Perspective Of Wittgenstein Research Articles

50 Years After Wittgenstein’s Vienna. On Wittgenstein, Toulmin and Philosophy. Tomasz Zarębski in Conversation With Allan Janik

In this interview, Tomasz Zarębski speaks with Allan Janik, co-author of Wittgenstein’s Vienna (1973, with Stephen Toulmin), on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the publication of this pathbreaking book. The conversation concerns the circumstances, motivations and reasons for his undertaking the work on the book, as well as its reception and place in Wittgenstein scholarship. A large part of the discussion refers to his perspective of Wittgenstein, Toulmin’s philosophical writings, and Janik’s own vision of philosophy. The interview took place in Innsbruck on 23rd and 25th August 2023.

Logic and Value in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

AbstractIn Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus (TLP), Wittgenstein gave ethics the same semantic status as logic. This paper first investigates this claim from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s lifelong semantic framework. This reveals that ethical sentences are meaningless expressions, which can only be used to ostensively point out conditions of meaningfulness. Secondly, the paper assesses the implications of this conclusion for understanding the seven cryptic remarks on value and ethics in TLP. Using the connection between will and value in TLP and will and sentence interpretation in Philosophical Investigations, it is suggested that Wittgenstein held lifelong views on value and ethics.

A acolhida do Teorema da Incompletude de Gödel pelos matemáticos

Neste artigo apresentamos nosso entendimento sobre como alguns matemáticos acolheram os resultados estabelecidos pelo Teorema da Incompletude de Gödel. Compreendemos que a postura assumida por Bourbaki e revelada em suas obras diz desse modo de como os matemáticos recepcionaram este importante teorema bem como suas implicações. A atitude é de seguir fazendo Matemática com o mesmo ideal de formalização completa, mesmo ante a prova da existência de um conjunto não vazio de proposições verdadeiras e indecidíveis e consequentemente da incompletude de toda teoria que contenha a aritmética de Peano em sua formalização. Apresentamos também a perspectiva de Wittgenstein em relação ao TIG. Por fim, entendemos que esse teorema é compreendido pela comunidade como mensageiro da incompletude como uma característica da Matemática, não como um impedimento para o prosseguimento da atividade com sistemas formais e sim como um resultado revigorante para a Matemática.

Колір і світло у «пейзажах відчуттів» у романах Мерилін Робінсон про Галаад

У статті проаналізовано особливості використання кольорів і світла в романах Мерилін Робінсон «Галаад» (2004) та «Дім» (2008) з точки зору теорії кольору Вітґенштайна та феноменології відчуттів як чинника атмосфери місця. Для персонажів Робінсон кольори й світло – це складові «пейзажу відчуттів», що формують концепцію дому та визначають підходи до моральних і соціальних дилем. Барви дерев, квітів і трав, кольори домашніх предметів, а також переливи сонячного й місячного світла творять атмосферу родинного життя та дають відчуття домашнього затишку, що має ключове значення для героїв романів. Вітґенштайн у «Нотатках про колір» стверджує, що в кольорі усе є унікальним, оскільки він презентує змінне явище, завдяки чому набуває ідентичності. В теорії атмосфери місця «пейзаж відчуттів» опредметнюється й візуалізується через описування кольорів, запахів та звуків і їх пов’язування з конкретними об'єктами. Для персонажів роману «Дім» кольори, як і інші елементи «пейзажу відчуттів», стають складовою досвіду і пам’яті. Переживання минулого відбувається за допомогою спогадів про сенсорні відчуття, пов’язані з батьківським домом, кольорами, звуками та запахами дитинства. Натомість у романі «Галаад» сонячне й місячне світло, що наповнює навколишній світ красою і божественною радістю, стає для старого Еймеса нагадуванням про наближення смерті. У «Домі» поняття кольору набуває політичного звучання: громадянська дружина Джека – темношкіра і його біла протестантська родина не прийме її у свій дім. Колір стає перешкодою, яку Джекові не подолати, оскільки батьківський дім закритий для інших кольорів. Таким чином, у романах Робінсон кольори і світло як складові «пейзажу відчуттів» стають засобами відображення досвіду персонажів та вираження затаєних емоцій і невисловлених думок.

의료에서 고통에 관한 환자와 의사 간 의사소통의 중요성: 비트겐슈타인의 고통 해명을 중심으로

Since pain is an internal or subjective experience, it is not possible for a doctor to experience a patient’s pain directly or to understand it fully. However, patients do describe or express their pain using language, which Wittgenstein considered to be a public phenomenon. It is primarily through language that a doctor understands a patent’s pain. This article examines the issue of pain within the context of medical care from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. It is argued that Wittgenstein’s thinking illuminates what pain is and also how it should be understood by doctors.

The Nature and Task of Ethics from the Perspective of Wittgenstein

The Nature and Task of Ethics from the Perspective of Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons

In The Sources of Normativity (Korsgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Christine Korsgaard tried to argue against what she called the ‘privacy’ of reasons, appealing to Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language. In recent work she continues to endorse Wittgenstein's perspective on the normativity of meaning, although she now emphasizes that her own argument was only meant to be analogous to the private language argument. The purpose of the present paper is to show that the Wittgensteinian perspective is not only not useful in support of Korsgaard's general project, but that it is positively inimical to it, in two ways. First, Wittgenstein opposes views on which principled or rule-following behavior requires that one be guided by anything like a mental representation of a rule or principle. But for Korsgaard, human action essentially requires this. Second, Wittgenstein systematically attempts to de-emphasize the importance of the first-personal perspective, and to emphasize the social functions even of concepts that might seem deployed primarily from that perspective: for example, concepts of sensations and intentions. This is the reverse of Korsgaard's emphasis. The paper also argues, however, that the private language argument does have some implications for a theory of rationality and reasons.

Estilo y naturaleza: el texto filosófico como imagen de su autor

When the style Wittgenstein shows in his Philosophical Investigations is analyzed, some authors take it as a mere eccentricity of the Viennese thinker, whilst many others consider it as a consequence derived from the peculiar method used in the Philosophical Investigations for dissolving philosophical problems by describing the way in which we mix and misuse language-games. However, we offer in this work a different perspective of Wittgenstein’s conception of style by analyzing a series of remarks in which he takes the style of his writings as an expression of his own nature: to be precise, the style someone shows when he writes about himself shapes an image of his own and non-transferable natur, which should guide all of his acts. Therefore Wittgenstein thinks this kind of self-knowledge is essential not only to live in a decent way, but also to become a deep philosopher.

Motivating Wittgenstein's Perspective on Mathematical Sentences as Norms

The later Wittgenstein's perspective on mathematical sentences as norms is motivated for sentences belonging to Hilbertian axiomatic systems where the axioms are treated as implicit definitions. It is shown that in this approach the axioms are employed as norms in that they function as standards of what counts as using the concepts involved. This normative dimension of their mode of use, it is argued, is inherited by the theorems derived from them. Having been motivated along these lines, Wittgenstein's perspective on mathematical language may appeal also to those who are not friends of or experts on Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics.

Motivating Wittgenstein's Perspective on Mathematical Sentences as Norms

The later Wittgenstein’s perspective on mathematical sentences as norms is motivated for sentences belonging to Hilbertian axiomatic systems where the axioms are treated as implicit definitions. It is shown that in this approach the axioms are employed as norms in that they function as standards of what counts as using the concepts involved. This normative dimension of their mode of use, it is argued, is inherited by the theorems derived from them. Having been motivated along these lines, Wittgenstein’s perspective on mathematical language may appeal also to those who are not friends of or experts on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mathematics.

The Religious Experience from a Later Wittgenstein Perspective

The Religious Experience from a Later Wittgenstein Perspective

THE SUPERNATURAL AS LANGUAGE GAME

Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew?

The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective

This paper discusses Wittgenstein's take on the problem of other minds. In opposition to certain widespread views that I collect under the heading of the “No Problem Interpretation,” I argue that Wittgenstein does address some problem of other minds. However, Wittgenstein's problem is not the traditional epistemological problem of other minds; rather, it is more reminiscent of the issue of intersubjectivity as it emerges in the writings of phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. This is one sense in which Wittgenstein's perspective on other minds might be called “phenomenological.” Yet there is another sense as well, in that Wittgenstein's positive views on this issue resemble the views defended by phenomenologists. The key to a proper philosophical grasp of intersubjectivity, on both views, lies in rethinking the mind. If we conceive of minds as essentially embodied we can understand how intersubjectivity is possible.