Do special times require special taxes? The answer may not be the same from a legal, political, or economic perspective. One type of answer that legislators in Europe – both on the national and the supranational level – have given to the crises that make our times special are fiscal measures targeting extraordinary profits, revenues, or even assets while reserving the collected revenue for specific purposes. This article discusses the arguments for and against such earmarked crisis response measures in the context of their implications in the framework of EU law. It argues that specific earmarks may be attractive for reasons of political psychology such as health expenditure or inflation relief for households and firms. However, they may have unintended legal consequences by putting the respective measure into the scope of other legal regimes such as social security or banking regulation. The article contributes to the current debate about appropriate fiscal measures in times of crisis by pointing to examples of such direct and indirect interactions with primary or secondary EU law based on earmarking.