Personalist Regimes Research Articles

Revisiting the Personalism and Economic Performance Debate: Do All Personalist Dictators Produce Worse Economic Outcomes?

I revisit the debate around personalism and economic performance in dictatorships and the stylized fact that personalist regimes produce poor economic outcomes. Conceiving of and measuring personalism as a time-varying trait of autocratic rule as opposed to a regime typology, I find that many regimes with high personalism scores perform quite well in terms of both gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and growth. Only regimes at the highest levels of personalism have significantly worse performance. These results are based on quantitative analysis of cross-national data from 101 countries between 1960 and 2010 to probe the hypothesis. These early findings are relevant to the growing literature on personalism in dictatorship and raise new questions regarding the conditions under which personalism leads to poor economic outcomes.

Personalism and purges: Are personalist dictators more likely to engage in elite purges?

AbstractObjectiveIn this article, we empirically examine the relationship between personalism and employing purging or cooptation as regime elite management techniques. Much of the literature suggests that there is a close relationship between personalism and the use of violence to maintain power, and thus suggests a connection between personalism and violent purges.MethodsUsing data from 109 autocracies from 1946 to 2008, we employ a seemingly unrelated negative binomial regression estimationResultsWe find that personalist regimes are not more likely to engage in purges when compared to other regimes. Further, the results suggest that personalist regimes are not more likely to rely on purges as an elite management strategy. In fact, our analysis suggests that personalism as a regime attribute (rather than as an institutional type) is associated with less (not more) use of purges and that personalism tends to be more associated with the use of cooptation than purges.ConclusionWe offer an explanation for these findings and suggest that future research should focus on the characteristics of the autocrat as a political agent when explaining the propensity to engage in different elite management techniques.

Personalism and Negotiation during Civil Conflicts

Abstract Under what conditions do authoritarian regimes negotiate with the rebels and accept mediation during civil conflicts? While extant literature on autocracies and conflicts has demonstrated that personalist regimes are most likely to experience both interstate and civil wars, scholars have paid less attention to how civil conflicts unfold under these regimes. Meanwhile, the characteristics of the state fighting civil conflicts can profoundly influence the battlefield dynamics, the state's willingness to negotiate, and the involvement of third-party actors. However, extant research on civil war negotiation and mediation has not identified the specific types of states that engage in negotiations. Building on research in authoritarian politics and wartime negotiation, I build a theory that connects personalist regimes with negotiation and mediation during civil conflicts. I argue that personalist regimes are more likely to negotiate with the rebels due to their low military effectiveness and high level of policy flexibility. The repressive nature of personalist regimes and their lack of credibility make bilateral negotiations more difficult to occur, increasing the probability of third-party mediation. Using comprehensive data on authoritarian regimes and civil war negotiations, this article finds support for these arguments.

The regional dimension of Russia’s resilience during its war against Ukraine: an introduction

ABSTRACT This symposium challenges the common perception that authoritarian regimes are less resilient than democratic ones because they lack the sources of democratic resilience. We focus on Russia, a personalist authoritarian regime, which has demonstrated a surprisingly high level of resilience during its war against Ukraine. We argue that for a territorially large and diverse country such as Russia, the critical dimension of resilience is manifested in maintaining central control over the entire territory of the country during times of crisis. Contributions in this issue explore the sources and limits of Russia’s territorial resilience. We argue that, while the personalist regime in Russia has demonstrated coping and adaptive dimensions of resilience, its transformative dimension remains questionable.

Qaddafi’s Downfall in Libya

Abstract Muammar Qaddafi’s downfall arguably came as a surprise to many given that he had been able to successfully run a personalist regime from 1969 to 2011. This paper examines the factors that led to Qaddafi’s downfall and seeks to determine which ones can be primarily credited with causing the end of his rule. The paper theorizes that there are four main factors that led to Qaddafi’s downfall: a) governance, b) military, c) media, and d) international intervention. It argues that governance and the military proved to be a source of strength up until the Arab Spring—which was an exogenous shock in itself. Out of the four variables, the paper also finds that during the Arab Spring, the external intervention proved to be a detrimental factor for the Qaddafi regime as it destroyed the military apparatus. The protests also brought to the fore the polarization and grievances of the people that had been simmering under the wraps of the personalistic governance model of Qaddafi. Thus, the Arab Spring converted governance and military from sources of strength into sources of weakness, thereby contributing towards Qaddafi’s downfall.

Boys and Their Toys: Status Inconsistency in Non-democratic Regimes and the Import of Major Weapon Systems

Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.

Policymaking in personalist dictatorships: a theory of outbidding

ABSTRACT This article offers a novel perspective on policymaking in personalist dictatorships based on outbidding theory. Originally developed with reference to ethnic conflict and terrorist organizations, outbidding suggests that individuals or organizations compete for support from their relevant audience, which produces predictable outcomes. I present a modified version of outbidding theory derived from the incentives faced by autocratic elites’ desire to avoid upward accountability and attract the favour of the dictator. I probe the theory’s plausibility for explaining policymaking in one prominent authoritarian legislature, the State Duma in Russia. Using two conditions “most likely” to reveal outbidding dynamics – the archetypal personalist regime of Putin’s Russia and the realm of electoral policy – I couple quantitative text analysis with rigorous study of legislative debates. The findings support the existence of outbidding behaviour in Russian policymaking, suggest that it may result in positive outcomes for Duma deputies, and substantiate outbidding’s effects on the repressiveness of public policy.

Regime Types, Regime Identities, and African Foreign Policies

Despite the common interests of African states vis-à-vis the rest of the world, African states display autonomy and variety in their foreign policies with one another. How can we account for this variation? This article advances the idea that regime type and regime identity frame the overall foreign policies of African states. It identifies three regime types: the competitive multiparty regime, the party-dominant regime, and the personalist regime. The latter two types have identities that reflect the dominant party's ideology or the ruler's predilections. One can find distinctive patterns of foreign policy associated with each regime type in areas such as relations with Western powers, adherence to African norms, and willingness to engage in continental peacebuilding missions.

“As Inscrutable as the Sphinx, but Far More Dangerous”: Trends in Democratic–Personalist Conflict

AbstractWhile liberal democracies do not go to war with other democracies, they frequently engage in conflict with autocratic regimes. Little research has been conducted, however, to indicate what type of autocracies liberal democracies tend to target. This article demonstrates that liberal democracies are more likely to initiate conflict against personalist regimes, rather than autocracies with some form of collective leadership. I argue that, when a conflict of interest arises between a liberal democracy and a personalist regime, liberal foreign policy elites’ psychology and social identity work together to produce particular emotional responses, predisposing them to favor coercive action against personalist regimes. This paper presents new quantitative evidence regarding patterns in democratic–personalist conflict and introduces process evidence from US foreign policy decision-making during the Gulf Crisis.

Assessing centralization: on Turkey’s rising personalist regime

ABSTRACT Research on non-democratic regimes has accelerated in the post-Cold War world, but inordinate attention paid to procedural definitions of regime type and democratization has reduced the study of utilitarian components in assessing cases of political transition. We utilize two frameworks oft-cited within the comparative authoritarianism literature to evaluate our claim that Turkey has moved from a dominant-party system to one resembling a personalist regime while arguing that elite defection and institutional degradation may catalyse political centralization. In doing so, we refocus evaluative attention on the substantive content of the regime rather than mere modes of perpetuation while reasserting the value of the literature’s diagnostic frameworks to empirically place Turkey’s subtype of authoritarianism.

Personalism and the politics of central bank independence under authoritarianism

This paper provides a domestic explanation for variation in de jure central bank independence (CBI) in nondemocracies. I argue that there is a nonlinear relationship between personalism and CBI: regimes with very low and very high levels of personalism tend to have lower CBI compared to states with intermediate personalism. Where personalization is low, autocrats face greater constraints and more frequent political challenges, leading to increased contestation over political institutions. In these states, leaders choose lower CBI to signal their control over monetary policymaking and prevent dissent over economic policy. In contrast, in strongly personalist regimes, leaders face few risks associated with CBI, but they discount the benefits of CBI and thus prefer not to implement costly central bank reforms. Nondemocracies with intermediate levels of personalism tend to have the highest levels of CBI. I support these arguments using recent data on CBI from 1970–2012.

One or Many? Disentangling the Puzzle of Pro-Government Militia Deployment

Why do some countries harbor pro-government militias (PGMs), while others do not? We assert that the deployment of PGMs depends on topographic, social, and political structures within which governments and rebels operate. Drawing on the concept of opportunity structures, we postulate that structural conditions within which governments are embedded in constitute a contributing factor to the existence and multiplicity of PGMs. Data from the Pro-Government Militia Dataset along with a two-stage hurdle model reveal that personalist regime type and civil wars increase the likelihood of PGM emergence. In contrast, ethnic fractionalization, onshore oil fields, drug production, number of rebel groups, and military prowess influence the number of PGMs.

State breakdown and Army-Splinter Rebellions

In Afghanistan, Libya, Liberia and beyond, armed rebellions have begun when armies fell apart. When does this occur? This paper conducts a large-N analysis of these army-splinter rebellions, distinct from both non-military rebellions from below and from coups, using new data. It finds that they follow a logic of state breakdown focusing on regime characteristics (personalist regimes and the loss of superpower support at the end of the Cold War) rather than drivers of mass mobilization from below. In contrast, these regime-level factors matter much less for the non-military rebellions from below that dominate theorizing about civil war origins. This paper also shows that one option for military rebels lies in not attempting a coup but instead heading straight into a rebellion. This paper thus distinguishes highly different paths to armed conflict, validates the state breakdown approach to why armies fall apart, and extends the well-known tradeoff between coups and civil wars.

Политические режимы и режимные изменения в пене популистской волны

The article studies populist regimes, their relationship with authoritarianism and democracy and modes of their transformation. First, the approaches to conceptualizing populism are critically analyzed; second, the concepts are systematized through the maneuvering on the ladder of abstraction; third, the ways of classifying populist regimes are studied, and fourth, the influence of populism on political regime change is assessed. The authors made an attempt of radial categorization of populism having distinguished its central and peripheral features. On the basis of the minimalist definition of populism by C. Mudde “the idea” revealing itself in the antiestablishment and will of the people discourse, was taken as a central category. Such approach allowed to distinguish three species of populism including ideational, personalist and charismatic, thus making the categorization applicable for comparative research. The conceptualization of populist regimes was reviewed. It is noted that populist regime is rarely conceptualized as a separate type of political regime and is more often associated with personalist regime or as a sub-type of democratic regime. The further development of the B.G. Peters and J. Pierre’s approach led to conclude that populism is a regime modification, inherent in all types if political regimes. Democratic and hybrid regimes are more inclined to such regime modification, that is why the populist regimes evolve multidirectionally. The study concludes that the establishment of populist regime in polities at different levels of political development – from consolidated democracies to premobilized authoritarian and democratic systems – leads to differentiation of functions. In the former cases populist regimes foster the redetermination of the effectiveness criteria for ruling elites and democratic governance in general, and in the latter – populist regimes support the general framework of the in-country political process by filling the institutional gaps.

Authoritarian origins of term limit trajectories in Africa

ABSTRACT The article advances two related arguments with regard to term limit decisions in Sub-Saharan Africa. We should take a long-term perspective on term limit decisions and not describe and explain them as isolated events. Such a historical perspective reveals the remarkably stable patterns according to which some African countries have enforced effective term limits while others have established a tradition of circumventing them. Second, these stable term limit trajectories are shaped by the institutional legacies of different types of authoritarian regimes which had existed before 1990. Single-party authoritarian regimes have thus created a favourable institutional context for the enforcement of term limits, although through two different mechanisms. Personalist regimes, conversely, created an institutional legacy which made the continued circumvention of term limits likely. This argument is developed both theoretically and by looking at the three cases of Tanzania, Zambia and Côte d’Ivoire.

On Peculiarities of the Foreign Policy of Personalist Regimes (Example of Turkmenistan)

The foreign policy of states is often viewed through the prism of the geopolitical, geostrategic or geoeconomic determinants. It is forgotten that in addition to these factors, foreign policy also has a strong human, or personal, factor. This factor is especially evident in authoritarian regimes of the personalist type, in which decisions, including on foreign policy issues, are made by the leader or a narrow stratum of the elite alone. In this case, the personal factor and personal interests of the leader are not limited to other regulators (institutions, elections, etc.). A foreign policy centered on the interests of the first person in this case may differ significantly from what one would assume when analyzing state policy and the national interests of the country. Since power in Turkmenistan is in the nature of a personalist regime, the article attempts to explore, within the framework of the available (very limited) information, the foreign policy of this country from the perspective of the personal interests of the head of state and the Turkmen elite rather than those of the state. In addition to the theoretical framework of the study and a brief personal profile of both presidents, the article also provides examples relating to the two main factors of interest to the leader of the nation and his elite - economic profit and regime security. Comparing the regimes of the first and second president in foreign policy also demonstrates the continuity of the political culture and system in the country. The study shows that the Turkmen regime combines all features of the theoretical conceptions of personalist foreign policy if we look at them as an interrelated complex. The personal characteristic of the president, his almost unshakable position in decision-making, as well as the interests of his entourage, including his family, play a key role in it. On the other hand, the singularity of decision-making makes it easier for those foreign players who have the necessary information about the country’s leader and know how to lead him to the decision they want without regard to other interest groups or institutions in the country.

Sexual Violence by the State: The Role of Political Institutions in Sexual Violence Perpetration

Abstract What explains the variation in sexual violence perpetrated by state-security forces? Prior research has suggested sexual violence is an explicit strategy of violence. More recent work has suggested sexual violence in certain contexts acts as a tolerated practice. I argue that the type of regime institutions influences the perpetration of sexual violence by deterring behavior of individuals and providing pathways to accountability. Authoritarian regimes in general have weaker institutional accountability compared to democracies. Institutions in personalist regimes in particular are geared toward preservation of personal power, rather than accountability for the regime. Regimes with higher accountability will experience lower sexual violence, while those with lower accountability experience higher perpetration. Moreover, the gendered nature of regime institutions influences perpetration of sexual violence where masculine institutions predominate. I test these predictions using cross-national data on the incidence of sexual violence, during both peace and conflict. The results suggest that personalist regimes, and especially regimes with weaker female empowerment or higher levels of corruption, experience more sexual violence. This analysis links political institutions to the toleration of sexual violence by state-security forces, underscoring the importance of institutional structure and behavior in the perpetration of sexual violence.

Max Weber and the Modern Plebiscitary Democracy

The paper offers an interpretation of one of the most controversial concepts of Max Weber: the plebiscitary leader democracy (Führerdemokratie). In particular, it considers Weber’s views on the role of parliament and his assessment of democracy. The question of why the types of legitimate domination do not include democratic legitimacy is discussed, and the author also shows the connection between the conception of plebiscitary democracy and Weber’s theory of bureaucracy. The presentation is not limited to the historical and philosophical analysis of Weber’s views. The main goal of the article is to show how the scientist’s ideas have again become relevant in modern politics. Weber’s concept of plebiscitary democracy is applicable both to analyzing the distortion caused by the crisis of traditional party politics in established democracies and to describing modern personalistic regimes, the legitimacy of which popular elections of a national leader confirm.

The politics of autocratic survival in Equatorial Guinea: Co-optation, restrictive institutional rules, repression, and international projection

Abstract Equatorial Guinea is not only one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes but also a striking case of regime and leader survival. This small, oil-rich state and personalist regime defies conventional wisdom because it is both far more resilient and faces far fewer threats from within the regime and from opposition political parties than other resource-rich states. But how does the regime manage to survive? This study argues that four key mechanisms interact to explain Equatorial Guinea’s record of authoritarian survival. Firstly, co-optation (via patronage, party, and cabinet appointments) which President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and the regime party—Partido democrático de guinea ecuatorial—have used to build internal cohesion and fragment opposition. Secondly, the crafting of restrictive institutional rules (party and electoral laws) that, combined with informal rules, aim to protect the regime’s interests and make participation in political opposition more costly. Thirdly, the use of (selective and diffuse) repression to shield the regime and shrink the living space of challengers. Finally, the regime’s international linkages and projection to gain credibility and offset pressure for change. We argue that autocrats’ survival depends on their ability to play a strategic two-level game: domestic and international.

Presidential Term Limits and Regime Types: When Do Leaders Respect Constitutional Norms?

Why do some leaders respect constitutional provisions like presidential term limits, while others do not? For all regimes, constitutions are important reference texts that provide some basic rules of the game. Within this framework, term limits and electoral laws are crucial because they are directly concerned with the exercise of power. Using Geddes’ regime typology, this article is proposing a regime-oriented approach to explain the variation on the African continent. Democracies, party-based regimes, and military regimes are surely different from each other, but they have a degree of depersonalisation in common that is not found in personalist regimes. For the latter type, term limits are a question of regime survival. Personalist rulers will therefore seek to amend or ignore constitutions, but their success will depend on the cohesion of their ruling coalition. The argument will be illustrated with two case studies: Togo and Tanzania.