Abstract
The philosophical investigation of perceptual illusions can generate fruitful insights in the study of subjective time consciousness. However, the way illusions are interpreted is often controversial. Recently, proponents of the so-called dynamic snapshot theory have appealed to the Waterfall Illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, to support a particular view of temporal consciousness according to which experience is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities. This dynamism is meant to account for familiar features of the phenomenology of time, such as succession, continuity, and change. Previous theories have typically appealed to a subjective present occupying an interval of time; that is, a “specious present.” I argue, through analysis of motion aftereffect illusions and the rare condition of akinetopsia, i.e. motion-blindness, that the Waterfall Illusion fails to support the dynamic snapshot theory as intended. Furthermore, I suggest that future theories of subjective time should see temporal phenomenology as the result of non-localised processes closely tied to the mechanism underlying consciousness generally.
Highlights
The Waterfall Illusion is a type of motion aftereffect (MAE) known at least since the time of Aristotle (1908) (On Dreams: Part 2)
Whether in the illusory or non-illusory case, while the cliff next to the waterfall is either stationary or apparently exhibiting motion, our experience of that object must continue through a window of time for us to experience that object as either static or moving. It doesn’t give the dynamic snapshot theorists any further ammunition that the cliff-face can be seen to exhibit motion-like properties, as the perception of any properties whatsoever still requires an extended experience in the way that the competing, “specious present” models of temporal phenomenology identify
Temporal phenomenology cannot be adequately explained in the way that the dynamic snapshot theorists wish
Summary
The Waterfall Illusion is a type of motion aftereffect (MAE) known at least since the time of Aristotle (1908) (On Dreams: Part 2). It will be argued that the phenomenology of motion aftereffects should compel us to recognise that subjective temporal properties encoded at an instant are not sufficient for a subjective experience of motion, contrary to the position of the dynamic snapshot theorists.3 This becomes apparent when the phenomenology of the Waterfall Illusion is appropriately interpreted. The fourth section gives a different interpretation—one which is more faithful to the phenomenology and which reveals the illusion is not supportive of a snapshot view of any kind On this interpretation, encoding change-like properties at an instant is insufficient for the phenomenology of motion without the perception of a change in position over time. The connection, between visual motion-like properties of experiential objects and aspects of temporal phenomenology, like succession, is not strong enough to support inferences about the nature of the latter
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