Party Apparat Research Articles

“Erikaader”: nomenklatuur ja julgeolekuorganid Eesti NSV-s 1940–1953 [Abstract: “Special cadre”: the nomenklatura system and the state security organs in the era of Stalinist rule in the Estonian SSR 1940–1953

As one of the main pillars of support for Stalin’s regime, the Soviet state security organs had a prominent role in both the state authority’s and the Party’s nomenklatura system. The principle of the nomenklatura system – to establish the control of Party organs over the appointment of leading cadres – was introduced in the Estonian SSR immediately after its annexation in 1940. This article considers the development of the nomenklatura of the state security organs at the Union republic level, the implementation of the nomenklatura system, and the role of the state security organs in this on the basis of the example of the Estonian SSR in the years 1940–53. It clearly appears that changes in the composition of the nomenklatura, yet also in the individuals filling posts that belonged to the nomenklatura were as a rule initiated not in Estonia but in Moscow in the CPSU Central Committee and in the headquarters of the state security organs. Here the role of the Estonian SSR Party apparat was formal. For this reason, essentially no rights emerged for the Estonian SSR Party apparat to appoint state security leaders to their posts nor did any patron-client relationships develop. In actuality, the role of the Estonian SSR Party apparat was limited to that of the informer and – if necessary – of the institution that had to answer for any conceivable consequences. The strictness with which Estonian Party authorities followed the nomenklatura system depended primarily on what the attitude and regulations of the CPSU Central Committee were at any given moment in relation to this matter. When the order came from Moscow to follow the nomenklatura system more strictly, that is just what was done. With isolated exceptions, non-Estonian cadre officers sent to Estonia from the Soviet Union formed the personnel subject to nomenklatura in the state security organs of the Estonian SSR. The fact that the state security organs carried out background checks not only on their own nomenklatura officials but also on those of other agencies, including those in the Party apparat, increased the independence of the state security organs even further. Considering the centralization and dictator-like control with which the state security organs were run, this was also most likely the intentional policy of the Kremlin, meaning that patronage relationships between the local Party and the leadership of the state security organs were considered undesirable. Instead, rivalry and denunciations were preferred. It appears that the state security agency also did not welcome or encourage actual intervention by the EC(b)P Central Committee in their cadre work. When the situation became problematic, it was always possible to refer to the covert nature of the state security organs. The fact that the approval of the heads of state security had to come from Moscow also essentially gave them independence in relation to the local administration, including Party authority. Keywords: nomenklatura, Stalinism, Estonia, Soviet state security organs.

Eestimaa Kommunistliku Partei Keskkomitee nomen klatuur 1945–1990: areng ja statistika [Abstract: The nomenklatura of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 1945–1990: development and statistics

The nomenklatura system that had taken shape in the Soviet Union in the 1920s was implemented in the Estonian SSR in the post-war years, even though this issue was already on the agenda during the first year of Soviet occupation. The year 1945 was the most important from the standpoint of getting the nomenklatura system to start functioning since it was then that the system for documenting nomenklatura cadres was worked out, personal fi les were drawn up, a card fi le of personal cards of the nomenklatura cadres was established, and the ECP CC nomenklatura was approved. The specification of the principles of the nomenklatura carried out at the USSR-wide level in 1946 and the drawing up of a new USSR-wide list also brought changes in the nomenklaturas of the local Party committees. The first post-war ECP CC nomenklatura was approved in September of 1946 and it listed a total of 1739 official posts. The total number of positions that belonged to the ECP CC nomenklatura increased with each approved list starting from 1946 to 1950, when 3155 positions were included in the nomenklatura. Based on the decision of the CPSU CC, the new ECP CC nomenklatura was approved in August of 1953 with a total of 2252 positions. The reduction in nomenklatura posts continued during the subsequent years as well both at the USSR-wide level as well as regionally. The smallest number of ECP CC nomenklatura positions is found in the list from 1961, when their number had dropped to 1579 positions. Two years later, on the other hand, there were once again over 2000 posts in the ECP CC nomenklatura, remaining in this order of magnitude with small variations until 1971, when the total number of ECP CC nomenklatura extended to nearly 3000 positions. The total number of nomenklatura positions was 2166 in the full listing that was approved four years later. The ECP CC nomenklatura was of the same order of magnitude in the 1980s as well, shrinking to 1761 positions by 1988 and 1349 posts by 1990. In 1947–50, the number of posts belonging to the listed nomenklatura increased and the number of posts belonging to the list of potential replacements for nomenklatura positions decreased with each new listing of official positions. This meant that during these years, the number of positions that required the direct approval of the ECP CC increased. The relative proportion of listed nomenklatura began decreasing in the ECP CC nomenklatura in the latter half of the 1950s, reaching its lowest point in the full listing of 1956, when only 55% of the ECP CC nomenklatura required the approval of the ECP CC Bureau or Secretariat. From this point onward, the relative proportion of listed nomenklatura began increasing again, levelling off at between 74 and 83% in the 1960s. Positions in the Party apparat, the ideological, agricultural and other administrative apparats formed the bulk of the ECP CC nomenklatura in 1946–75. The relative proportion of these spheres of activity remained somewhere in the range of 52–73% in total in the different listings. The institutions that belonged to the ECP CC nomenklatura in 1946–90 went through several changes in their designations and structure over the years. For the most part, the number of positions included in the ECP CC nomenklatura in the jurisdiction of such institutions decreased or increased with the approved listings or by way of decisions made during the intervening periods. Regardless of frequent changes, the core of the ECP CC nomenklatura remained essentially the same over this period of 45 years. Keywords: nomenklatura, political elite, cadre policy, sovietization, Estonian SSR

Why did CPSU reform fail? The 28th Party Congress Reconsidered

This article considers the reasons for the failure to reform the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which was central to the Soviet collapse. Using a wide range of party and other archives, it challenges the conventional view that power was concentrated in the hands of a very conservative party apparat that was able to frustrate any attempt at reform. Focusing on the issue of party renewal at the 28th Party Congress of 1990, it argues that party reformers, including many party secretaries, made serious efforts to change a hierarchically organised vanguard party into a social democratic one at about this time. Their eventual failure was due more than anything else to the reformers' lack of an organised movement and Gorbachev's indecisiveness.

Book Review

January 01 2005 Subverting the System: Gorbachev's Reform of the Party's Apparat, 1986–1991 JonathanHarris, Subverting the System: Gorbachev's Reform of the Party's Apparat, 1986–1991. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. x 1 179 pp. Graeme Gill Graeme Gill University of Sydney Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Graeme Gill University of Sydney Online Issn: 1531-3298 Print Issn: 1520-3972 © 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2005 Journal of Cold War Studies (2005) 7 (3): 197–199. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2005.7.3.197 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Graeme Gill; Subverting the System: Gorbachev's Reform of the Party's Apparat, 1986–1991. Journal of Cold War Studies 2005; 7 (3): 197–199. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2005.7.3.197 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll JournalsJournal of Cold War Studies Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2005 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Removing the Core of Power

The Soviet collapse was one of the most significant events in the 20th century. The reason for it is still a controversial issue. The party apparat has been regarded as one of the key aspects of the Soviet-type political regime. It is well known that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had controlled state (executive) organs before perestroika through the party apparat's intervention. In addition, it is also well known that the party lost most of its control under Gorbachev's reform. There were two reorganizations of the party apparat under Gorbachev in 1988 after the 19th Party Conference and in 1990 after the 28th Party Congress. Researching these reorganizations may help us consider the reason for the Soviet collapse.This article investigates the decision-making and implementation processes of the party apparat reorganizations, and also looks into the structure and work of the party apparat. Utilising party archives that became available after the Soviet collapse, this article makes clear the following findings. Firstly, the first attempt to reorganize the party apparat in late 1988 had created a “power vacuum, ” though the party leadership intended to activate the economy by preventing the substitution (podmena) of the executive organs by the party. When the party stopped intervening in the executive organs, these bodies, which had depended on the party for a long time, also stopped working. The presidency, which was created in March 1990 in order to manage the “power vacuum, ” did not properly function either. Secondly, such a situation complicated further reform efforts. The second party apparat reorganization prolonged and not far-reaching especially in relation to security organs, though the party apparat certainly lost most of its ties with other state organs. In addition, despite the party leadership's intention to strengthen “political activity” of the party, the theoretical or ideological work did not improve. Thus, the communist party failed to transform itself into a normal political (or parliamentary) party, partially because of the “power vacuum.” Thirdly, losing its traditional administrative function and failing to achieve a new function, the party lost its raison d'etre. The party organizations were disintegrating well before Russian President Yeltsin's decree on the suspension of the party's activity that was issued immediately after the attempted coup in August 1991.

The first reorganisation of the CPSU central committee apparat under Perestroika

THE ATTEMPT BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV to reform the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) apparat, particularly its all-powerful Central Committee (CC) apparat, was inextricably tied to the conduct of the economic and political reforms of perestroika and determined many of their successes and failures. Indeed, reform making is policy making, and it must pass through the stages of decision, conception, bargaining and implementation and is subject to the vicissitudes of political conflict. Any assessment of the suitability of a reform's design and strategy and any explanations for its success or failure therefore should examine the constraints on reform making, both structural and 'intentional': the range of choices configured by the demands imposed on the rational calculations of decision makers from different powerful interest or political groups and tendencies within a polity.1 It is insufficient to look exclusively at the political intentions of reform's friends and foes2 or to focus only on the explanatory value of such structural constraints as the multinational and 'partyised' nature of the Soviet state or the hypercentralised structure of its economy.3 The combined power of the conservative opposition to reform (an intentional constraint) and the power of entrenched bureaucracies (a structural constraint) must be taken into account when assessing the reasons for the successes and failures of perestroika. The more conservative and entrenched the bureaucrats, the more difficult it is to implement reform and the less likely it is to produce the outcome the originators of reform seek: a more effective system and maintenance of their power. In the Soviet case, no reform could be implemented without the strong commitment of the party apparatus, if not especially then including the central apparat, the only mobilisational instrument capable of orienting both the state machinery and society toward reform. There were essentially two reorganisations of the CC apparat during Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary. The first was initiated in autumn 1988 and was being executed virtually right up to the XXVIII Congress, after which a second reorganisation was implemented. This article examines the first reorganisation as it was conceived and implemented, in an attempt to understand better the obstacles to successful reform in the USSR better. Both 'intentional' constraints-the conservatives' active opposition and the bureaucratised 'crypto-politics' of the apparat (factional political struggle conducted in the depths of bureaucratic structures through

The social background and political allegiance of the political elite of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: The terminal stage, 1984 to 1991

OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF POWER in the Soviet Union, the popularly elected soviets were undoubtedly the weakest prior to the reforms instituted by Gorbachev. They were representative and affirmative bodies, rather than decision-making ones. Gorbachev's reforms in 1989, however, strengthened the soviets and weakened the other two pillars of power in the USSR-the party's apparat and the government executive, the Council of Ministers. The Supreme Soviet and a new body, the Congress of People's Deputies, became a springboard for radical political change and an arena for political opposition to the Gorbachev leadership. Most of the discussion of the Supreme Soviet has been in terms of the role of deputies and the rise of political factions (parties) and interest groups outside the Communist Party. And studies of the 1989 Congress and Supreme Soviet have been devoted to an analysis of the institutional power of the parliament and its law-making powers and functions.1 This article has as its frame of reference the elites of the Supreme Soviet as they developed between April 1984 and August 1991.2 Our discussion therefore focuses on two distinct time-periods: that from 1984 to spring 1989, when the traditional structures and processes were in place, and that from spring 1989 to 1991, which was a period when the Supreme Soviet became a major actor in the process of political change.3 The article considers the changes in origin and composition of the positional legislative elite in the terminal period of the USSR.

Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee

Historically, leaders of the Soviet Union have shown extraordinary faith in the power of bureaucratic reorganization to solve political problems. The 1985-1987 restaffing and restructuring of the foreign policy establishment indicate that Mikhail Gorbachev shares this faith. In the first sixteen months of his leadership, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replaced its minister, two first deputy ministers, seven deputy ministers, a third of all Soviet ambassadors, and created four new departments. In addition, important changes were made in the central party apparat, affecting three of the CPSU Central Committee departments: The International Information Department was abolished. The Propaganda Department gained added prominence in international affairs with the appointment of a new chief, Aleksandr Iakovlev, who began playing a conspicuous role as Gorbachev's advisor at international conferences even before his elevation to the Politburo in January 1987. Of great significance for the Soviet foreign policy establishment as a whole, the International Department (ID) was given new leadership, a new arms control unit, and expanded missions.

Soviet-Japanese Relations: Perceptions, Goals, Interactions

One of the recent emphases in the study of international relations has been on perception and misperception. Certainly, decision makers act on the basis of their perception of reality, and not on objective reality. In the case of Soviet decision makers, we should also be concerned with their belief system-that is, the ideological baggage they bring to bear on their decisions. Of course, there is vast disagreement among analysts of the Soviet scene on the value of ideology as a variable; some take it at face value and argue that the occupants of the Kremlin are pursuing maximalist ideological goals; others feel that ideology is used today largely to legitimize the Party apparat and its decisions. My own position is that, irrespective of conscious uses of ideology by Soviet decision makers, the impact of indoctrination and early socialization is unquestionably present, so that these decision makers also bring an unconscious component to their decisions. No matter how cynical they may be about MarxismLeninism, they are also the captives of their ideological environment. (Of course, the historical Tsarist Russian dimension should not be neglected. ') Until the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the predominant experiential reality of the Soviet leadership had been the trauma of World War II. As we shall see, this was the dominant Soviet perceptual image vis-a-

The Development of the Soviet Party Apparat in the Civil War: Center, Localities, and Nationality Areas

The Development of the Soviet Party Apparat in the Civil War: Center, Localities, and Nationality Areas