Peace In Europe Research Articles

Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Treaties revisited

ABSTRACT The approaching centenary of the Locarno conference in October 1925 provides a convenient reason to re-evaluate the significance of the treaties that emerged from it. Often styled as the ‘real’ peace settlement at the end of the First World War, the treaties of Locarno collectively represent one of the most important attempts to ensure lasting peace in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Central to the treaties’ reputation as the ‘real’ peace settlement is their role in rehabilitating Germany’s Great Powers status after the humiliation suffered at the Paris Peace Conference six years earlier. The Locarno agreements have been seen as one of the rare highpoints in post-First World War Western European diplomacy. They were viewed by contemporaries as a real diplomatic breakthrough that would allow finally for the ghosts of the enmities that had caused the First World War to be laid to rest, although subsequent generations of scholars have been much more critical about what the agreements achieved in the long-term. This article focuses on the contribution made to the conference by the head of the British delegation, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain. It re-examines his diplomatic priorities, especially his reputation as a Francophile. Its central thesis is that Chamberlain himself can be seen to embody the essential reasons why the Locarno agreements were heralded as a success at the time of their conclusion, but less so with the perspective of hindsight. The treaties contained within them two opposing diplomatic forces. On the one hand, the remnants of the pre-war national state system, with its emphasis on diplomatic self-interest, secret, private negotiations, versus the so-called ‘new’ diplomacy: international, open, democratic and accountable. This rendered most of the European diplomatic problems in the post-First World War era intractable; indeed that they were incapable of resolution by anyone. Chamberlain’s entire engagement with the western European security question during the mid-1920s can be seen as evidence not only of those tensions but of the futility of trying to resolve them.

Reformy i ewolucja Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej w latach 2016-2023

REFORMS AND EVOLUTION OF THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 2016-2023: Achievements and Failures The aim of the article is to analyze the reforms of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union, with particular emphasis on the new EU External Security Strategy adopted in 2016 and its evolution, achievements and failures in the years 2016-2023. In addition, the European Union’s position on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and its impact on the evolution and reforms of the CSDP and the necessary changes to the EU’s foreign policy and security strategy for Europe will be shown. The main thesis here is that the previous reforms of the European Union’s WSDiO have been defensive in nature and should be radically changed in view of the current international situation. Among other things, the EU’s soft power policy should be supplemented with hard power measures. The decision making process on matters relating to the EU’s foreign and security policy should also change, and in particular the use of the EU veto requires urgent reform. This will not be easy to achieve, but it is necessary for the European Union to be able to respond quickly and effectively to emerging threats to the security of its members and peace in Europe.

The Causes of the Russian-Ottoman War (1877-1878)

The Eastern Question had numerous regional aspects. Conflicts and crises on the southeastern periphery of the Ottoman Empire, which was already facing numerous internal problems and external pressures, were not particularly novel during the 19th century. These issues were usually resolved without endangering peace in Europe. Offensive realism views great powers as the most significant actors in the international system. The political geography of the Balkans was largely reshaped by their interests, regardless of their inadequate understanding of the complex situations and peoples in that volatile region, defined by the “architecture of roads and inns.” The Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878), a dramatic stage in the prolonged resolution of the Eastern Question, began with the Serbian uprising in July 1875 in the Bosnia Eyalet. It continued with the Bulgarian uprising in April 1876 and the war between Serbia and Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire in July of the same year, initiated in support of Orthodox Christians in the Bosnian pashaluk, but “in truth to expand their territory and consolidate their still insecure independence.” European public opinion during the escalation of the crisis, when the Ottoman side had military superiority, was being prepared for harsh interventions against the Ottoman Empire. This sentiment was particularly pronounced in Russia. Russia did not reconcile with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and the previous failure in the Crimean War (1853-1856), which was a struggle for access to the straits - the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. It sought ways to free itself from the imposed provisions of that treaty. The entire “Russian 19th century” passed under the sign of the Slavophile dream of Constantinople - “which sooner or later must be ours,” as well as the “southern, warm seas.” Every Russian war with the Ottoman Empire in that century activated, on the Russian side, the armed participation of Orthodox peoples in the Balkans. Russia supported their movements, involving them in a “historical clash” with the Ottoman state. Pan-Slavism also served as a justification for Russian military-political interventions. Essentially, it represented the ideology of Great Russian imperialism. For the great powers, the key motive was interest, not imaginative “historical connections” and “brotherly emotions.” Benjamin von Kállay wrote that the “struggle of Russia against Turkey” was one of the “most interesting, most important facts of world history.” Religious motives were present in all Russo-Ottoman wars. These conflicts had, to a greater or lesser extent, political consequences in the Balkans. All peoples have separate stories and different dates in their memory. After the war of 1812, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, an integral part of the Great Eastern Crisis and a continuation of the Crimean War, was the only foreign policy event that had a significant impact on all layers of Russian society. It became one of the “most ideologized” in Russian history, as the causes, course, and consequences of the war were directly related to public opinion. Numerous Slavophile associations constantly urged the tsar to liberate Christians in the Balkans from the “Turkish yoke.” According to numerous accounts, the war with the Ottoman Empire was invoked to a considerable extent by the press. It fueled the “Pan-Slavic fire” in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which forced the Russian government in 1877 to undertake diplomatic actions, following the Ottoman suppression of the Bulgarian uprising in 1876 and alarming reports of their mass suffering, while neglecting the significant Muslim losses on the other side, to start a war with that empire for which it already had plans and goals prepared. Russian intervention, amidst propaganda and the “Bulgarian horrors,” was expected, considering the broader ambitions of this imperial state.

동유럽·발칸 민족분쟁과 공존 가능성: 21세기 코소보 사례

that ushered in the ‘New Cold War’ of the 21st century. And it was an event that clearly impressed the international community on the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Kosovo in the international dynamics. In terms of the history of international relations, there are two main implications of the ‘Kosovo War’. First, it was the first attempt to convert NATO's traditional concept of ‘defensive strategy’ into the concept of ‘offensive strategy’. The Kosovo War was the first war involving NATO in a country outside the region. And through this, NATO can be said to have laid the foundation for pursuing its own influence in the Interest Sphere of United States in the 21st century. The second can be said to be the ‘resurrection of the Russian Empire’ and the ‘emergence of Putin’. As a result of the 1999 Kosovo War, Russia chose Putin in 2000, and he promised to revive Russia in the 21st century as an empire similar to that of the Cold War era. And this led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022. As Kosovo’s geopolitical importance has been confirmed, the United States and Europe agree on the need to establish permanent peace in Kosovo for peace in Europe. However, it is also true that there are still many obstacles to the possibility of peace and coexistence between the Serbian and Kosovo governments surrounding Kosovo today. Therefore, in this study, based on theoretical discussions on the origins of national conflicts in Balkan Europe, I will introduce the various aspects and characteristics of national conflicts in Kosovo in the 21st century, and consider the possibility of their coexistence.

A study on economic cooperation in the EU and East Asia: can Franco-German cooperation be a model for Japan and Korea?

The economic integration has been the most important agenda since the Second World War particularly in Europe because many European nations were heavily destroyed and ruined. After the severe destruction, European political leaders started to rethink how to restore Europe economically and politically in order to establish a long-term peace in Europe. The two major countries, France and Germany, initiated this based on reconciliation processes and signed on the Elysee Treaty that is legally binding and known as the de jour approach. Unfortunately, East Asian countries, Japan and South Korea took a different path, without reconciliation processes, based on the de facto approach only for economic cooperation. As a result, it is not solid yet, but contains fragile risks for the two countries to cooperate in a sustainable way. This paper investigates how and why Franco-German tandem has played core roles in the EU integration. Furthermore, it argues what are successful factors for Franco-German cooperation. Last, but not least, it analyzes whether the Franco-German model can be adapted for the Japan-Korea economic cooperation or not. Received: 31 January 2024Accepted: 05 March 2024

Remote sensing through the fog of war: Infrastructure damage and environmental change during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict revealed by open-access data

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict spawned a high-intensity war that shattered decades of peace in Europe. The use of drones and social media elevates open-source intelligence as a critical strategic asset. However, information from these sources is sporadic, difficult to confirm, and prone to manipulation. Here, we use open-access spaceborne remote sensing data to probe the damage to infrastructure on and off the frontline at the city, region, and country-wide scales in Ukraine. Nighttime light data and Synthetic Aperture Radar images reveal widespread blackout and unveil the destruction of battleground cities, offering contrasted perspectives on the impact of the conflict. Optical satellite images capture extensive flooding along the Dnipro River in the aftermath of the breach of the Kakhovka dam. Leveraging visible, near-infrared, and microwave satellite data, we bring to light disruption of human activities, havoc in the environment, and the annihilation of entire cities during the protracted conflict. Open-source remote sensing can offer objective information about the nature and extent of devastation during military conflicts.

The Way to Collision

It is ironic that NATO, an alliance ostensibly committed to preserving peace in Europe, has once again made war the only effective way for a state to preserve its security. But such an outcome was essentially predetermined as soon as the USSR collapsed, when the U.S. decided to expand NATO into Ukraine.

Сравнительный анализ военной помощи Украине со стороны Германии и Франции (2022–2024 гг.)

The article examines German and French strategies for military support of Kyiv starting from 2022. The analysis reveals two different models for military assistance, although gradually they became more similar. While France distributes money mainly by means of the European Peace Facility, Germany focuses more on bilateral support. Having not much military equipment in stock, Paris started delivering military equipment from the French army and later established a special fund to provide direct supplies to Ukraine. Berlin, at first, tended to avoid the delivery of heavy weapons, participation in “Ringtausch” and transfer of weapons from Bundeswehr stocks, but later bought more military equipment from German industry through state funds for security capacity building. Since 2024, both countries have been involved in capability coalitions for military support of Ukraine. France and Germany went through three stages of their policies: 1) restricted deliveries of European weapons to Ukraine (spring 2022); 2) a gradual increase in EU military supplies from stock, and the launch of production (second half of 2022 – early 2023); 3) increase of the military industry capacity (2023–2024). Both countries stimulate each other to support Ukraine, but their volumes of supplies and types of weapons do not always coincide. Both countries have to increase their military capacities to fulfill commitments for Ukraine, especially the production of the SAM system IRIS-T SLM and self-propelled howitzer CAESAR as well as the launch of new facilities for artillery shells. The authors conclude that Paris and Berlin have no joint projects and agreements for joint procurement. Thus, unlike other crises, the current conflict makes France and Germany act in parallel, but not together.

«Европейская комиссия сейчас подобна ЦК КПСС». Беседа с журналом «Логос»

In his conversation with the editors of Logos about the key plots and the context of the book Endgame Europe. Why the Europe Political Project Has Failed and How Can We Dream of It Again (2022) its co-author, Hauke Ritz, emphasizes that it was induced by a reflection on the reasons of the European Union project’s failure at the time of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. This failure has both an internal political — the failure of democracy and republicanism in the internal structures of the EU, and a foreign dimension — the deterioration of relations between Germany (Europe), the West and Russia and, of course, the conflict in Ukraine. Moreover, the internal political failure in the implementation of the European peace project, largely associated with the choice of an extensive path of its development (EU enlargement, coupled with NATO expansion to the east) at the expense of intensity (deepening political integration) leads to deep foreign policy complications and is aggravated by them. The fact that the EU project, which has not made progress in its domestic political (democratic and republican) content and is artificially limited through the exclusion of Russia from the European world and the common security architecture, has turned out to be instrumentalized, along with support for the US position on Ukraine, according to Ritz, constitutes a betrayal of Europe. The problem is compounded by the disregard of the university community and the mainstream media for this catastrophic state of affairs. However, new, alternative media are emerging and gaining popularity all over Europe, critically and responsibly exploring these topics and contributing to the formation of reflective European solidarity.

The strength of the intergovernmental principle in the common security and defence policy and the weakness of the eu’s strategic autonomy ambitions in the context of the ukrainian crisis

Since the beginning of Russia?s open military attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has introduced thirteen new packages of economic sanctions against Russia. Moreover, in addition to direct economic aid to Kyiv, Brussels and a number of member states have pursued a policy of sending military aid in various forms, mostly in accordance with their own assessments of security interests and available capabilities. The EU established a military assistance mission (EUMAM Ukraine) and began to use part of the existing programs, such as the European Peace Facility, for the purpose of equipping the Ukrainian army. In addition, the perception of Russia as a longterm threat is increasingly influencing new plans in the field of military industry and future armaments. In this paper, we want to analyse the cooperation of these steps taken by the EU and which member states take independently or (and) in cooperation through NATO as the dominant military alliance on European soil. Our argument is that the practice of this military crisis shows that member states to a negligible extent tend to use the Common Security and Defense Policy as a framework for their actions, to strengthen and build it in the long term, but tend to use either the bilateral ties - towards Ukraine and among each other, or the existing framework of NATO. This argumentation confirms the postulates of the new intergovernmentalism in the study of CSDP. In political practice, the intergovernmental principle remains dominant in the CSDP domain, and shows that the current practice is not effectively aimed at strengthening the CSDP nor does it provide a new synergistic effect, and that relatively, in the broader balance of power, the EU loses compared to the existing ties within the NATO pact and new flexible forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation of its member states, outside the CSDP.

Soldier duties as a form of shaping the ethos of military service

The war which broke out on February 24, 2022, as a result of the military aggression of Russian Federation against Ukraine once again shattered the state of relative peace in Europe and reevaluated the perception of threats, shifting focus from non-military threats to military ones. Thus, the issue of the readiness of the state, including the readiness of its military forces acting as its armed wing, for another potential military conflict came to the forefront of all discussions conducted in the political, scientific and social world. Events on the international arena coincided with measures undertaken as part of the Ministry of National Defence. These consist primarily in increasing the number of soldiers in the Polish Army (ultimately up to 300,000 soldiers), increasing combat capacity through modernisation and purchasing modern armament, as well as improving combat capabilities, as assumed by the Development Program of the Armed Forces for 2017-2026. It is worth noticing that the process focuses not only on supplying the army with modern equipment, but also on shaping in soldiers those features that will be useful both in peacetime and in wartime. What is meant here is soldier duties understood as fulfilment of a certain moral obligations to the Homeland, nation, as well as both military and civil environment. Duties can also be understood in the context of a specific vocation, mission, or responsibility to be fulfilled towards those who established a particular entity, in this case the Polish Army, to fulfil tasks prescribed by law and put their trust in them. In the course of the research, the soldier duties which are relevant to the process of building the ethos of military service and the way in which these duties should be shaped were identified.

Metternich's League to Preserve Peace and the Conservative Elites’ Doubts about the Functionality of the Post-Napoleonic Order

Abstract Before 1848 not merely democrats and liberals criticized the post-Napoleonic order for their growing mistrust of its ability to protect the sovereignty of smaller countries and preserve the general peace. The predominantly conservative ruling elite, namely rulers, statesmen, and diplomats, raised the same criticism when the law-breaking and abuse of power made them similarly mistrustful of the state of European politics during the 1830s and 1840s. This became true even for some of the order's authors like Austrian chancellor Metternich who serves as a prominent example of this mistrust with his project of a league to preserve peace in Europe in August 1840. Metternich, who helped to create this order in 1815, found it defective and in need of improvement only a quarter of a century later. He certainly did not want to create a completely new international order and law of nations as some liberals and democrats desired at that time, but his idea was still, in a certain sense, revolutionary since its realization would have fundamentally modified the pillars on which the order had been founded at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

Same dream, different ambitions: Charles de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe in the 1960s.

This study examines and compares the visions of de Gaulle and Monnet for Europe, considering both their shared aspirations and perceived differences. Both figures played significant roles in shaping European international relations throughout the 20th century, but their portrayals often diverged. De Gaulle is often characterized as a nationalist figure, while Monnet is often revered as ‘the Father of European Integration'. While the prevailing narrative emphasizes the divergences between De Gaulle and Monnet, it is important to acknowledge that they shared the same dream of a strong Europe built upon a strong France. Both de Gaulle and Monnet recognized the necessity of European integration in maintaining European peace, addressing the 'German Problem' after World War II, and creating a strong and independent Europe. However, they differed significantly in their approaches to constructing Europe, particularly in terms of methods, institutions, and relationships with the United States. These differences often resulted in conflicts between the two leaders, especially regarding the issue of British participation in the EEC and the Europe-United States relationship. By comparing de Gaulle's Europe to Monnet's Europe, this study aims to enhance our understanding of their contributions to European integration and shed light on the complex motivations and ambitions that influenced their visions of Europe.

The European Peace Facility in action: rethinking EU-Africa partnership on peace and security?

The European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) have had and continue to maintain a long-standing partnership on peace and security, which dates back to the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) at the beginning of the 2000s. However, in 2021, the EU embarked on a different pathway of financing its activities in the field of peace and security by establishing the European Peace Facility (EPF). This new financial instrument allows the EU to directly finance (bypassing the AU) national and sub-regional military initiatives on the African continent, to finance lethal equipment for African armies and expand its scope globally. While the vast majority of current debates and research focus solely on the „train and equip“ provision of the EPF and its implications in the Ukrainian war, the EU engagement in Africa through the instrument mentioned above is scarcely assessed. Therefore, drawing on the theory of interregional security cooperation, this paper considers how establishing the EPF impacts the EU‘s engagement on the African continent in the security field. Empirically assessing the instances in which the EPF has been implemented on the African continent, this paper aims to answer the research question: how does the establishment and implementation of the EPF impact the EU-AU partnership on peace and security? This paper employs a qualitative research design, namely a case study approach of inquiry and process tracing methods. The results of this approach show two distinct tendencies. First, while implementing the EPF in Africa can solve certain operational and technical aspects of the EU engagement on the continent, the EU-AU partnership must be reinforced on the political and strategic levels. Moreover, considering the plethora of international and regional actors involved in managing the security dynamics on the African continent, it is essential to prioritise the political dimension of the EU-AU partnership.

Funding the War in Ukraine: The European Peace Facility, the Macro‐Financial Assistance Instrument, and the Slow Rise of an EU Fiscal Capacity

The war in Ukraine represented a major geopolitical shock for the EU. In the face of an illegal Russian aggression, EU institutions and member states rallied to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine also exposed the limited fiscal capacity of the EU. As a result, EU institutions and member states had to come up with creative ways to financially back Ukraine’s military and civilian efforts. This article examines the two key tools deployed by the EU so far to fund Ukraine in its war against Russia, namely the European Peace Facility and the Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument. The article details the legal features of these tools, evaluates their intergovernmental vs. supranational nature, and reflects on their significance for the consolidation of an EU fiscal capacity. As the article argues, the war in Ukraine quickly prompted the EU to replicate some of the novelties it used to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic, namely the use of common borrowing and spending. Nevertheless, structural fiscal and governance weaknesses still limit the ability of the EU to mobilize resources and leverage power on the international stage.

From the Palace of Ryswick to the Sultan’s Seraglio: The Ottoman Translation and Interpretation of a Christian European Peace Treaty

The inclusion of peace treaty articles between Christian powers in an Ottoman historical work of the late seventeenth century is unquestionably distinctive. The article presents an Ottoman translation of the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) concluded between the French king and the German emperor. This translation is included by the late seventeenth – early eighteenth-century Ottoman historian and palace official Silāḥdār Fındıklılı Meḥmed Aġa in his historical work called ‘The Book of Victory’ (Nuṣretnāme). With this unique text as its basis, the article will first attempt to place the translation in its historical context and explain the possible reasons for its inclusion by Silahdar in his history. Secondly, to morphologically evaluate the text to bring to the fore the translation strategies adopted and to explore the reception and the degree of understanding by the Ottoman side of the basic terms and linguistic topoi of a Christian European peace treaty. And lastly, to analyse the specific interpretation ascribed to the Ryswick agreement by the Ottoman leadership.

Strategic autonomy in the European Union’s external relations law

The article reviews the legal significance of the European Union’s quest for “strategic autonomy” in its external relations. First the political origin of the term is recapped and a legal definition proposed: “Striving for multilateral solutions, while being able to take lawful action alone to safeguard the Union’s values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity!” Second, the application thereof in the EU’s common commercial policy is reviewed. In particular, the recent EU legislative initiatives that combat economic distortions on the one hand are distinguished from the pieces of EU legislation that foster EU values worldwide on the other hand. Third, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is considered. It is shown how the EU’s reaction in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to an unprecedented array of use of available instruments (European Peace Facility, ten sanctions packages, support for Ukraine for its legal cases against Russia). The conclusion identifies a new defining moment for the European project through a remarkable legal push from intergovernmental to integrationist conduct in its external relations in the 2020s. strategic autonomy, external relations law, common commercial policy, CFSP, European Peace Facility

Russia, Ukraine, and Lasting Peace in Europe

Among the many competing narratives that drive the war in Ukraine, the healing of the Ukrainian people themselves is often overlooked. That is because current Western policy overlooks the Other Ukraine, whose disagreement with the policies of the Ukrainian government since 2014 led up to this conflict. The Western response to Russia’s invasion has been tailored to punishing Russia, but not necessarily to healing the domestic tension within Ukraine. This article suggests that only a reconciliation within Ukrainecan bring lasting social harmony to Ukraine and peace to Europe as a whole.

Activities in the European Union for Ukraine

Introduction: Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union date back to the first half of the 1990s. After Russia's unprovoked invasion of the Ukrainian state, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for Ukraine's candidate status, and the same day the European Council approved it. Throughout the invasion, the European Union authorities provide assistance to Ukraine and its inhabitants, including refugees fleeing the war.Objective: Presentation of information on actions taken by states and European Union authorities in response to the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.Materials and methods: Review of the websites of the European Commission, EU legislation, analysis and presentation of statistical data from the Central Statistical Office and Eurostat.Results: After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the European Union took a number of effective actions to improve the situation of that country and its inhabitants. Refugees, 90% of whom are women and children, were given special care. The scope of support includes, among others: medical care, access to education, psychological assistance, access to temporary accommodation and housing, as well as financial instruments such as macro-financial assistance or the European Peace Facility.

Caught between the Union Jack and the Nazi Swastika: African Protests over Ambiguous Status under British Imperialism and Potential Transfer to Nazi Colonialism

AbstractResistance to colonial rule is a dominant topic in the historical study of Africa. But resistance to attempted transfer of colonised peoples and territories, to promote peace in Europe, has not gained similar attention in African and colonial historiographies. This article looks at how rumours and reports of Nazi Germany's colonial demands in Africa, and the ambiguous reactions of British officials to them, shaped conversations among colonised peoples about their dignity under British colonialism and in intra-European diplomacy. The article argues that the prospect of Nazi rule and its spectre of slave-labour concentration camps for Africa's Western-educated elites, and other colonial subjects, bound these segments of colonial society closer to British, and French, imperialism than they relished at an uncertain, but critical moment in African and international history. They became the defenders of colonial systems they deplored, and opponents of a ruthless regime they feared.