Permanent Structured Cooperation Research Articles

Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign Policy

One cannot begin to understand EU foreign policy without taking identity politics into account. First, the differential Europeanization of national identities explains to a large degree why the current European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has not been supranationalized. Second, the gap between the EU’s grandiose rhetoric of being a ‘force for good’ in the world and its inability to put this foreign policy identity at work into practice, largely results from the fact that the EU’s construction of a distinct foreign policy identity is inward rather than outward-oriented. Last, but not least, the EU enlargement discourse, particularly about Turkey, has as much to do with contested self-descriptions of the EU and what follows for its boundaries than with any security or economic considerations. The article starts with conceptual remarks on collective identity, followed by three case studies focusing on the lack of supranationalization of the ESDP, the EU’s foreign policy construction as a civilian power, and the enlargement discourse, particularly with regard to Turkey. I conclude with some policy recommendations. Policy Implications • A ‘coalition of the willing’ should move ahead towards permanent structured cooperation in foreign and defence matters, irrespective of British objections. • The more the EU pursues a coherent foreign policy with one voice, the more it will recognize that its foreign policy identity and its ‘vision for the world’ need to be adjusted. • It is more important for European identity creation to pursue a coherent foreign policy than to embark on an identity discourse that cannot be put in practice. • We need more rather than less public controversies about the boundaries of the EU and how these borders reflect European identity.

The UK and European defence: leading or leaving?

The UK, with France, initiated the European, today Common, Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP) in 19989. A strong consensus on the need to address capability shortfalls, which the UK accepted to attempt under the EU flag, however masked the lack of consensus about the extent to which the EU would also make policy and launch operations (which would require permanent planning and conduct structures). This debate about the degree of EU autonomy vis-a-vis NATO and the US is one of the reasons why Europeans collectively have no strategic vision on the regions and scenarios for which they should assume responsibility, as the Libyan crisis demonstrated. But also on the capability side, the UK in the end never fully committed, withholding the necessary budget to allow the European Defence Agency to operate as intended and resisting moves towards military integration, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation, in favour of bilateral arrangements such as the 2010 agreement with France. Meanwhile, however, the US came to demand that Europe take charge, autonomously, of crisis management in its own neighbourhood. British policy now seems to have struck a dead end. London has managed to slow down the CSDP. NATO has seen even fewer results in capability development, but when it comes to operations, in the absence of US leadership NATO is equally blocked by the lack of a collective European strategic vision. London, with Paris, remains the only European actor able and willing to engage in crisis management and war, but cannot mobilize many other capitals to join in. Unlike the US, the UK does not have the means to go in alone if necessary. A fundamental revision of policy is needed if the UK wants to maintain its level of influence in security and defence.

The European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation: Are We Heading Towards Another Missed Opportunity?

The member states’ military capability deficits are well known. These can be attributed to nationally focused investment which leads to duplication and non-interoperability, the lack of a fully-fle...

CSDP and the ‘Ghent Framework’: The Indirect Approach to Permanent Structured Cooperation?

The move, with the Lisbon Treaty, from a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) must mean more than a change of name. This article pleads for a creative use of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the new mechanism in the area of defence offered by the Lisbon Treaty. Building on the continued will of European Union (EU) Member States to pursue the transformation of their armed forces towards expeditionary operations, notably by exploiting opportunities for further pooling and sharing of capabilities, we propose a Permanent Capability Conference as a high-level political platform to generate effective military convergence. Systematic alignment of national defence planning through such a permanent and structured process at the strategic level will enable each Member State to focus its defence effort on the right capabilities, to do away with redundant capabilities, to make maximal use of pooling and specialization, and to contribute to multinational projects to address Europe's strategic capability shortfalls. In times of austerity, there is no alternative to European cooperation if Europe wants to remain militarily relevant.

European Union Armaments Policy: Options for Small States?

This article addresses the question of small states and their future role in any EU armaments policy. It argues that their traditional tactics of demanding equality of membership in armaments organisations, using protectionist tactics to preserve the indigenous defence industry and using their home markets as a method of gaining advantages for their firms, are increasingly failing at the EU level. A combination of their own choices on defence spending, the agreement to allow permanent structured cooperation within the European Defence Agency and the Commission's efforts to liberalise the defence procurement market seem likely to force most small states into the backseat of EU armaments policy-making.

European Security and Defence in the EU Constitutional Treaty

This contribution analyses the provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (EU Constitution), focusing on elements that constitute a further development of the present acquis in this field. It successively addresses the adoption and status of the EU Constitution and the place of the CSDP therein, the objectives, scope and missions of the CSDP, the actors, decision-making, instruments and implementation, capabilities and permanent structured cooperation, financing, enhanced cooperation and cooperation with third States and other international organisation and concludes with some final remarks. The author argues that the commitment to a common defence as a future objective, the mutual defence clause, even with its caveats, the explicitly broader definition of the EU’s crisis management missions, the possibility of enhanced cooperation on defence and of entrusting the execution of a mission to a group of Member States, the commitment to improve capabilities, the permanent structured cooperation and the creation of the function of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs are significant positive developments in the EU Constitution regarding the CSDP. However, he submits that the CSDP still faces several major challenges, in particular some of the provisions concerned are rather ambiguous, a reference to cooperation with NATO is lacking, Member States will have to live up to their commitments and it remains to be seen whether the EU Constitution will enter into force.