Temporal Phenomenology Research Articles

The moving open future, temporal phenomenology, and temporal passage

Empirical evidence suggests that people naïvely represent time as dynamical (i.e. as containing robust temporal passage). Yet many contemporary B-theorists deny that it seems to us, in perceptual experience, as though time robustly passes. The question then arises as to why we represent time as dynamical if we do not have perceptual experiences which represent time as dynamical. We consider two hypotheses about why this might be: the temporally aperspectival replacement hypothesis and the moving open future hypothesis. We then empirically test the moving open future hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, we represent the past as objectively fixed and the future open. And we represent that this objective openness moves as events that were open become fixed, such that in doing so, we represent a privileged moving present. We found no evidence for the moving open future hypothesis, which suggests that further investigation of the temporally aperspectival replacement hypothesis is called for. Our results also shed further light on our understanding of the respects in which we represent the future to be open, which, in turn, has implications for our theorising about the open future.

Non-dynamism and temporal disturbances

Philosophical accounts denying that temporal passage is an objective feature of reality face an explanatory challenge with respect to why it appears to us as though time passes. Recently, two solutions have surfaced. Cognitive illusionism claims that people experience the passage of time due to their belief that time passes. Cognitive error theory claims that we do not experience the passage of time, but hold the belief that we do, which we have acquired through making an inference from the prior belief that time passes. These approaches suppose that belief and passage experience are explanatorily connected, and they depend on the claims that people who experience the passage of time or at least believe that they do also believe that time passes. To test these claims, we probed the beliefs of populations of individuals with depression and schizotypy, thus conditions that are strongly associated with alterations in temporal phenomenology. Depression was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and schizotypy with the short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE). While cognitive illusionism and inferentialist cognitive error theory would predict a strong association between BDI and O-LIFE scores and beliefs about time passage, our study found no such association. The experience of passage does not seem to be explanatorily connected to beliefs about the passage of time.

The Self-Simulational Theory oftemporal extension.

Subjective experience is experience in time. Unfolding in a continuous river of moments, our experience, however, consists not only in the changing phenomenological content per se but, further, in additional retrodiction and prospection of the moments that immediately preceded and followed it. It is in this way that William James's 'specious present' presents itself as extending between the past and future. While the phenomenology of temporality always happens, in normal waking states, to someone, and the notions of self-representation and temporal experience have continuously been associated with each other, there has not yet been an explicit account of their relationship. In this paper, the emergence of the subjective experience of temporal extension will be conceived of as arising out of a difference-relation between counterfactual and actual self-representations. After presenting the proposed relationship on both a conceptual level and a formalized and neuronally realistic level of description using information theory, convergent empirical evidence from general findings about temporal experience and inference, altered states of consciousness, and mental illness is examined. The Self-Simulational Theory of temporal extension is able to explain systematic variations in the subjectively experienced length of the temporal Now across numerous domains and holds potentially wide implications for the neuroscience of consciousness, as well as for a deeper understanding of different forms of mental illness.

The role of the Ifá in the construction of the person in relation to death: Psychology’s interface with ideas from the Adjatado of Dogbo, in Benin

According to the Adjatado systems of knowledge, the Ifá is a mediator between the world of the living and of the dead and this mediation depends on the funerary rites. Ifá is a word used to refer to the science of divination, the son of God, among other names. It is present from a person’s birth to death. The paper discusses the Ifá’s relation with the cultural processes of the construction of the Adjatado person, assuming its significant role in the lives of the Adjatado people in sustaining personal experience. After discussing selected cultural perspectives, about the meaning of Ifá for the Adjatado people, we propose a dialogue on the construction of the person in relation to death in the framework of Semiotic-Cultural Constructivism in psychology, in which death can be discussed from a philosophical perspective, articulated to the phenomenology of temporality, tradition, and alterity (cf. Simão, 2005; 2010; Simão, Guimarães & Valsiner, 2015), nevertheless, the subject of death has not yet been much explored. We argue that the dialogue here proposed enables an understanding of how the meanings that the Adjatado confer to the experience of death is related to processes that involve the cultivation of the person in the culture, addressing further developments concerning dialogues between diverse cultural understandings on psychological processes.

In search of lost time: Integrated information theory needs constraints from temporal phenomenology

Integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness proposes an identity between its causal structure and phenomenology. Through this assertion, IIT aims to explain consciousness by prioritizing first-person experience. However, despite its phenomenology-first stance, developments in IIT have overlooked temporality. As such, we argue that at present IIT’s phenomenological analysis is incomplete. In this critique, we show how IIT takes a non-identical illusionist stance towards the experiences of continuity, flow, and extent of our experiences. Moreover, in isolating temporal grains of experience to a single timescale, IIT misses out on capturing the multi-scale nested nature of temporal phenomena. Hence, we contend that IIT needs an axiom for time, through which its causal structure can be refined to account for temporal experiences. Here, we propose an axiom to address these concerns. We conclude by discussing how IIT may need to be revised if our concerns hold true.

Flow and presentness in experience

AbstractIn the contemporary landscape about temporal experience, debates concerning the “hard question” of the experience of the flow—as opposed to debates concerning more qualitative aspects of temporality, such as change, movement, succession and duration—are gaining more and more attention. The overall dialectics can be thought of in terms of a debate between the realists (who take the phenomenology of the flow of time seriously, and propose various account of it) and deflationists (who take our description of temporal phenomenology as “flowy” to be spurious, and propose various explanation of this spuriousness). In this paper we look inside the realist side. We distinguish primitivist realism, according to which the feeling of time flowing is an irreducible sui generis phenomenology, and various forms of reductionist realism, according to which the experience of the flow is ultimately explainable in terms of a more basic phenomenology. We present reasons to be sceptical against the various reductionist proposals. The conclusion is thus disjunctive: either primitivism or deflationism is the correct account of the purported experience of the flow of time.

Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias

Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our (tacit) beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal belief hypothesis according to which future-bias is explained by the belief that time robustly passes. Our results do not match the apparent predictions of this hypothesis, and so provide evidence against it. But we also find that people give more future-biased responses when asked to simulate a belief in robust passage. We take this to suggest that the phenomenology that attends simulation of that belief may be partially responsible for future-bias, and we examine the implications of these results for debates about the rationality of future-bias.

Are the Folk Functionalists About Time?

AbstractThis article empirically investigates the contention that the folk concept of time is a functional concept: a concept according to which time is whatever plays a certain functional role or roles. This hypothesis could explain why, in previous research, surprisingly large percentages of participants judge that there is time at worlds that contain no one‐dimensional substructure of ordered instants. If it seems to participants that even in those worlds the relevant functional role is played, then this could explain why they judge that there is time in those worlds. While our experiment supported the finding that participants are reticent to judge that there is actually no time, we found no evidence that this is because they deploy a functionalist concept, at least of the kind proposed in recent research. Our findings are, however, consistent with the folk deploying a much more minimal functionalist concept according to which time is just whatever it is—regardless of its nature—that plays the role of grounding our temporal phenomenology.

The contribution of “time novels” to a phenomenology of temporality. Thomas Mann, Martin Heidegger, and our experience of time

Abstract This paper insists on similarities between Heidegger’s presentation of Dasein’s authentic understanding of time in Being and Time (§§ 79-80) and Thomas Mann’s attempts to “narrate time itself” in The Magic Mountain. It shows that Thomas Mann’s temporal experiments can contribute to a phenomenology of temporality, not merely by “illustrating” philosophical theses, but also by achieving something that goes beyond any phenomenological consideration on time: the enactment of fundamental temporal experiences.

Temporal phenomenology of Otherness by A. Schütz (or the birth of phenomenological sociologism)

The author considers the construction of the temporal sociologism by A. Schtz from the general thesis of the alter ego to the Stranger and the Homecomer. The background and starting point of this construction is Schtzs criticism of the Husserlian egological approach to the basic category of the Other and the radicalization of phenomenological reduction. The Husserlian primordial reduction to an isolated monad is replaced by a radical reduction of the cultural pattern as a phenomenon of the social a priori. Social a priori and the Stranger serve as necessary conditions for intersubjectivity as not derived from the Ego and acquire temporal features in the categories of cultural pattern of the group and Homecomer. In Schtzs interpretation, the Stranger combines temporal and functional (spatial) features, which allows to define the category of cultural pattern of the group and describe the relations of the Stranger with the group in terms of temporal sociologism. The Stranger category is the result of reduction of the taken-for-granted cultural pattern of the group. Schtzs temporal sociologism places any manifestation of the social not only in the intersubjective space but also in the continuum of alterations in intersubjectivity. After this radical reduction of the natural attitude to the cultural pattern of the group by the Stranger category, Schtz goes further and reduces the natural attitude to the belonging to/identification with any group by the Homecomer category, which allows to explore the continuum of alterations in intersubjectivity exactly at the moment of its breaching. The experience of Homecomer restoring a breach with his group represents the reduction of taken-for-granted self in itself - turning into a Stranger for oneself, which allows to find a social basis in oneself. Thus, Schtzs temporal sociologism develops as a definition of the social through changes in time and preserving social identity despite changes in the continuum of intersubjectivity.

Don\u2019t Go Chasing Waterfalls: Motion Aftereffects and the Dynamic Snapshot Theory of Temporal Experience

The philosophical investigation of perceptual illusions can generate fruitful insights in the study of subjective time consciousness. However, the way illusions are interpreted is often controversial. Recently, proponents of the so-called dynamic snapshot theory have appealed to the Waterfall Illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, to support a particular view of temporal consciousness according to which experience is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities. This dynamism is meant to account for familiar features of the phenomenology of time, such as succession, continuity, and change. Previous theories have typically appealed to a subjective present occupying an interval of time; that is, a “specious present.” I argue, through analysis of motion aftereffect illusions and the rare condition of akinetopsia, i.e. motion-blindness, that the Waterfall Illusion fails to support the dynamic snapshot theory as intended. Furthermore, I suggest that future theories of subjective time should see temporal phenomenology as the result of non-localised processes closely tied to the mechanism underlying consciousness generally.

Temporal relationship between onset of positive and negative symptoms in the course of attenuated psychotic illness

Research in individuals at clinical high-risk (CHR) for psychosis has traditionally focused on the relationship between the severity of positive and negative symptoms and development of syndromal psychosis. In this study, we examined the temporal order of emergence of positive and negative symptoms in 116 CHR individuals who met criteria for the Attenuated Positive Symptom Syndrome defined in the Structured Interview for Psychosis-Risk Syndromes (SIPS). We found that positive symptoms emerged at a significantly younger age than negative symptoms with no significant differences between converters and non-converters. These findings may provide important information about the temporal phenomenology of CHR symptoms.

Experiences of Time and Timelessness in Electroacoustic Music

Electroacoustic music and its historical antecedents open up new ways of thinking about musical time. Whereas music performed by humans is necessarily constrained by certain temporal limits that define human information processing and embodiment, machines are capable of producing sound with scales and structures of time that reach potentially very far outside of these human limitations. But even musics produced with superhuman means are still subject to human constraints in music perception and cognition. Focusing on five principles of auditory perception – segmentation, grouping, pulse, metre and repetition – we hypothesise that musics that exceed or subvert the thresholds that define ‘human time’ are likely to be recognised by listeners as expressing timelessness. To support this hypothesis, we report an experiment in which a listening panel reviewed excerpts of electroacoustic music selected for their temporally subversive or excessive properties, and rated them (1) for the pace of time they express (normative, speeding up, or slowing down), and (2) for whether or not the music expresses ‘timelessness’. We find that while the specific musical parameters associated with temporal phenomenology vary from one musical context to the next, a general trend obtains across musical contexts through the excess or subversion of a particular perceptual constraint by a given musical parameter on the one hand, and the subjective experiences of time and timelessness on the other.

METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON THE HETEROCHRONIA IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT OF A HEALTH PRESERVING COMPETENCE OF A PHYSICAL EDUCATION TEACHER

The article presents the methodology of using knowledge about the phenomenon of heterochronia in pedagogy. The aim of the study is to improve the methodology of development of health-saving competence of Physical Education teacher in postgraduate education based on actualization and understanding of the phenomenon of heterochronia. The use of knowledge about the phenomenon of heterochronia is considered in the context of pedagogical anthropology and conducted within the framework of phenomenological, health-saving and anthropological approaches. Approaches used in the research are the following: competence, axiological, existential, transdisciplinary, etc. Due to the use of the phenomenon of heterochronia, the temporal phenomenology of a person is represented, as well as its non-linearity, processability. Knowledge of the phenomenon of heterochronia and its value interpretations is used in the pedagogical methodology of prevention of sudden cardiac death. The use of knowledge of heterochronia promotes the effective application of Physical Education teacher the knowledge of human morphophysiology in educational practices of health preservation and axiologicalization and humanization of the educational process. The results of the conducted study determine quite considerable prevalence of knowledge as well as value and health oriented understandings of heterochronia among the working Physical Education teachers in comparison with students mastering this profession.

The phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience of experienced temporality

We discuss the three dominant models of the phenomenological literature pertaining to temporal consciousness, namely the cinematic, the retentional, and the extensional model. This is first done by presenting the distinction between acts and contents of consciousness and the assumptions underlying the different models concerning both the extendedness and duration of these two components. Secondly, we elaborate on the consequences related to whether a perspective of direct or indirect realism about temporal perceptions is assumed. Finally, we review some relevant findings from the psychology and neuroscience of temporality in order to decide which of the three models of time consciousness is better confirmed from an empirical viewpoint. Depending on the time scale, all three models of temporal consciousness might apply. We specifically argue in favor of an extensional model of time consciousness for the experienced present where the acts and contents of consciousness are both extended. The retentional model might apply to longer time intervals covered by working memory. In addition, a predictive component is highlighted as decisive for an understanding of temporality.

Self-Referential Memory and Mental Time Travel

Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can shed some light on the experience of mental time travel. This is the view that, when a subject remembers some fact episodically, their memory represents itself as coming from a perception of that fact. I propose that the experience of mental time travel in memory is the experience of representing one of the elements in this complex content, namely, the past perceptual experience of the remembered fact. In defence of this proposal, I offer two considerations. Firstly, the proposal is consistent with the idea that memories enjoy a temporal phenomenology (specifically, a feeling of pastness). Secondly, the proposal is consistent with the possibility that some of our other cognitive capacities might yield an experience of mental time travel which can be oriented towards the future. I argue that the received conception of mental time travel is in tension with those two ideas.

The cresting wave: a new moving spotlight theory

AbstractOne argument for the moving spotlight theory is that it better explains our temporal phenomenology than does any static theory. In this paper it is argued that insofar as moving spotlight theorists take this to be a sound argument they ought embrace a new version of the moving spotlight theory according to which the moving spotlight is a cresting wave of causal efficacy. Hence a range of fundamental properties are temporary because presentness synchronically changesthe fundamental properties that are instantiated in the present moment, and our experiences of presentness co-varies with presentness, allowing us to phenomenologically detect presentness.

How Long is Now? A New Perspective on the Specious Present

AbstractWhat is the Specious Present? Which is its duration? And why, ultimately, do we need it to figure in our phenomenological account of temporal perception? In this paper, after introducing the role of the Specious Present in the main models that account for our phenomenological present, and after considering the deflationary objection by Dennett (that the debate relies on the fallacy of the Cartesian Theatre of Mind, the idea that it is meaningful to ask where and when an experience becomes conscious), I claim—thanks to a spatial analogy—that there could be a good criterion to distinguish between a present experience and a past experience, that there are good reasons to sustain the Specious Present (while snapshots are in no sense part of our phenomenological life), and that there could be a precise way to define the nature—and to measure the duration—of the Specious Present; as I will clarify, our capability and possibility to act and react are central in this perspective. If we accept this change of perspective, there is a definite sense in which the Specious Present is part of our temporal phenomenology.

Human Capital and Self-Entrepreneurship. The Concept of Robbed Time.

The notions of ″human capital″ and ″self-entrepreneurship″ are by now widespread. The present work takes a critical look at their pervasive acceptance and stresses the self-exploitation to which they give rise. The concept of self-entrepreneurship needs to take into account, in fact, the nature of a revolution in temporal phenomenology. This revolution not only blurs the distinction between time dedicated to life and time dedicated to one's profession. It means that time spent on whatever is traditionally irrelevant to work is potentially time robbed from successful self-entrepreneurship. An analysis is made, lastly, of the relationship between body and ″bio-labor″, recognizable in the emergence of new forms of manual labor. Emblematic, in this sense, is gestational surrogacy. This provides an opportunity to rediscover the pregnancy of M. Foucault's biopolitical interpretation of neoliberalism as opposed to the more recent category of ″psychopolitics″ defined by B.C. Han. In the current scenario, indeed, the body maintains a role that remains as central as it is paradoxical, on account of its configuration as an ″entrepreneurial resource″.

Gender as Lived Time: Reading The Second Sex for a Feminist Phenomenology of Temporality

This article suggests that Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex offers an important contribution to a feminist phenomenology of temporality. In contrast to readings of The Second Sex that focus on the notion of “becoming” as the main claim about the relation between “woman” and time, this article suggests that Beauvoir's discussion of temporality in volume II of The Second Sex shows that Beauvoir understands the temporality of waiting, or a passive present, to be an underlying structure of women's existence and subordination. Accordingly, I argue that Beauvoir does not see “woman” as a mere becoming, as that which unfolds in time, but instead understands becoming a woman to be realized as lived time. As such, Beauvoir's account shows that gender and temporality are deeply entangled, and thus she challenges the classic phenomenological account of temporality as a general, given structure of human existence. More specifically, I argue that her account shows how a particular experience of time is an underlying structure of sexual objectification, a claim that expands on the feminist phenomenological claim that a particular relation to space becomes a way in which women take up and negotiate their own subordination and objectification.