Party Donations Research Articles

Motivations for political donations in Aotearoa New Zealand

This research explores motivations for political party donations in Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ). Drawing on interview data from 29 political ‘insiders,’ we utilize McMenamin and Power’s theoretical framework to assess the pragmatic, partisan and social motivations for donations. We extend the original framework beyond business donations, incorporating a broader range of donor and non-donor insights. We observe strong social motivations for donating and a general agreement among political actors that donations provide access to politicians. The theoretical lens is expanded by NZ-specific factors, notably a strong concern for democracy and the potential for adverse impacts from donating. The latter brings negative motivations into the theoretical lens. We offer an amended framework that more closely reflects donation motivations in the NZ environment, which is dominated by a small pool of large donors, close connections between political actors and a desire for adequately funded political parties to enhance democratic outcomes.

When (and how) ideas become arguments: the regulation of party donations in Germany

Abstract This article aims to explain the deviant German case of an early and comprehensive regulation of party donations (combining a high level of transparency and incentives for small donations). Given the limited explanatory power of economic and institutional factors, the article emphasises the causal role of ideas for a policy stabilisation which occurred after 1993. A process-tracing analysis suggests that the 1983–1993 reform period was characterised by a conflict of ideas. During this conflict, ideas regarding undisclosed donations as an anti-democratic interference with democratic political competition came to prevail over ideas regarding all donations as a necessary condition for democratic competition irrespective of their regulation. The key actors in this conflict were, on the one hand, the new Green party which resuscitated the idea of donations being potentially anti-democratic and, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court which ultimately endorsed this ideational legacy promoted by the Greens. After 1993, donations in Germany came to be accepted as a necessary evil whose anti-democratic potential had to be limited by transparency obligations and incentives for small donations. The findings presented here suggest that policymakers need to link attempts to regulate party donations to ideational legacies (if available) to successfully tackle political corruption.

Implementation of Klaten Regency Regional Regulation Number 12 of 1991 Concerning Acceptance of Third Party Contributions to Regional Governments in Efforts to Increase Regional Original Income

This research aims to review the implementation of Klaten Regency Regional Regulation Number 12 of 1991 concerning Acceptance of Third Party Contributions to the Region which has been running effectively and the obstacles and solutions implemented in the implementation of Klaten Regency Regional Regulation Number 12 of 1991 concerning Acceptance of third party donations. to the Region in the future. This research uses a type of normative-empirical legal research with descriptive research characteristics. The data sources used are primary and secondary data sources. With data collection techniques through interviews and documentation. Data analysis techniques use methods of collecting data, qualifying, connecting and drawing conclusions. The results of this research explain that the implementation of Klaten Regency Regional Regulation Number 12 of 1991 concerning Acceptance of Third Party Contributions to the Region is already underwaywhether in the form of a sum of money or equivalent to money, some are determined voluntarily by a third party and/or on the basis of mutual agreement with the Regional Government of Klaten Regency, which is fully deposited into the Regional Treasury. things that become obstacles in the Implementation of Klaten Regency Regional Regulation Number 12 of 1991 concerning Acceptance of Third Party Contributions to the Region, namely the lack of socialization of the Regional Regulation to third parties, only two agencies that organize the reception of donations from third parties, the content of the Regional Regulation is no longer in accordance with developments era, constitutional conditions, and current demands for implementing regional autonomy. Meanwhile, the solution that must be implemented is to increase socialization, increase the number of Regional Apparatus that organizes the receipt of donations from third parties, guided by a memorandum of mutual agreement, or a third party letter of intent, or a Regent's Decree as written proof of the existence of a reminder for third parties to routinely be willing to make voluntary donations to the Region for development purposes.

Unfavorable hydroxychloroquine COVID-19 research associated with authors having a history of political party donations.

We explored the degree to which political bias in medicine and study authors could explain the stark variation in Hydroxychloroquine (HCQ)/Chloroquine (CQ) study favorability in the US compared to the rest of the world. COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2 preprint and published papers between January 1, 2020-July 26, 2020 with Hydroxychloroquine and/or Chloroquine; 267 met study criteria, 68 from the US. A control subset was selected. HCQ/CQ study result favorability (favorable, unfavorable, or neutral) was noted. First and last main authors of each US study were entered into FollowTheMoney.org Website, extracting any history of political party donation. Of all US studies (68 total), 39/68 (57.4%) were unfavorable, with only 7/68 (10.3%) of US studies yielding favorable results-compared to 199 non-US studies, 66/199 (33.2%) unfavorable, 69/199 (34.7%) favorable, and 64/199 (32.2%) neutral. Studies with at least one US main author were 20.4% (SE 0.053, P < 0.05) more likely to report unfavorable results than non-US studies. US Studies with at least one main author donating to any political party were 25.6% (SE 0.085, P < 0.01) more likely to have unfavorable results. US studies with at least one author donating to the Democratic party were 20.4% (SE 0.045, P < 0.05) more likely to have unfavorable results. US authors were more likely to publish studies with medically harmful conclusions than non-US authors. Cardiology-specific HCQ/CQ studies were 44.2% more likely to yield harmful conclusions (P < 0.01). Inaccurate propagation of HCQ/CQ cardiac adverse effects with individual scientific author political bias has contributed to unfavorable US HCQ/CQ publication patterns and political polarization of the medications.

Unfavorable Hydroxychloroquine COVID-19 Research Associated with Authors Having a History of Political Party Donations

OBJECTIVE: To explore the degree to which political bias in medicine and study authors could explain the stark variation in Hydroxychloroquine (HCQ)/Chloroquine (CQ) study favorability in the US compared to the rest of the world.SETTING: United States and Worldwide.PARTICIPANTS: COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2 preprint and published papers between January 1, 2020 and July 26, 2020 with the terms Hydroxychloroquine and/or Chloroquine; 267 met study criteria, of which 68 originated from the US. 68 control studies were randomly selected from the same time period to serve as a control subset for baseline COVID-19 publication trends and author characteristics, not related to HCQ/CQ.MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: HCQ/CQ study result favorability, with each recorded as favorable, unfavorable, or neutral. First and last main authors of each US study were entered into FollowTheMoney.org Website, to extract any history of political party donation, and to which political party.RESULTS: Of all US studies (68 total), 39/68 (57.4%) were unfavorable, with only 7/68 (10.3%) of US studies yielding favorable results. This was compared to 199 non-US studies, in with 66/199 (33.2%) were unfavorable, 69/199 (34.7%) favorable, and 64/199 (32.2%) neutral. Studies with at least one US main author were 20.4% (SE 0.053, PCONCLUSIONS: HCQ/CQ study outcomes from US-based research were quite unfavorable as compared to the rest of the world, amplifying the impact of US author political party donations on unfavorable study results. The intense media exposure in this US election year has polarized our society and may be injecting various forms of bias into medical research, including from the study authors themselves. We thereby suggest the addition of “political disclosures” to the already required “financial disclosures” for scientific research submissions going forth.

What do we Know About Lobbying in Germany?

Abstract Contribution payments and information are two important channels of lobbying influence. This survey analyzes what is known about these channels in Germany from a political economy perspective. Based on a discussion of the empirical literature and the available data, I argue that the state of empirical knowledge about lobbying in Germany is rather limited. To improve our understanding of the lobbying process, I identify research gaps and discuss potential methodological approaches which can be suitable to address these questions. Also, I discuss the role of party donations and temporary employment of bureaucratic staff, based on two novel data sets. The analysis indicates that party donations might play a role as a means to achieve access; in contrast, the temporary exchange of employees in the public administration seems to be of rather less importance in informational lobbying.

Political Parties and Their Funding in Germany

In Germany, as in most modern democracies, the funding of political parties is a sensitive issue and even after a changeful history of party funding with many scandals the present model is not perfect. There is a combination of private funding and partial public funding (which must, however, not affect the freedom of the political parties from state influence [Staatsfreiheit der Parteien]), flanked by strict rules of financial accountability. Donations are the most controversial element. There is neither a ban on donations from companies nor an absolute limit for donations. Only donations of more than 50 000 € must be reported immediately and will be made public in a timely manner so that it is ensured that the citizens are informed about them before the next elec­tions. Con­cer­ning public funding, there is an indirect funding through income tax reductions on membership fees and (limited) on donations, plus a direct public funding (per vote and per contribution), which must not be higher than the revenue from private fun­ding. Since 2017, parties seeking to undermine or abolish the free and democratic constitutional order shall be excluded from the public funding. In order to ensure transparency, every party must submit for each calender year a correct and exhaustive audited public statement of accounts. In case of illegal donations or incorrectness of the state­ment there are sanctions, which are, however, rather soft. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) has criticised the intransparency arising from the fact that party donations up to 50 000 € do not need to be reported immediately but only in the annual statement of accounts, which may be published several months after the elections influenced by them. So there is still room for improvement.

HUBUNGAN KERJA PEMERINTAH DESA DENGAN LEMBAGA ADAT DALAM PENGELOLAAN KEKAYAAN DESA DI DESA LUBUK SIAM KECAMATAN SIAK HULU KABUPATEN KAMPAR

The 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia opens the possibility of a government structure within the Indonesian system of government. Then the existence of the village is very important in the implementation of the government and in order to realize the National goal. Besides, the village is the leading structure of the government as the spearhead of the success of national development and development carried out by Desa Itu Sendiri. One of these villages is Lubuk Siam Village, Siak Hulu District, Kampar District. In the execution of development in the village using village funds and village income. However, in practice, the original income of Lubuk Siam village was accepted by the adat institution so that the original income of the village was 0 (zero) rupiah. While villages have original source of village income comes from third party donations, lake management and other legitimate income. This study aims to find out how the working relationship of village government with village customary institution in Lubuk Siam village Siak Hulu subdistrict of Kampar regency. To know the system of management of original income of village (PAD) of Lubuk Siam village of Siak Hulu district Kampar regency. The method used in this research is qualitative with the technique of data collection is observation, interview and documentation. As for the informant of the research are Village Head, Customary Institution, Chairman of BPD and Community Leaders and Village Treasurer. The result of the research is the working relationship of the Data Institution with the Village Government in the management of village wealth is first: the partnership relationship in the sense of equally managing the income of the village, the coordination relationship with the deliberation and the social control relationship in which the adat institution oversees the use of the fund. While the management system is received by customary institutions and managed by the village government for village development activities. From the result of the research, it can be concluded that the original village revenue management system of lubuk siam is not in accordance with the applicable regulations because the adat institution is not regulated by its authority in the management of village's wealth. To be supervised by the government in this case Kampar regency government. In order that the management does not violate the rules, the village of Lubuk Siam Subdistrict Siak Hulu proposed to be a traditional village.

Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?

SummaryWhat motivates donations to political parties? Two views prevail. Donors are perceived either as ideologically motivated consumers or as privilege‐seeking investors. To investigate differences in donor motivation between corporations and individuals, we analyze data from Germany. For the period from 1994 to 2014, we find that corporations act more like investors than individuals do. First, we test whether corporations or individuals are more inclined to give more to incumbent parties than to parties outside the governing coalition. Giving to incumbent parties whose representatives hold public offices may be more attractive for investing donors. Second, we test for differences between corporations and individuals in the relative increase in donations from non‐election years to election years. Investor donations may be more volatile than consumer donations. We find that only corporations donate more to incumbent parties and that corporations increase their party donations from non‐election years to election years more than individuals do. These differences in the behavior of corporate and individual donors provide some evidence for potentially undesirable exchanges between corporations as investors and parties. Further, the differences between individual and corporate donors tend to be more consistent for parties to the right on the political spectrum.

Breaking the Cycle? How (Not) to Use Political Finance Regulations to Counter Public Procurement Corruption

There are widespread perceptions and countless documented cases of tight-knit networks of politicians and businessmen colluding for allocating public procurement contracts in return for political party donations. In the absence of systematic evidence, neither the magnitude of the problem nor the effectiveness of policies curbing such corruption is well-understood. In order to advance our understanding of these phenomena, this paper tests whether political financing regulations can contribute to controlling corruption in public procurement. We utilize aggregated official micro-level data on almost 3 million contracts awarded across 29 European countries in 2009-2014 to measure the risk of high-level institutionalised corruption using novel proxy indicators. Legislation regulating political finances are directly measured by coding national laws in 2009-2014. In cross-country panel regression and difference-in-difference models, we find that introducing additional political financing restrictions does not have a measurable negative impact on public procurement corruption risks. In fact, the observed effect is positive in most models. The observed relationship remains the same for most constitutive components of political financing regulations. Several challenges remain for a conclusive judgement of political party financing regulations’ effectiveness to curb corruption such as measuring implementation rather than legislation, allowing for longer lead-time for regulatory impact, or considering institutional inter-dependencies.

Breaking the Cycle? How (Not) to Use Political Finance Regulations to Counter Public Procurement Corruption

There are widespread perceptions and countless documented cases of tight-knit networks of politicians and businessmen colluding for allocating public procurement contracts in return for political party donations. In the absence of systematic evidence, neither the magnitude of the problem nor the effectiveness of policies curbing such corruption is well-understood. In order to advance our understanding of these phenomena, this paper tests whether political financing regulations can contribute to controlling corruption in public procurement. We utilize aggregated official micro-level data on almost 3 million contracts awarded across 29 European countries in 2009-2014 to measure the risk of high-level institutionalised corruption using novel proxy indicators. Legislation regulating political finances are directly measured by coding national laws in 2009-2014. In cross-country panel regression and difference-in-difference models, we find that introducing additional political financing restrictions does not have a measurable negative impact on public procurement corruption risks. In fact, the observed effect is positive in most models. The observed relationship remains the same for most constitutive components of political financing regulations. Several challenges remain for a conclusive judgement of political party financing regulations’ effectiveness to curb corruption such as measuring implementation rather than legislation, allowing for longer lead-time for regulatory impact, or considering institutional inter-dependencies.

Polarizers or landscape groomers? An empirical analysis of party donations by the 100 largest German companies in 1984–2005

What can donation strategies tell us about corporate political preferences, as seen from the perspective of power resource and varieties of capitalism theories? This article tests six hypotheses within an Olsonian framework for corporate donations to political parties with new data from the 100 largest German firms between 1984 and 2005. The findings reveal that only a minority of firms donate, and donation amounts are surprisingly small given the financial assets of these companies, which suggests the presence of a collective action dilemma with small selective and arguably larger collective benefits. Management ties between firms are an important way of making firms overcome the collective action dilemma. Firms distribute their donations if any – mainly on the right side of the political spectrum, particularly if the firms are personally interwoven with other large companies or if they are family owned. However, some firms, particularly those belonging to the automobile sector, donate across the political spectrum.

Campaign trail.

The quality of care in the specialist unit for older people I worked in at Poole Hospital was fantastic - some of the most skilled nursing I have ever seen. You need an understanding of a diversity of medical conditions, multiple pathologies and social issues to work in this specialism, and as a professional it really stretches you.

Parents' Commitment to Participation in Mesenchymal Stem Cell Donation and Research Demonstrates Extensive Altruism to Other Patients.

Mesenchymal stem cells (MSC's) can be used in the experimental transplant setting for treatment of life threatening GvHD or to improve engraftment. Presently, the European MSC Consortium has three ethically approved multi center clinical protocols in use. MSC's expanded ex vivo from donor bone marrow are mostly of parental origin. We reviewed donation data from two participating centers, to establish donor commitment, donation and procedural related complications. Parents of children undergoing haploidentical PBSCT or a cord blood transplant were asked to donate 50 cc of bone marrow 4–5 weeks prior to HSCT. Parents of children with non-steroid responsive aGvHD (grade III-IV) were asked at the time of treatment failure. Bone marrow was aspirated either under general or local anesthesia. Haploidentical PBSC donors received in addition 5 days of G-CSF immediately before stem cell harvest. Donors were asked to consider consent for additional MSC's to be donated for research or use as 3rd party donations for other patients. Donors were cleared for donation by an independent physician. Thirty three donors (14 mothers, 18 fathers, 1 brother) of 34 relatives asked, agreed to donate bone marrow for MSC expansion and all additional uses. One parent whose child died before receiving MSC's requested they be used for 3rd party donations. Fourty five patients (included 6 adults) were treated with MSC's (see table 1 for details). Thirty one patients (68%) received MSC's from a parent, the remaining treatments being 3rd party for acute GvHD. All donors were considered suitable for PBSC or BM donation, although excess weight, mild hypertension and depression were documented in a minority of donors. No adverse events were documented after bone marrow donation, but one parent suffered severe bone pain, requiring opiate analgesia, during G-CSF administration. At 6 weeks follow up no adverse effects were reported. MSC donation either alone or in combination with stem cell mobilization can be achieved without major problems. Parental donor commitment is definitely related to the needs of the child. However, donor altruism to include other unknown patients including adult recipients was uniformly evident in our studies. Donation of stem cells for parents is a stressful situation and requests for multiple donations of various types of cell products can raise questions about medical and ethical considerations. Our protocols show that well informed parents have a propensity to commit to others needs as well as their offspring's. It is therefore essential when introducing experimental treatments to establish a balance between donors commitment and patient needs.Table 1Patient and donor characteristicsPATIENTS n=45OUTCOMEDONORS n=33Male2921 alive19Female1612 alive14Age (range years)7.0 (0.6–16.4)38 (26–53.3)Hematological malignancy35Immune deficiency3Others7Haplo+ MSC2115 aliveOwn child donationsCord + MSC91 rejection 1 deathOwn child donationaGvHD15CR in 11 patients14/15 3rd party donationsComplications2 a GvHD (grade I)Severe pain 1 donorInfections 14 patientsPlatelet tx in 4 haplo-donors

Ideological Congruence Versus Electoral Success

Political scientists have long studied the importance of money in congressional elections. The primary conclusion of such studies is that candidates who lack financial resources rarely win elections. Recently, Democratic and Republican national party organizations have taken an active role in congressional campaigns, contributing millions of dollars to House and Senate hopefuls. In this work, I seek to determine whether the parties prefer to send resources to ideologically congruent candidates or to candidates engaged in competitive races. Building on previous works that analyzed the patterns of party contributions in House elections, I use a superior measure of ideology to study patterns of party donations to a specific subset of Senate candidates from 1990 to 2000. Consistent with studies of House contributions, I find that competitiveness, not ideology, is the primary determinant of party giving in Senate elections.

But murderers can have all the children they want: surrogacy and public policy.

No new ethical issue is created by reproductive technologies. The state should not intervene to suppress individual rights to take advantage of these technologies, including third party donations. Some individuals will view these technologies as the best available option for having and rearing children. The major values to be protected in public policy ought to be compassion, privacy and procreative rights.

Political Bucks and Government Billings: A preliminary enquiry into the question of linkage between party donations by business and government contracts

In spite of the current interest in scandal-mongering, the record of corporate contributions to political parties has not been studied for the light it might shed on the practice of patronage in the federal government. The article looks, first of all, at the big donors and the contracts they received; secondly, it examines the big contracts and what those companies contributed to the parties. The conclusion is that, although a number of firms substantially favour one party over the other, the evidence for a connection between donations and the actual awarding of contracts is not dramatic.