We frequently assume that a state of affairs as we find or experience itwhether that state of affairs be cultural, institutional, or personal-both is, and should be, the norm. This objectivization arguably functions to facilitate acceptance of our environment, but it also makes critical assessment difficult and change often beyond contemplation. To what degree does this egocentric phenomenon operate in law, and more specifically among legal scholars? It might be thought to operate little, for legal scholars seem constantly to be engaged in an inquiry into what the law should be. But even those who participate in that inquiry frequently start with fundamental assumptions about the status of law that go unchallenged as other policy issues are confronted. And if the assumption relates to the supposed form of the law, as opposed to its content, there seems to be a lesser tendency to recognize and correct anomaly. The stranger to our legal system does not share this perceptual problem, as he has not yet adapted to this legal environment in which we write and teach.