Abstract
To Walk With the Devil: Slovene Collaboration and Axis Occupation, 1941-1945, by Gregor Joseph Kranjc. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2013. xi, 329 pp. $32.95 US (paper). Gregor Kranjc has produced a detailed study of the local collaboration with Italian and Germany occupation forces in Slovenia during the Second World War. His purpose is to correct earlier historians' dichotomous perspective, especially the post WWII Yugoslavian communist track on collaboration and the view proffered by the exiled anti-communist emigres. The first view holds that there was a wide spread popular resistance toward the occupiers with only a small group of collaborators attempting to maintain their positions of privilege. The emigre version states that the Slovenians had to choose between evils (the Germans or the communists) with the goal of preserving the Slovene nation. Kranjc amply demonstrates that both are mythologies in need of modification. Yugoslavia entered into WWII with the idea of preserving its statehood through an alliance with the Axis powers. This effort was subverted by a group of anti-Fascist military officers who overthrew the government and attempted to form a monarchy led democracy. The folly of this aspiration was underlined by the immediate invasion and dissection of Yugoslavia by German, Italian, and Hungarian forces. Slovenia was sliced into three portions, a part for each occupier. Kranjc focuses on the area which the Italians first occupy: the Province of Ljubljana. Ljubljuana is significant because the area had relatively more independence than other parts of Yugoslavia during the early occupation, and because of what happened to anti-partisan forces from this region after the war. The mass murders, trials, and mob justice enacted against collaborators (perceived and real) are the impetus for his exploration of the topic. Chapter two lays out the history of Slovene and Yugoslavia between 1900 and the eve of WWII. The history of previous occupiers including resistance and collaboration is a key point in this story. The political divide between the communists and the non-communists was established prior to the war, with Government and Church leaders dynamically opposed to communism. Resistance to the Axis invaders is explored in chapter three. The resistance started small: hiding food stuffs, collecting weapons, and gathering intelligence to pass on to the British and Yugoslavian government in exile. Armed resistance was not yet a rational option due to the overwhelming military clout of the invaders and the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviets. Armed resistance began when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. The Yugoslavian communists, in the main form of the Liberation Front under Tito were the backbone of the communist contribution to the resistance. The Italians, who occupied Slovenia, poured in thousands of troops to meet the armed partisans. They were ultimately unsuccessful. Kranjc does not spend a large amount of text on Tito or on resistance as his study is about collaboration. Collaboration, and its complexity, is the focus of the remainder of the book. In the first two years the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies seemed unlikely and so hopes of a successful war against the Fascists appeared delusional. People settled into the Italian occupation and worked to make a life for themselves. This involved carrying on business which inevitably led to dealing with the invaders, and at times this presented opportunities for great profit. …
Published Version
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