Phenomenal Content Research Articles

Intrinsic brain activity and phenomenal contents Comment on “Beyond task response—Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness” by G. Northoff, F. Zilio & J. Zhang

Intrinsic brain activity and phenomenal contents Comment on “Beyond task response—Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness” by G. Northoff, F. Zilio & J. Zhang

Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content

Most people think indexical thought has special content (de se content). However, it has been acknowledged that classical examples, such as those offered by Perry and Lewis, are insufficient to establish this conclusion. Ongoing discussions typically focus on first-person beliefs and their relationship to the explanation of successful behavior and linguistic practices. Instead, I want to direct attention to the phenomenal content of our conscious experiences and the largely neglected contribution that its comprehension can make to the way in which first-person representation is understood. This paper offers a novel argument for both the existence and a specific interpretation of the essential indexicality thesis based on widely accepted assumptions regarding the relation between phenomenology and representation. Specifically, I will argue that if (i) two different individuals can have token experiences with the same phenomenology and ii) two token experiences of ordinary subjects with the same phenomenology have the same phenomenal content, then phenomenal content is de se content of a particular kind: perspectival de se content.

Is the Mind a Magic Trick? Illusionism about Consciousness in the “Consciousness-Only” Theory of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati

Illusionists about consciousness boldly argue that phenomenal consciousness does not fundamentally exist—it only seems to exist. For them, the impression of having a private inner life of conscious qualia is nothing more than a cognitive error, a conjuring trick put on by a purely physical brain. Some phenomenal realists have accused illusionism of being a byproduct of modern Western scientism and overzealous naturalism. However, Jay Garfield has endorsed illusionism by explicitly drawing support from the classical Yogācāra Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu. In this paper, I assess the degree to which Garfield’s illusionist interpretation accurately captures the views of Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati in their extant Sanskrit works. As it turns out, Vasubandhu and Sthiramati converge with contemporary illusionists in taking an unconscious causal basis of cognitive/linguistic processes to be responsible for generating the illusion of representational states with apparently phenomenal contents. Within their constitutive understanding of the mind as the “imagination of what is non-existent” (abhūtaparikalpa), I raise possible candidates for what might seem to be real instances of phenomenality—mental appearances (pratibhāsa), affective sensory experience (vedanā), and “intrinsic luminosity” (prakṛtiprabhāsvara)—and consider possible responses on behalf of an illusionist interpreter. I conclude that Vasubandhu and Sthiramati really do appear to be strong illusionists about phenomenal consciousness, particularly if phenomenal states are assumed to be essentially representational.

How-tests for consciousness and direct neurophenomenal structuralism.

Despite recent criticism, the search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is still at the core of a contemporary neuroscience of consciousness. One common aim is to distinguish merely statistical correlates from "NCCs proper", i.e., NCCs that are uniquely associated with a conscious experience and lend themselves to a metaphysical interpretation. We should then distinguish between NCCs as data and NCCs as hypotheses, where the first is just recorded data while the second goes beyond any set of recorded data. Still, such NCC-hypotheses ought to be testable. Here, I present a framework for so-called "sufficiency tests." We can distinguish four different classes of such tests, depending on whether they predict creature consciousness (which systems are conscious), state consciousness (when a system is conscious), phenomenal content (what a system is conscious of), or phenomenal character (how a system experiences). For each kind of test, I provide examples from the empirical literature. I also argue that tests for phenomenal character (How-Tests) are preferable because they bracket problematic aspects of the other kinds of tests. However, How-Tests imply a metaphysical tie between the neural and phenomenal domain that is stronger than supervenience, delivers explanations but does not close the explanatory gap, uses first-person methods to test hypotheses, and thereby relies on a form of direct neurophenomenal structuralism.

Philosophical, Experimental and Synthetic Phenomenology: The Study of Perception for Biological, Artificial Agents and Environments

In this paper the relationship between phenomenology of perception and synthetic phenomenology is discussed. Synthetic phenomenology is presented on the basis of the issues in A.I. and Robotics that required to address the question of what enables artificial agents to have phenomenal access to the environment. Phenomenology of perception is construed as a theory with autonomous structure and domain, which can be embedded in a philosophical as well as a scientific theory. Two attempts at specifying the phenomenal content of artificial agents are discussed. Concepts and experimental evidence on the independence of perception and the coordination of motion and appearances are set out to submit that phenomenology of perception makes a contribution to synthetic phenomenology.

Neurophenomenal structuralism. A philosophical agenda for a structuralist neuroscience of consciousness.

The program of “neurophenomenal structuralism” is presented as an agenda for a genuine structuralist neuroscience of consciousness that seeks to understand specific phenomenal experiences as strictly relational affairs. The paper covers a broad range of topics. It starts from considerations about neural change detection and relational coding that motivate a solution of the Newman problem of the brain in terms of spatiotemporal relations. Next, phenomenal quality spaces and their Q-structures are discussed. Neurophenomenal structuralism proclaims a homomorphic mapping of the structures of self-organized neural maps in the brain onto Q-structures, and it will be demonstrated how this leads to a new and special version of structural representationalism about phenomenal content. A methodological implication of neurophenomenal structuralism is that it proposes measurement procedures that focus on the relationships between different stimuli (as, for instance, similarity ratings or representational geometry methods). Finally, it will be shown that neurophenomenal structuralism also has strong philosophical implications, as it leads to holism about phenomenal experiences and serves to reject inverted qualia scenarios.

John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences by Tony Cheng

Reviewed by: John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences by Tony Cheng Benjamin Murphy CHENG, Tony. John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences. New York: Bloomsbury, 2021. x + 222 pp. Cloth, $115.00; paper, $39.95; eBook, $103.50 Tony Cheng's book is intended not as an introduction but as a critical reflection on John McDowell's work. Oxford Kantianism is a movement that begins with Strawson's reading of Kant. Strawson endorsed the use of transcendental arguments but without subscribing to transcendental idealism. McDowell and Cheng both follow Strawson's lead, but Cheng attaches more importance to findings of empirical psychology than McDowell does. In the first two chapters, Cheng defends McDowell's basic insight that the world and the minded-subject are constitutively interdependent. We cannot, with Descartes, take the mind to be real and wonder whether the world exists, but it is also an error to try to make sense of a mindless world. As humans we, like animals, have natural drives, but as we acquire language and thus rationality we gain a kind of freedom that other animals do not have. This new freedom is not supernatural—it is second nature, a fulfillment of a potential of our animal life. In chapter 3, Cheng examines perception and knowledge, arguing for strong externalism—mental states are both internal and external, but cannot be analyzed into a separate internal and external part. There is therefore no inner realm about which we cannot be mistaken: We must live with the possibility of bad epistemic luck. In chapter 4, he examines how McDowell charts a middle course between Kripke and Davidson. Davidson is right to say—in opposition to Kripke—that language is not essentially a matter of following rules, but Davidson draws the false conclusion that there could be a language without customs. McDowell's insight—frequently overlooked by analytical philosophers—is that the potential for thought can be actualized only when the thinker is initiated into a tradition. In chapter 5, Cheng examines McDowell's position on personhood and agency. Animals can be said to act for reasons, as when a dog flees from danger, but they lack the human capacity to reflect on those reasons. I might decide that although there is danger, I will not flee, and so I can be said to have beliefs about danger. Herbert Dreyfus misunderstands what McDowell says about the capacity to step back and reflect. Dreyfus thinks of reflection as a barrier to action. But McDowell does not mean that action always follows from reflection. I may act, and then reflect on the reason for my action. In chapter 6, Cheng presents what he describes as the core of the book, a discussion of McDowell's account of subjectivity. McDowell offers a transcendental argument that establishes that experience has no phenomenal content that is not intentional—otherwise rational cognition would be impossible. But McDowell is a disjunctivist, and Tim Crane argues that disjunctivism is incompatible with the idea that all experience has intentional content. As a disjunctivist, McDowell holds that veridical perception involves a relation to an external object and hallucinations do not—these are two different kinds of mental state. Cheng points out that since McDowell is an externalist about mental states, he can treat the [End Page 811] difference between the presence or absence of an external object as an intentional difference, so from McDowell's perspective, disjunctivism is compatible with the idea that there is no phenomenal content that is not intentional. It is in the final chapter that Cheng diverges somewhat from McDowell. McDowell once argued that thought and perception are propositional. However, he revised that idea after considering the following example. Two people see a red bird, and just one of them is capable of framing the thought "That bird is a cardinal." The less knowledgeable observer lacks the capacity to express this proposition, but both have the same perception. So McDowell now argues that perception is not propositional, but he maintains that it is conceptual. Making use of recent experimental data, Cheng argues that McDowell would do better to argue that perception has...

Stable Consciousness? The "Hard Problem" Historically Reconstructed and in Perspective of Neurophenomenological Research on Meditation.

Finding a scientific, third-person explanation of subjective experience or phenomenal content is commonly called the “hard problem” of consciousness. There has recently been a surge in neuropsychological research on meditation in general and long-term meditators in particular. These experimental subjects are allegedly capable of generating a stable state of consciousness over a prolonged period of time, which makes experimentation with them an interesting paradigm for consciousness research. This perspective article starts out with a historical reconstruction of the “hard problem,” tracing it back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Emil du Bois-Reymond in the 18th and 19th century, respectively, and the problem of introspection as already acknowledged by Wilhelm Wundt in the 19th century. It then discusses the prospects of research on long-term meditators from a contemporary perspective and with respect to the neurophenomenological research program already advocated by Francisco J. Varela.

From Shorter to Longer Timescales: Converging Integrated Information Theory (IIT) with the Temporo-Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC).

Time is a key element of consciousness as it includes multiple timescales from shorter to longer ones. This is reflected in our experience of various short-term phenomenal contents at discrete points in time as part of an ongoing, more continuous, and long-term ‘stream of consciousness’. Can Integrated Information Theory (IIT) account for this multitude of timescales of consciousness? According to the theory, the relevant spatiotemporal scale for consciousness is the one in which the system reaches the maximum cause-effect power; IIT currently predicts that experience occurs on the order of short timescales, namely, between 100 and 300 ms (theta and alpha frequency range). This can well account for the integration of single inputs into a particular phenomenal content. However, such short timescales leave open the temporal relation of specific phenomenal contents to others during the course of the ongoing time, that is, the stream of consciousness. For that purpose, we converge the IIT with the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC), which, assuming a multitude of different timescales, can take into view the temporal integration of specific phenomenal contents with other phenomenal contents over time. On the neuronal side, this is detailed by considering those neuronal mechanisms driving the non-additive interaction of pre-stimulus activity with the input resulting in stimulus-related activity. Due to their non-additive interaction, the single input is not only integrated with others in the short-term timescales of 100–300 ms (alpha and theta frequencies) (as predicted by IIT) but, at the same time, also virtually expanded in its temporal (and spatial) features; this is related to the longer timescales (delta and slower frequencies) that are carried over from pre-stimulus to stimulus-related activity. Such a non-additive pre-stimulus-input interaction amounts to temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism of TTC for the constitution of phenomenal contents including their embedding or nesting within the ongoing temporal dynamic, i.e., the stream of consciousness. In conclusion, we propose converging the short-term integration of inputs postulated in IIT (100–300 ms as in the alpha and theta frequency range) with the longer timescales (in delta and slower frequencies) of temporo-spatial expansion in TTC.

Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) – Bridging the gap of neuronal activity and phenomenal states

Consciousness and its neural mechanisms remain a mystery. Current neuroscientific theories focus predominantly on the external input/stimulus and the associated stimulus-related activity during conscious contents. Despite all progress, we encounter two gaps: (i) a gap between spontaneous and stimulus-related activity; (ii) a gap between neuronal and phenomenal features. A novel, different, and unique approach, Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) aims to bridge both gaps. The TTC focuses on the brain’s spontaneous activity and how its spatial topography and temporal dynamic shape stimulus-related activity and resurface in the corresponding spatial and temporal features of consciousness, i.e., ‘common currency’. The TTC introduces four temporo-spatial mechanisms: expansion, globalization, alignment, and nestedness. These are associated with distinct dimensions of consciousness including phenomenal content, access, form/structure, and level/state, respectively. Following up on the first introduction of the TTC in 2017, we review updates, further develop these temporo-spatial mechanisms, and postulate specific neurophenomenal hypotheses. We conclude that the TTC offers a viable approach for (i) linking spontaneous and stimulus-related activity in conscious states; (ii) determining specific neuronal and neurophenomenal mechanisms for the distinct dimensions of consciousness; (iii) an integrative and unifying framework of different neuroscientific theories of consciousness; and (iv) offers novel empirically grounded conceptual assumptions about the biological and ontological nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain.

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness.

Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to (the most relevant) cases of change. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporal change plays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a “solution” to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The present Hypothesis expresses that the step from neuronal activity to phenomenal content of consciousness is reflective of a (phenomenal) “solution:” the main source of the incomprehensibility of consciousness is proposed to result from the introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities. These are “filled-in” via integration, even though neuronal data only exists for changes to these entities. In this way, a temporally continuous picture of the world phenomenally appears. Qualia are “initial conditions,” which are required for integration and cannot be deduced from present data. Phenomenal “identity” (vs. “high similarity”) is related to qualia. Inattentive visual perception, which is only rarely investigated, offers insights into these relationships. Introspectively, unattended vision appears rich because percepts are cumulated over long time spans, whereas attentive perception relies purely on present neuronal signals. The present Hypothesis is that a brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting and constant phenomenal content of consciousness. Experimental support is presented that comes from discrepancies between neuronal activity and perception: transient neuronal responses to sustained stimuli, “filling-in,” change blindness, identity vs. close resemblance.

Implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness or consciousness as such.

Consciousness is multi-dimensional but is most often portrayed with a two-dimensional (2D) map that has global levels or states on one axis and phenomenal contents on the other. On this map, awareness is conflated either with general alertness or with phenomenal content. This contributes to ongoing difficulties in the scientific understanding of consciousness. Previously, I have proposed that consciousness as such or nondual awareness—a basic non-conceptual, non-propositional awareness in itself free of subject-object fragmentation—is a unique kind that cannot be adequately specified by this 2D map of states and contents. Here, I propose an implicit–explicit gradient of nondual awareness to be added as the z-axis to the existing 2D map of consciousness. This gradient informs about the degree to which nondual awareness is manifest in any experience, independent of the specifics of global state or local content. Alternatively, within the multi-dimensional state space model of consciousness, nondual awareness can be specified by several vectors, each representing one of its properties. In the first part, I outline nondual awareness or consciousness as such in terms of its phenomenal description, its function and its neural correlates. In the second part, I explore the implicit–explicit gradient of nondual awareness and how including it as an additional axis clarifies certain features of everyday dualistic experiences and is especially relevant for understanding the unitary and nondual experiences accessed via different contemplative methods, mind-altering substances or spontaneously.

Silence Perception and Spatial Content

ABSTRACT It seems plausible that visual experiences of darkness have perceptual phenomenal content that clearly differentiates them from absences of visual experiences. I argue, relying on psychological results concerning auditory attention, that the analogous claim is true about auditory experiences of silence. More specifically, I propose that experiences of silence present empty spatial directions like ‘right’ or ‘left’, and so have egocentric spatial content. Furthermore, I claim that such content is genuinely auditory and phenomenal in the sense that one can, in principle, recognize that one is experiencing silence. This position is far from obvious, as the majority of theories concerning silence perception do not ascribe perceptual phenomenal content to experiences of silence.

Is Husserl guilty of Sellars’ myth of the sensory given

This paper shows that Husserl is not guilty of Sellars’ myth of the sensory given. I firstly show that Husserl’s account of ‘sensations’ or ‘sense data’ seems to possess some of the attributes Sellars’ myth critiques. In response I show that, just as Sellars thinks that our ‘conceptual capacities’ afford us an awareness of a logical perceptual space that has a propositional structure, Husserl thinks that ‘acts of apprehension’ (Akt der Auffassung) structure sensations to afford us perception that is similarly propositionally structured. Not only this, but there is much affinity and shared motivation between Husserl and Sellars accounts of the sensory stratum. Reflection on phenomenological considerations prevents Sellars from denying phenomenal non-conceptual content, whilst Husserlian ‘sense data’ are technical designations; dependant parts of perceptual experience grasped in abstraction, necessary for providing a reflective/philosophical account of empirical knowledge. I show that both Husserl and Sellars assert that the proper description of phenomenal content affords it the function of presenting properties of spatial objects during perception, and reiterate the well-known fact that Husserl thinks that perception is of ‘conceptually’ apprehended spatiotemporal objects (not sense data).

Spontaneous mystical experience among atheists: meaning-making, psychological distress, and wellbeing

ABSTRACT In religious individuals, spontaneous mystical experiences (SMEs) tend to reinforce pre-existing beliefs and are associated with enhanced wellbeing, mediated by adaptive interpretive frameworks and accepting social environments. The meaning-making and outcomes of SMEs among atheists have not been investigated to date. Using a grounded theory approach, the present study found that the SMEs of eight male and female atheists of diverse backgrounds resembled those of religious experiencers in phenomenal content, but differed with respect to appraisal, coping, and outcome. Challenges in reconciling the SME with secular views and values were common and linked to varying degrees and durations of psychological distress, especially in relation to negative reactions from the social environment. No participant embraced organised religion, but most adopted more agnostic or spiritual worldviews, and ultimately associated their SMEs with enhanced wellbeing in various domains. However, participants who reported persisting doubt and preoccupation about their SMEs experienced deteriorating mental health.

Peripheral Experience and Epistemic Neutrality: Color at the Margins

I argue that Husserl’s account of passive synthesis can be developed into a phenomenology of peripheral experience. Peripheral experiences are not defined by their location in visual space but by their phenomenal and intentional character, by what these experiences are like and how they present things in the world. Further, I argue that peripheral experience is of a piece with our most basic background convictions about the world. As such, the periphery is epistemically neutral, but not therefore empty of meaning. It is meaningful as holding open the possibility of further activity, both practical and intellectual. I explore these ideas by focusing on peripheral color experience. Husserl’s discussions of associative synthesis, affection, and doxic and nondoxic forms of attention prove key to detailing peripheral color experience. I end by arguing that at the periphery, intentional content and phenomenal content come apart.

Nondual Awareness and Minimal Phenomenal Experience

Minimal phenomenal experiences (MPEs) have recently gained attention in the fields of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. They can be thought of as episodes of greatly reduced or even absent phenomenal content together with a reduced level of arousal. It has also been proposed that MPEs are cases of consciousness-as-such. Here, we present a different perspective, that consciousness-as-such is first and foremost a type of awareness, that is, non-conceptual, non-propositional, and nondual, in other words, non-representational. This awareness is a unique kind and cannot be adequately specified by the two-dimensional model of consciousness as the arousal level plus the phenomenal content or by their mental representations. Thus, we suggest that to understand consciousness-as-such, and by extension consciousness in general, more accurately, we need to research it as a unique kind.

Liberal phenomenal concepts

In this paper, I offer a third way in debates over the scope of phenomenal consciousness, in the form of a novel synthesis of liberal and conservative introspective observations. My primary claim is that at least some liberal observations arise due to the existence of a heretofore unrecognized type of phenomenal concepts, liberal phenomenal concepts, while conservative observations arise by virtue of the nonexistence of at least some types of liberal phenomenal contents. Liberal phenomenal concepts, when deployed in direct introspection on phenomenal consciousness, misrepresent consciousness as including high-level, liberal contents. The misattribution of these contents to consciousness is partly defeasible, however: by using a more methodical, stringent heuristic for cataloging the introspected contents of consciousness, it is possible to note the nonexistence of liberal phenomenal contents. Thus, at least in some cases, conservatives are right and liberals are wrong about the scope of phenomenal consciousness. However, liberals have picked up on something conservatives have missed: an inaccurate introspective appearance caused by liberal phenomenal concepts. The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin by defending the faithfulness to introspection of liberal and conservative observations in the context of the debate over the existence of cognitive phenomenology. I then show how liberal phenomenal concepts can explain these observations, and discuss three jointly sufficient conditions whose collective truth serves to establish that a type of liberal content is misattributed to phenomenal consciousness by such concepts. Before concluding, I briefly consider an explanation for why liberal phenomenal concepts might exist.

Content-Free Awareness: EEG-fcMRI Correlates of Consciousness as Such in an Expert Meditator.

The minimal neural correlate of the conscious state, regardless of the neural activity correlated with the ever-changing contents of experience, has still not been identified. Different attempts have been made, mainly by comparing the normal waking state to seemingly unconscious states, such as deep sleep or general anesthesia. A more direct approach would be the neuroscientific investigation of conscious states that are experienced as free of any specific phenomenal content. Here we present serendipitous data on content-free awareness (CFA) during an EEG-fMRI assessment reported by an extraordinarily qualified meditator with over 50,000 h of practice. We focused on two specific cortical networks related to external and internal awareness, i.e., the dorsal attention network (DAN) and the default mode network (DMN), to explore the neural correlates of this experience. The combination of high-resolution EEG and ultrafast fMRI enabled us to analyze the dynamic aspects of fMRI connectivity informed by EEG power analysis. The neural correlates of CFA were characterized by a sharp decrease in alpha power and an increase in theta power as well as increases in functional connectivity in the DAN and decreases in the posterior DMN. We interpret these findings as correlates of a top-down-initiated attentional state excluding external sensory stimuli and internal mentation from conscious experience. We conclude that the investigation of states of CFA could provide valuable input for new methodological and conceptual approaches in the search for the minimal neural correlate of consciousness.

Anti-individualism and Phenomenal Content

The paper addresses a prima facie tension between two popular views about concepts. The first is the doctrine that some concepts are constitutively perceptual/experiential, so that they can be possessed only by suitably experienced subjects. This is a classic empiricist theme, but its most conspicuous recent appearance is in literature on phenomenal concepts. The second view is anti-individualism: here, the view that concept possession depends not only on a thinker’s internal states and relations to the concepts’ referents, but also on certain of her relations to sociolinguistic peers. In recent works, Derek Ball and Michael Tye have in effect argued that the doctrines are incompatible, and their conclusion is that no concepts depend on experience. In reply, Bénédicte Veillet endorses those authors’ incompatibilism, but argues that it is anti-individualism (about the concepts at issue) that we should reject. I develop an approach to reconciliation that is more promising than any considered by these theorists. Against Veillet, I defend a version of anti-individualism about phenomenal concepts, but against Ball and Tye, I argue that they can be possessed only by suitably experienced thinkers.