Parts Of Yugoslavia Research Articles

Alberto Basciani and Egidio Ivetic. Italia e Balcani. Storia di una prossimità

Alberto Basciani and Egidio Ivetic. <i>Italia e Balcani. Storia di una prossimità</i>

Economic development of Montenegro from 1918 to 1990: the impact of political status and economic development model

ABSTRACT This study aims to explore the impact of the different political statuses of Montenegro within Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1990 and the state-led development strategies in the process of intensive postwar industrialization on its economic development. This study investigates the possible causes of the lower level of development of Montenegro in relation to other parts of Yugoslavia. The research shows that, after gaining the status of an equal federal member in Yugoslavia after World War II, in combination with the state-led model of accelerated industrialization, it achieved the best economic results in its history. This emphasizes the positive effects of state-led development in regions with a weak capitalist tradition and underdeveloped political and market institutions. By applying the growth accounting method, we estimated the annual growth rates of TFP in Montenegro and Yugoslavia from 1952 to 1988. The results show lower TFP growth in Montenegro than in Yugoslavia because of the lower development of its determinants (education, infrastructure, market efficiency, innovation, and institutions).

Architectural Reconfigurations and Urban Remaking After Ruptures: Interrogating Frontier Urbanism in Rijeka/Fiume

The city of Rijeka/Fiume underwent an array of transitions in the long twentieth century, from the port of Hungary in the Dual Monarchy to a free city, to D´Annunzio´s Italian Regency of Carnaro, annexation by Italy, incorporation into Yugoslavia, and eventually the independence of Croatia. The article examines the processes of urban reconstruction and architectural reconfigurations in the city as “frontier urbanism”, building on Wendy Pullan’s (2011) discussion of how various actors employ architectural and place-making practices to secure the state in contested urban space. The article traces Rijeka/Fiume´s urban development as a window of fixating state identities in the built environment throughout the century, focusing on the aftermath of the Second World War. It examines the urban transformations of the city as the demographic landscape was reshaped after the departure of the local Italian-speaking majority and the arrival of workers from various parts of Yugoslavia, but also from Italy. By analysing decisions to rebuild or not buildings damaged by war, as well as the demolition of the 1943-built votive temple in Mlaka, the article inquires how reconstruction and urban planning became avenues to secure the state at its new frontiers.

Uloga fabrike “Bratstvo” u razvoju Novog Travnika

The establishment of the socialist regime had led to thorough political, economic, social, cultural and other changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first decade after the Second World War was marked by the reconstruction of the war-torn country, and great support in that process was provided by the USSR - the main ally of the new Yugoslavia. Emphasis was placed on the intensive development of the industry, which was to be the carrier of the overall economic development of the entire country. In accordance with this strategy, large industrial plants were established in all parts of Yugoslavia, thanks to which there was an intensive process of urbanization of numerous previously dormant communities. However, when there was a conflict and then a break with the USSR, Yugoslavia was forced to partially modify its economic development plans (the so-called Five-Year Plans). These changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina were most felt by cities such as Zenica, which instead of the originally planned Doboj became a Yugoslav metallurgical center, and Novi Travnik, which arose as a result of relocating part of the arms industry from Kragujevac in Serbia to central Bosnia. The factory “Bratstvo" (meaning Brotherhood) was built on a deserted meadow near Travnik in the heart of central Bosnia, and for the needs of housing workers who built industrial plants, as well as for those who worked in those plants, the first residential buildings were built in the form of low-quality wooden barracks. These were the roots of the workers' settlement that gradually grew into a new town called Novi Travnik. The fateful link between the factory and the city, which was established at that time, was not interrupted during the entire socialist period, so the survival and development of Novi Travnik completely depended on the business opportunities in the "Bratstvo" factory. The expansion of the production and plant of the "Bratstvo" also included the construction of new housing, communal, social, health, sports, cultural, catering and other facilities in Novi Travnik. A successful business year in "Bratstvo" meant a secure inflow of money into the local community budget as well as a sufficient number of funds for the work of cultural, artistic, entertainment, sports and all other societies in the city. The same rule applied in the case of bad business of "Bratstvo", and the most obvious example of how important the factory was for Novi Travnik can be seen in the case of a failed business in Ghana. The local authorities in Novi Travnik were absolutely aware of the role of the "Brotherhood" in the development of Novi Travnik and tried in every way to facilitate the functioning of the company, so, except for a few mere misunderstandings, relations between city and factory management were mostly friendly. After all, when the survival of the "Bratstvo" was called into question due to the failed business in Ghana, local authorities were among the first to appeal for the company's salvation, clearly noting that with the disappearance of the factory, the fate of Novi Travnik would be sealed. The paper presents a brief overview of the history of the company "Bratstvo" from its founding in June 1949 until the end of the socialist period in 1990, and analyses the relations between the city and factory authorities in that period. The aim of the paper was to show the importance that the factory "Bratstvo" had for the overall development of Novi Travnik and to determine how much the local authorities were aware of the role of companies in the development of the city. The paper provides insight into the processes that took place in a particular local community, but which can also be found in other industrial cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia during the socialist period.

„Spomenici su prošlost i budućnost.”

Na temelju novije literature koja se bavi proučavanjem kulture sjećanja i izvora iz različitih fondova pohranjenih u Arhivu Jugoslavije u Beogradu ovaj rad želi dati prilog raspravi o socijalističkim spomenicima za vrijeme Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije / Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije prikazom nekih političkih i administrativnih mehanizama njihova financiranja unutar socijalističkoga sustava, a razmatra se i pitanje odnosa prema spomenicima i kulturi sjećanja s aspekta vlasti, tj. iz perspektive države i državnih institucija u tom razdoblju. Posebna pozornost dana je, kako je često nazivan, „najpoznatijem partizanskom spomeniku na prostoru bivše SFRJ”, skulpturi „Bitka na Sutjesci” kipara Miodraga Živkovića na Tjentištu iz 1971. godine.

Historiografski tekst i historijski kontekst

Rad zavisno od vremena i mjesta nastanka analizira historiografsku literaturu koja je nastala o Nijemcima (folksdojčerima) na teritoriju koji je obuhvaćala Jugoslavija posljednjih sto godina.

’The German Anabasis’: The Breakthrough of Army Group E from Eastern Yugoslavia 1944

ABSTRACTThe eastern parts of Yugoslavia were the site of savage fighting between October and December 1944, as the German Army Group E tried to force its way out of an almost desperate situation it had found itself in following the evacuation of Greece. Against all odds, this huge German formation managed to best three Allied armies, rugged terrain, and autumn rains and reach the relative safety of the Independent State of Croatia, where it joined the remainder of the Axis front in the Balkans. Although this dramatic episode had been extensively written about in the former Yugoslavia and Germany, it received next to no attention in the English-speaking academic community. The article at hand will provide an overview and an analysis of military operations based on a wide plethora of primary and secondary sources of all sides. It will also argue that the ultimate success of the breakthrough was as much due to the unwillingness of the Soviet high command to devote more resources to the Balkan Front, and the structural weaknesses of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Partisans’ armies, as it was to the battlefield prowess of the Wehrmacht.

Serbian

Dr Đorđe Guelmino was born on in 1893 in Nis and died in 1875 in Belgrade. The famous epidemiologists, worked in many different parts of Yugoslavia and had a rich professional biography and bibliography with international importance. He specially contributed to the study of malaria. As a head manager of the Institute of Hygiene, he participated in the establishment of the Department for Tuberculosis in 1937 in Nis. During World War II, he was a prisoner the Red Cross concentration camp, and after the liberation he made a fruitful scientific career.

To Walk With the Devil: Slovene Collaboration and Axis Occupation, 1941-1945, by Gregor Joseph Kranjc

To Walk With the Devil: Slovene Collaboration and Axis Occupation, 1941-1945, by Gregor Joseph Kranjc. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2013. xi, 329 pp. $32.95 US (paper). Gregor Kranjc has produced a detailed study of the local collaboration with Italian and Germany occupation forces in Slovenia during the Second World War. His purpose is to correct earlier historians' dichotomous perspective, especially the post WWII Yugoslavian communist track on collaboration and the view proffered by the exiled anti-communist emigres. The first view holds that there was a wide spread popular resistance toward the occupiers with only a small group of collaborators attempting to maintain their positions of privilege. The emigre version states that the Slovenians had to choose between evils (the Germans or the communists) with the goal of preserving the Slovene nation. Kranjc amply demonstrates that both are mythologies in need of modification. Yugoslavia entered into WWII with the idea of preserving its statehood through an alliance with the Axis powers. This effort was subverted by a group of anti-Fascist military officers who overthrew the government and attempted to form a monarchy led democracy. The folly of this aspiration was underlined by the immediate invasion and dissection of Yugoslavia by German, Italian, and Hungarian forces. Slovenia was sliced into three portions, a part for each occupier. Kranjc focuses on the area which the Italians first occupy: the Province of Ljubljana. Ljubljuana is significant because the area had relatively more independence than other parts of Yugoslavia during the early occupation, and because of what happened to anti-partisan forces from this region after the war. The mass murders, trials, and mob justice enacted against collaborators (perceived and real) are the impetus for his exploration of the topic. Chapter two lays out the history of Slovene and Yugoslavia between 1900 and the eve of WWII. The history of previous occupiers including resistance and collaboration is a key point in this story. The political divide between the communists and the non-communists was established prior to the war, with Government and Church leaders dynamically opposed to communism. Resistance to the Axis invaders is explored in chapter three. The resistance started small: hiding food stuffs, collecting weapons, and gathering intelligence to pass on to the British and Yugoslavian government in exile. Armed resistance was not yet a rational option due to the overwhelming military clout of the invaders and the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviets. Armed resistance began when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. The Yugoslavian communists, in the main form of the Liberation Front under Tito were the backbone of the communist contribution to the resistance. The Italians, who occupied Slovenia, poured in thousands of troops to meet the armed partisans. They were ultimately unsuccessful. Kranjc does not spend a large amount of text on Tito or on resistance as his study is about collaboration. Collaboration, and its complexity, is the focus of the remainder of the book. In the first two years the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies seemed unlikely and so hopes of a successful war against the Fascists appeared delusional. People settled into the Italian occupation and worked to make a life for themselves. This involved carrying on business which inevitably led to dealing with the invaders, and at times this presented opportunities for great profit. …

Anticipating the Disintegration: Nationalisms in Former Yugoslavia, 1980–1990

In addition to rapid economic decline and the persistent political violence in the province of Kosovo, in the 1980s Yugoslavia experienced a veritable renaissance of nationalist ideologies of the “dominant nation” type. According to this kind of national ideology, its target nation is historically predetermined to be politically dominant on a given territory which is then chosen by the national ideology in question. From 1971–1972, when the Croat nationalist movement and the Serbian liberal communist elite was suppressed by Tito until the early 1980s, publication of any nationalist writings was effectively banned in all parts of Yugoslavia, except in Kosovo. While ending public polemics by national ideologues, the ban confined nationalist polemics to the closely watched realm of intellectual dissidence. At that time, intellectual dissidents aimed primarily at the delegitimisaton of the communist regime in Yugoslavia. For this purpose, nationalist—as opposed to liberal—dissidents argued that the Yugoslav communist regime not only intentionally belittled and disadvantaged their respective nations, therefore benefiting the competitor nation(s), but also that it had betrayed their respective nations’ national goals. However absurd these claims may appear when taken together, they reveal how limited the target of each national ideology was: it targeted only “its” nation, in the attempt to prove that the communist regime had failed that nation alone and should not have the right to rule over it. These “dominant nation” ideologies stood in sharp contrast to the official Yugoslav Communist Party ideology of “equal nations,” which maintained the equality of all nations and nationalities in all parts of Yugoslavia; according to the official ideology, no nation in Yugoslavia was, in theory, politically dominant in any part of Yugoslavia.

Slovenia's road to democracy

WITH LESS THAN TWO MILLION INHABITANTS and no history of independent statehood in the last millennium, Slovenia seemed to many in the West to be an unlikely candidate for independence. Advocates of large states warned in vain that Slovenia was 'too small' to be viable and suggested that if the republic separated from Yugoslavia, it would inevitably find it necessary to join a federal or confederal union with one of its neighbours-whether Austria, Italy, Croatia, or-in the most fanciful renditioncombining with Austria, Hungary and Croatia to form an entirely new state. Yet despite all this scepticism, Slovenia, which had been a part of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941 and again from 1945 on, declared its independence on 25 June 1991. Almost two years later, Slovenia's economy has been strained by the influx of Bosnian refugees, and recovery has been held up by the long delay in passing a bill of privatisation. That said, Slovenia appears to be roughly in a class with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of its prospects for carrying out successfully the transition to pluralism. Slovenia has had several important advantages in this regard. First, Slovenia's per capita social product, while lower than Austria's or Italy's, has nonetheless ranked as the highest in Eastern Europe, more than twice as high, for example, as that in Hungary or Poland. Second, the transition to pluralism was begun by the Slovenian communists themselves, for reasons having nothing to do with broader processes in Eastern Europe. Indeed, for reasons quite specific to Slovenia, pluralisation was undertaken (in the late 1980s) by the local communists and local dissidents jointly and cooperatively. Third, the population of Slovenia remains, despite the recent immigration of people from other parts of former Yugoslavia, largely homogeneous: about 90% of the population is Slovenian. Fourth, none of Slovenia's neighbours has either active or inactive claims on its territory. Compared to the uncertainties associated with most of the rest of former Yugoslavia, let alone Transylvania, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and Kaliningrad oblast', there is little to trouble the Slovenian authorities here. Their most difficult 'border' problem has related to free access to the sea through Croatian territorial waters-a problem which might be resolved by trading some territory west of Zagreb in exchange for Cape Savudrija.1 And fifth, Slovenia's transport infrastructure, a critical element in calculating the prospects of economic success, is on a par with other Central and West European states. On the other hand, Slovenia has, since the Serbian side launched its war against Bosnia-Hercegovina at

Quasi‐proletarians and a patriarchal bureaucracy: Aspects of Yugoslavia's re‐peripheralisation

THE CRISIS AND COLLAPSE of 'real socialism' in Europe should be seen in the overall perspective of increasingly unequal conditions in confrontation with a global capitalist economy undergoing profound restructuring since the beginning of the 1970s. The social and economic systems of'real socialism' showed themselves incapable of commanding or developing forms of organisation consistent with the demands of the 'third industrial revolution' (the microelectronic) on increased 'just in time' flexibility, human creativity and decentralised institutional autonomy harnessed to intensified accumulation of capital in the postmodern era. This could be seen as one of the important factors undercutting their economies, leaving them hopelessly stagnating and outdated, and forcing them into rapidly increasing dependence on Western capital, knowhow and technology. This new dependence made them slide into the quagmire of the 1970s petrodollar foreign debt trap. At the same historical juncture, the vastly expanded integration of formerly 'Third World' regions into the economic orbit of transnational capital meant that the stagnating and increasingly world-market-dependent economies of 'real socialism' were rather abruptly exposed to ferocious competition from a mushrooming of new, vastly more modern plants within the classical base industries now resituated in low-wage, low-cost Asiatic and Latin American NICs (newly industrialising countries). Yugoslavia was the 'real-socialist' country in Europe longest and most intensively confronted with a number of dilemmas relating to socialist states' (re-)integration into a global capitalist economy. During the 1960s, according to a number of social and economic criteria, Yugoslavia could be described as a country aspiring to entry into the category of'core' industrial countries. There was the problem of rather extreme regional development imbalances. All parts of Yugoslavia, however, had experienced fast industrial development during the post-war period. Living standards had continuously improved, and the country had succeeded in controlling its de-agrarianisation process to a larger degree than most other NICs. A decentralising economy in combination with the social and economic incentives represented by incipient forms of industrial and local-level democracy, as embodied in 'self-management', appeared promising as a determined attempt to transform the structure of the national accumulation scheme, and to build up a strong and internationally competitive export sector. Growing

Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome in Yugoslavia: detection of hantaviral antigen and antibody in wild rodents and serological diagnosis of human disease.

Lung tissues from 547 rodents and 26 insectivores captured between 1981 and 1984 in central Bosnia (Fojnica) and central Serbia (Cacak), 2 regions known to be endemic for hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS), were examined for hantaviral antigen by the indirect immunofluorescent antibody technique. Antigen was detected in 17/231 Apodemus flavicollis, 3/187 A. sylvaticus, 1/46 A. agrarius, 4/32 Mus musculus, and 3/28 Clethrionomys glareolus. In addition, antibodies against Hantaan and Puumala viruses were found in serum pooled from 2 C. glareolus captured in Fojnica and 6 Pitimys subterraneus caught in Cacak. Sera of 27 HFRS patients from different parts of Yugoslavia were tested against 3 serotypes of hantavirus. Patients from Bosnia and Serbia had highest titers against Hantaan virus, while patients from Croatia had highest titers against Puumula virus, the agent of nephropathia epidemica.

Incidence of hemagglutination-inhibiting antibodies for bhanja virus in humans along the north-west border of yugoslavia

By the hemagglutination-inhibition test with the Yugoslav strain of Bhanja virus, the sera of 380 youngsters residing in the region along the Yugoslav-Hungarian border (North Croatia) and 367 sera from newcomers to the area from various parts of Yugoslavia were examined. The testing included 154 sera of the youngsters who had came to the region along the Yugoslav-Italian border (Slovenia) without antibodies for Bhanja virus and were staying there for a year. Hemagglutination-inhibiting antibodies for BHA virus were found in the sera of 5.53% examined natives of North Croatia, while in the newcomers after one-year stay in the area HI antibodies for the virus were confirmed in 3.27% of the sera examined. HI antibodies for BHA virus were found in 1.95% sera of the 154 youngsters who had come to the study area along the Yugoslav-Italian border (after one-year stay in the area). These results suggest a recent circulation of Bhanja virus in the regions studied. It is important to point out that the presence of the tick Haemaphysalis punctata, the principal vector of Bhanja virus in Europe, was evidenced in both regions.

Concerning the Origin of the Onion Dome and Onion Spires in Central European Architecture

THE O N I O N SHAPED SPIRES of the country and pilgrimage churches in Southern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and the Dolomite mountain region of Italy are a characteristic part of these landscapes. They are found, to a lesser degree, in Poland and Hungary, and in the parts of Yugoslavia which before 1918 formed part of the Austrian empire. The distinctive design of these spires differs from the more elaborate tower terminations employed by architects on other structures during the i7th and I 8th centuries. No study explores the origin of the design, or the reason for its geographic distribution.1 Passing conjectures about Byzantine or Eastern originsin view of the resemblance to Russian and Greek Orthodox church spires and Islamic structures-are found, but only to note stylistic similarities, which are then not examined. Indeed, precisely this similarity is part of the interest in the subject. If we assume that a foreign stylistic element has been adopted, we would expect to see it made part of the general architectural design portfolio, and not be limited to country churches. Since these churches were constructed to celebrate and uphold the victory of the Catholic church over its Protestant adversaries, architects would not use a form that is the unmistakable hallmark of another deviation from victorious church doctrine, namely the Greek Orthodox. This relationship of architecture and doctrine also speaks against the use, as a model for oniondome structures, of a Western representative of Byzantine architecture, like S. Marco in Venice. Since the onion shape is not found except in the geographical areas mentioned, and there only in limited examples, it is reasonable to seek the origin of the design in a specific place. This approach turned out to be fruitful. Evidence in the form of a dated city view reveals that as early as I56z tower helmets or spires of definite onion shape existed in Prague, employed for both sacred and secular architecture: the small towers placed at the corners of the terminal platform of the main tower of St. Vitus cathedral, the five towers of the no longer extant Rosenberg palace, and a water tower (Fig. i). A later (i6o6) and more skillful rendering of the palace on the south side of Hradschin castle and the water tower of the Old Town confirms the earlier view (Fig. z). The external fabric of Rosenberg castle, completed in 1549,

Epidemiology and Treatment of Renal Pelvic and Ureteral Tumors

Throughout the world the number of cases of renal pelvic and ureteral tumors has increased considerably during the last 2 decades. In Yugoslavia this increase has been exceptionally high since about 1953 or 1954. Many of our patients with these tumors come from regions where the population is affected by endemic nephropathy, the frequency of tumors in these regions being about 100 times higher than it is in other parts of Yugoslavia. In many cases these patients have renal failure and, therefore, conservative procedures are undertaken.Herein are reported the causes and results of therapy in 972 cases of renal pelvic and ureteral tumors collected in Yugoslavia. Particular attention has been paid to conservative operations (37 cases of renal pelvic and 64 cases of ureteral tumors), including their indications and possibilities. That many patients with renal pelvic and ureteral tumors have favorable conditions for a conservative procedure is confirmed by the comparatively good followup. However, in other cases a conservative operation is unreasonable and nephroureterectomy is mandatory.

The System of the Sisters Ljubica and Danica Jankovic for the Recording, Description and Analysis of Folk Dances

Their original idea was to use the Laban system of notation for this purpose. They decided, therefore, to master the Laban system of rigid symbols. It proved a very happy circumstance-at least as far as the Serbian folk dances were concerned-that the first attempt to record the Vranjanka dance by using the Laban system was not successful at all; the unusual Balkan phenomenon-arrhythmy in the rhythm-did not permit it. This phenomenon was not anticipated in the ballet technique and terminology for which Labanotation had first been created. In this specifically Balkan phenomenon the principle of Eastern rhythm based on the number of bars coexists with the principle of Western rhythm based on accents and pulsations. In the case of the Vranjanka dance, while the 3/ meter is the same both in the dance and in the melody, the number of bars varies, the dance having 5 bars, and the melody extending to 28 bars. Every 140 bars, thus, the initial and final measures of both the dance and the melody synchronize with a clear rhythmic cue. In addition to an individual quantitative arrhythmy, therefore, there occurs a quantitative, periodic rhythm. (On this subject, more is to be found in Jankovic, L. 1968). Despite this unusual phenomenon, the Vranjanka dance runs smoothly, since the initial and final bars of both the dance and the melody coincide periodically-in a normalized, regular manner-in a broad rhythm. Since it was impossible to apply Labanotation to this phenomenon, the Sisters Jankovic were forced to abandon it. These rhythmic phenomena present to the student of folk dances certain specific questions that also demand specific answers. The abandonment of the Laban system proved to be fully justified when the Sisters Jankovic later found more than two hundred other dances with this Balkan phenomenon of the arrhythmy in the rhythm in various parts of Yugoslavia.

The Missing Historical Dimension in Yugoslavia

F OR over a decade, no major European crisis, with the possible exception of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, has produced such a crop of different and often mutually contradictory reactions and interpretations as last December's political upheaval in Croatia, Yugoslavia's second largest federal republic. Was it just another round in the perennial conflict between Yugoslavia's richer and poorer republics, as the importance of the question of the allocation of hard currency among the republics seemed to suggest? Or was it merely the preliminary stage of the succession crisis that was bound to arise after President Tito's death or retirement from the political scene in 1976? If there was a deeper issue of principle at stake, was it to be found in the conflict between the ' liberalisers ' and the 'conservatives '? Or in the more familiar struggle between Croatian 'separatists ' working to detach Croatia from Yugoslavia, and the ' unitarists ' (Croat and nonCroat alike) defending a united Yugoslav state? The almost total lack of consensus about what was really going on in Yugoslavia in 1971 is, to borrow a phrase from the communist political vocabulary, not at all accidental. This article will argue that the confusion and disagreement about contemporary Yugoslavia stem not only from a shortage of reliable factual information (though that can still be very hard to come by even in a relatively liberal communist country like Yugoslavia) but also from the neglect of what might be called the historical dimension of the subject. The great disparity between the rich and the poor Yugoslav republics was a potential source of trouble which the Yugoslav Communists recognised and tried to remove as soon as they came to power. But by the early 1950s the policy of investing heavily in the poorer areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and the Serbian province of Kosovo was beginning to provoke sharp disagreements. Its critics, who came mainly from Croatia and Slovenia, which provided most of the investment capital, argued that the money was being invested wastefully in what often proved to be 'parallel industrial capacity ' that duplicated what already existed in other parts of Yugoslavia. Although the policy of centrally directed investments has been modified over the years, deep disagreements still persist about, for example, how obviously

Cysticercosis and Hydatid Disease of Cattle in Kenya

Many surveys have been conducted in different countries on the incidence of Cysticercus bovis and Echinococcus granulosus cysts in bovine carcasses. Abattoir findings of these two infections were given in the Annual Reports of the Department of Veterinary Services, Kenya (1954-58); the figures ranged between 20 and 35 percent for C. bovis; higher figures were for stock from African areas. The incidence of E. granulosus was 17 to 47 percent. Articles from other countries usually refer to only one condition. A comprehensive survey of the literature on occurrence and other aspects of cysticercosis was made by Viljoen (1937), who gave infection rates from most countries in the world. Since then, figures published include those of Jepson and Roth (1952) who reported less than 1 percent in Denmark in 1948, Silverman (1955) who found varying rates of 0.81 to 3.47 percent at different abattoirs in the United Kingdom, Simitch and Nevenitch (1955) who recorded 10 to 20 percent infection with C. bovis in different parts of Yugoslavia, and Peel (1953) who found 38.4 percent of 1,000 N'dama cattle infected at abattoir inspection in Sierra Leone. Pullar and Marshall (1958) who surveyed a large number of cattle in Australia for hydatid disease, recorded an overall 12 percent infection. Cyprus had the highest recorded incidence with up to 100 percent affected (Cyprus Dept. of Agr., 1957), while up to 90 percent of Yugoslavian stock was infected in some parts of the country (Nevenic, 1953). The infection rate in different districts of Chile varied from 0.6 to 86.3 percent (Neghme et al, 1951), and in Italy there was a variation from 1.5 to 42 percent according to Altara (1953). Pipkin and his co-workers (1951) reviewed the incidence in man and animals in the Near East and quoted several previous papers which showed that there was a cattle infection rate of 8.4 to 47 percent in that area. On the other hand, the United States of America appeared remarkably free, since an annual average of only 2,837 livers were condemned for hydatidosis in the period 1950 to 1957 from an average kill of 20 to 26 million cattle (Poole, 1957). The total infection rate was probably higher, as Schwartz (1957) pointed out in a discussion of Poole's paper, the liver: lung ratio being at least 2: 3, but this still gives a very low percentage compared with other countries. The present study in Kenya on 1,000 head of cattle was made chiefly to discover whether cysts of C. bovis and E. granulosus could occur in the same beast, or whether some interference occurred due to their relatively close generic relationship. Taliaferro (1930) quoted Meyer and others who stated that complement fixation cross reactions could be obtained with sera from persons infected with T. saginata and hydatid cysts against the heterologous antigens. Other workers did not confirm this. Miller (1932) reported that T. pisiformis material given intraperitoneally to rats conferred a high degree of protection against T. taeniformis. Coudert and Coly (1956) found that the serum of Taenia carriers agglutinated

Health in Europe

THE health of Europe today is, with one reservation, too bad; it is by no means desperate or irremediable. The reservation lies in the risks for the future, the potentialities of the immediate liberation and postliberation periods, the possibilities, indeed probabilities, which it will take all our skill, resources and goodwill to resolve. Any picture of the medical state of Europe now must have as its background the sombre shadow of malnutrition and its medical effects. About two years ago an independent Swiss observer, Dr. Gautier, Chief of the Health Section of the League of Nations, estimated that about a hundred million people in Europe needed feeding; that number has since increased. He did not mean, of course, that a hundred million people in Europe were starving; he meant that a hundred million people needed additional food to maintain them in health and efficiency. The countries of Europe can be divided very roughly into the starving, the half-starved, the hungry and those like the British people who have had their choice reduced but are still getting enough to maintain them in efficiency and good health. It is invidious to classify, but into the list of the starving countries I would put Greece, Poland, occupied Russia, parts of Yugoslavia; into the half-starving countries, Belgium, urban France, Norway, Finland, Spain and Portugal, perhaps Italy; into the hungry countries Holland, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the rest of the Balkans. This leaves us with Germany, Great Britain and the neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland and Eire. Even more important is a classification according to the value of the individual to the German war effort. The Germans have by now so organized the feeding of Europe that a man who is contributing directly to the German war effort may be getting perfectly good rations, whereas his neighbour who is not so contributing may be living at starvation level. There are other differences and discrepancies within one country or one area. In war-time rural populations are always, with certain exceptions, better off than urban populations; even the Germans have not succeeded in taking away all the food from those who produce it. There is the difference between the rich and the poor, between those who can take advantage of the Black Market and those who cannot do so. For instance, the official ration of the Polish Jew is said to be 400 calories a day. Since 2,400 calories are required to maintain an adult doing light work, a Polish Jew can exist on his official ration for one-sixth of a day, four hours. Since the Jew is not usually a peasant, and in any case has been herded into ghettos in the town,