptions of, or better, theories of, logic are as a controversial a matter as specific issues in the philosophy of logic. With this, of course, Quine would agree.