Password-based Protocol Research Articles

Scalable, password-based and threshold authentication for smart homes

Smart homes are a special use-case of the IoT paradigm, which is becoming more and more important in our lives. Although sensors, devices and applications make our daily lives easier, they often collect our sensitive data, which may lead to security problems (e.g., hacked devices, botnets, etc.). In several cases, the appropriate security mechanisms are missing within the devices. Therefore, security measures have become a central topic in the field of IoT. The most essential requirements are secure user–device authentication and confidentiality of transferred sensitive data. Passwords are the most widely used factors in various areas, such as user authentication, key establishment, and also secret sharing. Password-based protocols that are resistant to typical threats, such as offline dictionary, man-in-the-middle and phishing attacks, generate new session keys. The major aim of these solutions is to guarantee high-level security, even if a user applies a single low-entropy human memorable password for all their accounts. We introduce a threshold and password-based, distributed, mutual authenticated key agreement with key confirmation protocol for a smart home environment. The proposed protocol is a scalable and robust scheme, which forces the adversary to corrupt l-1 smart home devices, where l is the threshold, in order to perform an offline dictionary attack. The protocol is designed to achieve password-only setting, and end-to-end security if the chosen IoT devices are also authenticated besides the user. We also provide a security analysis of the protocol in AVISPA. We apply the on-the-fly model checker and the constraint-logic-based attack searcher to perform protocol verification for bounded numbers of sessions. We show that the proposed protocol provides session key secrecy and mutual authentication of the user and the device manager. Since efficiency is a crucial aspect, we implemented our protocol to measure the computation and communication costs and demonstrate that our solution is appropriate and eligible for smart homes.

Security Analysis of Wireless Authentication Protocols

Background & Objective: Cryptographic protocols had been evident method for ensuring con dentiality, Integrity and authentication in various digital communication systems. However the validation and analysis of such cryptographic protocols was limited to usage of formal mathematical models until few years back. Methods: In this paper, various popular cryptographic protocols have been studied. Some of these protocols (PAP, CHAP, and EAP) achieve security goals in peer to peer communication while others (RADIUS, DIAMETER and Kerberos) can work in multiparty environment. These protocols were validated and analysed over two popular security validation and analysis tools AVISPA and Scyther. The protocols were written according to their documentation using the HLPSL and SPDL for analysis over AVISPA and Scyther respectively. The results of these tools were analysed to nd the possible attack an each protocol. Afterwards The execution time analysis of the protocols were done by repeating the experiment for multiple iterations over the command line versions of these tools.As the literature review suggested, this research also validates that using password based protocols (PAP) is faster in terms of execution time as compared to other methods, Usage of nonces tackles the replay attack and DIAMETER is secure than RADIUS. Results and Conclusion: The results also showed us that DIAMETER is faster than RADIUS. Though Kerberos protocol was found to safe, the results tell us that it is compromisable under particular circumstances.

Composition of password-based protocols

Formal and symbolic techniques are extremely useful for modelling and analysing security protocols. They have helped to improve our understanding of such protocols, allowed us to discover flaws, and they also provide support for protocol design. However, such analyses usually consider that the protocol is executed in isolation or assume a bounded number of protocol sessions. Hence, no security guarantee is provided when the protocol is executed in a more complex environment. In this paper, we study whether password protocols can be safely composed, even when a same password is reused. More precisely, we present a transformation which maps a password protocol that is secure for a single protocol session (a decidable problem) to a protocol that is secure for an unbounded number of sessions. Our result provides an effective strategy to design secure password protocols: (i) design a protocol intended to be secure for one protocol session; (ii) apply our transformation and obtain a protocol which is secure for an unbounded number of sessions. Our technique also applies to compose different password protocols allowing us to obtain both inter-protocol and inter-session composition.

An Improvement Password-Based Authentication Protocol Using Smart Card

To access resources from a remote system, the user authentication is a very important security mechanism. Among remote authentication protocol, password-based authenticated key exchange protocol is most popular since the two communication entities only shared a human-memorable password can establish a session key which is used to protected their later communication over an insecure networks. Recently, Xu Zhu proposed improved password-based protocol using smart card based on previous research. He claims that his protocol is secure against various attacks. However, Song points out that the Xu Zhu’s protocol suffers from attacks. In addition, Song gives an improved version of Xu Zhu. In this paper, we first found Song’s protocol also is vulnerable to off-line dictionary attack. Later, we extend Song’s protocol so that the extended protocol can resist to off-line dictionary attack even if an adversary captures the smart card.

Re-attack on a three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol

A password based authenticated key exchange protocol is of practical usefulness in the protection of sharing of urban rail train sensor monitoring data. However, many password-based protocols in the literature were not secure. Recently, Huang presented a simple and efficient three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol. However, Yoon et al. found it had some security weaknesses. In this paper, we further show it has another critical security weakness, which opens door to a partition attack (offline dictionary attack). Thereafter we propose an enhanced protocol that can defeat the attacks described (including Yoon et al.’s attacks) and yet is reasonably efficient. Furthermore, our protocol can resist against the stolen-verifier attacks and achieve the provable security.

Analysis and Improvement of a User Authentication Improved Protocol

Remote user authentication always adopts the method of password to login the server within insecure network environments. Recently, Peyravin and Jeffries proposed a practical authentication scheme based on one-way collision-resistant hash functions. However, Shim and Munilla independently showed that the scheme is vulnerable to off-line guessing attacks. In order to remove the weakness, Holbl, Welzer and Brumenn presented an improved secure password-based protocols for remote user authentication, password change and session key establishment. Unfortunately, the remedies of their improved scheme cannot work. The improved scheme still suffers from the off-line attacks. And the password change protocol is insecure against Denial-of-Service attack. A proposed scheme is presented which overcomes these weaknesses. Detailed cryanalysis show that the proposed password-based protocols for remote user authentication, password change and session key establishment are immune against man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, password guessing attacks, outsider attacks, denial-of-Service attacks and impersonation attacks .

User authentication using keystroke dynamics for cellular phones

A new approach for keystroke-based authentication when using a cellular phone keypad as input device is presented. In the proposed method, users are authenticated using keystroke dynamics acquired when typing fixed alphabetic strings on a mobile phone keypad. The employed statistical classifier is able to perform user verification with an average equal error rate of about 13%. The obtained experimental results suggest that, when using mobile devices, a strong secure authentication scheme cannot rely on the sole keystroke dynamics, which however can be a module of a more complex system including, as basic security, a password-based protocol eventually hardened by keystroke analysis.

Improvement of the Peyravian–Jeffries’s user authentication protocol and password change protocol

Remote authentication of users supported by passwords is a broadly adopted method of authentication within insecure network environments. Such protocols typically rely on pre-established secure cryptographic keys or public key infrastructure. Recently, Peyravian and Jeffries [M. Peyravian, C. Jeffries, Secure remote user access over insecure networks, Computer Communications 29 (5–6) (2006) 660–667] proposed a protocol for secure remote user access over insecure networks. Shortly after the protocol was published Shim [K.A. Shim, Security flaws of remote user access over insecure networks, Computer Communications 30 (1) (2006) 117–121] and Munilla et al. [J. Munilla, A. Peinado, Off-line password-guessing attack to Peyravian–Jeffries’s remote user authentication protocol, Computer Communications 30 (1) (2006) 52–54] independently presented an off-line guessing attack on the protocol. Based on their findings we present an improved secure password-based protocol for remote user authentication, password change, and session key establishment over insecure networks, which is immune against the attack.

Modular approach to the design and analysis of password-based security protocols

In this paper, a general framework for designing and analyzing password-based security protocols is presented. First we introduce the concept of "weak computa- tional indistinguishability" based on current progress of password-based security protocols. Then, we focus on cryptographic foundations for password-based se- curity protocols, i.e., the theory of "weak pseudorandomness". Furthermore, based on the theory of weak pseudorandomness, we present a modular approach to de- sign and analysis of password-based security protocols. Finally, applying the modular approach, we design two kinds of password-based security protocols, i.e., password-based session key distribution (PSKD) protocol and protected password change (PPC) protocol. In addition to having forward secrecy and improved effi- ciency, new protocols are proved secure.

Security weakness in a three-party pairing-based protocol for password authenticated key exchange

Authentication and key exchange are fundamental for establishing secure communication channels over public insecure networks. Password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange are designed to work even when user authentication is done via the use of passwords drawn from a small known set of values. Recently, Wen et al. (H.-A. Wen, T.-F. Lee, T. Hwang, Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol using Weil pairing, IEE Proceedings—Communications 152 (2) (2005) 138–143) proposed a new protocol for password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting, where the clients trying to establish a common secret key do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Wen et al.’s protocol carries a claimed proof of security in a formal model of communication and adversarial capabilities. However, this work shows that the protocol for three-party key exchange is completely insecure and the claim of provable security is seriously incorrect. We conduct a detailed analysis of flaws in the protocol and its security proof, in the hope that no similar mistakes are made in the future.

Security flaws of remote user access over insecure networks

Remote user authentication based on passwords over untrusted networks is the conventional method of authentication in the Internet and mobile communication environments. Typical secure remote user access solutions rely on pre-established secure cryptographic keys, public-key infrastructure, or secure hardware. Recently, Peyravian and Jeffries proposed password-based protocols for remote user authentication, password change, and session key establishment over insecure networks without requiring any additional private- or public-key infrastructure. In this paper we point out security flaws of Peyravian–Jeffries’s protocols against off-line password guessing attacks and Denial-of-Service attacks.

Access control protocols with two-layer architecture for wireless networks

In this paper we study two access control protocols which have similar two-layer access control architectures for wireless networks in public places. The first protocol, called the Lancaster protocol, employs user password for authentication and enforces access control at the IP layer; while the second protocol, referred to as the Stanford protocol, uses public key cryptosystems (PKC) for authentication and performs access control at the link layer. Although both protocols are intended to restrict access to wireless networks only to authorized users, our analysis shows that both protocols have serious security flaws which make them vulnerable to attacks. Then we propose a password-based protocol and a PKC-based protocol for the Lancaster architecture and the Stanford architecture, respectively. Both of our protocols provide mutual authentication, perfect forward secrecy and access control for wireless networks. Moreover, they also provide DoS resistance and identity confidentiality for the client. We present detailed security and performance analysis for our protocols, and show that both of our protocols are secure and efficient for access control in wireless networks.

Security analysis of a password-based authentication protocol proposed to IEEE 1363

In recent years, several protocols for password-based authenticated key exchange have been proposed. These protocols aim to be secure even though the sample space of passwords may be small enough to be enumerated by an off-line adversary. In Eurocrypt 2000, Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway (BPR) presented a model and security definition for authenticated key exchange. They claimed that in the ideal-cipher model (random oracles), the two-flow protocol at the core of Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) is secure. Bellare and Rogaway suggested several instantiations of the ideal cipher in their proposal to the IEEE P1363.2 working group. Since then there has been an increased interest in proving the security of password-based protocols in the ideal-cipher model. For example, Bresson, Chevassut, and Pointcheval have recently showed that the One-Encryption-Key-Exchange (OEKE) protocol is secure in the ideal cipher model. In this paper, we present examples of real (NOT ideal) ciphers (including naive implementations of the instantiations proposed to IEEE P1363.2) that would result in broken instantiations of the idealised AuthA protocol and OEKE protocol. Our result shows that the AuthA protocol can be instantiated in an insecure way, and that there are no well defined (let alone rigorous) ways to distinguish between secure and insecure instantiations. Thus, without a rigorous metric for ideal-ciphers, the value of provable security in ideal cipher model is limited.

Secure remote user access over insecure networks

Remote user authentication based on passwords over untrusted networks is the conventional method of authentication in the Internet and mobile communication environment. Typical secure remote user access solutions rely on pre-established secure cryptographic keys, public-key infrastructure, or secure hardware. In this paper, we present secure password-based protocols for remote user authentication, password change, and session key establishment over insecure networks. The proposed protocols do not require the use of any additional private- or public-key infrastructure.

Comments on password-based private key download protocol of NDSS'99

The weaknesses of the password-based protocol for downloading a private key presented by Perlman and Kaufman at NDSS'99 are discussed.

Efficient and secure password-based authentication protocols against guessing attacks

We propose authentication and key exchange protocols which are both efficient and secure against password guessing attacks. Conventional authentication protocols have assumed that a strong secret should be shared between communicating participants, in the light of a threat of guessing attacks. A cryptographically long secret would be favored for security reasons, but it is not suitable for users to remember. Recent password-based protocols to defeat guessing attacks are more expensive than previous ones, in terms of the computation and communication costs. Using a one-time pad and a strong one-way hash function, we promote both security and efficiency. Thereby, we also verify our protocol formally.

Refinement and extension of encrypted key exchange

In their recent paper, "Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-based Protocols Secure Against Dictionary Attacks," Bellovin and Merritt propose a novel and elegant method for safeguarding weak passwords. This paper discusses a possible weakness in the proposed protocol, develops some enhancements and simplifications, and provides a security analysis of the resultant minimal EKE protocol. In addition, the basic 2-party EKE model is extended to the 3-party setting; this yields a protocol with some interesting properties. Most importantly, this paper illustrates, once again, the subtlety associated with designing password-based protocols.