The notion of rules is common to the economics of organization and the economics of institutions. These two fields may find a better relation thanks to clearer conceptual distinctions on one hand, and to a more hierarchised systemic approach on the other hand. This may clarify somewhat debates among institutionalist approaches. The paper first discusses the totalizing theory of working rules of Commons, the distinction between the rules of the spontaneous order and those of the organised order in Hayek, and North's view of institutions as rules of the game for organizations. A critical comparison of these three theories raises different questions : the importance of distinguishing organizational and institutional rules, and of taking into account informal and formal rules and their relations at both levels, the teleological character of the organization, the hierarchy of rules at different levels of society. The paper proposes a synthetic and critical approach in trying to articulate individual and collective actions in a systemic framework where organizations are defined as collective and hierarchised ensembles of specific rules, and institutions as general and social rules with higher durability, directly or indirectly sanctioned by the State. The cohesion of various configurations of rules is contingent, subject to permanent tensions, it evolves. It is an essential source of organizational and institutional change in a given system, and it is the origin of crises.
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