Throughout history many terrorist organisations have originated in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. In their efforts to eradicate the terrorist threat, democracies and their authoritarian counterparts have employed a vast array of measures. Such measures, however, differ according to regime type. Thus, democracies generally have more constraints on their counterterrorist means than authoritarian regimes that are not bound by similar considerations. And while scholars agree on the differences in counterterrorist arsenals, no consensus exists as to whether democracies or authoritarian regimes are superior counterterrorists. This article presents a case study of China, a regime that has been fighting Uyghur separatism and terrorism since its founding in 1949 with authoritarian means. However, while authoritarian crackdowns in Xinjiang have ensured tactical respites leading to periods of relative stability, strategically China has facilitated the construction of a threat more radical than the initial Uyghur challenge. Thus, before September 11 China acknowledged links between Uyghur terrorism and separatism. After September 11, however, China announced it was fighting a war against international terrorist groups in Xinjiang. And while this rhetoric gained international acknowledgement, it at the same time has affected the nature of Uyghur terrorism, which has shifted in response to China’s framing. As a result, today we are witnessing transformations in the East Turkistan Islamic Movement activities, which are becoming increasingly reliant on al-Qaeda’s guidance and support.