Partisan Strength Research Articles

The Blame Game: The Role of Media Environments and Political Discussion in Americans’ Attribution of Blame for Interparty Hostility

Abstract Polarization and hostility between political parties is a dominant feature of politics in the United States and is growing in many other democracies worldwide. Yet, there remain questions of who the public blames for this hostility and how those attributions of blame emerge. This study examines the role of partisan strength, political media exposure, and political discussion on blame for partisan hostility. Analyses of survey data (YouGov) collected during the 2020 U.S. presidential election suggest that political discussions play a particularly strong role in shaping attributions of blame, while partisan strength and political media exposure are relatively less influential. The data also indicate that who one talks to about politics matters for placing blame, as conversations with like-minded partisans lead to more blame placed on the out-party and less blame on the in-party, whereas political discussions with people who hold different views can temper out-party blame. Overall, findings suggest that political discussion may matter more than political media exposure for attributions of blame for partisan hostility.

Seeing Red (And Blue): Partisan Identity, Emotions, and Selective Exposure

ABSTRACT Selective exposure occurs when individuals gravitate toward attitude-consistent information. In the United States, partisan identity guides selective exposure behavior. While partisanship is the typical culprit for partisan media selectivity, scholars have recommended examining the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. This study examines the relationship between partisan identity threat and reassurance and selective exposure as well as the moderating effect of partisan identity strength and mediating effect of anger and enthusiasm. We find that partisan identity threat is associated with anger, reassurance with enthusiasm, and that the relationship increased as partisan strength increased. Threat and reassurance did not directly spur selective exposure, though we found an indirect effect of partisan reassurance on selective exposure via enthusiasm, which strengthened as partisanship intensified.

Easy to read, easy to judge: Assessing readability as a heuristic for credibility in news

Despite calls for journalists and media agencies to address a disconnect between news audiences and news prose, content continues to increase in its difficulty to read and comprehend for the masses. While readability is often associated with audience comprehension and engagement, studies have neglected to assess whether readability is a factor in audience assessments of the credibility of content. Using an online experimental design, this study examines whether readability acts as a heuristic that helps news consumers make credibility judgments of news. Results show that readability tends not to be a predictor of credibility perception, regardless of partisanship strength or media use preferences. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Partisan Bias in Episodes of Political Violence

Imagine two incidents of political violence. In the first, you share political affiliation with the victim. In the second, they reside in the opposite party. How would this minor change – a shifting label, the difference of a word – impact your reaction? This article offers empirical insight through an experiment: U.S. participants read a mock college controversy, where a student sent death threats to, and doxed, a professor. The treatment varied whether the perpetrator described the professor as a Democrat, Republican, or used otherwise non-descript (e.g., “political”) adjectives. A posttreatment survey then measured respondents’ discrete emotions, the penalties they preferred the student receive, and their partisan group identity strength. Participants who read about violence against a copartisan victim showed a statistically significant increase in preferred penalty severity. But violence against an outparty victim mirrored the control, with subjects reacting as if they didn’t know the political affiliation of anyone involved. Posttreatment measures also demonstrated the potential for anxiety (but not anger or partisan strength) to mediate this underlying partisan bias.

The “Us vs. Them” Mentality: The Role of Affective Polarization in Deepening the Partisan Divide in Media Bias Perception

This study examines how affective polarization impacts the partisan divide in perceptions of cable news networks’ political biases. Results from a 2016 U.S. presidential election survey show that affective polarization deepens this divide, even after controlling for election involvement, partisanship strength, and cable news usage. Partisanship strength is more closely associated with in-party love than out-party hate, but out-party hate has a stronger association with media bias perception, indicating that out-group hate is more influential in shaping partisans’ media bias perception.

When Independence Meets Reality: Symbolic and Pragmatic Politics in Taiwan

ABSTRACT In Taiwan, where relations with China define the major political cleavage, voters have distinct preferences on the issue of independence. Do Taiwanese favor a symbolic or pragmatic approach to the Taiwan independence issue? What are the factors that account for their political preferences? We identify two types of voters, symbolic and pragmatic, according to whether their preferences on independence are conditional or unconditional on China’s potential counter actions. Specifically, symbolic voters have unconditional preferences on independence, while pragmatic voters are more agreeable to independence under more favorable conditions. Using multiple wave data from the Taiwan National Security Surveys (TNSS 2002–2022), we investigate the individual- and macro-level factors and find that gender, age, education level, ethnicity, partisan strength, and economic growth rate shape the types of voters in Taiwan. This paper contributes to the study of political attitudes in Taiwan, and have important implications on the regional stability in East Asia.

Fake news and partisan blame attribution: Exploring the mediating role of self-enhancing perceptual bias among young adults

ABSTRACT The politicized public discourse on online ‘fake news’ today has contributed to the rise in scholarly interest on blame attribution for this fake news problem, particularly when the attribution is directed at an outgroup. A study comprising of 284 young adults (selected for their heavy reliance on digital social networks for their news consumption) sought to ascertain the impact of partisan strength on this outgroup blame attribution effect, as well as identify potential cognitive factors that explain this effect. A path analysis confirmed the relationship between partisan strength and outgroup blame attribution, and suggests that perceived self vs. outgroup differences in the ability to spot fake news acts as a small but significant partial mediator in this relationship. Self-enhancing bias, or the need to protect self-esteem, is suggested as a motivator for this mediating relationship.

Affective Polarization and Misinformation Belief.

While affective polarization has been shown to have serious social consequences, there is little evidence regarding its effects on political attitudes and behavior such as policy preferences, voting, or political information accrual. This paper provides evidence that affective polarization impacts misinformation belief, arguing that citizens with higher levels of affective polarization are more likely to believe in-party-congruent misinformation and less likely to believe out-party-congruent misinformation. The argument is supported by data from the ANES 2020 Social Media Study and the ANES 2020 Time Series Study, which speaks to the generalizability of the relationship. Additionally, a survey experiment provides evidence that the relationship is causal. The results hold among Democrats and Republicans and are independent of the effects of partisan strength and ideological extremity. Furthermore, the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication rather than tempered by it, implying that education will not solve the issue. The results speak to the need for work on reducing affective polarization.

At the Extremes: Assessing Readability, Grade Level, Sentiment, and Tone in US Media Outlets

ABSTRACT This study examines the question of asymmetry/symmetry regarding the use of language in partisan media outlets in the US. Some research has suggested that conservatives and conservative media are unique in how they present information to their audience, positing that conservatives use simpler, more uncivil language. Others have noted that some of these matters, such as use of uncivil language, applies to both conservative and liberal outlets. The current study adds to this literature by examining whether the ideological leanings of news sources correlate with reading ease, level of negativity (sentiment), and level of formality (tone). Specifically, we examine whether only conservative outlets use simpler, negative, and less formal language or if these trends appear for media outlets across the ideological spectrum. Our findings find support for the symmetry hypothesis. Indeed, our findings suggest that ideological extremity and partisanship strength correlate with use of easier-to-read language.

Priming Partisan Identities and Support for Political Violence

Individuals in the United States appear increasingly willing to support and justify political violence. This paper therefore examines whether making partisan identities salient increases support for political violence. We embed priming manipulations in a sample of roughly 850 U.S. adults to investigate whether activating positive partisan identity, negative partisan identity, instrumental partisan identity, and American national identity might lead to differences in reported support for political violence. While we uncover no effects of priming various identities on support for political violence, we replicate and extend previous research on its correlates. Specifically, we demonstrate how various measures of partisan identity strength as well as negative personality traits are correlated with acceptance of political violence.

Affective Polarization: Over Time, Through the Generations, and During the Lifespan

The continual rise of affective polarization in the United States harms trust in democratic institutions. Scholars cite processes of ideological and social sorting of the partisan coalitions in the electorate as contributing to the rise of affective polarization, but how do these processes relate to one another? Most scholarship implicitly assumes period effects—that people change their feelings toward the parties uniformly and contemporaneously as they sort. However, it is also possible that sorting and affective polarization link with one another as a function of age or cohort effects. In this paper, I estimate age, period and cohort effects on affective polarization, partisan strength, and ideological sorting. I find that affective polarization increases over time, but also as people age. Age-related increases in affective polarization occur as a function of increases in partisan strength, and for Republicans, social sorting. Meanwhile, sorting only partially explains period effects. These effects combine such that each cohort enters the electorate more affectively polarized than the last.

Social Media, Messaging Apps, and Affective Polarization in the United States and Japan

ABSTRACT This study explores how emerging media platforms (i.e., social media and messaging apps) contribute to affective political polarization. We rely on cross-national data (USA and Japan), which allows us to explore the broader implications of how emerging media platforms contribute to political polarization in different cultural contexts. The results are very consistent; social media news use is positively related to affective polarization while messaging apps are negatively related in the USA and Japan. In addition, in the USA, the association of messaging app news and affective polarization is amplified by partisanship strength.

Social watching the 2020 presidential and vice-presidential debates: the effect of ideological homogeneity and partisan identity strength

This study presents a novel test of the effects of social watching a live campaign debate. We recruited just over 500 participants to view one of the two 2020 presidential campaign debates or the vice-presidential debate in real time via Zoom watch rooms. We experimentally manipulated the social dynamics of these Zoom watches to include either ideologically homogenous real-time chat, heterogenous chat, or no chat. We found asymmetry in the extent to which these chat manipulations exacerbated biased information processing. Participants in the homogenous chat Zoom sessions were more likely to provide negative debate performance evaluations of the out-group candidate but were no more likely to provide positive evaluations of the in-group candidate. Stronger partisans exhibited more bias in performance evaluation regardless of chat condition but, contrary to our expectations, did not engage in more chat compared to weak partisans.

You’ve Lost That Loving Feeling: How Gender Shapes Affective Polarization

We examine variation in levels of affective polarization for men and women. Using the 1980 to 2016 American National Election Studies, we find that women are more affectively polarized than men. The effect of sex partially works indirectly through political identities and issue positions. Moreover, sex acts as a moderator, with political identities and issues positions have different effects on men’s and women’s level of affective polarization. Three factors create women’s higher levels of affective polarization: women are more likely to be partisans, strength in abortion attitudes, and partisanship has a more substantial influence on women’s attitudes compared to men’s attitudes. Breaking the analysis apart into three time periods: (1) gender gap emergence 1980 to 1988, (2) elite polarization 1990 to 1998, and (3) hyper-partisanship 2000 to 2016 reinforces that partisan strength is central to understanding affective polarization. Additionally, during the 1990s when elite polarization is intensifying the strength of issue attitudes and ideology.

“Fake News Is Anything They Say!” — Conceptualization and Weaponization of Fake News among the American Public

ABSTRACT This study examines the articulation of public opinion about so-called fake news using a national survey (N = 510) of U.S. adults conducted in 2018. We coded respondents’ open-ended answers about what is “fake news” and found that while some respondents adopted a politically neutral, descriptive definition, others provided a partisan, accusatory answer. Specifically, the weaponization of fake news was evident in the way respondents used the term to blame adversarial political and media targets. Perceptions of fake news prevalence, partisanship strength, and political interest were associated with a higher likelihood of providing a politicized and accusatory response about fake news. Accusations were polarized as a function of partisan identity and positively correlated with affective polarization. Results are discussed in light of the linguistic distinction of the term and what it means in the context of news media distrust and polarization.

Partisanship and Autocratization: Polarization, Power Asymmetry, and Partisan Social Identities in Turkey

Although theories of partisanship were developed for the democratic context, partisanship can be important in electoral autocracies as well. We use survey data to analyze partisanship in an electoral autocracy, Turkey, and find that partisanship is pervasive, strong, and consequential. Using the Partisan Identity Scale to measure partisanship, we show that, like in democracies, partisanship strength is associated with political attitudes and action. Unlike in democracies, however, the ruling party’s superior ability to mobilize supporters through clientelistic linkages makes the association between partisanship and political action weaker for ruling party partisans. We find that partisan identities are tightly connected to the perception that other parties may threaten one’s well-being, and that such fears are widespread on both sides of the political divide. We interpret our findings in light of the autocratization process Turkey went through. Our contribution highlights the potential of integrating regime dynamics in studies of partisanship.

Yikes! Are we disgusted by politicians?

In the political domain, disgust is primarily portrayed as an emotion that explains individual differences in pathogen avoidance. We hypothesized that political rhetoric accusing opponents of moral transgressions also elicits disgust responses. In this registered report, we present the results from a laboratory experiment. We find that participants self-report higher disgust and have stronger physiological (Levator labii) responses to pictures of out-party leaders compared with in-party leaders. Participants also report higher disgust in response to moral violations of in-party leaders. There is more suggestive evidence that in-party leaders evoke more labii activity when they commit moral violations than when out-party leaders do. The impact of individual differences in moral disgust and partisanship strength is very limited to absent. Intriguingly, on average, the physiological and self-reported disgust responses to the treatment are similar, but individuals differ in whether their response is physiological or cognitive. This motivates further theorizing regarding the concordance of emotional responses.

Partisan strength and the politicization of global climate change: a re-examination of Schuldt, Roh, and Schwarz 2015

In the USA, self-identified Republican supporters tend to be more skeptical about the existence and consequences of global climate change (GCC) than Democratic supporters. If this phenomenon is well established, discussions about the “partisan gap” often treat partisan groups as if they were two homogeneous blocks. In this article, we question this practice. According to theory, strong partisan identification (PID) puts pressure on partisans to hold beliefs that conform to elite discourse and to perceived in-group positions. Meanwhile, public opinion research on environmental issues offers reasons to expect greater heterogeneity among Republicans than among Democrats. This literature leads us to predict that strong Republicans will be more skeptical about GCC than Republican leaners, whereas among Democrats, PID strength will not be associated with greater confidence in the existence of GCC. Our study tests this hypothesis leveraging the characteristics of a unique dataset where strong partisans are purposively oversampled to facilitate group comparisons. Results from multivariate regression models support our prediction. Next, our study also examines how PID strength shapes more complex patterns found in the literature. Previous work has shown that, compared to Democrats, the views of Republicans are less correlated with educational attainment and more influenced by issue labeling (e.g., global warming vs climate change). Our study tests if PID strength also moderates these factors. This time, interaction models produce mixed results. Overall, our findings suggest that breaking down GCC beliefs by PID strength can reveal a more nuanced understanding of the differences between and within partisan groups.

Campaign Contributions and Donors’ Policy Agreement with Presidential Candidates

Presidential campaign contributions primarily come from individuals, yet we know little about what motivates them to give. Using a recent donor survey, we analyze how policy positions affect these decisions, holding constant partisan strength and presidential approval. Three main findings emerge. First, donor agreement with candidates’ positions significantly affects the likelihood of giving to these campaigns. Second, while there is suggestive evidence that the effects are stronger for Independents, the results hold even for fellow partisans. Third, conditional on donating, issue positions do not increase the amount contributed; for both partisans and Independents, the amount depends on wealth and income.

Patterns and Mechanisms of Political Participation among People with Disabilities

Abstract Context: Previous research has shown that Americans with disabilities turn out to vote at significantly lower levels than people without disabilities, even after accounting for demographic and other situational factors related to political involvement. The authors examined the potential mechanisms underlying their low turnout. They asked whether people with disabilities exhibit participatory attitudes and behaviors at levels commensurate with their other individual-level characteristics. Methods: The present study conducted descriptive and predictive analyses on data from the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies. Findings: Despite low levels of turnout in recent elections, people with disabilities were just as participatory, if not more so, when considering alternative forms of political engagement. The authors' analyses indicate that, while disability status had no bearing on political efficacy or partisan strength, those with disabilities reported being even more interested in politics than those without disabilities. Evidence is provided that depressed turnout rates among those with disabilities may be due in part to lower levels of attentiveness to the news, political knowledge, and negative perceptions of government. Conclusions: The psychological impacts and behavioral consequences that emerge from possessing a disability and the broader role of disability in the American political context are multifaceted. This area of research would benefit from future studies that examine a variety of electoral contexts.