Petty Bourgeoisie Research Articles

An outline of the social history of socialism or an auto-critique of an auto-critique

The purpose of this paper is to offer an outline of the history of changes in social structure during socialism and after the fall of communism. This ‘history’ is presented as an open one, which may have been pregnant at various time points with opportunities, which were not realized. I try to capture this ‘openness’ of the social history of socialism by presenting in an auto-critical way how I in my own work was compelled to reframe my analysis, and not necessarily because my analysis was wrong, but even more so because history did not deliver on some of its promises and offered surprises — some pleasant ones and some unpleasant ones — on other occasions. Thus Stalinism is presented here as a society ruled by a bureaucratic estate. Mature socialism was the Golden Age, in which the bureaucracy entertained to idea of compromise with the intellectuals and it was not unconceivable that socialism may turn into rational redistribution rule by the ‘new class’ of intellectuals. During late socialism, the alliance between the bureaucracy and intellectuals broke down and reform communist societies were on a ‘third way’, moved between socialism and liberal market economy and made concessions to the working class and to the emergent new petty bourgeoisie. In post-communism, intellectuals did attain power, but not as a class of redistributors. They constituted a modernizing elite, a cultural bourgeoisie, which regards as its historic mission to ‘build capitalism’. I end the paper with a methodological note. With the fall of communism the ‘futuristic’ or ‘utopian’ critique Marxism offers becomes increasingly problematic. Nevertheless, critical social science is still possible if it adopts the ‘ironic’ method, what retains the critical perspective for neoclassical sociology, or for the comparative sociology of capitalisms.

Elderly migrants in a northern Swedish town in the nineteenth century

This article investigates the impact of industrialization and urbanization on the migration patterns of elderly Swedish men and women in the town of Sundsvall during the nineteenth century. The geographical mobility of old men and women increased as industrialization proceeded. Social ties were important factors in the decision to migrate, and the study investigates in particular the significance of social networks for childless old persons. This analysis also examines migration patterns among elderly men and women of different social groups. Very few childless men seem to have moved to live with a relative, whereas a higher proportion of migrating women in this category had some kinship network. A similar pattern was found among widowers and widows. There was also a class dimension: relatives seem to have been most important for the group of women belonging to the petty bourgeoisie.

Class Structure and Racial Consciousness Among Black Americans

Analyses of class cleavages among Black Americans have taken on a new importance since the growth of a sizeable black middle class during the post-Civil Rights era. Less often analyzed are the cleavages within the black middle class itself; small employers, well-educated professionals and others in supervisory positions often have differing interests and beliefs. Wright's (1985) 12-celled class typology provides a means of obtaining a more nuanced view of the position and beliefs of the black middle class by defi ning class on the basis of access to exploitative assets. Using data from the National Survey of Black Americans, 1979—1980 , a good approximation of Wright's class structure developed for a largely white sample is applied to a sample of over 1100 Black Americans. This indicates that the black middle class is more concentrated in positions with less access to exploitative assets than their white counterparts. An analysis of beliefs about black separatism utilizing this class schema finds that separatist beliefs are concentrated among the proletariat, while expert managers and the petty bourgeoisie are the least supportive of separatism.

Between governance & under‐development: accumulation & Africa's ‘catastrophic corruption’

Capital eschews no profit, or very small profit, just as nature was formerly said to abhor a vacuum.With adequate profit, capital is very bold. A certain 10 per cent will ensure its employment anywhere; 20 per cent will produce eagerness; 50 per cent positive audacity; 100 per cent will make it ready to trample on all human laws; 300 per cent and there is not acrime at which it will scruple, nor a risk it will not run, even to the chance of its owner being hanged. If turbulence and strife will bring a profit, it will freely encourage both. Smuggling and the slave trade have amply proved all that is here stated. T J Dunning, quoted in Karl Marx, Capital I (1976:926, fn.). This paper explores aspects of the tension between, on the one hand, international efforts by multilateral and bilateral creditors and aid donors to reduce corruption in developing countries and, on the other, the role played by political corruption in promoting local accumulation of wealth, property and capital in Africa. The process of globalisation includes a concerted effort to reduce the costs and increase the predictability of international business activities. The effort has been particularly directed at countries undergoing economic restructuring and democratic change. The weak bargaining position of African states, where debt and underdevelopment make dependence on international creditors and aid donors especially acute, has led to a variety of direct, unsubtle pressures to force these states to undertake ‘governance’ reforms. While many of these measures address important problems undermining African development, they also misunderstand the nature of corruption as an African problem in two important ways. First, they seek to impose rules and norms of proper public behaviour, developed for and within liberal democracies, in environments where liberal democracy is not established. And, second, they threaten the dependence of the African petty bourgeoisie on access to the state and its resources. In the context of underdevelopment, local accumulation rests heavily on political power and the ability it provides to appropriate public resources. Corruption provides a means of transferring public resources to the new middle class and bourgeois strata which emerged in the post‐colonial order. And underdevelopment ensures that dependence on political power for accumulation is continuous. Africa's development crisis has intensified dependence on the political domain even more and increased conflict as claimants fight over a diminishing pool of resources. Far from arresting the upward spiral of corruption, liberalisation and governance measures imposed by the donors have encouraged the development of new forms of corruption.

Institutions, Context, and Outcomes: Explaining French and British Rule in West Africa

Why did Ivory Coast and Ghana adopt such different economic policies? In the 1950s Ivory Coast and Ghana shared a similar economic structure, based largely on coffee and cocoa production, and similar levels of economic development. Yet with independence Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny embraced capitalism, implementing export-oriented policies favorable to the agrarian sector, while Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah espoused socialism, implementing import substitution industrialization policies favorable to the urban sector.l What explains this divergence? In answering this query, scholars have typically focused on each nation's class structure.2 In Ivory Coast Houphouet-Boigny's Parti Democratique de Cote d'lvoire (PDCI) mobilized the agrarian elite. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party (CPP) depended upon the urban petty bourgeoisie. Though important, this account is incomplete because it does not explain why the two nations possessed such different class structures. The explanation refocuses, but does not answer, the empirical question. I seek to solve this puzzle by tracing the origin of class formation in Ivory Coast's and Ghana's rural areas. Specifically, French and British colonial institutions generated different property rights and landholding patterns, forming the basis for different patterns of class formation. The link between institutions and outcomes is complex, however. Institutions define what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted for a given class of actors in a given situation and how these actions will be rewarded or penalized.3 In theory, institutions generate predictable patterns of behavior.4 In reality, analysts and policymakers are often surprised by institutions' impact. Indeed, French colonial institutions did not universally create a landed elite, as they did in Ivory Coast, and British institutions did not always create a small peasantry, as they did in Ghana. The colonial institutions' impact is contingent upon the interaction between colonial and indigenous institutions and the institutions' joint impact upon state actors (here, indigenous chiefs), upon the institutions' indirect effect upon social actors (here, the chiefs' subjects), and upon all actors' ability to evade and undermine colonial institutions. Institutions have unintended consequences, first, because actors work within multiple sets of institutions.5 Actions rewarded under one institutional arrangement may be penalized under a second, or actions permitted under one institutional arrangement may interfere with actions more highly rewarded under a second. In these cases, an actor's behavior depends upon the way in which he or she balances these competing pressures.

No Man, No Cry? The Film Girls in Uniform and Its Discourses of Political Regime

Leontine Sagan's film Girls in Uniform (Germany, 1931) offers a critique of Prussianism and, by extension, of patriarchy and fascism. By dint of a shift in psychoanalytic paradigms, this essay displaces the 1947 interpretation of Siegfried Kracauer, who thought the film opts for authoritarianism. Instead, the author argues that the master signifier, the closure offered by a new regime, is lacking: Girls in Uniform presents a cinematic space that tends toward democracy. The investigation of the status and function of the representation of men, i.e., patriarchal figures, in the film and its critical discourses is pivotal to this conclusion.

Middlebrow: For and Against

Clement Greenberg's fulminations on the commercial 'ersatz culture' of the urban proletariat and petty bourgeoisie in Avant-Garde and Kitsch, that 'debased and academicized simulacra of genuine culture', were directed not just against the official art of the totalitarian regimes and Hollywood films, but also against the arts of the American Popular Front as his passing reference to Steinbeck indicates. In this respect (as in others), Greenberg's essay rehearses wellestablished themes in Partisan Review of the late thirties, which had already criticized Marc Blitzstein's 'proletarian opera' The Cradle Will Rock and Orson Welles's Mercury Theatre, and damned The Grapes of Wrath with the faintest of praise. Lionel Trilling, commenting on the 'literary nationalism' of the Popular Front in the same issue, observed that for the most part it was 'the calculated policy of a party line', and that it could not be 'anything but vulgar and, in the end, downright chauvinistic'. The novelist James Farrell had made the same equation between 'Popular Frontism', nationalism, and 'vulgarity' the issue before. A somewhat later contributor to Partisan Review, Irving Howe, would argue in the history of the American Communist Party he co-authored with Lewis Coser that it was 'precisely through its vulgarity' that the Popular Front managed to secure an influence 'on the stage, in Hollywood, and in radio . . . Like modern advertising, with which it had deep spiritual affinities, the Popular Front outlook aimed at indiscriminate saturation of the audience rather than intellectual quality'.' The interpretation of Popular Front culture developed by the Partisan Reviewers in the factional battles of the thirties left, effectively became the common sense of post-war cultural history. Howe and Coser's conclusions were even reaffirmed by New Left scholars such as Warren Susman, who attacked Popular Front Americanism for the harm it had done American socialism through its 'absurd vision of the American past', 'peculiar notion of American society in the present', and 'ludicrous attitude toward American culture in general'.2 It is only in recent years that left-wing literary scholars such as Barbara Foley, Paula Rabinowitz, and Alan Wald have begun to question this type of judgement through a more sustained and sympathetic analysis of the Proletarian Literature of the period. Now along comes Michael Denning, with a 556 page study which makes by far the most sweeping and ambitious attempt to re-evaluate the culture of the Red Decade to date.3 Like other scholars who have pursued this goal, Denning eschews the category of Stalinism, so central to the world view of Partisan Review. Indeed, in his account of thirties culture the Communist Party plays a fairly marginal role. This is because for him the Popular Front is only one phase of a process which he calls 'the labouring of American culture', and whose institutions and products he prefers to denominate 'the Cultural Front'. For Denning, this process is not to be understood as the effect of a sequence of political directives issuing ultimately from Moscow, but rather as the cultural expression of a much broader social and political movement intrinsically linked to the class consciousness of the new

Christianity, Colonialism and the Postmodern Project in South Africa: The Comaroffs Revisited

forces or structures. And some activities are more important than others: spiritual life and agrarian practice, clothing and architecture, labor and bodily disposition ... became central and were often contested; much more so than, say, patterns of public decision making or rituals of office (1997, 28-29). One problem for the Comaroffs is how to represent this conversation. The meat of their argument lies in the familiar distinction in history, journalism, and literary studies between what they term realism and rhetoric in cultural texts. Realistic representations present material in a linear, chronological, narrative fashion; privilege written texts; focus on information, especially about persons and events; and rely on factual evidence that is presented in what is regarded as an objective and unbiased (read balanced, fair, impartial) manner. Rhetorical representations are representations that often present material in a non-linear, non-chronological, nonnarrative fashion; privilege art, ritual, pageantry and performance; employ oral and visual texts; and draw on a range of verbal, nonverbal, and visual images or tropes to interpret the world. The Comaroffs rightly reject the popular assumption that history and its representations are two distinct entities one mirrors or reflects reality and the other is reality or that realist modes of presenting history stand opposed to rhetorical modes: ... history and its representations are not nicely distinguishable. To the contrary: history lies in its representations, for representation is as much the making of history as it is consciousness speaking out ... [rhetoric] is not a mere aesthetic embellishment of a truth that lies elsewhere [and realism] is but one among many modes of constructing past and present, with no greater claim on authenticity, no less attention to aesthetics (1991, 35-36). This content downloaded from 157.55.39.198 on Fri, 17 Jun 2016 06:41:32 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 186 CJAS / RCEA 32:I 1998 They decry the positive stereotypes associated with realistic texts and the negative stereotypes associated with rhetorical texts, arguing that rhetorical evidence may represent African realities more effectively than the kind of realistic evidence presented often in colonial narratives or, from the later nineteenth century, in narratives written by the emerging African petty bourgeoisie. The fourth and final point on the Comaroffs' cultural map is an elaborate rendering of three concepts colonialism, modernity, and the everyday that are positioned in relation to each other. Each exhibit the material and symbolic tensions that characterize the modern/postmodern divide. The Comaroffs note that these concepts have been depicted simplistically by modernists in terms that privilege Eurocentric readings of the bourgeois subject in non-western culture. Whether modernity as modernization, for example, is viewed positively as development (and presumably, in its contemporary guise, as globalization) or negatively as dependency/underdevelopment, it is largely framed by a hierarchical political, economic, and social trajectory from centre to periphery. The colonial project is depicted in similar terms as the control by Europeans over non-Europeans. And the everyday the ordinary, the mundane is modernityas-lived. Nonconformist missionaries principal players in the Southern Tswana case study were obsessed with the natural habitat of the ordinary, average person at home, at work, at prayer and at play because the everyday brought the Protestant ethic in line with the spirit of capitalism ... it was the taken-for-granted medium of both European civilization and salvation (1997, 30-31 ). The Comaroffs also caution against tendencies in postmodern readings of colonialism that focus exclusively on human agency, especially the subaltern subject, read pre-colonial representations mainly as traditions invented by Europeans, or reverse the colonial encounter and read the conversation mainly in terms of the non-European's influence on the European. They find most extreme the Derridean-derived deconstructionist view that treats

Class counts: comparative studies in class analysis

1. Class analysis Part I. The Class Structure of Capitalism and its Transformations: 2. Class structure in comparative perspective 3. The transformation of the American class structure, 1960-90 4. The fall and rise of the petty bourgeoisie Part II. The Permeability of Class Boundaries: 5. Class-boundaries permeability: conceptual and methodological issues 6. Permeability of class boundaries to intergenerational mobility 7. Cross-class friendships 8. Cross-class families Part III. Class and Gender: 9. Conceptualizing the interaction of class and gender 10. Individuals, families and class analysis 11. The non-effects of class on the gendered division of labor in the home 12. The gender gap in workplace authority Part IV. Class Structure and Class Consciousness 13. A general framework for studying class consciousness and class formation 14. Class consciousness and class formation in Sweden, the United States and Japan 15. Class, state employment and consciousness 16. Temporality, class structure and class consciousness Part V. Conclusion 17. Confirmations, surprises and theoretical reconstructions Index.

The Zeitroman of the Late Weimar Republic

During the turbulent Weimar era, the Zeitroman emerged as a literary genre with sharp social and political criticism as its focus. Morally or ideologically engaged writers across the political spectrum - Willi Bredel, Hans Fallada, Irmgard Keun, Erich Kaestner, and Ernst von Salomon among others - used current events to craft novels that sought to persuade a wide readership of the need to reform German society. How did these novels present the lives of blue-collar workers, the petty bourgeoisie, women, intellectuals, and right-wing activists? How were they received by the press and the public? And why are many locked in the literary history of their period, while others find resonance beyond their own time and culture?

Shopkeepers and the Swedish Model: The Petty Bourgeoisie and the State during the Interwar Period

When the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party came to power in 1932, Sweden experienced a turning point in its history. For the first time the role of the Social Democratic Party in the construction of the welfare state became significant. Until the end of the 1910s the Social Democrats had concentrated their primary efforts on the problems of trade union recognition and the struggle for parliamentary democracy. After 1920 the Social Democrats became the largest party, but did not gain political power except for a brief interlude. The concept of the ‘Swedish Model’ has often been used in Sweden and abroad to describe the unique development of Swedish society in the twentieth century. However, historians and social scientists have tended to analyse Swedish society without a clear definition of the very concept, the ‘Swedish Model’.

Differences between proposals for implementation of the social class concept in epidemiological studies

This article compares different proposals for the implementation of the concept of social class and analyzes the alternatives used in each proposal, considering previous epidemiological studies on this issue and the potential of such a concept as a central category in studies on social determination in the health/disease process. Seven basic differences were identified, pertaining to the following aspects: class structure; research objective; the social class concept as a reference; the decision as to which individual has his/her occupational activity taken as defining the family's social class; the class status of the unemployed, housewives, and the retired; class status of students; and criteria for distinguishing between the "bourgeoisie", "petty bourgeoisie", "new petty bourgeoisie", and "proletariat" and whether there is a specific flow in certain population groups. Given the observed differences and underlying theoretical models, this study discusses problems related to the fact that the use of a specific concept of social class can have various implementation models.

Contradictory Class Definitions: Petty Bourgeoisie and the "Classes" of Erik Olin Wright

The "two-class model" of capitalism widely attributed to Marx neglects his analysis of the capitalistic characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie. Erik Olin Wright exemplifies those who, by regarding petty bourgeois owners as "precapitalist," and rejecting the labor theory of value, fail to recognize the capitalist nature of the "old" middle class. This leaves Wright without the conceptual tools needed to analyze the capitalistic relations of the "newer" middle strata of salaried professionals and managers as well and leads him to adopt "classless" concepts typical of petty bourgeois ideology itself. A return to the Marxist conception of a capitalist petty bourgeoisie allows a unified analysis of the class position of both "old" and "new" middle strata.

African Capitalists in African Development

African Capitalists in African Development, C. Leys The Ivoiren J. Rapley Domestic Capitalists and the State in Kenya, D. Himbara The African Petty Bourgeoisie and the Struggle for Acceptance in Zimbabwe, S. Nicholas Industrial Policy in Zimbabwe - the Role of the National Bourgeoisie, T. Ostergaard Accumulating Wealth, Consolidating Power - Renterism in Senegal, C. Boone The Alliance of Oil and Maize - the Response of Indigenous and State Capital to Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, P. Lubeck and M. Watts State Deterioration and Capitalist Development - the Case of Zaire, J. MacGaffey African Industrialisation in Comparative Perspective - the Question of Scale, D. Brautigam The Bourgeoisie in Context - Culture, Technology and the State, B. Berman.

Liquor and Leadership: Temperance, Drunkenness and the African Petty Bourgeoisie in South Africa

(1994). Liquor and Leadership: Temperance, Drunkenness and the African Petty Bourgeoisie in South Africa. South African Historical Journal: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 128-148.

‘The Last Great Bourgeois’: on the Plays of Henrik Ibsen

The death of Ibsen in 1906 prompted a number of appraisals of the dramatist by Marxist critics, notably Clara Zetkin, Henrietta Roland-Holst, and George Plekhanov. The most extended of these was Anatoly Lunacharsky's article, ‘Ibsen and the Petty Bourgeoisie’, published in three parts in Obrazovanie, St. Petersburg, Nos. 5–7 (June-August 1907). The central section, ‘Ibsen's Dramas’, is printed below. Born in the Ukraine in 1875, Lunacharsky became a Marxist in his teens and joined the Moscow Social Democrat group in 1899. Arrested for his political activities, he was exiled to Northern Russia, where he wrote his first theoretical treatise, An Essay in Positive Aesthetics. In 1903 he joined the Bolsheviks, but broke with Lenin after 1905, having identified himself with the so-called ‘God-seeking’ tendency. Following the fall of Tsarism in 1917 Lunacharsky rejoined the Bolsheviks, and after the October Revolution he was appointed to Lenin's first ‘Cabinet’ as Commissar for Enlightenment, a post embracing the arts and education. Exceptionally, he retained this position up until 1930, when he became one of the Soviet Union's two representatives to the League of Nations. He died in 1933, shortly before he was due to become Soviet ambassador to Spain. Lunacharsky's published output runs to some 1,500 articles, embracing philosophy, aesthetics, and theoretical and critical writings on all the arts. He also wrote a number of plays, including Faust and the City (1918) and Oliver Cromwell (1920). He was an intellectual of wide erudition and acute critical perception, balancing respect for the old and the traditional with encouragement for the new and the inconoclastic. As Commissar for Enlightenment, he did much to defend the early avant garde's freedom to experiment, making the Soviet Union a power-house of artistic innovation.

The Contradictions of Community Politics: The African Petty Bourgeoisie and the New Brighton Advisory Board, c. 1937–1952

Studies of the politics of urban African communities in South Africa have focused on the sporadic manifestations of mass protest, identifying formal labour and political organizations as the prime agents of mobilization. Whilst some recognition has been accorded to the role played by vigilance and civic associations in contributing to the growth of community politics, Advisory Boards and other government-created institutions have been portrayed as ‘collaborationist’ bodies, and those serving on such Boards dismissed as ‘stooges’. Looking beyond the political rhetoric that has surrounded the Advisory Boards, the historical reality has been more complex. Although Advisory Boards lacked legitimacy, and were often powerless in policy terms, even progressive political organisations were prepared to use these ‘institutions of the oppressor’ to further their aims in the 1940s and 1950s. This case study of the politics of the New Brighton Advisory Board demonstrates the way in which such institutions provided a platform (albeit a limited one) from which African communities might be mobilized around the everyday issues of urban life. In this way, the Advisory Board contributed to the formation of a strong political tradition in the Port Elizabeth township. This tradition was appropriated by different political groups and used to mobilize the African community around a variety of social, economic and political issues affecting the township.

The Ideal of the Christian Couple: Ign. Pol. 5.1–2 Looking Back to Paul

Reflecting upon ethical ideals upheld by the Apostolic Fathers scholars have noted the presence of a ‘positive attitude towards pagan society’, ‘ideas comparable to those of nineteenth-century petty bourgeoisie’, a vision of the church made up of ‘generous householders, well-disciplined children, submissive wives, and reliable slaves’. Commenting on the renunciation of Paul's preference for virginity by the beginning of the second century, Elizabeth A. Clark concludes that ‘… the ordering of the household deemed normal by late ancient pagan society tended to prevail in Christianity as well’. Recent work on the implications of remaining unmarried for the lives of early Christian women has perhaps allowed the tipping of the scale away from the preference for the privileges of virginity towards the ideal of wifely submission to stand out in even fuller relief. The obvious question is why the Christian ideal of the married couple with its apparent openness to Greco-Roman ethics emerges so boldly at the turn of the century. The attractive solution most frequently proposed is, as Clark puts it, that wives exhibiting the characteristic virtues of good domestic order, discretion and modesty, stood as ‘apologists for the new faith’.

The Roots of Parliamentary Socialism in Australia, 1850-1920

The Australian Labor Party was formed in 1891 as the political wing of a working class mobilisation that sought to curtail business power in the interests of working people. In 1905 it weakly acknowledged the socialist component of its vision. In 1910 the Australian Labor Party formed the first working class majority government in the world. In 1921 an angry trade union movement forced a thoroughgoing socialist objective on the party in response to the failure of national and state Labor governments to advance or even protect working class interests. In this narrative of events may be discerned two views of parliamentary socialism in Australia. In the first the stress is on the term 'parliamentary'. The parliamentarism of the party blocks the socialism of the working class militants. Parliamentary socialism in fact is no more than labourism, a pragmatic response to the immediate needs of wage-earners. There can be no progress to socialism by working through capitalist institutions. But supposing we try a different reading of this narrative. Now the stress is on the term 'socialism', and on the ruling class resistance that it elicited. The problem for the labour movement is to find a way to unite its parliamentary and industrial wings so that a socialist agenda can be pursued in both parliament and community organisations. A Labor government can and does protect workers and consumers at the expense of employers; workers organised around extending democracy at work and in the community strengthen the parliamentary party's determination to stick to its socialist agenda in the state. Parliamentary socialism is the legislative arm of the movement to democratise society. Institutions are not intrinsically capitalist or socialist, but sites for political struggle. These two readings indicate that the history of parliamentary socialism has to be a theorised history. In fact there has only been one such history of parliamentary socialism in Australia, V. Gordon Childe's How Labour Governs, which appeared in 1923. This paper does not try to extend Childe's form of class analysis into the present; rather it is concerned to extend it back into the late nineteenth century, to provide an enlarged discussion of the roots of parliamentary socialism. It has two other concerns, also inspired by Childe. Both of them carry the theory of parliamentary socialism beyond the models used in the contrasting readings described above.1 The first of these concerns may be expressed in the proposition that parliamentary socialism is an option not only for the working class but also for small rural and urban producers, for shopkeepers, self-employed artisans and professionals. 'From its foundation', as Childe said, 'the Labour Party has had to look for allies outside the working class and the few middle class protagonists of proletarian revolt/ (74). He explained how the bonds of democratic and nationalist sentiment as well as economic interest attracted the petty bourgeoisie to the party. Various state agencies and enterprises were set up by Labor to help the small producers escape the grip of the monopolists while supposedly carrying the whole society towards socialism. We should take a broader view than Childe, and say that parliamentary socialism in Australia was a matter of inter-class accommodations steered by the relations between political forces in the state, accommodations whose origins predated the Labor party.

Small and Medium-Scale Industry In Greece: Oasis of Dynamism or Symptom of Malaise?

This paper, informed by the experience of other countries, examines the logic of development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Greece. It argues that the development of SMEs is historically connected to a double process: the accumulation of capital on an expanded scale, and the production and reproduction of the Greek petty bourgeoisie, as a means of consolidating the hegemony of the capitalist class. Thus SMEs, statistically examined in terms of comparative rates of growth, sizes of employment, magnitudes of value added per person, levels of wages and salaries and degrees of labor productivity, are neither exogenous to Greek capitalism nor declining pockets in an otherwise dynamic system. Rather, they are an intrinsic and structured part of the Greek economy.