Sprawiedliwość a wykładnia postanowień konstytucyjnych. Dylematy sędziego jusnaturalisty

Abstract

Nowadays, constitutional courts, by applying constitutional provisions, resolve disputes involved in the most controversial moral and social issues and thus change legal orders. This happens not only on the basis of provisions directly protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals (human rights), but also on the basis of other constitutional provisions containing evaluative concepts. Given the axiological openness or aspiration of constitutional acts, one may ask whether the adoption of a position affirming (I) the existence of natural law and affirming (II) the requirement of the compatibility of positive law with natural law, has consequences for the interpretation and application of constitutional provisions. In particular, whether – in the light of natural law – a judge of a constitutional court, when interpreting a constitutional act, may refer directly to moral reasoning and his/her own understanding of natural law. In seeking the answer to this question, the author distinguishes three model theoretical positions: (1) a moral reading of the constitution; (2) a positivist reading of the constitution, and (3) an intermediate position. These positions can be illustrated by the jurisprudence of constitutional courts regarding the permissibility of abortion. While asserting the advantages of the positivist model, the author raises doubts about the feasibility of its implementation. For it may turn out that judges are confronted with the abstract terminology of the constitutional act and, at the same time, with the practical impossibility to precisely reconstruct the axiology of the constitution-maker underlying this terminology with the help of analytical legal tools.