Party Bans Research Articles

Why ban Batasuna? Terrorism, political parties and democracy

This article addresses the question: under what conditions do democracies ban political parties? It does so by testing three hypotheses generated by a disparate literature on party bans in a ‘most likely case’, namely, the proscription of radical Basque nationalist parties Herri Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok and Batasuna in 2003. These parties were banned for their integration in a terrorist network led by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). The hypotheses are that democracies ban anti-system parties if (i) anti-system parties do not unambiguously eschew violence; (ii) alternatives to proscription are not effective; and (iii) relevant office holders have reason to believe they will not be disadvantaged in their pursuit of office or votes for supporting the ban. Case study findings confirm the hypotheses other than that on violence, given that ETA’s political wing escaped proscription for around two decades before it was banned. Explaining this finding – or addressing the question of why the parties were not banned until 2003 – the article develops two further hypotheses, namely, that democracies ban anti-system parties if (iv) the parties have been ‘securitized’ as an existential threat to the state or democratic community and (v) proscription is the preference of all veto players.

Democratization and the illegalization of political parties in Europe

This article explores the literature on democratization to account for the proscription of political parties in democratizing states. A survey of 22 party bans in 12 European states identifies two distinct classes of proscription derived from the ‘degree of democratization’ present in a banning state. I identify features of ‘new’ and ‘incomplete’ democracies that help explain proscription. Case studies on Germany, Austria, Russia, Latvia and Greece illustrate the impact of ‘modes of transition’, heightened uncertainty, political tensions and instability on ‘new democracy bans’, and the impact of illiberalism, limited checks on executive power and circumscribed political participation on ‘incomplete democracy bans’.

Parties in chains: Do ethnic party bans in Africa promote peace?

Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced legal provisions to ban ethnic or other identity-based particularistic parties. Altogether, 12 countries have actually banned political parties on these grounds. In theoretical terms, such bans can exclude particularism from politics but — contrary to public discourse — also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to violent means or of becoming an object of conflict themselves. Empirically speaking, hardly any general patterns in the effects of bans can be detected. A closer look at 12 politically relevant bans in six countries reveals an initially stabilizing impact in one case (Rwanda in 1994). A ban on a religious party in Kenya in 1993 triggered violent conflict. In cases such as Equatorial Guinea (1994) and Rwanda (2001, 2003), this regulatory measure, allegedly designed to promote peace, seems to be part of the ‘menu of manipulation’ and is abused to suppress the opposition.

Party bans in Africa – an empirical overview

With the re-introduction of multiparty politics at the beginning of the 1990s most African countries started to regulate political parties extensively, especially ethnic and other particularistic parties. This article presents a new database on particularistic and other party bans in sub-Saharan Africa, drawing on a comprehensive collection of African party regulations and records of their implementation since 1990. After demonstrating the magnitude and complexity of party bans in Africa the article deals in depth with enforcement institutions and legal procedures. It shows that party bans are especially pervasive in less democratic countries and have often targeted politically relevant parties.

An effective measure of institutional engineering? Ethnic party bans in Africa

Following the introduction of multiparty systems, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced wide-ranging measures of party regulation, particularly bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties, in order, it is claimed, to prevent intercommunal conflict and to promote democracy. While this restrictive type of party regulation has become a dominant political feature in Africa, little is known about the efficacy of such measures. This article engages in an analysis of the possible effects on democracy and peace of different types of party regulation and implemented party bans and shows that party bans are apparently less suited to alleviating conflict than has been claimed. It also finds that implemented bans seem to be negatively related to democracy as ethnic bans are frequently abused to suppress the political opposition or to silence ethnic or religious minorities.

Understanding variations in party bans in Africa

The article is interested in the main reasons for the emergence and enforcement of party bans in sub-Saharan Africa. While the introduction of legal provisions that allow for the banning of particularistic political parties is the standard on the African continent, few countries actually use these provisions and actually deny registration or ban existing parties. We use qualitative comparative analysis to compare the introduction of party bans and the patterns of implementation across all sub-Saharan countries. Our analysis shows that structural conditions do matter. Countries that did not introduce legal provisions to ban political parties combine a British colonial background and a stronger tradition of multi-party democracy. With regard to the decision to actually use these provisions our analysis shows the interaction of two conditions to be decisive: Countries which have experienced ethnically motivated violence in the past and which are at the same time ‘liberalizing’ their regimes rely on party bans to restrict political party competition.

Senegal's party system: the limits of formal regulation

Senegal has a long history of multiparty rule. In the 1970s the regime used party regulation to restrict political competition; since the 1990s and notwithstanding a steady rise of the number of political parties to around 150 at the end of 2008, there have been only a few attempts to regulate the activities of political parties. Party bans have been effective in limiting the politicization of ethnicity in the party system, but other social and political variables have contributed equally to this outcome. Formal rules have not been applied in stopping the rise of religious parties, as the electoral success of these parties remains limited. The shrinking importance of political parties in the increasingly personalist regime of President Wade makes regulation of party activities a less contested issue.

Ethnic party bans in Africa: an introduction

During the 1990s the number of African states allowing multiparty elections increased dramatically. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied in the majority of countries by legal bans on ethnic and other particularistic parties. The main official reason has been the aim of preventing the politicization of ethnicity as this is feared to lead to ethnic conflict and political instability. Despite the resurgent interest in institutional engineering, this phenomenon has received little scholarly attention. This contribution outlines the main research questions and preliminary answers of a collaborative research project which combines large and small N comparisons and case studies. Bans are relatively rarely enforced and the decision actually to ban parties is best explained by the interaction of an experience of ethnic violence in the past and hybrid regimes using these measures to restrict political party competition. Positive effects on democracy and conflict management seem generally limited and are context dependent.

Ethnic party bans and institutional engineering in Nigeria

Nigeria is the African country that implemented ethnic party bans most systematically. At different points in time, a total of at least 64 parties has been denied registration for failing to demonstrate ‘national presence’. Nigeria is also the African country with the longest record in institutional engineering. Ethnic party bans are one instrument in a broader repertoire of incentives for the creation of national parties that transcend the manifold socio-cultural differences. This article provides an overview of the often highly innovative ways in which successive Nigerian leaders, especially military, have sought to control the political organization of ethnicity in the process of democratization.

Political party bans in Rwanda 1994–2003: three narratives of justification

This article discusses the public justifications brought forward for three waves of bans on political parties in Rwanda after the regime change of 1994. While the standard narrative of protecting democracy from its enemies (‘militant democracy’) was not invoked, two alternative narratives carried the burden of justification. The first is that of banning strongly particularistic parties, i.e. parties that discriminate or incite hatred and violence along ethnic or similar lines. The second is that of banning the former ruling party, responsible for mass atrocities, and its successor organizations. While both justification narratives have strong initial plausibility against Rwanda's history of ethnic conflict and genocide, and mirror analogous justifications for banning parties elsewhere, a detailed discussion of the evidence suggests that Rwanda's bans mainly served the purpose of repressing political opposition. The justifications brought forward in the later waves of bans remain unconvincing and cannot claim political legitimacy.

Party prohibition cases: different approaches by the Turkish constitutional court and the European Court of Human Rights

The article deals with the different approaches followed by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in party prohibition cases. The Turkish Constitution and even more so the Law on Political Parties contain a long list of party bans, the violation of which leads to the closure of the party by the Constitutional Court. The Turkish Constitutional Court, both under the 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions, interpreted these provisions in an exceedingly illiberal manner, and has so far closed down a total of 24 political parties. Turkish rules and practices concerning the prohibition of political parties are among the most important ‘democracy deficits’ of the Turkish political system. In the article, the Turkish Court's illiberal approach to party prohibition cases, especially those involving the protection of the national and territorial integrity of the state and of the principle of secularism, is compared with the much more liberal criteria developed by the ECtHR and the Venice Commission.

Promoting Peace and Democracy Through Party Regulation? Ethnic Party Bans in Africa

Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty system s in the early 1990s almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties. Such party bans have been neglected in research, and this paper engages in a preliminary analysis of their effects on democracy and peace. Theoretically, particularistic party bans can block particularisms from entering politics but also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to extra-legal or violent means. Neutral or context-dependent effects are also possible. Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics on the basis of a unique inventory of party bans and readily available indicators for the dependent variables, no simple connection can be detected. Rather, context conditions seem to be of superior explanatory power. We also find a systematic connection between party bans and variables that could be conceptualized as the causes of their implementation.