Dream Phenomenology Research Articles

Dreaming and hallucinations – Continuity or discontinuity? Perspectives from dementia with Lewy bodies

Comparing the phenomenology, neurochemical pathology, and psychopharmacology of hallucinations and dreaming is limited by the available data. Evidence to date reveals no simple correspondence between the two states. Differences in the phenomenology of visual hallucinations and the visual component of dreams may reflect variations in visual context acting on the same underlying mechanism - the minimal visual input during dreaming contrasts with the more substantial perceived context in hallucinations. Variations in cholinergic, dopaminergic and serotonergic neurotransmitter function during sleep and during hallucinations in Lewy body dementias, together with relevant drug effects suggest that, on the whole, different, potentially opposite, changes characterise the two states. A similar analysis of other psychotic features in Lewy body dementia and other disorders suggests that, in contrast to hallucinations, there may be more convincing parallels between dreaming and delusional states.

Hacia una fenomenología negativa de los sueños

In the first part of the essay, I describe phenomenologically the transition between dreaming and wakefulness in order to determine whether a reliable dream memory can result from this transition (after all, we have no evidence of our dreams other than our memories). This description shows that this is indeed the case and indicates the conditions under which we can apprehend dreams without imposing on them meanings they do not have. These conditions, or “attitude” is theoretically supported by a negative phenomenology of dreams, namely, a phenomenology which describes dreams by stating what they are not. This first part also explains why we usually forget our dreams and accounts for the cases in which we are conscious of dreaming. In the second part I sketch out a negative phenomenology. This phenomenology shows that the attributions consisting in qualifying dreams, or assigning them hidden originary meanings in need of deciphering (or interpreting), or their own teleology, as well as certain positive attributions (i.e. those that start by affirming: “dreams are such and such”) are nonsensical. The conclusions demonstrate the continuity between the “threshold or transitional phenomenology” developed in the first part, and the negative phenomenology developed in the second.

Costly Signaling Theory of REM Sleep and Dreams

The function of REM sleep dreaming is still unknown. We situate our approach to understanding dream phenomenology and dream function within that part of evolutionary theory known as Costly Signaling Theory (CST). We contend that many of the signals produced by the dreaming brain can be and should be construed as “costly signals”—emotions or mental simulations that produce daytime behavioral dispositions that are costly to the dreamer. For example, often the dreamer will appear in the dream as handicapped in some way (i.e., no clothes, no ID, no money, is under attack, being chased etc.). The dreamer, during waking life, is then influenced by the carry-over effect of the unpleasant dream content. The informational and affective content of the dream creates a mental set in the dreamer that operates during the daytime to facilitate the signaling of a “handicapped” Self. The subtle signaling effect might be via display of the intense emotions or physical demeanor that had first appeared in the dream. When the dreamer shares his dream with others the dream has a more direct impact on waking life and social interactions. In effect, the dreamer uses his or her dreams to adopt a self-handicapping strategy when dealing with significant others. The increased use of costly signals (the self-handicapping strategy) during the daytime then facilitates some vital communicative goal of the dreamer.

Phenomenology of dreams in Parkinson's disease

Rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder (RBD) occurs in approximately one third of patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) and is associated with a loss of muscle atonia during REM sleep and aggressive dream content. We examined the dream characteristics of PD patients to determine whether dream content differed between patients with RBD and without RBD, men and women with RBD, and men and women with PD. One hundred-twenty patients with a diagnosis of idiopathic PD were consecutively recruited from a movement disorders clinic and were assessed for RBD using clinical diagnostic criteria of the International Classification of Sleep Disorders Revised (2001). Verbatim dream content was obtained from each patient and categorized into dream themes that were coded into nominal categories. Fisher's exact tests determined whether particular dreams were correlated with RBD versus non-RBD, men and women with RBD, and men and women with PD. RBD patients had a higher percentage of violent dreams compared to non-RBD patients. There were no significant sex differences in the dream content of RBD patients. Men with PD had more aggressive dreams compared to females with PD. Aggressive dream content was characteristic of RBD patients and sex differences exist in the dream content of the PD population.

When does a dream begin to ‘have meaning’? Linguistic constraints and significant moments in the construction of the meaning of a dream

The paper investigates the origin of the meaning of dreams starting with a discussion of psychotic dreams. The author distinguishes the dream as dream from the remembered and the narrated. A two-step dream phenomenology is proposed that both acknowledges the objectivity of the dream and traces the origin of its meaning to its translation into language. Following a review of recent neurobiological theories of dreaming, the paper focuses on certain aspects of the psychoanalytical understanding of the dream phenomenon and in particular on the interpretation of dreams from the perspective of intersubjectivity and phantasy.

Conceptual coordination bridges information processing and neurophysiology

Information processing theories of memory and skills can be reformulated in terms of how categories are physically and temporally related, a process called conceptual coordination. Dreaming can then be understood as a story-understanding process in which two mechanisms found in everyday comprehension are missing: conceiving sequences (chunking categories in time as a higher-order categorization) and coordinating across modalities (e.g., relating the sound of a word and the image of its meaning). On this basis, we can readily identify isomorphisms between dream phenomenology and neurophysiology, and explain the function of dreaming as facilitating future coordination of sequential, cross-modal categorization (i.e., REM sleep lowers activation thresholds, “unlearning”).[Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]

The interpretation of physiology

Not at all self-evident, the so-called isomorphisms between the phenomenology and physiology of dreams have been interpreted by Hobson et al. in an arbitrary manner to state that dreams are stimulated by chaotic brainstem stimulation (an assumption also adopted by Vertes & Eastman). I argue that this stimulation is not chaotic at all; nor does it occur in the absence of control from the cerebral cortex, which contributes complexity to brainstem activity as well as meaningful information worth consolidating in the brain during sleep.[Hobson et al.; Vertes & Eastman]

A historical loop of one hundred years: Similarities between 19th century and contemporary dream research.

Contemporary cognitive and neuropsychological approaches to dreaming show striking methodological and conceptual similarities with the scientific dream literature of the last century. The use of introspective dream reports and the emphasis on dream phenomenology are characteristic of both periods but were bannished during the first half of this century, the former by behaviorism, the latter by psychoanalysis. Three main common axioms of 19th century and contemporary dream research are described: (a) dream experience results from cognitive syntheses realized in the absence of external constraints; (b) dream narrative or dream coherency involves mental associative mechanisms; (c) dream bizarreness emerges from a cerebral state characterized by functional dissociation. According to these three axioms, the observation of dream phenomena reveals that distinct cognitive processes might function in a partly autonomous, automatic, and dissociated way, making dreaming a unique model of these cognitive processes.

The stuff that dreams aren't made of: Why wake-state and dream-state sensory experiences differ

It is adaptive for individuals to be continuously alert and responsive to external stimuli (such as the sound and odor of an approaching predator or the cry of an infant), even during sleep. Natural selection thus has disfavored the occurence during sleep of hallucinations that compromise external vigilance. In the great majority of mammalian species, including Homo sapiens, closed eyes and immobility are basic aspects of sleep. Therefore, (a) visual and movement sensory modalities (except kinesthesis) do not provide the sleeper with accurate information about the external environment or the sleeper's relationship to that environment; (b) the sleeper's forebrain “vigilance mechanism” does not monitor these modalities; hence (c) visual and movement hallucinations — similar or identical to percepts — can occur during sleep without compromising vigilance. In contrast, the other sensory modalities do provide the sleeper with a continuous flow of information about the external environment or the sleeper's relationship to that environment, and these modalities are monitored by the vigilance mechanism. Hallucinations of kinesthesis, pain, touch, warmth, cold, odor, and sound thus would compromise vigilance, and their occurrence during sleep has been disfavored by natural selection. This vigilance hypothesis generates novel predictions about dream phenomenology and REM-state neurophysiology and has implications for the general study of imagery.

Sketch for a Phenomenology of Dreaming

AbstractDreaming as lived experience qualifies as intentional life, despite its strangeness. Yet the dream-phenomena themselves receive little direct clarification consistent with Edmund Husserl's major work on conscious intentionality. With fundamental accomplishments of Husserlian phenomenology in play, how could a study of these neglected appearances begin? First it is necessary to describe the essential relevant Husserlian concepts. From Husserl's descriptions in his phenomenological psychology, his analysis of internal time-consciousness, and his theory of wholes and parts in Logical Investigations, the sense of intentionality as a streaming indivisible nexus, a double continuity of inseparable wholeness, becomes evident. Immersed in this self-awareness, we do not find it difficult to access dream-appearances and account for their connection in intentional life. A claim can be made for their presentational objectivity as well as for their "gnomonic" subjectivity. A systematic sketch of their typology or fundamental structure is thus possible without reducing dream-intentionality to something other than itself. Hence, a Husserlian sense of conscious lived experience is first presented. Dream evidence is then considered, despite possible bewilderment, in order to provide a clue to an extended sense of both subjectivity and objectivity. Lines toward a development of dream typicality are thereby indicated.

Deep Thoughts on the Science and Phenomenology of Dreaming

Deep Thoughts on the Science and Phenomenology of Dreaming

Psychanalyse existentielle et spatialité onirique

Study of the phenomenology of dreams and waking dreams shows that to a large extent dream structure is determined by the representation of space. The spatial aspect of dreams has a personal significance which can be interpreted in the framework of existential analysis.