Peircean Abduction Research Articles

Integrating Abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation

Tomis Kapitan’s work on Peirce’s conception of abduction was instrumental for our coming to see how Peircean abduction both relates to and is importantly different from inference to the best explanation (IBE). However, he ultimately concluded that Peirce’s conception of abduction was a muddle. Despite the deeply problematic nature of Peirce’s theory of abduction in these respects, Kapitan’s work on Peircean abduction offers insight into the nature of abductive inquiry that is importantly relevant to the task of making sense of explanatory inquiry in the sciences in general. The view developed here stems from his work and involves disambiguating three forms of inference involved in Peircean abduction in terms of Reichenbach’s and Laudan’s context models of inquiry. Importantly, this includes understanding that abduction involves the context of pursuit.

Putting inference to the best explanation into context

It is often assumed that Inference to the Best Explanation, or ‘IBE’, belongs to the context of justification. But several recent developments might lead one to ask whether it is more appropriate to situate it in the context of pursuit. Peircean abduction, which has been designated as an immediate precursor to IBE, is, according to recent scholarship, best located in the context of discovery and pursuit, rather than justification. Furthermore, alleged difficulties in reconciling IBE with Bayesianism have led to a proposal for giving IBE a non-justificatory role, which is close to that of pursuit. I argue, however, that these considerations do not make a strong case for locating IBE in the context of pursuit. Although abduction plays an important role in the context of pursuit, IBE is not simply a renaming of abduction. It has been reconceptualised in a way which makes it unsuitable to operate in the context of pursuit. Considerations concerning the compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism also do not give strong grounds to locate IBE outside the context of justification. This is because we should not expect that the context of justification can be characterised in purely probabilistic terms. Thus IBE should continue to be regarded as a candidate for characterising epistemic appraisal in the context of justification.

Using Peircean abduction to understand teacher mentoring

Lesson observation is frequently used in teacher induction programmes to support newly-qualified teachers in their reflection and classroom enquiry. This article uses an elaboration of Peirce’s abduction to illustrate how the post-observation conversation supports a teacher’s reflection on her teaching, and in particular, her teaching of language to young children. It shows that abduction involves an expert-like intuition, where the interaction and co-enquiry with the advisor was crucial. The analytical framework used is based on six modes of abductive reasoning or inference that deal with potential or possibility, three modes of induction dealing with actuality, and one mode of deduction focusing on rules and regulations. In a context of lifelong learning, with emphasis on teacher learning across the professional lifespan, the article shows how newly-qualified teachers can be supported in using abductive reasoning and engage in worthwhile classroom enquiry. The article contributes to edusemiotics, a recently developed direction in educational theory that explores the philosophical specifics of semiotics in educational contexts.

Introduction: Measurement at the Crossroads

Introduction: Measurement at the Crossroads

Syllogistic reasoning as a ground for the content of judgment: A line of thought from Kant through Hegel to Peirce

AbstractIn this paper I develop Paul Redding's suggestion that Peircean abduction and Hegel's discussion of the syllogism can be seen as a working out of Kant's treatment of the reflecting power of judgment, particularly concerning its role in conceptual change. After some historical background I regiment a use of singular terms, kind terms, and predicates across Hegel's three syllogistic figures and reconstruct an account of comprehension and extension for this system suggested by Peirce. In doing so I show that reasoning according to the ampliative syllogistic figures affects the content of these three classes of terms in precise ways. I close with a treatment of inference by analogy (associated by Hegel with the third syllogistic figure) as an exercise of reflection, and I discuss two cases in the history of science, one in astronomy and the other in biology, where a reflective exercise associated with analogical inference revised our understanding of the domain in question.

Abduction − the context of discovery + underdetermination = inference to the best explanation

The relationship between Peircean abduction and the modern notion of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers, such as Harman (Philos Rev 74(1):88–95, 1965) and Lipton (Inference to the best explanation, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 58; 2004, p. 56), claim that abduction and IBE are virtually the same. Others, however, hold that they are quite different (Hintikka in Trans Charles S. Peirce Soc 34(3):503, 1998; Minnameier in Erkenntnis 60(1):75–105, 2004) and there is no link between them (Campos in Synthese 180(3):419–442, 2009). In this paper, I argue that neither of these views is correct. I show that abduction and IBE have important similarities as well as differences. Moreover, by bringing a historical perspective to the study of the relationship between abduction and IBE—a perspective that is lacking in the literature—I show that their differences can be well understood in terms of two historic developments in the history of philosophy of science: first, Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification—and the consequent jettisoning of the context of discovery from philosophy of science—and second, underdetermination of theory by data.

O Argumento do Milagre comete a Falácia da Taxa-base? Apresentação, Estado da Arte e Questões de Formalização

Objetivamos discutir a crítica, avançada por Colin Howson em Hume's problem, segundo a qual o argumento do milagre (doravante, AM) comete a falácia da taxa-base. Por falácia da taxa-base, entende-se a negligência do valor da probabilidade prévia de determinada hipótese ou teoria T, P(T). Por sua vez, em uma de suas versões, AM assere que apenas assumindo que uma teoria científica madura T é aproximadamente verdadeira não faz de seu sucesso preditivo um milagre. Formalizado probabilisticamente, Howson argumenta que a conclusão de AM, a probabilidade de que a teoria T seja aproximadamente verdadeira é grande, apenas se segue se assumirmos para T um valor não-negligenciável. Tal crítica de Howson despertou duas categorias de reação na literatura especializada: supondo que AM comete a falácia da taxa base, alguns autores propuseram abandonar AM enquanto um argumento para a tese epistemológica do realismo científico, ao passo que outros defenderam que apenas uma versão de AM comete a falácia da taxa-base; defendendo que AM não comete a falácia da taxa base, certos autores alegaram alguns problemas na formalização probabilística de AM, enquanto outros buscaram refinar tal formalização de modo que a nova evite a falácia em questão. Tendo apresentado esse estado da arte, investigaremos se a formalização probabilística do argumento do milagre é razoável. Discutiremos se ela acomoda a natureza de inferência à melhor explicação pressuposta no AM. Por fim, indicaremos, brevemente, algumas dificuldades para a crítica de Howson ao assumir-se que AM instancia, na verdade, uma abdução Peirceana.

Semeiotic logic or, deduction, induction, and semeiotic

AbstractDeduction, induction, and semeiotic relate by each being a permutation of modus ponens. As deduction providing necessary inference is the means of mathematical proof, and induction establishing sound generalizations is the basis of scientific research, so semeiotic bringing to bear informed responses to experience is the core of human understanding. Semeiotic, specifically semeiosis, is shown to be Peircean abduction in the context of signs, thus producing informed response to experience.

Polanyi’s “Illumination:” Aristotelian Induction or Peircean Abduction?

Polanyi’s “Illumination:” Aristotelian Induction or Peircean Abduction?

On classifying abduction

We can witness the recent surge of interest in classifying different patterns or types of abduction. Many philosophers have suggested their own classifications emphasizing different aspects of abduction. Such a development is remarkable, in view of the fact that until quite recently the focus of the research on Peircean abduction was to identify its logical form. Another agenda in the recent attempts to classify abduction is whether to allow non-explanatory abductions. In order to resolve these two closely related issues, I propose to examine how Peirce would have responded to them. In particular, I suggest to do this in connection with Peirce's another life-long project, the classification of sciences. In this examination, it will be shown that Peirce struggled with the problem of conflating induction and abduction. I shall discuss how this problem influenced both Peirce's views on the interrelationship between abduction, deduction, and induction on the one hand, and his many classifications of sciences on the other. Also, the implication of the fundamental change in Peirce's views of abduction, deduction, and induction to the problem of the classification of sciences will be uncovered. Finally, I shall discuss whether inference to the best explanation is abduction. Insofar as this problem has bearing on the two controversial issues in classifying abduction, my negative answer will demonstrate that classifying abduction is yet to get off the ground.

Availability of Alcoholic Beverages During the Brazilian Navy Working Hours

This article presents and discusses one of the five main categories that emerged from the narratives of patients treated in a military outpatient clinic of the Brazilian Navy: the availability of drinks on board. A dense ethnography was conducted at this clinic from 2005 to 2009, and, in 2010, a participant observation was carried out in two treatment groups, during 24 sessions. Sampling, data collection, analysis, and interpretation occurred in an interactive way, rather than in a stepwise sequence. Data interpretation was possible by using the Peircean abduction reasoning of the peculiar categories that emerged in the participants’ discourse. A templum-synthesis was built according to the Boudon diagram to analyze and discuss the information. In conclusion, the institution seems to contribute to the production of the alcoholic habitus, unaware that alcohol availability may influence the emergence of alcoholism, leading to harmful impacts on the health of its contingent.

Confabulating the Truth: In Defense of “Defensive” Moral Reasoning

Empirically minded philosophers have raised questions about judgments and theories based on moral intuitions such as Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium. But they work from the notion of intuitions assumed in empirical work, according to which intuitions are immediate assessments, as in psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s definition. Haidt himself regards such intuitions as an appropriate basis for moral judgment, arguing that normal agents (nonphilosophers) do not reason prior to forming a judgment and afterwards just “confabulate” reasons in its defense. I argue, first, that the notion of “considered intuitive judgment” that Rawls spells out when he first presents his method is pre-theoretical, but not at all pre-reflective, in the way Haidt’s definition supposes; it may rest on various forms of reasoning short of systematic derivation from theoretical principles. I go on to take issue with Haidt’s dismissal of ex post facto moral reasoning, arguing that it can play both a causal role in an individual’s later intuitions or judgments and a legitimate normative role, as required by moral competence in judging non-taboo cases. I suggest that the move from intuition to judgment and thence to ex post facto reasoning makes sense as a justificatory version of Peircean abduction, or what is now mainly called “inference to the best explanation.”

Promoting convergence: the Phi spiral in abduction of mouse corneal behaviors.

Why do mouse corneal epithelial cells display spiraling patterns? We want to provide an explanation for this curious phenomenon by applying an idealized problem solving process. Specifically, we applied complementary line-fitting methods to measure transgenic epithelial reporter expression arrangements displayed on three mature, live enucleated globes to clarify the problem. Two prominent logarithmic curves were discovered, one of which displayed the ϕ ratio, an indicator of an optimal configuration in phyllotactic systems. We then utilized two different computational approaches to expose our current understanding of the behavior. In one procedure, which involved an isotropic mechanics-based finite element method, we successfully produced logarithmic spiral curves of maximum shear strain based pathlines but computed dimensions displayed pitch angles of 35° (ϕ spiral is ∼17°), which was altered when we fitted the model with published measurements of coarse collagen orientations. We then used model-based reasoning in context of Peircean abduction to select a working hypothesis. Our work serves as a concise example of applying a scientific habit of mind and illustrates nuances of executing a common method to doing integrative science. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 20: 22–38, 2015

Abductive Ethnography of Practice in Highly Uncertain Conditions

The highly contextual nature of ethnographic inquiry allows a researcher to develop and adjust data collection and analysis to specific social situations. This methodological flexibility also makes it possible to choose for analytic attention specific instances of human activity and experience that show potential to illuminate conceptual issues or alter our theoretical understandings. Theoretically interesting social activity can be identified using Peircean abduction. In the field, the researcher embraces serendipity and intuition. Data analysis begins neither with inductive nor deductive reasoning. By initially disassociating the data from their context, specific theoretical debates, and the experience of data collection in the field, the ethnographer is able to play with the data freely and let this process generate a surprising discovery. This discovery is then articulated through a dialog among insight, contextualized empirical evidence, and theoretical knowledge. Leaving open the possibilities of insight and discovery, abductive ethnography is a strategy of unforeclosed possibilities.

Abduction and Estimation in Animals

One of the most pressing issues in understanding abduction is whether it is an instinct or an inference. For many commentators find it paradoxical that new ideas are products of an instinct and products of an inference at the same time. Fortunately, Lorenzo Magnani’s recent discussion of animal abduction sheds light on both instinctual and inferential character of Peircean abduction. But, exactly for what reasons are Peirce and Magnani so convinced that animal abduction can provide us with a novel perspective? Inspired by Peirce’s and Magnani’s discussions of animal abduction, I propose to compare Peirce’s and Magnani’s views of animal abduction with the estimative power of non-human animals and humans, which was one of the internal senses in medieval psychology.

Delectable Creatures and the Fundamental Reality of Metaphor: Biosemiotics and Animal Mind

This article argues that organisms, defined by a semi-permeable membrane or skin separating organism from environment, are (must be) semiotically alert responders to environments (both Innenwelt and Umwelt). As organisms and environments complexify over time, so, necessarily, does semiotic responsiveness, or ‘semiotic freedom’. In complex environments, semiotic responsiveness necessitates increasing plasticity of discernment, or discrimination. Such judgements, in other words, involve interpretations. The latter, in effect, consist of translations of a range of sign relations which, like metaphor, are based on transfers (carryings over) of meanings or expressions from one semiotic ‘site’ to another. The article argues that what humans describe as ‘metaphor’ (and believe is something which only pertains to human speech and mind and, in essence, is ‘not real’) is, in fact, fundamental to all semiotic and biosemiotic sign processes in all living things. The article first argues that metaphor and mind are immanent in all life, and are evolutionary, and, thus, that animals certainly do have minds. Following Heidegger and then Agamben, the article continues by asking about the place of animal mind in humans, and concludes that, as a kind of ‘night science’, ‘humananimal’ mind is central to the semiotics of Peircean abduction.

On the distinction between Peirce’s abduction and Lipton’s Inference to the best explanation

I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peircean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In particular, I claim that Peircean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton’s thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference.

Uexküll, Peirce, and Other Affinities Between Biosemiotics and Biolinguistics

The purpose of this paper is to describe some parallels and theoretical affinities between biosemiotics and biolinguistics. In particular, this paper examines the importance of Uexküll's Umwelt and Peircean abduction as foundational concepts for Sebeok's biosemiotics and Chomsky's biolinguistic program. Other affinities touched upon in this paper include references to concepts articulated by Immanuel Kant, Konrad Lorenz, Marcel Florkin, François Jacob, C.H. Waddington, D'Arcy Thomson and Ernst Haeckel. While both programs share theoretical influences and historiographical parallels in their mid-century origins continuing throughout the late twentieth century, recent articulations of biosemiotics and biolinguistics privilege different intellectual styles and methods of inquiry that define their future objectives as intellectual movements. The goal of this paper is to show that, in spite of the different scholarly agendas of biosemiotics and biolinguistics, both movements share a theoretical and philosophical core in Peirce and Uexküll.

Peircean Abduction: Instinct or Inference?

Peircean Abduction: Instinct or Inference?

Hegel and Peircean Abduction

Hegel and Peircean Abduction