Processing Of Persuasive Messages Research Articles

Biassed processing of persuasive information: on the functional equivalence of cues and message arguments

AbstractResearch on persuasion has shown that inferences based on heuristic or peripheral cues can bias the subsequent processing of persuasive messages. Two studies (total N = 296) examined the additional possibilities that a message argument can serve as a biassing factor and cue‐related information can serve as the target of processing bias. It was demonstrated that a message argument can bias (a) the processing of subsequent other message arguments (Study 1) and (b) the processing of subsequent cue information (Study 2). Results are discussed within dual‐process models and the recently developed unimodel of persuasion. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

An Extension of the Activation Model of Information Exposure: The Addition of a Cognitive Variable to a Model of Attention

The principal objective of this article is to offer an extended theoretical framework for further development of persuasive message design for media-based health campaigns. Drawing upon considerable convergent evidence that attention to and processing of persuasive messages is a function of both cognitive and biologically based processes, we consider implications for attention and processing from an extension of the activation model of information exposure through the addition of a cognitive variable associated with the elaboration likelihood model, need for cognition. The overall goal is to determine how target audiences are optimally influenced with persuasive health information that attracts and holds attention, triggers information processing, and eventually brings about behavior change.

Caffeine, Cognition, and Persuasion: Evidence for Caffeine Increasing the Systematic Processing of Persuasive Messages

Caffeine is known to increase arousal, attention, and information processing–all factors implicated in facilitating persuasion. In a standard attitude-change paradigm, participants consumed an orange-juice drink that either contained caffeine (3.5 mg/kg body weight) or did not (placebo) prior to reading a counterattitudinal communication (anti-voluntary euthanasia). Participants then completed a thought-listing task and a number of attitude scales. The first experiment showed that those who consumed caffeine showed greater agreement with the communication (direct attitude: voluntary euthanasia) and on an issue related to, but not contained in, the communication (indirect attitude: abortion). The order in which direct and indirect attitudes were measured did not affect the results. A second experiment manipulated the quality of the arguments in the message (strong vs. weak) to determine whether systematic processing had occurred. There was evidence that systematic processing occurred in both drink conditions, but was greater for those who had consumed caffeine. In both experiments, the amount of message-congruent thinking mediated persuasion. These results show that caffeine can increase the extent to which people systematically process and arc influenced by a persuasive communication.

Uncertainty Orientation in the Group Context: Categorization Effects on Persuasive Message Processing

Persuasive messages often originate from in-group or out-group sources. Theoretically, in-group categories could facilitate heuristic-based message processing (because of the attractiveness of in-groups and their social reality cues) or systematic-based processing (because of high personal relevance of the message). The authors expected individual differences in uncertainty orientation and socially based expectancy congruence to be important variables in understanding these processes. Participants were exposed to strong or weak, in-group or out-group messages that were either expectancy congruent (in-group agreement, out-group disagreement) or expectancy incongruent (in-group disagreement, out-group agreement). As predicted, uncertainty-oriented participants increased systematic information processing under incongruent conditions relative to congruent (i.e., relatively certain) conditions; certainty-oriented individuals processed systematically only under congruent conditions. These findings suggest that uncertainty that has been created through social-categorization conflicts is treated differently by people of different personality styles.

Fear appeals motivate acceptance of action recommendations: evidence for a positive bias in the processing of persuasive messages.

Three experiments are reported that tested the hypothesis that the use of fear appeals in health persuasion may lead to positively biased systematic processing of a subsequent action recommendation aimed at reducing the health threat and, consequently, to more persuasion, regardless of the quality of the arguments in the recommendation. The levels of participants' vulnerability to as well as the severity of a health risk were varied independently, followed by a manipulation of the quality of the arguments in the subsequent action recommendation. The dependent variables included measures of persuasion (attitude, intention, and action), negative affect, and cognitive responses. The results show that participants who felt vulnerable to the health threat were more persuaded, experienced more negative emotions, and had more favorable cognitive responses. Both negative emotions concerning one's vulnerability and positive thoughts concerning the recommendation mediated the effects of vulnerability on persuasion.

Anger, fear, uncertainty, and attitudes: a test of the cognitive-functional model

The cognitive-functional model of discrete negative emotions and attitude change (CFM; Nabi, 1999) attempts to bridge the theoretical gap between “emotional” and “rational” approaches to persuasion by focusing on how emotions motivate attention to and processing of persuasive messages. As a first test of the CFM, this study explored the effects of 2 emotions, anger and fear, and 2 levels of expectation of message reassurance, certainty and uncertainty, on attitudes toward domestic terrorism legislation. Results supported a main effect for emotion type, suggesting that anger promotes deeper information processing than fear, and a main effect for reassurance certainty level, with uncertainty promoting deeper information processing. The expected interaction between emotion type and reassurance expectation level was not found. Implications of these findings for the model and persuasion research generally are discussed.

The effects of anger, sadness and happiness on persuasive message processing: a test of the negative state relief Model

Although scholars have posited that message strength has a weak effect for those in happy moods, and a strong effect on individuals in sad or neutral moods (e.g., Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992), research findings reveal contradictory results. Moreover, several theoretical observations of this effect have treated emotion as if it exists on a continuum with “negative emotion” on one end, and “positive” emotion on the other end. We sought to further examine the affect of happiness and sadness on persuasion, and to compare these effects with the impact of anger on attitude positivity and persuasive message processing. We predicted if the negative state relief model is the dominant model of emotion, then anger and sadness should “behave” similarly, but if emotions are discrete and unique, anger and sadness should elicit distinct effects. A4 (anger, sadness, happiness, control) X2 (strong message, weak message) independent groups design was employed. Consistent with past research, message strength was positively correlated with attitude, intention and behavior, but was negatively correlated with negative thoughts, and counterarguments. When considering recall, and thought relevance unique interactions emerged dependent on the emotion(s) participants experienced. In general, the negative state relief effect was not supported.

Able but not motivated? The relative effects of happy and sad mood on persuasive message processing

The effects of happy and sad moods on systematic processing are examined in the present study. Research has indicated that positive mood leads to less systematic processing, and negative mood heightens systematic processing. Debate has ensued as to whether persons in a positive mood lack the cognitive ability to process messages systematically (e.g., Worth & Mackie, 1987), or lack the motivation to process systematically (e.g., Bohner et al., 1992). In the present study, it was posited that, consistent with Cialdini's Negative State Relief Model (1973), persons in a positive mood lack the motivation to process, but do not lack the cognitive ability to do so. An experiment was designed to test this motivational hypothesis by varying outcome involvement, message strength, and mood. Contrary to the cognitive inability hypothesis, results indicated that persons in a positive mood do have the cognitive capacity to process systematically, but that message strength is the major predictor of attitude.

The "hired gun" effect: assessing the effect of pay, frequency of testifying, and credentials on the perception of expert testimony.

Three experiments addressed the proposition that jurors use short cuts in processing information when confronted with expert scientific testimony. The results of the first two studies demonstrated that experts who are highly paid for their testimony and who testify frequently are perceived as "hired guns." They are neither liked nor believed. The results of the third experiment replicated the hired gun effect and showed that it is most likely to occur when the testimony is complex and cannot be easily processed. The results were discussed in terms of the theoretical differences between central and peripheral processing of persuasive messages in a legal context.

Ambivalence and Persuasion: The Processing of Messages about Immigrant Groups

Previous research has found that ambivalence is an important characteristic of attitudes toward minority groups. In the present research, we determined whether people who are ambivalent toward a minority group exhibit more systematic processing of persuasive messages pertaining to the group than do people who are not ambivalent toward the group. To test this hypothesis, we measured 113 participants' ambivalence toward Oriental people. After a delay, the participants were presented with a persuasive message that contained either strong or weak arguments in favor of immigration from Hong Kong. We examined the effects of the persuasive message on agreement with immigration from Hong Kong, attitudes toward residents of Hong Kong, and immigration-relevant thoughts. In accordance with our hypothesis that ambivalence leads to systematic processing, we predicted first that the strong message would cause ambivalent participants to be more favorable toward residents of Hong Kong and toward their immigration from Hong Kong than would the weak message; this tendency was expected to be weaker among nonambivalent participants. Second, we predicted that the effect of message strength on ambivalent participants' agreement with immigration from Hong Kong would be mediated by their immigration-relevant thoughts. Results indicated support for both predictions.

An involvement moderated model of choice shifts

An issue involvement moderated dual process model of choice shifts is developed from Chaiken's (1980, 1987) work on systematic and heuristic processing of persuasive messages. The model predicts that the relative strengths of social comparison and persuasive arguments processes in producing choice shifts are moderated by the amount of issue involvement associated with the decision. The dual process model is compared with persuasive arguments and social comparison models and is found to better fit the data.

The effects of good moods on systematic processing: ?Willing but not able, or able but not willing??

Previous research has indicated that good moods may disrupt systematic processing of persuasive messages (e.g., Worth & Mackie, 1987). Three experiments were conducted to attempt a replication of this disruptive effect and determine whether this effect is attributable either to cognitive capacity deficits (i.e., ability) or to motivational concerns (e.g., mood maintenance, desire to think about something other than the experimental topic). Several similarities were noted across the experiments. First, no interactions between mood and argument strength emerged on measures of message-based persuasion. Similarly, the quantity of message-related thoughts generated by our subjects was not consistently influenced by the manipulation of mood. Most importantly, consistent findings regarding the relationship between polarity of message elaborations and message-based persuasion implied that good moods may have disrupted message processing when (a) the message was low in personal relevance, (b) source information preceded the message itself, or (c) subjects were led to believe that their moods were stabilized by a drug. These results call into question the robustness of the alleged disruptive effect of positive mood on systematic processing, and are incompatible with the view that such effects are attributable to cognitive capacity deficits.

Individual differences as moderators of persuasive message and attitude‐behavior relations

Two individual difference characteristics, need for cognition and argumentativeness, are investigated to determine their impact on persuasive message processing and attitude‐behavior relations. Results indicate that although these characteristics moderate message perception and the relationship between attitudes and behavioral intentions they did not significantly influence message processing.

Processing deficits and the mediation of positive affect in persuasion.

Motivational and cognitive mediators of the reduced processing of persuasive messages shown by recipients in a positive mood were tested. Ss in positive or neutral moods read strong or weak counterattitudinal advocadies for either a limited time or for as long as they wanted. Under limited exposure conditions, neutral mood Ss showed attitude change indicative of systemic processing, whereas positive mood Ss showed no differentiation of strong and weak versions of the message. When message exposure was unlimited, positive mood Ss viewed the message longer than did neutral mood Ss and systematically processed it rather than relying on persuasion heuristics. These findings replicated with 2 manipulations of mood and 2 different attitude issues. We interpret the results as providing evidence that reduced cognitive capacity to process the message contributes to the decrements shown by positive mood Ss.