Party Leadership Election Research Articles

The Party Leadership Model: An early forecast of the 2015 British General Election

British political parties select their leaders to win elections. The winning margin of the party leader among the selectorate reflects how likely they think she is to win the General Election. The present research compares the winning margins of party leaders in their party leadership elections and uses the results of this comparison to predict that the party leader with the larger winning margin will become the next Prime Minister. I term this process “the Party Leadership Model”. The model correctly forecasts 8 out of 10 past elections, while making these forecasts 4 years in advance on average. According to a Bayesian analysis, there is a 95 per cent probability that having the larger winning margin in party leadership elections increases the chances of winning the General Election. Because David Cameron performed better among Conservative MPs in 2005 than Ed Miliband did among Labour MPs in 2010, the model predicts Cameron to become Prime Minister again in 2015. The Bayesian calculation puts his chances of re-election at 75 per cent.

The Influence of Legislators' Endorsements in Party Leadership Elections

The Influence of Legislators' Endorsements in Party Leadership Elections

Japan's backroom politics: factions in a multiparty age

Translator's Preface Introduction: The Defeated One: The Decline of Party Politicians Chapter 1: The Backroom: Testimonies of Party Leadership Elections Chapter 2: Popularity: Leadership and the People Chapter 3: Money: The Basis for Politics Chapter 4: Factions, Part 1: Steps to an Administration Chapter 5: Factions, Part 2: Background of Leaders Chapter 6: Multiparty Age: Undercurrents of the 1967 Elections Chapter 7: The Myth of a Two-Party System: Recommendations for a Multiparty System Chapter 8: The End of Backroom Politics: Administrations in a Multiparty Age Afterword

The 2011 Scottish Conservative Party Leadership Election: Dilemmas for Statewide Parties in Regional Contexts

The 2011 Scottish Conservative leadership election presented the party with two radically different visions for the future. The Scottish Conservatives rejected Murdo Frasers plan to create a new independent Scottish Party of the centre right and elected Ruth Davidson, who promised to reform the party within the UK Conservative Party. The Conservatives rejection of a radical break with the past suggests they will continue along a path of incremental change and supports an institutionalist analysis of party adaptation to devolution. This article explores why Davidson won and examines some of the implications for the Scottish and UK Conservative parties. The centre-periphery tension played out during the campaign is a dilemma for all territorial branches of statewide parties but poses especially difficult problems for the Conservatives because of the tension between unionist and centre-right agendas.

‘O, brother, where art thou?’ The Labour Party leadership election of 2010

This article examines the 2010 Labour leadership contest, seeking to explain why Ed Miliband narrowly defeated his brother, and erstwhile favourite, David. The article places this contest in the context of previous Labour leadership contests, and also the historical development of the often controversial electoral college which, on this occasion, meant that the first preferences of the Party's parliamentarians were outweighed by the votes of affiliated bodies, most notably the trade unions. Crucially, though, we argue that while undeniably important, the role of the trade unions in ensuring Ed Miliband's victory has been somewhat exaggerated by his political and media opponents. His success over his brother was also due to the fact that he attracted enough second preference votes cast by MPs/ Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and members of the constituency Labour parties (CLPs) to increase his share of overall support in the electoral college. David Miliband remained more popular than his brother among Labour parliamentarians and CLPs, but Ed Miliband reduced his brother's lead sufficiently over four rounds to ensure that when added to his share of the votes of individual trade union levy-payers, he secured a narrow victory over David Miliband. The votes of the latter were crucial to Ed Miliband, and ultimately decisive, but would still not have been sufficient to secure victory had he not also increased his support, via second preference votes, among Labour MPs/MEPs and CLP members.

Reinventing the block vote? Trade unions and the 2010 Labour party leadership election

Labour's electoral college chose Ed Miliband as the party's new leader on the basis of votes that were influenced by trade union activities. Some trade unions made a number of decisive interventions in the 2010 leadership election contest: they coordinated their nominations, canvassed intensely for their nominees (channelling considerable resources into their campaigns), and distributed ballots with strong recommendations in the same package as the voting slips. Such was the closeness of the election that, we argue, these interventions determined the result. This conclusion is all the more surprising since commentators and academics alike had maintained that the introduction of ‘one member, one vote’ had fundamentally reduced the role of trade unions in Labour party politics. In contrast, our opinion is that having been apparently deprived of control by the introduction of one member one vote, trade union elites developed a strategy to mould the outcome of the Labour leadership contest and so reassert their traditional influence over the party. Such was the extent of the role played by the trade unions that, we believe, the normative legitimacy of the electoral process by which Ed Miliband was elected can be called into question although the rules of the contest were not broken.

The Significance of the 2005 British Conservative Party Leadership Election

The Significance of the 2005 British Conservative Party Leadership Election

How Michael Foot Won the Labour Party Leadership

This paper examines the voting motivations of Labour parliamentarians in the final parliamentary ballot of the Labour party leadership election of 1980. By constructing a data set of the voting behaviour of Labour parliamentarians and by determining the ideological disposition of the 1980 parliamentary Labour party (PLP) this paper examines the ideological disposition of the candidates' vis‐à‐vis their electorate, and offers a challenge to traditional interpretations of how and why Foot was elected. The traditional interpretation has sought for explanations as to how a right‐wing dominated PLP elected a left‐wing candidate. Whilst citing the traditional interpretations of the impact of the impending Electoral College, mandatory reselection and the assumed weaknesses of the Healey campaign, this paper argues that there was considerably more left‐wing sentiment within the 1980 PLP in terms of economic management, defence and the Common Market, than previously considered. As such this paper suggests that, taken with the impact of the other factors, the victory of Foot should not be seen as that surprising.

The Labour Party Leadership Election of 1963: Explaining the Unexpected Election of Harold Wilson

The failed attempts that Harold Wilson made to rest the Labour Party leadership from Hugh Gaitskell in 1960, and the Deputy Leadership from George Brown in 1962, had confirmed his reputation for disloyalty and divisiveness, and secured him the hostility of ‘social democratic right’. As they constituted the majority of the parliamentary Labour Party and ideology was assumed to be the dominant influence in any future party leadership contest, this seemed to undermine the chances of the ‘socialist left’ candidate Wilson succeeding Gaitskell. This paper examines how Wilson defied these assumptions and acquired the party leadership in 1963 following the death of Gaitskell. It attributes his success to the following. First, the fact that the minority left only put one candidate forward, ensured that they coalesced around one candidate. Second, the fact that the majority social democratic bloc fractured between Brown and James Callaghan gave Wilson a first ballot lead and second ballot momentum. Third, the naïve campaigning by Brown meant he was perceived to be a divisive candidate whilst Wilson, the devious, disloyal and defeated challenger to Gaitskell, was amazingly the unity candidate.

LABOUR LEADERSHIP ELECTIONS FROM WILSON TO BROWN: IDEOLOGICAL FACTIONS AND SUCCESSION PLANNING STRATEGIES

This paper examines the succession planning strategies deployed by ideological factions at the level of the parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in party leadership elections since 1963. The paper seeks to evaluate the short term tactics and long term strategies pursued by the ‘socialist left’ and the ‘social democratic right’ to enhance the prospect of their faction securing the lineage on the party leadership. The analysis will be undertaken by considering two key aspects of party leadership selection: first, ideological factions and the processes within which they determine, or fail to determine, who ‘their’ candidate should be; and, second, the importance of party leadership selection rules and the significance of the left’s commitment to shifting from a PLP ballot to an Electoral College based on their assumption that this would aid their succession planning. Incorporating analysis of each of the leadership contests since 1963, the paper suggests that the inability of the left to pass the threshold for participation in 2007 was a reflection of their tactical and strategic miscalculations in terms of succession planning dating back to 1980.

Ideological alignments within the parliamentary Labour Party and the leadership election of 1976

The orthodox interpretation of Labour Party historical analysis in the 1960s and 1970s has assumed the existence of a ‘majority’ social democratic right within the parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) prevailing over a ‘minority’ socialist left. In the limited academic work that exists on the Labour Party leadership election to determine the successor to Harold Wilson, it has become established that voting behaviour by Labour parliamentarians, and the subsequent election of James Callaghan over Michael Foot, was shaped by ideological alignments and was thus indicative of the enduring numeric strength of the social democratic right vis-a-vis the socialist left. This article offers a narrative of the succession contest and reappraises this traditional explanation. It then challenges the validity of the traditional explanation by questioning the viability of the orthodox one-dimensional left-right ideological divide. The article identifies the cross-cutting nature of ideological alignments within the PLP in 1976, and demonstrates that individual Labour MPs could not necessarily be placed in left wing (that is, economic expansionist, unilateralist and anti-common market) or right wing (that is, economic consolidators, multilateralist and pro-common market) pigeon holes. By analysing the attitudes and behaviour of all Labour parliamentarians across the three dominant ideological policy divides (that is, the economy, defence and the common market), the article will demonstrate that left wing thinking was actually predominant within the PLP on the economy, defence and the common market. Our revisionist account highlights how the candidature of Foot failed to secure the loyalty of ideological bedfellows, while the triumph of Callaghan was due to his capacity to appeal to those who did not necessarily share his ideological commitments.

The Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians in the Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2001

This article examines the voting motivations of Conservative parliamentarians in the final parliamentary ballot of the Conservative party leadership election of 2001. By constructing a data set of the voting behaviour of Conservative parliamentarians in the final parliamentary party ballot, this article seeks to test a series of hypotheses relating to the ideological disposition and political characteristics of the candidates vis-à-vis their electorate. The article examines how and why the eliminative parliamentary ballot ensured that the party membership was presented with a face-off between the europhile, Kenneth Clarke, and the eurosceptic, Iain Duncan Smith, and why the modernising and socially liberal Michael Portillo was rejected. It will demonstrate that while arguments based on ideological factors are valid, the political characteristics of age and career status were also significant motivational influences that contributed to the rejection of Portillo and the delaying of the modernisation of the Conservative party.

Choosing the Tory Leader: Conservative Party Leadership Elections from Heath to Cameron – By Timothy Heppell

Choosing the Tory Leader: Conservative Party Leadership Elections from Heath to Cameron – By Timothy Heppell

Transcending Thatcherism? Ideology and the Conservative Party Leadership Mandate of David Cameron

This paper examines the voting motivations of Conservative parliamentarians in the final parliamentary ballot of the Conservative Party leadership election of 2005. By constructing a data set of the voting behaviour of Conservative parliamentarians in the final parliamentary party ballot, and by determining the ideological disposition of the 2005 PCP this paper examines the ideological disposition of the candidates' vis‐à‐vis their electorate. The paper identifies the increasing Thatcherite nature of the PCP across three dominant ideological divides of contemporary British Conservatism‐economic, European, and social, sexual and moral policy. Through such an analysis the paper demonstrates how the modernising David Cameron, who came first in the final parliamentary ballot and then won the membership ballot, transcended the traditional ideological voting motivations of candidates' vis‐à‐vis their electorate. Most significantly, the paper demonstrates that the European ideological policy divide was not a factor in the succession contest, unlike the succession contests of 1990, 1997 and 2001.

Democratising conservative leadership selection: from grey suits to grass roots

Preface 1. Introduction: democracy, legitimacy and Conservative leadership 2. The 'magic circle' and after: from selection to election 3. Hague's revenge: the Conservative leadership election of 2001 4. Full circle to the magic circle 5. From May to December Part 1: the phoney war 6. From May to December Part 2: a tale of two speeches 7. Cameron's mandate for modernisation 8. Conclusion Appendix I: Conservative Party leadership election results 1965-2005 Appendix II: The experience upon reaching office of Conservative Party leaders since the War Appendix III: Declarations of support in the 2005 Conservative Party leadership election Appendix IV: Bookmakers' odds on the 2005 Conservative Party leadership election Selected bibliography

The 2001 British Conservative Party leadership election and the general membership of the Party

The 2001 British Conservative Party leadership election and the general membership of the Party

Democratising Conservative Leadership Selection: From Grey Suits to Grass Roots * Choosing the Tory Leader: Conservative Party Leadership Elections from Heath to Cameron

In an era of valence rather than position politics, an era in which some see parliamentary systems becoming ever more presidentialised, party leadership is clearly crucial. Just as importantly, one can argue that contests to elect leaders provide something of a window into the soul of a particular party. They not only help determine its electoral fate. They also expose fault-lines. They show what really matters to those involved. They demonstrate strengths and weaknesses, collective and individual. They mark turning points. Or they show that the party in question is not yet ready or able to change. They also reinforce the feeling that politics is an art as well as a science. Leadership, of course, has always mattered a great deal in the British Conservative Party—an organisation which John Ramsden, one of its leading historians, once characterised as an ‘autocracy tempered by assassination.’ Accordingly, there has in recent years been a steady flow of articles written about the origins, course and outcomes of Tory leadership contests, notably by Philip Cowley and Keith Alderman and their collaborators. But full-length books about those contests are obviously like London buses. You wait ages for one and then two come along at exactly the same time. Not very funny, I grant you. But laugh-out-loud compared to what it must be like to be one of the authors involved. This kind of thing is surely every academic's nightmare: there you are, busy beavering away on your magnum opus, only to find that you're not the only game in town.

The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997: An Analysis of the Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians

This paper examines the voting motivations of Conservative parliamentarians in the final ballot of the Conservative Party leadership election of 1997. Conservative parliamentarians had a clear choice between the political characteristics and the ideological disposition of the candidates. Should they endorse a senior, experienced and electorally attractive candidate, Kenneth Clarke, or a junior, inexperienced and less electorally attractive candidate, William Hague? and should they endorse the socially liberal, economic damp, and Europhile Clarke or the socially conservative, economic and Eurosceptic Hague? By constructing a data set of the voting behaviour of Conservative parliamentarians in the final party leadership ballot, this paper seeks, through the use of bivariate analysis, to test a series of hypotheses relating to the political characteristics and ideological disposition of the candidates vis-a-vis their electorate. The paper demonstrates that attitudes to the European ideological divide alone do not fully explain the rejection of Clarke and the endorsement of Hague. The paper concludes that ideological disposition was a key determinant of voting behaviour across all three of the ideological determinants of post-Thatcherite Conservatism (i.e. the social, sexual and morality policy divide, the economic policy divide and the European policy divide). Moreover, it confirms that ideology was not the sole determinant of voting behaviour; the political characteristics of age and parliamentary experience were significant in explaining how a youthful, inexperienced, Thatcherite Eurosceptic secured the party leadership.

The Irish Labour Party leadership election, 2002: A survey of party members

The Irish Labour Party leadership election, 2002: A survey of party members

Leden en hun inspraak binnen politieke partijen

In response to a decline of 'the party on the ground', political parties in Western Europe have increased the opportunities for their members to have a say on the party's policy. In this article, four ways of increased involvement of the rank-and-file in Belgian political parties are analysed : party leadership elections, co-decision as concerns the composition of electoral lists, intra-party referenda and the widening ofthe suffrage on party congresses. As concerns the statutory regulations, the involvement of party members has increasedsignificantly. In practice, however, influence of party members remains limited and the party elite continues to keep most power in their hands. Most party members are aware of the limits of their influence. Moreover, not all members are interested in having a greater say in party affairs. Those that adhere to a party because of ideological or programmatic reasons, participate most.