Partisan Loyalty Research Articles

Competing Redistricting Plans As Evidence of Political Motives

Redistricting is a thoroughly political act, but the political strategies of the various actors often have been lost amid legal and representational arguments. This article looks at one set of actors—state legislators—and examines how they pursue personal and partisan interests during redistricting. Rather than treating legislators as uniform in their preferences, we divide them into two categories: those who are ambitious for higher office and those who are not. These two groups of legislators face dramatically different sets of incentives and constraints, and these differences are reflected by their strategies in the redistricting process. Using North Carolina's 1992 redistricting as exemplar, this article outlines the redistricting debates, describes the interests of the various actors, and presents an analysis of eight redistricting plans using JudgeIt. The findings indicate that members balance individual and partisan interests when proposing plans and that for ambitious legislators, individual ambition generally outweighs partisan loyalty.

Parties, Politics, and the Sectional Conflict in Tennessee , 1832-1861 by Jonathan M. Atkins (review)

NEW APPALACHIAN BOOKS Opinions and Reviews Atkins, Jonathan M. Parties, Politics, and the Sectional Conflict in Tennessee , 1832-1861. Knoxville: University ofTennessee Press, 1997. 371 pages. Cloth. $38.00. This monograph is an expanded version of the author's 1991 University of Michigan dissertation. It has all of the strengths of that particular genre of historical literature and a few of its limitations as well. It is generally clearly organized and well researched in primary sources. In addition, Atkins has read most ofthe secondary literature on Tennessee, Southern, and American politics that deals with that subject between 1832 and 1861. He has combined all of these elements into a straightforward narrative that provides considerable detail about the several phases of state politics in Tennessee in this time period. Atkins starts with a chapter on politics and Republicanism in Tennessee . Republicanism serves as his interpretive theme and is described as follows: "Government was to be based on the consent of the governed; a written constitution represented the people's grant of power to their leaders and provided the framework for government and law; and all citizens were to be regarded as equal before the law..." This rather general sentiment had become embodied in the political image of Andrew Jackson, who was the unchallenged political leader in the state in the early 1830s. The Jackson coalition split during the presidential election of 1836 when Hugh Lawson White, a United States senator from East Tennessee, challenged Jackson's hand-picked successor, Martin Van Buren, for the electoral vote in Tennessee and won. White's supporters, who represented the more commercial interests in the state, on organized themselves into the Whig party. For the next two and one-half decades, Jackson's allies—calling themselves Democrats—and the Whigs and their successors contested statewide elections in close races that encouraged a remarkably high level of voter participation. Atkins traces the impact of bank and tariff policies , depression, slavery, the Union, and secession on the political leaders and voters of Tennessee. Most of this has been ably covered by Paul H. Bergeron in his Antebellum Politics in Tennessee (1982). Atkins does, however, greatly expand coverage of the period after the decline of the Whig party and shows the continuities that survived through the election of 1860. In addition, Atkins also provides a new focus on the ideas presented in these campaigns. He points out that many ofthe issues and 64 ideological assumptions in Tennessee politics were framed in a national perspective. The result was that specific state or local issues rarely intruded into the formal campaign speeches or partisan newspaper columns . Both parties emphasized the importance of maintaining a republican government and accused the other ofviolating major tenets of this point of view. When one compares this work with Marc W. Kruman's Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 1836-1865 (1983), the limitations ofAtkins's approach are apparent. Kruman spends several chapters setting the scene and describing the structure of the political system and its place in the broader context of North Carolina society. In addition, Kruman refuses to be bound by strict chronology and instead follows a series of developments in chapters that overlap time periods. Atkins, on the other hand, follows a strict chronological format that limits the amount of analysis that he can bring to the text. The result is that Atkins presents a series of election case studies that are very detailed and that provide clear explanation ofwhy one party or the other prevailed in that contest. The reader comes away, however, from this monograph not fully convinced about the analyses that the author presents. There are a number ofspecific instances that should be noted. First, Atkins does not really provide a convincing explanation for the profound differences in political behavior to be found in the three divisions of Tennessee. The readers of this journal will note that the insights provided by recent works by Tracy McKenzie, David Hsiung, and Ken Noe are not used to explain the distinctiveness—or lack thereof—of East Tennessee. Instead, Atkins relies on patterns of partisan loyalty, levels of commercial activity, and percentage of slaves in the population to explain voting patterns—which are...

Social Cleavage and the Revival of Far Right Parties: The Case of France's National Front

Does the left-right cleavage still structure citizen political behavior? What are the explanatory limits of cleavage politics? These questions are examined in light of support for a contemporary far right party, France's National Front. Though the predominance of former moderate right voters testifies to the cleavage's enduring influence, the weight of former left voters (especially those from the non-Communist left) indicates the importance of citizen concern with crosscutting political issues. Beyond voter movement from left and moderate right parties alike, however, explanation of far right success must also attend to the contribution of previous non-voters as well as the emergence of a new partisan loyalty.

The Emerging Party System in the New South Africa

This report presents evidence from a recent national post-election study concerning South Africa's prospects for developing into either a truly competitive multi-party system or the one-party-dominant system characteristic of so many other emerging democracies. Focusing on long-term party identification, the evidence indicates that the African National Congress (ANC) not only commands an overwhelming, but also intense, share of partisan loyalty. The potential sources of fluidity and electoral uncertainty - independent voters and those with weak party loyalties - are not large enough to threaten the ANC's re-election prospects. Surprisingly, the source of the ANC's (and the National Party's) support base is not an explicitly racial or ethnic one. Nevertheless, the prospects for a one-party-dominant system are high.

Electoral Influence and Economic Policy

The debate surrounding the role of bureaucrats and politicians in Japan's economic policymaking process has largely been advanced through the presentation and discussion of case studies. Some cases have shown that economic policy is dominated by Japan's bureaucracy, whereas others have shown that electoral politics has been the primary determining factor. To be sure, both the bureaucracy and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have been influential, and sorting out when and in what economic policy areas each has its influence remains a puzzle. This article addresses this issue by developing and testing a model of electoral influence that specifies the conditions under which one would expect electoral considerations to take precedence over more institutionalized (bureaucratic) procedures in the economic policy-making process. The model is informed by the idea that some economic policy areas are more important to Japan's previously ruling LDP than others, and what these are depends on the characteristics of the groups that support the LDP and the issues that affect their interests. Also, given that economic policy is a tool that has been available to the LDP to influence its continuation as ruling party, the timing of political intervention will necessarily revolve around the strength of its electoral majority. By examining Japan's postwar policy of providing financial aid to small- and medium-sized firms, this article will show that the timing and amount of aid extended to small- and medium-sized firms was influenced by the ruling party's attempts to ensure the partisan loyalty of this essential support constituency.

Religion and Partisan Loyalty: The Case of Catholic Workers in Mexico

Religion and Partisan Loyalty: The Case of Catholic Workers in Mexico

Religion and Partisan Loyalty: the Case of Catholic Workers in Mexico

eft-wing parties, including Marxist and various non-Marxist reformist ones, have often failed to attract widespread lowerclass support in Latin America despite social inequities that have generally accompanied economic development in the region. These parties have generally fared better among the lower class in Western European countries than in Latin America (see Smith and Rodriquez 1974; Davis 1989: 82-86). The weakness of the left in Latin America has been attributed to such factors as the cooptive capability of conservative ruling parties, corporatist interest intermediation, and various psychological characteristics of the lower class (see, inter alia, Cornelius 1975: Portes 1971). This study focuses on another factor that has received less empirical attention --the formation of a secular-religious cleavage in lower-class partisan preferences. Typically, leftist parties draw their lower-class support from secular, non-religious elements, while conservative parties draw their lower-class support from devout Catholics. '

Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis (review)

76CTVTL WAR HISTORY Besides, a white man might one day acquire slaves of his own. Hence, these men saw a threat to slavery as a threat to their liberty and independence. The men of the upcountry seceded not because they loved or were dominated by a planter elite but because they were devoted to their own special form of republicanism. The central strength of this book rests in Ford's ability to connect South Carolina's economic growth, the local politics of the state, and its movement for secession. But it is precisely because he has so successfully collapsed the boundaries around these categories that his adherence to other artificial boundaries is highlighted. It seems hard to believe that the style of politics engaged in by white men in their relations with each other was totally unconnected to the political style of these men in their relations with white women and slaves. At any rate, regardless of how these white men may have treated each other, it seems misleading to use the term "democratic" to describe a political universe which so consciously excluded so many people. Similarly, although the book recognizes the significance of both honor and evangelical Christianity as important sets of values in shaping upcountry life, Ford walls off these beliefs and loses sight of them as he concentrates so intently on republican ideology. Overall, Ford offers us a carefully researched, wellwritten analysis—but only of a segment of the political and economic life of a region of the South. Kenneth S. Greenberg Suffolk University Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis. By Daniel W. Crofts. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989. Pp. xxvii, 502. $45.00.) Daniel W. Crofts's important book explores topics usually ignored and discovers cautionary lessons for presentist historians. Focusing on the period between secession and Lincoln's call for volunteers, he studies the Unionist impulse in Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. He concentrates on the issues that dominated that time, place and electorate— which were Union and peace, not slavery—and insists that historians, overwhelmed by the antislavery results of the Civil War, have lost sight of the political realities and possibilities that existed before war and emancipation came. The heart of Crofts's argument is that, in the three states he studies, an integrative two-party system in which partisan loyalty cut across class and region survived in 1860. This fact, plus lower numbers of slaveholders and slaves, set the Upper South apart politically from the Lower South, enabling Unionism to weather the first wave of secessionist enthusiasm and winning the referenda of early 1861 on secession. Crofts's multiple BOOK REVIEWS77 regressions of county level voting statistics convincingly demonstrate that these elections separated nonslaveholders from the Democratic party, reduced the power of the planters, and made possible a new political coalition of Unionist Whigs and nonslaveholders. This Unionist party, while representing the first stages of a real shift in the social bases of politics, needed peace to survive—not least because most of its leaders were conditional Unionists who felt a sense of brotherhood with the rest of the South and, although they thought secession would be disastrous for the Upper South, rejected any Union based on force. They believed Southern Rights leaders were deluded and conspiratorial, but they still put the burden of compromise on the Republicans, demanding in a series of projected compromises that the Republicans guarantee the protection and even the potential expansion of slavery. The Confederacy, of course, ignored the proposed compromises, and Unionists could only hope that time, and a recognition of economic and political vulnerability, would lead the seceders back into the United States. If this did not happen, then peaceful separation would be politically better for the Union party than war. Lincoln and the Republicans, then, were being asked to acquiesce in the protection of slavery and in the destruction of both the country and themselves as a political force. Lincoln could not do that, and his call for volunteers to put down rebellion after the fall of Fort Sumter submerged the Unionist movement. For the conditional Unionists, regional ideology and emotion seemed stronger than the partisan and...

The Party's Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for America's Future. By Larry J. Sabato. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1988. 261p. $24.63.

This text examines the rejuvenation of the two major political parties in the late 1980Os, and considers possible strategies for regenerating partisan loyalty among the voting public and reviving the American party system.

Individual and Structural Influences on the Perception of Legislative Norms in Three European Parliaments

Members of the Belgian, Italian, and Swiss parliaments recognize norms of parliamentary courtesy and of partisan loyalty as constraints on their behavior. The structure of norm perceptions shows equivalence across the three countries. Perceptions of norms of courtesy vary among countries and are expressions of their national cultures, while perceptions of norms of party loyalty vary by the ideological tendency of parties independent of country. Perceptions vary among individuals by their status in parliament rather than by their political beliefs. As a result of their differing compositions and national environments, the Swiss parliament has the highest proportion of members who recognize norms of courtesy, Belgium the highest proportion recognizing norms of party loyalty, Italy the highest proportion who are generally norm-regarding. These norms presumably affect behavior, helping to promote collective decisions among individuals divided by classic social cleavages.

The Presidential Debate as a Civics Lesson

On assumption that learning comprises more than formal instruction, this article investigates attitudinal impact of exposure to 1976 televised debates between American presidential candidates. Following Robinson's (1976) finding that exposure to bad decreases confidence in political system, study examines possibility that viewing first Carter-Ford debate contributed significantly to changes in respondents' sense of political efficacy, trust in government, level of cynicism, orientation to campaign, and intent to vote. Data from an experimental study indicate only a limited impact from viewing debate, which is attributed both to general problems of attitude change and specific content of debates. Kenneth D. Wald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Memphis State University. Michael B. Lupfer is Professor and Acting Chairman in Department of Psychology at Memphis State University. authors want to thank graduate students from their departments who served as proctors and supplied several television sets for experiment. Public Opinion Quarterly ? 1978 by Trustees of Columbia University Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/78/0042-0342/$1.75 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.94 on Sat, 19 Nov 2016 04:36:18 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE AS A CIVICS LESSON 343 and McQuail, 1969; Klapper, 1960; Kraus and Davis, 1976; Mendelsohn and Crespi, 1970; Patterson and McClure, 1976) indicates to contrary that televised communication has at best a limited impact on political attitudes. V. 0. Key (1963:396) reflected academic consensus when he wrote that the major influence of media upon political attitudes is by and large a reinforcement of status quo. An impressive body of social psychological research, ably summarized by Zimbardo et al. (1977), specifies forces which limit impact of persuasive communication on preexisting attitudes: limited access, inattention, selective perception, incomprehension, distortion, etc. These factors, which combine to protect existing belief system from challenge posed by persuasive communication, seemed to be at work in 1960 televised debates between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Katz and Feldman's extensive literature review (1962) concluded that debates functioned primarily to reinforce partisan attitudes and commitments, not to change them. Yet there is some possibility that studies of media influence on political attitudes have failed to detect much influence because of their focus on kinds of attitudes most resistant to change. Most empirical studies have investigated extent to which television can influence voting patterns or candidate images. Given durability of partisan loyalty and impact of selective perception, it is not surprising that televised communication has a limited influence on voting patterns or candidate images. But might television have considerable power on more general orientations to political system? Michael Robinson (1976) reported recently that viewers of CBS documentary, The Selling of Pentagon, were highly critical of military after watching program. Using national survey data, Robinson argued further that a high level of exposure to national news broadcasts was associated with reduced confidence in many aspects of political system. He suggests that broadcast media have a considerable impact on national mood and his findings indicate that television is a potent agent of political learning. Carter-Ford debates of 1976 occurred at a time when national confidence was severely depressed. One of most striking trends in American politics since mid-1960s had been a spectacular erosion of public confidence in government, manifested in a variety of indicators (Ladd, 1976-77). presidential candidates were well aware of this trend and pitched their campaign messages to it. Gerald Ford, who began his presidency by asserting, Our long national nightmare is over, sought to portray himself as man who restored dignity and propriety to White House. challenger built his whole campaign around public disaffection, appealing for votes as candiThis content downloaded from 157.55.39.94 on Sat, 19 Nov 2016 04:36:18 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Partisan Loyalty and the Perceptions of Party, Candidates and Issues

ANY STUDENTS of the electoral process would defend the notion that the attitudes and perceptions of individuals are important determinants of the nation's voting patterns.' Indeed, the content of voters' perceptions of parties, candidates and issues appears to be strongly related to both shortterm and long-term fluctuations in election outcomes. One of the most interesting formulations of the relationship between individual perceptions and voting preferences is the six-component model developed at the University of Michigan Survey Research Center.2 These analysts viewed their work as an attempt to construct a model incorporating that set of attitudinal factors which bear on individual choice in any given election. In other words, both long-term and short-term forces had to be captured in a theoretical statement of the voter decision-making process.3 While the authors clearly recognized the longterm effect of such factors as party identification, they nevertheless argued that fixed party loyalties and sociological characteristics cannot account fully for the vote. In particular, neither of these factors, relatively inert through time, can account for the short-term fluctuations in the division of the vote which are of

Partisan Loyalty and the Perceptions of Party, Candidates and Issues

Partisan Loyalty and the Perceptions of Party, Candidates and Issues