Patron-client Networks Research Articles

Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies (review)

SEER, 91, 4, OCTOBER 2013 934 Describing the devastating Georgian-Abkhazian war as ‘clashes that erupted in 1992–3’ (p. 218) is an insult to the thousands who perished therein, whilst the charge that ‘weak secessionist states like Abkhazia and South Ossetia will exacerbate immigration on its [EU’s] borders and strengthen drug and other criminal networks’ (p. 245) is wholly unsubstantiated. As for South Ossetia, Gamsakhurdia’s provocations began the blood-letting (1990–91), Saak’ashvili later resorting to armed intervention (2004). As for the 2008 August war, Jones dismisses the EU Commission’s report, which found no evidence of Russian military encroachment to justify Saak’ashvili’s order to attack, as ‘anodyne’ (p. 242), upbraids the EU for letting Saak’ashvili down (p. 254) and even defends his actions that fateful month (p. 242). ‘[I]nternational finance organizations’ are rightly castigated for superficially equating ‘Tbilisi with Georgia and post-communism with modernity’, while ‘Westerneconomicadvice’evidently‘contributedtothedestructionofGeorgia’s economic base’ (p. 111), and ‘misguided Western reforms’ are criticized for helping ‘create an overcentralized executive’ (p. 271). But, whereas I readily join Jones in berating Western governments for having ‘neglected Georgia’s conflicts’ (p. 245), I have a different ‘neglect’ in mind. For me, the West precipitately recognized Georgia in 1992 and thus gave Tbilisi carte blanche to act in (actually self-defeating) defence of Georgia’s territorial integrity, insouciantly failing to apply any restraints regarding interethnic relations. In a decision calculated to annoy language-specialists, Jones elected not to mark Georgian’s glottalic consonants (achievable by mere addition of the apostrophe). No normal bibliography is provided for readers to see at a glance the range of authors/works cited. No theoretical model is constructed to account for the Georgian experience, though the work is replete with mots justes from several socio-politologists and/or economists deemed applicable to relevant phenomena. SOAS, University of London George Hewitt Kopecký, Petr; Mair, Peter and Spirova, Maria (eds). Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies. Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. xvi + 415 pp. Figures. Tables. Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. £60.00: $110.00. This book offers a rare example of research originating with work on new democracies that has been extended to established democratic systems. The book presents case studies of party patronage in fifteen European democracies — three from Central and Eastern Europe, twelve from Western Europe — but uses a conceptual and analytical framework developed by Kopecký, Spirova and their colleagues for the comparative study of new democracies in Europe, Latin America and Africa. REVIEWS 935 Party patronage, Kopecký, Spirova and Mair argue, takes broadly two forms: classical clientelism in which a party trades public office — or the resources stemming from it — with individuals or social groups in exchange for electoral support, and party use of patronage on a more limited scale as an organization-building resource to reward supporters and secure control over key state agencies. The editors accept that forms of classical clientelism — and, in particular, the mass patron-client networks historically characteristic of parties in less developed,ruralsocieties—areirreversiblydeclining. Historicaldevelopments such as the rise of programmatic class-based politics and mass organization, the decline of local, rural economies and the rise of more individualized, meritocratic societies with higher social mobility have cumulatively eliminated the social bases of traditional clientelism in almost all European societies. However Kopecký, Spirova and Mair suggest there are grounds to expect that party patronage in the second, narrower, organization-related sense will increase even in advanced European democracies: parties’ organizational presence in civil society has withered, leaving them with an ever smaller pool of well qualified, ideologically committed members to draw on, while a general decline in polarization between parties has made party ideology increasingly ineffective as means of securing loyalty. Moreover, they suggest, the displacement of traditional forms of government based on party direction of the state by more networked patterns of governance necessitates the development of party networks, which — as in many areas of professional activities — can be most easily co-ordinated by through patronage. It follows that, although often conflated with corruption by both academic and journalistic writers, partisan appointments can be entirely open and legal aspect of the democratic...

Le Sueur in the Sioux country: rethinking France's Indian alliances in the Pays d'en Haut

This essay explores the career of Pierre Charles Le Sueur, an explorer, fur trader, soldier, and diplomat in the nominal service of the French Crown at the turn of the eighteenth century among the Indian peoples of the Great Lakes and Upper Mississippi Valley, the Pays d'en Haut. It uses Le Sueur's story to suggest a new explanation for the instability of France's Indian alliances in the Pays d'en Haut that brings current ethnohistorical accounts – which have largely emphasized the diversity of, and conflicts of interest between, Indian villages in the region – into conversation with revisionist works on Louis XIV's France which have similarly deconstructed monolithic portrayals of the “absolutist” state with which these peoples engaged. Le Sueur's story – his transition from a contraband trader, or coureur de bois, in the Pays d'en Haut to a prominent agent of French empire – reveals the layers of bitter political infighting within New France and Louisiana over control of the lucrative fur trade; the gambles and deception that often shaped the dealings of colonial agents with officials at Versailles; and, most importantly, the destabilizing effects that their schemes could have upon the Pays d'en Haut as trade routes conveying powerful means of war into the continental interior consequently shifted, offsetting tenuous balances of power between the very Indian peoples the Crown hoped to galvanize as allies. Exploring Le Sueur's risk-laden and ultimately ill-fated attempts to integrate the powerful Sioux peoples of the Upper Mississippi into existing networks of trade and diplomacy that had long been centered upon their enemies in the Great Lakes region reveals these alliance systems as the often tumultuous entanglement of two equally complex systems: the village politics of the Pays d'en Haut and patron–client networks linking these spaces with the court of Versailles.

The Political Economy of Private Sector Development in Communist China: Evidence from Zhejiang Province

This article investigates a natural experiment in China’s Zhejiang province in order to identify why local officials across the province had varying motivations and capacities for protecting and promoting private entrepreneurship after 1949. As the result of communist revolution before 1949, all Zhejiang’s counties were divided into two categories in 1949: guerrilla counties and non-guerrilla counties. In guerrilla counties, local cadres were marginalized by the newly established provincial power structure and faced huge political insecurity, while their counterparts in non-guerrilla counties could rely on the patron–client network that was built by the provincial leadership for promotion. The local cadres in guerrilla counties were forced to cultivate popular support from below in order to guarantee their political survival, i.e., they looked after local economic interests by supporting local private sector development in exchange for the grassroots’ support. This mutual protection between local elites and potential private entrepreneurs explains why, relative to the non-guerrilla counties, the private sector was effectively protected after 1949 and therefore better developed in the long run. We argue that the analytical framework developed by this research can go beyond Zhejiang to apply to other provinces.

Right to contestation, patron-client networks, and corruption

In the paper the nature of Russian corruption is considered along the lines proposed by D. North, J. Wallis, and B. Weingast. The author considers patron-client networks as basic political and economic actors of the limited access order. The redistributive rent allocated within patron-client networks is not a corruption phenomenon. The main factor that is able to destroy patron-client networks and autonomous centers of power is the right to contestation (liberalization) according to R. Dahl. Realization of that right together with the right to participate in political life enables transition to the open access society.

Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity

Backed by studies finding only limited propensity for free-riding when communities have an interest in self-provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community-based development. A major caveat to the “second wave” of collective action studies, however, is that collective action often breaks down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for developing countries’ rural societies, which are often entrenched in patron-client networks. Using a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway, the article finds that clientelist relationships do not, in and by themselves, block peasant collective action. Rather, it is the interaction between clientelism and isolation that empowers patrons to block community-based projects. Peasants in connected villages face no such constraints, but instead rely on their patrons’ assistance in collective projects, making the hierarchical network an additional resource.

From blueprint master plans to democratic planning in South Asian cities: Pursuing good governance agenda against prevalent patron–client networks

Despite similar rhetoric and stated policies, there are major differences in urban planning and its implementation and management between cities of developed countries and those of the developing world. These differences are most evident in the degree of involvement of citizens in planning and urban governance processes. The degree of democratic traditions prevalent in these countries could partially explain these differences, stemming from historical factors and the evolutionary paths of urbanization followed by the countries and the resulting socio-economic and cultural condition. The multifaceted challenges and unpredictable political environment contribute to a complex nature of governance and participation. This article examines the nature of public participation in South Asian cities highlighting the tensions between representative democracy and participation in Bangladesh. The authors view the ‘orthodoxy’ of South Asian planning style steaming from a persistence of the blueprint master plan approach to planning as a major obstacle to true participation. The overall urban governance system in place is largely influenced (and often undermined) by a highly politicized bureaucracy with operates within complex patron–client networks created by bureaucrats and politicians for mutual benefits. With overwhelming numbers of urban poor and a general dearth of resources, these cities are highly dependent on foreign aid and so the planning agenda is, to a significant extent, donor-driven. The complexity of planning and urban governance is further intensified by remnants and legacies of the region’s colonial heritage that contribute to create a milieu of poor urban governance and entrenched corruption wherein opaque and non-participatory planning practices and processes are normally prevalent. The article sets out to identify the forces that are stifling participatory urban planning in Bangladesh, focussing on socio-economic disparity within cities and the ineffectiveness of the administrative setup. It also analyses the political system in terms of the influence of political parties as well as the role played by international aid/ donor agencies.

Outsourcing candidate selection

Conflict between factions has been identified as an important factor explaining different procedures of candidate selection. However, the question of what drives factions in choosing certain procedures over others remains under-theorized. This article argues that, when ranking their preferences for candidate selection procedures, factions are influenced by their electoral strategy. While clientelistic factions will push for candidate selection procedures that subordinate themselves to the logic of clientelistic exchange networks, programmatic factions will try to maximize the effectiveness of formal regulations. To demonstrate this relationship, the article studies the recent development of political parties in Taiwan and South Korea, where programmatic factions have ‘outsourced’ the authority to nominate candidates to external actors, thereby moving it beyond the reach of internal patron–client networks.

Gifts and Promises: Patronage Democracy in a Decentralised Indonesia

AbstractCan democracy exist in a social structure marred with patron-client networks? How do we define the situation in which democratic elections occur in tandem with the dyadic relations between elites and followers? "Gifts and Promises" sheds a light into the Indonesian local politics after decentralization. Despite the central state's effort towards democratization, such as sponsoring direct elections for district leaders, the local politics depicted patron-client relations between the elite candidates and the voters. Benefiting from the direct elections, the elites competed for political power in the regions by mobilizing ethno-religious sentiments and utilizing money-politics. The voters, in return, behave as clients as they seek to gain material benefits from their preferred candidates in exchange for political loyalty. However, the direct elections also created a novelty in patron-client relations: the opinion of the clients, now voters, became crucial in determining new leaders. The article reveals that, as voters, the clients had the opportunity to examine the qualities of candidates based on traditional "elite capitals". Taking the examples from three districts in North Sumatra, the article shows that the direct elections allow common people to behave as citizens (voters) and clients interchangeably. This condition propagated the system of Patronage Democracy, in which clientelistic practices exist side by side with democratization and continue to challenge the notion of Indonesian citizenship.

Political Instability, Threat Displacement and Civil War: Darfur as a Theory Building Case

This paper revisits the link between political instability and civil war. It focuses on the elite dynamics endogenous to political instability — namely the commitment problem, in which elites have no guarantees that any distribution of power they agree upon today will be maintained in the future when each actor possesses the capabilities to lock in a much larger share by permanently eliminating others from the regime. It argues political instability, such as coups d’etat, regime splits, and purges, often reflect rival elites’ attempts to resolve the commitment problem by destroying or otherwise neutralizing their rivals’ first and second-strike capabilities. The consequence of this political strategy, however, is it divides the regime, destroying the patron-client networks on which the government depends for maintaining societal control and support, increasing the risk of civil war. I explore this argument through an in-depth case study of the outbreak of the Darfur civil war. Based on hundreds of interviews with key members of Sudan’s Islamic Movement, leaders of the Darfurian rebel movements, and other Darfurians, including politicians, tribal sheikhs, and members of civil society, I systematically analyze the effect of the split in the Islamic Movement in 1999 and 2000 on the onset of civil war in Darfur in 2002.

The political economy of timber taxation: The case of Ghana

We analyze the political economy of timber taxation in Ghana. Our results show that politicians maintain control over allocation of timber rights, that taxation constitutes an insignificant share of the value of the timber resource, and that the distribution of timber revenues hardly contributes towards the official forest policy justifications. Our analysis suggests that politicians wield control over rent-seeking opportunities that are exchanged for political support through patron–client networks. This speaks to a larger literature on why governments waste resources and constitutes an argument for increased attention to the political economy underlying natural resource policies.

Collective Action, Clientelism and Connectivity

Backed by a range of studies finding only limited propensity for free riding when communities have an interest in self provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community based development amongst international organizations. A major caveat to the ‘second wave’ of collective action studies, however, is that collective action will often break down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for rural societies in developing countries, as these are often entrenched in patron-client networks. And while studies of collective action under clientelism are in short supply, the few that exist are generally pessimistic. This paper argues, however, that clientelist relations are highly context-specific, which matters a great deal for their implications for collective action. Making use of a natural experiment in rural Punjab, Pakistan, the paper finds that the unequal relationship between landlords and peasants does not, in and by itself, block peasant collective action. Rather, it is the interaction between clientelism and isolation that allow patrons to block community based projects. Despite still relying on powerful landlords, peasants in connected villages face no such constraints. On the contrary, their patrons assisted them in their collective endeavours, making the hierarchical network an added resource for peasants to rely upon.

Informal Politics and the State

Many theories of the state are implicitly premised on modernization theory—a linear transition from agrarian to industrial society and increasing centralization and extractive capacity of the state, while preexisting societal networks are eradicated or gradually absorbed into the political system. As a society becomes wealthier and more mobile, particularist allegiances are broadened to encompass the whole polity and rulers increas ingly govern to the benefit of the citizenry within the framework of stable political institutions. Political processes in systems that approach this ideal type may be under stood through the study of formal institutions, in which political actors work within con straints specified by formally codified rules that are (usually) consistently and equitably enforced. A research strategy typically involves analyzing a limited and easily identifi able set of institutions that produce probabilistically predictable outputs, under the assumption that consequential political behaviors governed by those institutions can be observed and that their influence on policy outcomes is transparent and measureable. Clearly, this description does not characterize all political systems in the world today, and perhaps approximates only a minority of them. Formal institutions are ubiquitous— post-World War II international norms ensure that even weakly institutionalized states and nondemocratic regimes adopt the formal trappings of industrialized democracies'— but they may not function everywhere as specified on paper (or on websites, in the twenty-first century).2 At best, rule enforcement may be inconsistent and the formal institu tions of governance implicated in unpredictable or inequitable outcomes. At worst, parts of the state can be appropriated by political factions, identity-based groups, or patron-client networks, and exploited to benefit a small minority at the expense of the majority. To make sense of political processes and outcomes in such contexts, paying attention to the 351

March of the chekists: Beria’s secret police patronage network and Soviet crypto-politics

Lavrentii Beria built up one of the most powerful patronage networks in Soviet history. Its success represents a unique case in Soviet history in which a regionally based secret police patron-client network, comprised primarily of representatives of ethnic minorities, took control first of the civilian leadership of one of the major regions of the Union, and then of the most powerful institution in the USSR, the national secret police, and subsequently became one of the main competing factions in the “crypto-politics” of the late-Stalin era. The fact that the Beria network emerged from the secret police gave it certain advantages in the political struggles of the period, but it also held weaknesses that played a role in Beria’s final undoing. The evolution and political struggles of Beria’s network also shed light on the inner workings of the competition among informal networks that made up the crypto-politics of the period. Using recent memoirs, new archival sources and interviews, this article will examine how Beria developed, managed and advanced his informal network, giving particular attention to the specific and unique outcomes that resulted from the rooting of this network in the secret police, at five critical junctures in Beria’s career.

The continuity of 'autocratic presidency' in Africa's democratisation project

This paper is about the movement of African states toward, or away, from democratisation with position that capacity building is a check to the predominance of political dictatorship and authoritarianism. Literature reverberate the contribution of presidents and in that context their roles in the dislocation of democratic values. Taking a sway on the neoclassical orientation of African presidents, the paper surmised that to mean nothing altruistic but pervasive and informal personalisation of state resources, using patron-client networks. These ties radiate down from the biggest 'big man' the imperial president to his lieutenants and allies serving as patrons to lower-level power brokers, down to the fragmented mass of ordinary citizens, trapped in relations of dependence on their local political patrons. The political economy of power relation in Africa beyond national boundaries is located within the network of neo-colonial institutional gamix over the colonised generating inequality, dependency that sustains autocratic presidency.

The Political Consequences of Center-Led Redistribution in Brazilian Federalism: The Fall of Subnational Party Machines

The article aims to identify the factors behind a series of center-left electoral victories in the 2002 and 2006 state elections, which indicate the decay of state political machines in Brazil’s poorest regions. It is argued that vertical competition between the federal and state governments in the provision of public policies works as a constraint on state bosses’ strategies of political control. The withering of state political machines may be understood as an indirect consequence of the national political shifts represented by the rise of Brazil’s most important left-wing organization—the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores)—to the presidency in 2002 and 2006. Social and economic policies implemented by the federal government under PT rule undermined subnational patron-client networks by improving the life conditions of the poorest sections of the electorate. The article explores the interlinking of national and subnational electoral dynamics by developing statistical models for state- and municipal-level data.

Does Patronage Still Drive Politics for the Rural Poor in the Developing World? A Comparative Perspective from the Livestock Sector

ABSTRACTIs the analysis of patron–client networks still important to the understanding of developing country politics or has it now been overtaken by a focus on ‘social capital’? Drawing on seventeen country studies of the political environment for livestock policy in poor countries, this article concludes that although the nature of patronage has changed significantly, it remains highly relevant to the ways peasant interests are treated. Peasant populations were found either to have no clear connection to their political leaders or to be controlled by political clientage. Furthermore, communities ‘free’ of patron–client ties to the centre generally are not better represented by political associations but instead receive fewer benefits from the state. Nonetheless, patterns of clientage are different from what they were forty years ago. First, patronage chains today often have a global reach, through trade, bilateral donor governments and international NGOs. Second, the resources that fuel political clientage today are less monopolistic and less adequate to the task of purchasing peasant political loyalty. Thus the bonds of patronage are less tight than they were historically. Third, it follows from the preceding point and the greater diversity of patrons operating today that elite conflicts are much more likely to create spaces in which peasant interests can eventually be aggregated into autonomous associations with independent political significance in the national polity. NGOs are playing an important role in opening up this political space although at the moment, they most often act like a new type of patron.

Political and social networks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: ‘clan’, region and beyond

A major debate among scholars studying Central Asian societies concerns the structure of social and political networks in the region. Still unresolved is the issue of whether to define such networks in terms of ‘clans’, ‘regionalism’, or personal networks. This article, based on data collected during fieldwork in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, attempts to understand these social and political networks. It suggests that networks are very complex. The networks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan draw on various loyalties including ties of family, friendship, work, education, and patron-client relationships. They are neither purely regional nor purely clan-based. Personal networks, factions, and self-interest play important roles. At the elite level, networks more closely resemble patron-client networks, which may or may not include regional or kinship ties. Among ordinary people, such ties tend to be based on localism, kinship, and/or patronage relationships.

Politics of Natural Resource Use in Cambodia

Natural resources are neither a blessing nor a curse; intrinsically they can neither positively nor negatively affect political and economic developments. Rather, the negative effects of natural resources are correlated with a country's “structured contingency”: the existing political configuration through which the oil revenue is managed and spent. Cambodia's political configuration is dominated by interlocking patron-client networks that require a leader to capture and maintain the loyalty of key sections of the politico-commercial elite by fulfilling their material aspirations through the distribution of perquisites. Under these conditions, corruption is widespread, the government institutions are unresponsive, and resources are misallocated. Examining the existing political configuration and the precedent set by the forest and land sectors, this article argues that future oil revenue will likely be used partly for self-enrichment of the political elites and partly to promote political legitimacy of the ruling elites through the politics of gift giving and patronage. The situation will likely have two significant impacts on Cambodia: (1) inequitable development and increased income inequality and (2) perpetuation of Cambodia's hybrid democracy, preventing any further movement toward democratic consolidation.

Explanatory models of influences on the construction and expression of user satisfaction

The paper asks why high levels of expressed satisfaction are recorded in settings where health care provision is manifestly inadequate. Qualitative interviews with 30 women aged 25-60 years from a rural district health system of Northeast Brazil were used to explore the applicability of three explanatory models of influences on the construction and expression of satisfaction: expectations; contextual dynamics; mediating filters. The first two of these models argue that a lack of information and a reluctance to be negative respectively lead to high expressed satisfaction that is artificial. The concept of mediating filters proposes that respondents construct an evaluation that takes account of wider issues, such that high levels of expressed satisfaction are, in this sense, real. All three models contribute towards answering the paper's question. However, our data suggest that it is an informed, but low, expectation of health care provision that leads to alternative strategies, including resort to patron-client networks, and success in gaining good health care that is important. Mediating filters identified in this study were culpability and the reference time-frame. We raise questions for practice and offer a combined explanatory model.

Towards a More Comprehensive Analysis of Warlord Politics: Constitutive Agency, Patron–Client Networks and Robust Action

This article serves as a critique of a recent American foreign policy formulation proposing to eradicate ‘warlordism’ and asserting that democratic institutions can be directly created out of the post-eradication anarchic chaos. Against this background, recent years have indeed seen a bourgeoning literature on ‘warlord politics’ in Southeast Asia. The majority commonly portray political actors as faithful followers of economic rationality and self-interest. Therefore, most are conceived as selfish predators who ruthlessly use violence for private gains at the expense of public interest. By suggesting that comparative studies on warlordism have been heavily influenced by the political economy perspective, the article develops a more comprehensive analysis of warlord politics. Along the lines of patron–client network analysis, insights from moral economy and agency-structure sociological dualism are considered. Contrasting case studies are used to illustrate how the alleged warlords of Southeast Asia do not fit entirely into the political economy perspective. Caught in a vast patron–client network of competing interests and diverse powers across state and society, one's agency is constantly constituted by discursive arrays of contending interests, juxtaposing rationalities and multiple intentions. In state building, this complication is regarded as paradoxically necessary for compelling the alleged warlord-actor to re-define and elevate multiple private interests into public interest.