ABSTRACT Many firms implement pay cuts to reduce labor costs during organizational crises and there are different ways to distribute pay cuts among employees. We experimentally investigate how employees respond to equal-share pay cuts compared to performance-based pay cuts. We predict and find that the effect of different ways of allocating pay cuts is moderated by employees’ relative performance before the pay cuts. Compared to equal-share pay cuts, performance-based pay cuts lead to higher performance but only for employees who underperform their peers before the pay cuts. Performance-based pay cuts also result in higher team performance. Interestingly, we also find that when pay cuts are caused by an organizational crisis, low performers do not perceive it as unfair to receive a larger share of pay reduction. Our findings contribute to both literature and practice on pay reduction during organizational crises. Data availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: D91; J33; M40.