Permissibility Of Abortion Research Articles

Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity.

A common justification for abortion rights is that the death of the fetus does not violate any of the fetus's time-relative interests. The time-relative interest account (TRIA) of harm and wrongdoing tells us that a necessary condition for harming someone is that his or her time-relative interests are frustrated. Regarding the justification for abortion, this account falls prey to impairment arguments. Impairment arguments entertain cases of prenatal injury, such as the mother using illicit drugs that disable the child. The intuition is that the child who is born with such disabilities is harmed by the mother's drug use. But it is unclear what time-relative interest is violated in cases of prenatal harm. Typical responses to impairment arguments point out that the abortion case is different because the child does not exist to experience such harms; but in prenatal injury + survival cases, the child does live to experience those harms. Thus, the TRIA justification for abortion is not impugned by impairment counter-examples. This article argues that this response to impairment arguments is viciously circular. The response must say that so long as you kill the child, no harm is done. But this assumes that killing itself is morally inconsequential and is not itself a case of harm. The response to impairment arguments, then, assumes the permissibility of abortion.

Abortion, Infanticide, and Choosing Parenthood

Abstract Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nature of parenthood.

The SIA Can’t Just Go with the FLO

Hendricks (2018) has defended an argument that abortion is (usually) immoral, which he calls the impairment argument. This argument purports to apply regardless of the moral status of the fetus. It has recently been bolstered by several amendments from Blackshaw and Hendricks (2021a; 2021b). In this paper, three problems are presented for their Strengthened Impairment Argument (SIA). In the first, it is observed that even with the new modifications the argument, contrary to their insistence, does seem to depend on Marquis’ argument. In order for it not to do so, they would need to provide some other plausible reason why impairing a fetus is wrong that persists in cases of abortion. Because of the restrictions regarding what reasons can be used, they are not entitled to stipulate that some plausible reason can be found. In the second section, the use of an over-ridingness caveat – the most recent modification – is scrutinised. This is shown to either beg the question about the permissibility of abortion by assuming that opposing reasons are insufficient in most cases, or require an entirely separate argument to establish that such reasons are insufficient. Thirdly, I observe that the principle utilised in the latest version of the argument fails to account for undercutting reason, which suggest that the principle, in its current form, is false.

Particular Sexual and Ambitious Attitude threatens the Global Societal Functioning and Individual Wellbeing

The authors begin with the premise that mental well-being, and even the quality of life in many countries worldwide, is not satisfactory. They further assert that the current state of welfare in individual countries can be objectively evaluated, citing the World Justice Project as an example. Objective data relating to the exercise of power reveals that many societies are governed in an authoritarian manner. The authors then recall findings made by Jonathan Haidt and other neuroscientists, who demonstrated that people with conservative attitudes differ from those with liberal-democratic orientations in five psychological traits defined by the terms: harm, fairness, authority, ingroup, and purity. Their own interpretation of these findings leads the authors to formulate a hypothesis explaining why there is a constant tendency for authoritarian regimes to emerge. In the next step of their arguments, the authors state that authoritarian regimes usually maintain a patriarchal social structure, based on the traditional system of customary taboo, adhering to religious mandates. This psychological and social situation leads to vast variations in legal regulations in individual countries regarding dilemmas such as the legality of adultery, pornography, prostitution, the permissibility of abortion, and sex education, which can be illustrated by maps available on Wikipedia. The authors then devote much attention to the links between religious views and the realm of sexuality and their influence in maintaining the patriarchal structure of many societies. In their opinion, the freedom, freedom of speech, and well-being of citizens are often limited from two sides: by oppressive power and by a strict, purist system of taboo. The authors also ponder what can be done to counteract the described social situation. They believe that a persuasive educational program should be developed.

Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral...

American-Muslims, Abortion, and the Construction of a “Normative Communal Conservatism”

The 2022 Supreme Court decision Jackson v Dobbs overturned Roe v. Wade, which provided federal protection to reproductive rights. The Dobbs decision catalyzed reactions from across the American landscape. This is especially true in different segments of American religious thought. One interesting phenomenon increasingly seen in minority religious groups is the bifurcation of intrareligious principles, whereby the religious permissibility of abortion and, to a larger extent, reproductive rights are presented in a binary fashion, facilitating internal conflict and tension within religious groups. One such example is the religious discourse ubiquitous in both the theological and legal realm in the American-Muslim community. The conservative American-Muslim position (i.e., high constraints on abortion) that claims to stem from traditional authority tends to oppose orthodox scholarly consensus, which in fact, aligns more with liberal viewpoints (i.e., low constraints on abortion). How can one make sense of this misalignment? The following paper will provide the legal and theological framework for this discussion, with an introduction to the concept of “Normative Communal Conservatism”, which seeks to explain this seemingly contradictory perspective.

Why Biblical Arguments for Abortion Fail

Abstract While the traditional Christian teaching opposing abortion has been relatively unanimous until the twentieth century, it has been claimed in more recent decades that certain Biblical passages support the view that the fetus, or unborn child, has a lesser moral status than a born child, in a way that might support the permissibility of abortion. In this paper, I address the foremost three texts used to argue this point: Genesis 2:7; Exodus 21:22–25; and Numbers 5:11–31. I argue that interpreting the former in the literal way necessary to support abortion leads to untenable moral and exegetical conclusions, indeed straightforwardly contradicting other Biblical texts. I then demonstrate that the most plausible readings of the other passages—on textual and contextual grounds—do not support a lesser moral status, one of the passages plausibly even supporting full moral status, for the unborn child.

Choice of Language in Discussions on Law. Pregnancy Termination in the Legislative Process of the Polish Sejm of the Eighth Term

Abstract The radicalization of views and the conflict concerning the possibility of, and the rationale for, the institutionalization of termination of pregnancy in Poland usually gain prominence before elections, when political parties, when presenting their programs, bring controversial issues that evoke extreme emotions to the debate. The appearance of the topic of abortion in the discourse is always accompanied by increased attention of the media, which makes the issue even more attractive for politicians. An analysis is presented of the bills amending the Act of 7 January 1993 on family planning, protection of the human fetus, and the conditions of permissibility of abortion, also known as the “Family Planning Act” or the “Anti-Abortion Act,” as well as of parliamentary debates1 focused on the issue of the right to abortion in Poland, that is primarily those debates where the issue of expanding or narrowing the enumerative catalog of prerequisites for permissibility of abortion was discussed. The temporal scope of the subject matter includes the legislative processes that took place before the eighth term of the Sejm. The paper is an attempt to interpret the regularities observed during the research and does not aspire to be an exhaustive description of the topic.

The sanctity of life as a sacred value.

The doctrine of the sanctity of life has traditionally been characterised as a Judeo-Christian doctrine that has it that bodily human life is an intrinsic good and that it is always impermissible to kill an innocent human. Abortion and euthanasia are often assumed to violate the doctrine. The doctrine is usually understood as being derived from religious dogma and, as such, not amenable to debate. I show that this characterisation of the doctrine is problematic in a number of ways, and I go on to rethink the doctrine. In doing so I follow in the footsteps of Ronald Dworkin, who offered a characterisation of the doctrine in his 1993 Life's Dominion, drawing on a conceptualisation of sacredness that is radically different from standard ones and not dependent on religious dogma. I'll argue that although Dworkin's efforts have much to recommend, his conceptualisation of sacredness is inadequate. Dworkin attempted to reconceptualise sacredness 'from the armchair'. Here I explain how sacred values are thought of in anthropology and psychology and argue that the sanctity of human life should be understood in the same way. I'll explain how doing so allows us to resolve a number of conceptual problems that bedevil standard characterisations of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. I'll also consider the possibility of a compromise over the sanctity of human life, and as a consequence, compromise over the permissibility of abortion and euthanasia. I'll argue that such compromise is possible, albeit difficult to achieve.

Current issues of legal regulation of abortions in Ukraine

The article is devoted to the main issues related to the realization of the right to life of the unborn child, as well as the mother’s right to self-determination regarding the ability to dispose of her body. The question of the moment of the beginning of the child’s life is also investigated. In determining the moment of the beginning of life, the author distinguished between the concepts of “embryo” and “fetus”.
 The urgency of the work in connection with the constant discussions and debates that take place among scientists, lawmakers, physicians and biologists not only in Ukraine but at the global level is analyzed.
 Pro life and pro choice approaches to determining the beginning of a person’s life are considered. The division of states is indicated, depending on the legislative permission for abortion, as well as social, economic and medical indicators. The urgency of the work in connection with the beginning of Russian aggression and occupation of Ukrainian lands.
 Ukrainian legislation, relevant provisions of the Civil Code, draft laws of Ukraine, which were submitted for consideration but did not enter into force, as well as the position of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to life for the embryo were analyzed.
 Opinions and statements of foreign scientists on the possibility of a mother to decide the future of her child in the womb are given. The division of states is indicated, depending on the legislative permission for abortion, as well as social, economic and medical indicators.
 A look at the problem that determines the beginning of a person’s life is fertilization, it’s not birthday of a child .
 The possibility of amending the Constitution of Ukraine and arguing the need for these changes in Ukrainian legislation to further determine the exact beginning of human life and eliminate legislative conflicts are considered.

Legalitas Aborsi Bagi Korban Perkosaan (Tinjauan Menurut Hukum Positif dan Hukum Islam)

Rape is not only a form of sexual violence that violates human rights but it is also an act that demeans the dignity of the women. The formulation of this research is: how to review criminal law and Islamic law regarding the legality of abortion for rape victims. This is a normative legal research that uses statutory and conceptual approaches. The results of this study conclude that the legality of abortion in Indonesian criminal law as stipulated in the Health Law and Government Regulations on Reproduction Health is in line with Islamic law. Maintaining the physical and psychological health of pregnant women is a rational consideration. However, justifying something that is unlawful due to certain circumstances and causes does not cause something to change its law to become halal. The permissibility of an action that is prohibited by legal norms with certain terms and conditions does not mean that the prohibited norm is principally and fundamentally not valid. Therefore, the basic substance related to the limits on the permissibility of abortion for certain reasons must be actively educated to the public so that it is known that the permissibility of abortion remains within the applicable legal provisions, both criminal law and Islamic law.

Sprawiedliwość a wykładnia postanowień konstytucyjnych. Dylematy sędziego jusnaturalisty

Nowadays, constitutional courts, by applying constitutional provisions, resolve disputes involved in the most controversial moral and social issues and thus change legal orders. This happens not only on the basis of provisions directly protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals (human rights), but also on the basis of other constitutional provisions containing evaluative concepts. Given the axiological openness or aspiration of constitutional acts, one may ask whether the adoption of a position affirming (I) the existence of natural law and affirming (II) the requirement of the compatibility of positive law with natural law, has consequences for the interpretation and application of constitutional provisions. In particular, whether – in the light of natural law – a judge of a constitutional court, when interpreting a constitutional act, may refer directly to moral reasoning and his/her own understanding of natural law. In seeking the answer to this question, the author distinguishes three model theoretical positions: (1) a moral reading of the constitution; (2) a positivist reading of the constitution, and (3) an intermediate position. These positions can be illustrated by the jurisprudence of constitutional courts regarding the permissibility of abortion. While asserting the advantages of the positivist model, the author raises doubts about the feasibility of its implementation. For it may turn out that judges are confronted with the abstract terminology of the constitutional act and, at the same time, with the practical impossibility to precisely reconstruct the axiology of the constitution-maker underlying this terminology with the help of analytical legal tools.

The Pitfalls of the Ethical Continuum and its Application to Medical Aid in Dying

The Pitfalls of the Ethical Continuum and its Application to Medical Aid in Dying

Public exposure of anti-abortion banners in the context of the limits of freedom of expression

In the article, the author analyzes, from the perspective of the limits of the freedom of speech, one of the controversial forms of expression on the permissibility of abortion. This form of expression consists of presentation in public spaces, large-format photographs containing images of bloody dead human fetuses. Banners containing these types of photographs are presented without any restrictions, which means that anyone, including children, can view them. For this text, common court judgements in which the courts held that this form of expression is not protected by freedom of speech were collected and analyzed. The analysis of the judgments of common courts was complemented by reference to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.

The right to abortion in Poland in the light of the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 22 October 2020


 
 
 The article presents the conditions for exercising the right to abortion in Poland following the entry into force of the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 October 2020, ref. no. K 1/20 (Journal of Laws “Dziennik Ustaw” of 2021, item 175), declaring unconstitutional those provisions of the Act of 7 January 1993 on Family Planning, Protection of the Human Foetus and Conditions of Permissibility of Abortion, which provided for the possibility to terminate a pregnancy due to defects in the development of the foetus. Moreover, the publication presents the arguments which were invoked in the analysed judgment and indicates its legal and social effects.
 
 

Triumph and concession? The moral and emotional construction of Ireland's campaign for abortion rights

In March 2018, the Irish government confirmed that a referendum would be held on 25 May, allowing for the Irish public to vote on the legalisation of abortion. The same month, Together for Yes – the national civil society campaign advocating for a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum – was launched. This article draws upon findings from 27 in-depth interviews conducted in December 2019 and January 2020 with Irish abortion activists, to explore the moral and emotional construction of abortion within the ‘Yes’ campaign. This research suggests that the ‘Yes’ campaign, which secured 66% of the votes cast in the referendum, framed abortion as a negative affective object and constructed the moral permissibility of abortion along rather conservative lines. Data from the first year of abortion provision in the Republic of Ireland reveals that abortion seekers still face huge obstacles in accessing services in the State. The legislation introduced in January 2019 allows abortion on request only until 12 weeks, whilst issues remain in relation to the refusal of care. This article, therefore, concludes that by framing abortion in conservative terms, the pro-choice campaign has not yet succeeded in destigmatising abortion in Ireland – an issue now translated into limited legislation and inadequate provision of services.

Is Pregnancy Really a Good Samaritan Act?

AbstractOne of the most influential philosophical arguments in favor of the permissibility of abortion is Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, presented in “A Defense of Abortion.” Its appeal for prochoice advocates lies in Thomson’s granting that the fetus is a person with equivalent moral status to any other human being, and yet demonstrating—to those who accept her reasoning—that abortion is still permissible. In her argument, Thomson draws heavily on the parable of the Good Samaritan, arguing that gestating a fetus in some circumstances is what she calls a Good Samaritan act, and claiming that we are not morally required to be Good Samaritans. Here, I argue that Thomson has subverted the parable to justify an action that is the antithesis of its meaning. I contend that Christians are required to be Good Samaritans, and explain that for Christians, this entails that abortion is impermissible in all circumstances. Furthermore, I argue that the parable shows that the fetus is our neighbor in need of our mercy and assistance, and consequently, Christians should be actively involved in helping to ensure the unborn are protected, whether they are fetuses in danger of induced abortion or miscarriage, or surplus frozen embryos.

Deontic Fallacies and the Arguments against Conscientious Objections

AbstractThe respect for one’s conscience is rooted in a broader respect for the human person. The conscience represents a person’s ability to identify the values and goods that inform her moral identity. Ignoring or overriding a person’s conscience can lead to significant moral and emotional distress. Refusals to respect a person’s conscientious objection to cases of killing are a source of incisive distress, since judgments that it is impermissible to kill so-and-so are typically held very strongly and serve as central moral commitments in one’s moral identity. I think it is wrong for a college basketball coach to pay his players, but I think it is really wrong to kill people. This article argues that any and all arguments for not respecting a conscientious objection to abortion commit a deontic fallacy. Briefly, arguments for the permissibility of abortion are structurally such that abortion is at best permissible, not obligatory. Now, arguments to justify overriding or ignoring a person’s objection to performing action (α) must understand action (α) as being obligatory. Thus, arguments for ignoring conscientious objections to performing abortion are incongruent with the actual philosophical justifications for abortion. Such arguments, then, commit a deontic fallacy.

Moral status of the fetus and the permissibility of abortion: a contractarian response to Thomson’s violinist thought experiment

Judith Jarvis Thomson famously argued that abortion is permissible even if we accept that a fetus qualifies as a person and possesses a right to life. The current paper presents...

Conscientious objection to abortion in the developing world: The correspondence argument.

In this paper we extend Heidi Hurd’s “correspondence thesis” to the termination of pregnancy debate and argue that the same reasons that determine the permissibility of abortion also determine the justifiability of acts involving conscientious objection against its performance. Essentially, when abortion is morally justified, acts that prevent or obstruct it are morally unjustified. Therefore, despite conscientious objection being legally permitted in some global south countries, we argue that such permission to conscientiously object would be morally wrong in cases of morally justifiable termination of pregnancy. After presenting and defending our “correspondence argument” we suggest that conscientious objection should be denied as a matter of public health policy in developing counties, even in cases where adequate referral services are possible. Towards the end, we extend our argument to midwives, nurses, and prospective students in the field. Given their essential position in resource‐poor contexts; they too have no claim to conscientious objection.