World events in recent years increasingly reveal that some of the concepts designed to explain international affairs are no longer operational. The East-West conflictual relationship defined in ideological terms (on both sides) could hardly help us understand President de Gaulle's shoutings against 'American-Soviet hegemony' and the harsh Sino-Soviet polemics; nor could one explain in such terms the joint Soviet-American nuclear treaties or the official Chinese statement at the U.N. that the People's Republic of China belongs to the Third World. The other predominant school the power theorists were startled last winter when a number of backward kingdoms and sheikdoms, surviving from another age, carried out an oil embargo that shook some of the rich and powerful metropoles to their very foundations. And how can one account, in terms of bipolar or pentagonal world models, for the estimation that in the next decade the oil exporting countries will accumulate over half a trillion dollars, which would actually mean control over the bulk of the liquid capital available in the whole world? Indeed, we must think anew and formulate new concepts that would allow us to understand the meaning of these unprecedented phenomena and to see where they take us. It is the assumption of this study that in a shrinking world, with its national units more and more interdependent and caught in a dense network of mutual relations, multiple interaction and crosscutting coalitions, a new type of power is emerging, utterly different from the existing structural one embodied in the nation-state: the systemic power. To start with, let us keep in mind that in international politics there is no center of authority and power, like the state in internal politics, and that this vacuum has been filled throughout history by various formulae of centralization of power supposed to perform, in the international arena, the ordermaintaining and integration functions of the state inside society. While in the old times vacuum generated hegemonal powers (Pax Romana, Pax Britannica) or balance-ofpower schemes (Concert of Europe), after World War II most analysts used the bipolar model with the two superpowers, the US and USSR, then the triangular model (including China in the big game), and more recently the pentagonal model (adding Western Europe and Japan). What is the meaning of this latest diplomatic balance in which one center of power, Japan, though a global eceonomic power, has no significant military force, and another, Western Europe, is a loose union of nine states with a certain degree of economic integration in the EEC and a military force that is neither independent nor sufficiently strong to counter the superpowers in the global strategic game? Apparently, the changes that have taken place in world politics have affected not only the relationship of forces between the major actors, but the dynamics of power itself, in the sense that the relative weight of the military component of power has been reduced in favor of the economic, technological and politico-diplomatic components that have grown accordingly. This is not to say that force will be eliminated from the attributes of power; in spite of its setbacks