People's Mental States Research Articles

Mentalizing under influence: abnormal dependence on prior expectations in patients with schizophrenia

An impaired ability to appreciate other people's mental states is a well-established and stable cognitive deficit in schizophrenia, which might explain some aspects of patients' social dysfunction. Yet, despite a wealth of literature on this topic, the basic mechanisms underlying these impairments are still poorly understood, and their links with the clinical dimensions of schizophrenia remain unclear. The present study aimed to investigate the extent to which patients' impaired ability to appreciate other people's intentions (known as mentalizing) may be accounted for by abnormal interaction between the two types of information that contribute to this ability: (i) the sensory evidence conveyed by movement kinematics; and (ii) the observer's prior expectations. We hypothesized that this is not a generalized impairment, but one confined to certain types of intentions. To test this assumption, we designed four tasks in which participants were required to infer either: (i) basic intentions (i.e. the simple goal of a motor act); (ii) superordinate intentions (i.e. the general goal of a sequence of motor acts); (iii) social basic; or (iv) social superordinate intentions (i.e. simple or general goals achieved within the context of a reciprocal interaction). In each of these tasks, both prior expectations and sensory information were manipulated. We found that patients correctly inferred non-social, basic intentions, but experienced difficulties when inferring non-social superordinate intentions and both basic and superordinate social intentions. These poor performances were associated with two abnormal patterns of interaction between prior expectations and sensory evidence. In the non-social superordinate condition, patients relied heavily on their prior expectations, while disregarding sensory evidence. This pattern of interaction predicted the severity of 'positive' symptoms. Social conditions prompted exactly the opposite pattern of interaction: patients exhibited weaker dependence on prior expectations while relying strongly on sensory evidence, and this predicted the severity of 'negative' symptoms. We suggest both these patterns can be accounted for by a disturbance in the Bayesian inferential mechanism that integrates sensory evidence (conveyed by movement kinematics) into prior beliefs (about others' mental states and attitudes) to produce accurate inferences about other people's intentions.

128. Relationship Between Puberty Status and Functional Brain Activity During Social Emotion Processing In Female Adolescents

Adolescence is the transitional stage of physical, psychological and social development between childhood and adulthood. During adolescence there are structural and functional changes in the ‘social brain', that is the network of brain regions involved in understanding other people's mental states and emotions. The social brain includes the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and the temporal poles, regions which undergo developmental change in terms of grey and white matter as measured using structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and also functional activity during social cognition tasks, as measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).

Evidence for deficits on different components of theory of mind in Huntington's disease.

The main aim of this study was to investigate the effects of Huntington's disease (HD) on cognitive and affective Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities. The relation of ToM performance and executive functions was also examined. Eighteen HD patients, early in the course of the disease, and 18 healthy volunteers matched for age and educational levels, were given two tasks: a nonverbal cognitive ToM task assessing attribution of intentions to others and a revised version of the 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' test, which is an affective ToM task assessing the understanding of other people's mental states from their eyes. Participants were also given various executive tests. The two ToM tasks revealed a significant impairment of ToM abilities in HD patients. Executive functioning was impaired in the HD group and ToM performance on the attribution of intentions task was dependent on several executive processes. Our results are consistent with the idea that both cognitive and affective aspects of ToM could be impaired in HD patients, indicating that cortico-subcortical circuits are underlying higher social functions such as ToM. The results are also consistent with the idea that only a few executive mechanisms regulate the ToM abilities we tested in this work. They also provide a basis for the understanding of the disorganized behavior and the breakdown of interpersonal relationships in daily life after HD.

Borderline personality disorder, mentalization, and the neurobiology of attachment.

We discuss the neural and neurobiological underpinnings of the core features of borderline personality disorder (BPD), including emotion dysregulation, impulsivity, disturbed interpersonal functioning, identity diffusion, and feelings of inner pain. We review neurobiological research that supports a developmental, biobehavioral switch-model of the relationship between mentalization, stress, and attachment. Although it is likely that there are different developmental pathways to BPD, involving complex interactions between environmental, biological, and psychosocial factors, the final common outcome of these pathways is a low threshold for the activation of the attachment system and for deactivation of controlled mentalization, coupled with impairments in the ability to differentiate mental states of self and other. This leads to hypersensitivity and increased susceptibility to contagion from other people's mental states, poor integration of cognitive and affective aspects of mentalization, and dysfunctions in stress-regulation systems. The treatment implications of this neurobiologically informed model of BPD are discussed.

What's in a voice? Prosody as a test case for the Theory of Mind account of autism

The human voice conveys a variety of information about people's feelings, emotions and mental states. Some of this information relies on sophisticated Theory of Mind (ToM) skills, whilst others are simpler and do not require ToM. This variety provides an interesting test case for the ToM account of autism, which would predict greater impairment as ToM requirements increase. In this paper, we draw on psychological and pragmatic theories to classify vocal cues according to the amount of mindreading required to identify them. Children with a high functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder and matched controls were tested in three experiments where the speakers’ state had to be extracted from their vocalizations. Although our results confirm that people with autism have subtle difficulties dealing with vocal cues, they show a pattern of performance that is inconsistent with the view that atypical recognition of vocal cues is caused by impaired ToM.

Common and Unique Neural Correlates of Autobiographical Memory and Theory of Mind

There is an inconsistency regarding the relationship between thinking about personal past experiences during autobiographical memory (AM) and thinking about other people's mental states during theory of mind (ToM). Neuroimaging studies of AM and ToM consistently report overlap in the brain regions recruited. Lesion data, however, show that amnesic people with AM impairment can have intact ToM, suggesting that distinct neural mechanisms support these abilities [Rosenbaum, R. S., Stuss, D. T., Levine, B., & Tulving, E. Theory of mind is independent of episodic memory. Science, 318, 1257, 2007]. The current fMRI study examined the functional and neural correlates of remembering one's own experiences in response to personal photos (AM condition) and imagining others' experiences in response to strangers' photos (ToM condition). AM and ToM conditions were matched in terms of content and vividness, and were compared directly and to a common baseline. Analyses revealed common activity within frontal and temporal-parietal regions, yet midline structures exhibited greater activity during AM. More specific analyses of event construction and detail elaboration revealed unique activation of the right hippocampus during AM construction, and of lateral regions, such as the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) during ToM elaboration. Moreover, a region of left hippocampus/perirhinal cortex appeared to be driven by event vividness. Thus, differences in AM and ToM emerge when a common baseline is used and temporal dynamics are taken into account. Furthermore, the right TPJ and related lateral regions, and not the hippocampus, may be needed for ToM, given that this ability is intact in amnesic people.

Effects of aging on mindreading ability through the eyes: An fMRI study

Theory of Mind – ToM, the capacity to understand one's own and other people's mental states and to refer to them to foresee and explain the behaviour – relies upon a circumscribed neural system: the posterior end of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the adjacent temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the temporal pole (TP), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the adjacent paracingulate cortex. To our knowledge, the neural basis of mentalizing has not yet been studied in a developmental perspective covering old age, so the aim of this work is to compare the neural basis of a specific aspect of ToM, the mindreading ability through the eyes, in healthy young and old subjects. Two groups of healthy adults (young: 25.2 years; old: 65.2 years) were submitted to an fMRI scanning while performing the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, which requires the attribution of a mental state to the other person focussing only on the eye-gaze. There was no difference in the behavioural performances between young and old and both groups of subjects activated the pSTS and the TP, thus indicating that old people show no impairment of mentalizing circuits. However, a relevant shifting of the neural circuit implied in each group to solve the task emerged. Old subjects showed a more bilateral activation of frontal areas and a stronger involvement of the linguistic components of the mirror neuron system (i.e. area 44), as compared to young. Both young and old participants activated the non-linguistic components of the mirror neuron system, such as area 6. These findings are discussed taking into account the recent literature dealing with cognitive functions during normal aging.

Theory of mind in Parkinson's disease and related basal ganglia disorders: A systematic review

Theory of mind (ToM), defined as the ability to infer other people's mental states, is a crucial prerequisite of human social interaction and a major topic of interest in the recent neuroscientific research. It has been proposed that ToM is mediated by a complex neuroanatomical network that includes the medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior gyrus cinguli, the sulcus temporalis superior, the temporal poles, and the amygdala. Various neurological and psychiatric diseases are accompanied by aspects of dysfunctional ToM processing. In this review, the association between basal ganglia, involved in the organization of complex cognitive and emotional behavior, and ToM processing is discussed. The purpose of this review is to provide an overview of research on ToM abilities in basal ganglia disorders, especially Parkinson's Disease and related disorders.

A developmental, mentalization-based approach to the understanding and treatment of borderline personality disorder

The precise nature and etiopathogenesis of borderline personality disorder (BPD) continues to elude researchers and clinicians. Yet, increasing evidence from various strands of research converges to suggest that affect dysregulation, impulsivity, and unstable relationships constitute the core features of BPD. Over the last two decades, the mentalization-based approach to BPD has attempted to provide a theoretically consistent way of conceptualizing the interrelationship between these core features of BPD, with the aim of providing clinicians with a conceptually sound and empirically supported approach to BPD and its treatment. This paper presents an extended version of this approach to BPD based on recently accumulated data. In particular, we suggest that the core features of BPD reflect impairments in different facets of mentalization, each related to impairments in relatively distinct neural circuits underlying these facets. Hence, we provide a comprehensive account of BPD by showing how its core features are related to each other in theoretically meaningful ways. More specifically, we argue that BPD is primarily associated with a low threshold for the activation of the attachment system and deactivation of controlled mentalization, linked to impairments in the ability to differentiate mental states of self and other, which lead to hypersensitivity and increased susceptibility to contagion by other people's mental states, and poor integration of cognitive and affective aspects of mentalization. The combination of these impairments may explain BPD patients' propensity for vicious interpersonal cycles, and their high levels of affect dysregulation and impulsivity. Finally, the implications of this expanded mentalization-based approach to BPD for mentalization-based treatment and treatment of BPD more generally are discussed.

The Lives They Left Behind

The Lives They Left Behind

Investigation of Mentalizing and Visuospatial Perspective Taking for Self and Other in Asperger Syndrome

Mentalizing refers to making inferences about other people's mental states, whereas visuospatial perspective taking refers to inferring other people's viewpoints. Both abilities seem vital for social functioning; yet, their exact relationship is unclear. We directly compared mentalizing and visuospatial perspective taking in nineteen adults with Asperger syndrome (AS) and fifteen control participants with the same stimulus material. Stimuli depicted virtual characters surrounded by two different objects. Virtual characters expressed a preference for one of the objects indicated by facial expression, gestures or head/body orientation. Compared to controls, participants with AS showed significantly increased reaction times and decreased accuracy for mentalizing (i.e., when inferring the virtual character's preference from the character's nonverbal bodily cues). By contrast, there were no significant group differences in perspective taking (i.e., by mental own-body transformations). These findings demonstrate, first, specific deficits in AS when mental states have to be inferred from nonverbal social cues. Second, visuospatial perspective taking may not necessarily be related to social impairments occurring in autism spectrum disorders.

Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception

Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts.

Differential involvement of the posterior temporal cortex in mentalizing but not perspective taking

Understanding and predicting other people's mental states and behavior are important prerequisites for social interactions. The capacity to attribute mental states such as desires, thoughts or intentions to oneself or others is referred to as mentalizing. The right posterior temporal cortex at the temporal-parietal junction has been associated with mentalizing but also with taking someone else's spatial perspective onto the world--possibly an important prerequisite for mentalizing. Here, we directly compared the neural correlates of mentalizing and perspective taking using the same stimulus material. We found significantly increased neural activity in the right posterior segment of the superior temporal sulcus only during mentalizing but not perspective taking. Our data further clarify the role of the posterior temporal cortex in social cognition by showing that it is involved in processing information from socially salient visual cues in situations that require the inference about other people's mental states.

False belief reasoning in the brain: An ERP study

Understanding others mind and interpersonal interaction are the cognitive basis of successful social interactions. People's mental states and behaviors rely on their holding beliefs for self and others. To investigate the neural substrates of false belief reasoning, the 32 channels event-related potentials (ERP) of 14 normal adults were measured while they understood false-belief and true belief used deceptive appearance task. After onset of the false-belief or true-belief questions, N100, P200 and late negative component (LNC) were elicited at centro-frontal sites. Compared with true belief, false belief reasoning elicited significant declined LNC in the time window from 400 to 800 ms. The source analysis of difference wave (False minus True) showed a dipole located in the middle cingulated cortex. These findings show that false belief reasoning probably included inhibitive process.

Theory of Mind Is Independent of Episodic Memory

Theory of mind (ToM) to infer other people's current mental states and episodic memory of personal happenings have been assumed to be closely related. We report two participants with severely impaired episodic memory who perform indistinguishably from healthy controls on objective ToM tests. These results suggest that ToM can function independently of episodic memory.

Self-consciousness, consciousness of the other and dementias

Studies of self-consciousness in dementia concern essentially anosognosia or the loss of insight. However, Self-consciousness is multifaceted: it includes awareness of the body, perceptions, one's own history, identity, and one's own projects. Self-consciousness is linked to consciousness of others i.e. to social cognition supported by identification of others, but also by comprehension of facial expression of emotions, comprehension and expression of emotional prosody, pragmatic abilities, ability to infer other's people's mental states, thoughts, and feelings (theory of mind and empathy), knowledge of social norms and rules, social reasoning. The subtypes of dementias (and namely Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia) affect heterogeneously the different aspects of the self-and other-consciousness. Further studies are needed for a better knowledge of the complex relationship between Self-consciousness, social cognition, decision making and neuropsychiatric symptoms and behavioral disturbances occurring in demented patients.

Elevated emotional reactivity in affective but not cognitive components of theory of mind: A psychophysiological study

Recent research proposes that theory of mind (ToM), that is the ability to infer other people's mental state, is a multidimensional construct and that a distinction may be made between affective and cognitive ToM. We examined whether these two subcomponents of ToM correspond to different levels in skin conductance responses (SCRs). Seventeen healthy adults listened to ten affective (faux pas) ToM stories, ten cognitive ToM stories and ten non-ToM stories. Results demonstrated significantly elevated SCR for affective ToM as compared with cognitive ToM and control stories, with no differences in SCR levels in the latter two story types. We discuss the possible underlying mechanisms for these differential psychophysiological correlates of affective and cognitive ToM processing, and suggest further investigations especially in clinical populations.

Neural correlates of true and false belief reasoning

Belief reasoning plays a central role in making inferences about other people's mental states. The ability to reason about false beliefs is considered as a critical test for having a Theory of Mind (ToM). There is some controversy as to whether it is the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) or the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) that is centrally involved in belief reasoning. According to developmental studies of belief reasoning we conducted an fMRI experiment with a carefully controlled paradigm (Sally Anne scenario). We compared false belief reasoning with true belief reasoning in parallel tasks, using a series of cartoon stories depicting transfer of an object unbeknownst to the protagonist (false belief) or with the protagonist witnessing (true belief). The false belief versus true belief contrast revealed activation of the dorsal part of the anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), the right lateral rostral prefrontal cortex and the right TPJ associated with false belief. We suggest that the activation of the dACC and the lateral PFC might be associated with action monitoring and stimulus-independent cognitive processing whereas the activation of the TPJ might be related to the computation of mental representations that create perspective differences, such as a person's false belief that contrasts with reality and therefore might be centrally involved in the decoupling mechanism. Additionally we found common patterns of activation for true and false belief reasoning, including inferior parietal and precuneus activation, but we found no activation of the MPFC or the TPJ in general belief reasoning.

What about theory of mind after severe brain injury?

Background: Behavioural changes are often reported after a severe traumatic brain injury (TBI). These changes are usually a greater burden for relatives than physical or cognitive impairments. This study investigated social cognition in TBI patients using two theory of mind (TOM) tasks.Method: The performances of 17 patients with severe TBI and 17 matched controls were compared on two tasks designed to investigate understanding of other people's mental states: The ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test (RME) and the ‘Character Intention Task’ (CIT). TBI patients and controls were also given several executive function tasks.Results: Compared to healthy controls, patients were impaired in most executive tests and in both TOM tasks. No relationship was found between TOM and executive measures. This is consistent with Rowe's position, who suggested an independence between executive functioning and social cognition. These data suggest that TBI patients may have specific social intelligence disturbances.Conclusion: Future work should employ additional tests of TOM and behavioural ratings and recruit more patients in order to complete analysis.

Cognitive and social impairments in patients with superficial siderosis

Superficial siderosis of the CNS is a rare condition, caused by deposition of haemosiderin in the superficial layers of the CNS due to repeated chronic subarachnoid or intraventricular haemorrhage. Typically, the hindbrain structures, especially the cerebellum, are most affected. There is a surprising lack of studies investigating in detail the behavioural functioning of patients with such a condition. In this study, we document for the first time the cognitive, social and emotional processing of six patients with a confirmed clinical diagnosis of superficial siderosis. They were aged between 40 and 62 years, with a mean age of 50.2 years; four were male. We administered a comprehensive battery of general cognitive ability and social cognitive tasks. A review of MRI was also undertaken. The findings indicate selective cognitive impairments affecting speech production, visual recall memory and executive functions. In addition, a selective pattern of social dysfunction, affecting the ability to represent other people's mental states, was found. These behavioural dysfunctions are reported in the context of MRI-documented lesions maximally involving the cerebellum, in particular the superior vermis, as well as the medial and inferior frontal cortex. These results suggest that superficial siderosis is associated with a distinct pattern of cognitive and social impairments. They are consistent with the recently proposed role of the cerebellum as a modulator of cognitive, social and emotional functions.