Partisan Influence Research Articles

Who are the "Deficit Hawks?": An Analysis of the Concord Coalition Congressional Vote Scores

Which members of Congress are most likely to consistently support policies leading to balanced budgets? Who are the true “deficit hawks” in Congress? This paper analyzes the degree to which the nation’s representatives and senators support policies conducive toward balancing the budget and reducing the national debt, as measured by the annual Fiscal Responsibility scores from 1995-2000 given to members of the House and Senate by the Concord Coalition. An analysis of the Concord Coalition vote scores indicates that a legislator’s party tends to have an important effect on congressional votes on balanced budget priorities, though the direction of partisan influences is not consistent. Fiscal responsibility is related to party preference, but varies over time. That is, for some years being a Republican has a positive effect on scores by the Concord Coalition, in other years there is a positive relationship being a Democrat. The fact that the votes that the Concord Coalition find most relevant to deficit reduction cannot be placed consistently on the left or right of the American ideological spectrum differentiates it from most other interest groups from an ideological perspective.

Parties and Policy: Evaluating Economic and Partisan Influences on Welfare Policy Spending during the European Post-Communist Transition

Research shows that social welfare expenditures in post-Communist Europe continued to increase during the dual transition. This article analyses the economic and political factors that influence these changes in budgets for total welfare spending, and more specifically, pension assistance. I find that the economic hardship and budgetary shortfalls of the transition play the most prominent roles in the adjustments to total spending levels. And while these factors also heavily influence the modifications to pension funding, the strength of the right parties in parliament has an independent impact in increasing pension changes. I argue that this relationship reflects a short-term association between the right's liberal economic plans, their policy structural adjustments and rising pension budgets.

Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada's Electoral Districts. By John C. Courtney. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001. 337p. $75.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.

The approach to the design and revision of electoral districts in Canada is quite different from that found in the United States, despite the two countries' sharing of the same basic first-past-the-post electoral system. As John Courtney notes in his careful study of the topic, in Canada the emphasis in defining electoral districts, or constituencies or ridings, has been underpinned by concepts such as “community of interest” and “effective representation,” which encompass a wide range of political and social considerations—many local in nature—and which permit substantial deviation from the principle of one person, one vote. At the federal level, the allowable deviation in the size of constituencies can be plus or minus 25% within any given province, with the possibility of even greater variances under special circumstances. At the level of provincial electoral systems, the variances can be even larger, in part due to the fact that in certain provinces the ratio of urban to rural seats is specified in law. At the same time, the actual process of designing and reconfiguring the boundaries of constituencies, in the hands of independent, arm's-length commissions for the past 40 years, has been remarkably free of direct partisan influence. In fact, given the rather tattered state of current Canadian parliamentary democracy, characterized by one-party dominance in the federal parliament and a precipitous decline in voter turnout over the past three elections, the institution of arms-length boundary commissions stands out as something that works well and enjoys broad respect.

Civic Autonomy in Journalism Education: Applying Expertise to Political Action

A contingent of student editors seethed in disdain, unbeknownst to me, as I lectured about the responsibility of the press in a participatory democracy. In retrospect, the public journalism course invited resentment from the first day of class. My intent in this essay is to make something good out of a failed class by describing a largely unrecognized problem of instruction as an influence on professional socialization. The news topic for the course was student retention and programs to alleviate the high dropout rate at our university. The undergraduate students conducted a survey to document faculty views, wrote indepth stories for the campus newspaper, and held a town hall forum to promote discussion. The class included editors and reporters of the newspaper along with mass communication students who were more interested in theory than professional skills. The latter group seemed to accept the goals of the class, but during the ninth week of the semester, two editors approached me after a class to deliver a legalistic document. In terse language, it outlined the independence of the paper as a student-run publication, and the lack of a guarantee that any article from the class would be published. I struggled the rest of the semester to convince the editorial staff that public journalism could be practiced without violating the autonomy of the press, and without jeopardizing the independence of the campus paper. I will argue in this essay that reform advocates have not appreciated adequately the dynamics of professional socialization that predispose college students to resist public journalism. While students in the early stages of anticipatory socialization might support the goals of public (or civic) journalism, the increasing importance of autonomy that comes with professional identification tends to erode this support. Unless instructors can promote an expanded view of autonomy - a conception that accommodates both conventional and reformist views of autonomy - public journalism is likely to fade away as an impetus for curriculum reform. After explicating the process of professional development that engenders a commitment to independence, I propose an instruction strategy based on a model of civic-oriented autonomy. This approach promotes public journalism goals while preserving autonomy - and recasting it as reflective judgment directed at civic activation. Student Resistance Professional autonomy refers to the relative freedom of practitioners to make and implement choices associated with occupational duties.1 Inside the newsroom, journalists value autonomy as the capacity for discretionary judgment despite the constraints of bureaucratic routine. Outside the newsroom, journalists value professional independence as an orientation that provides some insulation against partisan influences and other threats to credibility.2 Public journalism is dismissed by many in the press as an unacceptable threat to professional detachment. Public journalists set out to improve the conditions for discursive democracy so that citizens might participate in discussions that explore options for solving community problems. But independence is compromised, according to critics, when news organizations make connections with local institutions to activate the citizenry. Specific reporting techniques, rather than the lofty goal of civic empowerment, seem to elicit the most antipathy from practitioners.3 My understanding of autonomy as an outcome of professional development is derived from a case study intended to identify factors that predict levels of support for public journalism among undergraduate students.4 The setting for the survey was a large city in the Southwest, where we interviewed 317 students with varying degrees of interest in journalism as a career. Students tended to be critical of conventional reporting, and this disposition helped to account for their approval of public journalism. …

Left–right party ideology and government policies: A meta–analysis

Abstract. This paper summarizes how the partisan influence literature assesses the relationship between the left–right party composition of government and policy outputs through a meta–analysis of 693 parameter estimates of the party–policy relationship published in 43 empirical studies. Based on a simplified ‘combined tests’ meta–analytic technique, we show that the average correlation between the party composition of government and policy outputs is not significantly different from zero. A mutivariate logistic regression analysis examines how support for partisan theory is affected by a subset of mediating factors that can be applied to all the estimates under review. The analysis demonstrates that there are clearly identifiable conditions under which the probability of support for partisan theory can be substantially increased. We conclude that further research is needed on institutional and socio–economic determinants of public policy.

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Abstract. The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.

National Identity, Partisanship and Populist Protest as Factors in the 1999 Australian Republic Referendum

Using survey data from the Australian Constitutional Referendum Study 1999, the article begins by showing that the votes of direct electionists were as important as those of monarchists in the defeat of the republic referendum. Since these votes were crucial to the outcome, it then discusses several possible explanations of what differentiated those direct electionists who voted against the referendum proposal from those who voted in favour. Explanations considered include partisan influences, populist protest, and the role of national identity and ancestry. The article finds that all had a part to play in distinguishing the direct electionists who supported the referendum from those who did not, with the protest aspect being related to conceptions of national identity and capable of being interpreted as a reaction against multiculturalism. It also considers future prospects and argues that eventually some sort of direct election outcome is likely.

Organized Interests and the state: A disintegrating relationship? Evidence from Denmark

Abstract. It has proven difficult to determine the direction in which corporatism is moving. This discussion is marred by two shortcomings: A bias towards the macro–level and the lack of a clear distinction between the stages of the policy process. Trying to remedy these shortcomings, this paper follows the development of corporatism over the twenty years since 1980 and uses this material to illuminate the causes of the development of corporatism. The analysis consists of a comparative study of seven Danish policy areas. By focusing on the meso–level within one country we gain the methodological advantage of being able to hold constant a number of variables at the macro–level which are difficult to control for in cross–national analyses. We are thus in a position to illuminate the explanatory value of a number of commonly advanced explanations of corporatism: partisan influences; state traditions; and policy specific factors. These explanations are all found wanting. The paper concludes by suggesting an alternative explanation more consistent with the Danish data, namely that corporatism be studied from a perspective placing politicians and agency at center stage.

Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands

This paper analyses the role of partisan politics in determining the local tax burden. Property taxes are the most important revenue source which municipalities in the Netherlands can decide upon themselves. Using a new data set on Dutch local property taxes in 1996, it is concluded that municipalities with a council dominated by left wing parties have a higher tax burden. We also find that larger coalitions have lower levels of taxation. Finally, tax exporting increases tax rates. The role of partisan politics in determining public policy is a contentious issue. Whereas some authors argue that partisan politics play little if any role, Hibbs (1987) and others pose that ideological differences are important in determining public policy. In this view left wing political parties are believed to be more in favour of an active state and income redistribution than right wing parties. In terms of taxation: it is expected that right wing government will be more favourable towards a lower tax burden than left wing govern- ments. Some authors argue that over the last two decades, say, the latitude for partisanship at the national level has been reduced tremendously. Due to financial and economic integration, partisan preferences may have become less important in shaping national tax and spending policies. This could per- haps also explain that there is only mixed empirical evidence in support of the partisan hypothesis (see Cusack, 1997 for further discussion). So far, only a few studies have examined the impact of partisan polit- ics at the non-national level. Abrams and Dougan (1986) conclude that US states with a liberal governor have a relatively higher level of state spending. Ibrahim (1994) analyses the relationship between spending of counties in the UK and the "political colour" of the county's government. He finds that La- bour governments spend more than Conservative ones, but this conclusion is suspect as the author does not include control variables. Borge (1995) reports higher fee income for local Norwegian governments under socialist reign.

The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era

In this article, we ask what the pattern of distributive spending has been during the 104th. Congress, in which Republicans have been in the majority, compared to the preceding Congress when Democrats were the majority party. We seek to understand the patterns of change in light of four alternative explanations of distributive spending. The changes in the content and recipients of federal domestic outlays between the 103rd and 104th. Congresses are suggestive of a partisan influence. Republican control of Congress does not appear to have significantly altered the politics of domestic spending. However, Republican control has influenced the content of domestic public policy. The House under Republican control produced significantly more contingent liability obligations than the 103rd. Congress-programs that are ideologically and politically compatible with the interests of Republican representatives. Evidence suggests that Republican control has produced a partial shift in the interests that are rewarded b...

Macroeconomics and Politics Revisited: Do central banks Matter?

This paper provides a model encompassing both partisan influences on monetary policy and the issue of central bank independence. In a regime of partial independence, central bank's policy responses are not immune from partisan influences. Still, the latter fail to affect systematically the expected output level in election years. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical literature on partisan cycles and account for some of its controversial findings.

The Mass Media, Election Campaigning and Voter Response

Focusing on `capital-intensive politics', election campaign advertising in the `paid' and `unpaid' media is analysed for its impact on voters, as part of a suite of influences commonly seen to affect voter behaviour. The Australian experience from the 1990 federal election campaign supports a `modest impact' thesis, that campaign news, advertising and related activities reported in the mass media are significant among a number of secondary determinants operating beneath a primary, partisan influence on how most people vote. However, identification of subsets of voters - committed, wavering and swinging (changing), stable, volatile - shows that media-related influences impact differently on each subset, both absolutely and in the degree to which they act in a reinforcing or persuading role.

When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy

AbstractThis essay explores the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy in democratic nations. It will be pointed out, that differences in party composition of government, in general, matter in public policy in constitutional democracy. However, the extent to which parties influence public policy is to a significant extent contingent upon the type of democracy and countermajoritarian institutional constraints of central state government. Large partisan effects typify majoritarian democracies and states, in which the legislature and the executive are ‘sovereign’. More complex and more difficult to identify is the partisan influence on public policy in consensus democracies and in states, in which the political‐institutional circumstances allow for co‐governance of the opposition party. Narrowly circumscribed is the room to manoeuvre available to incumbent parties above all in political systems which have been marked by countermajoritarian institutional pluralism or institutional ‘semi‐sovereignty’. The article suggests, that it would be valuable if direct effects and interaction effects of the party composition of government and state structures featured more prominently in future research on comparative public policy.

Monetary policy in europe: towards a european central bank and one european currency

Most alternative blueprints for European Monetary Union (EMU) differ in their opinions about convergence requirements or the need for binding fiscal rules and controls of individual national governments' debt policies, but there is, if not complete consensus, widespread agreement that the European Central Bank (ECB) should be independent of political control from both European Community (EC) institutions and national governments. The main argument for an independent European central bank is empirical: those countries in which central banks are insulated from the political process and charged with maintaining price stability have experienced the lowest and most stable inflation rates in recent decades. The present paper reviews and critically evaluates this political economy literature which relates inflation performances to the constitutional features of central bank statutes. Based on this assessment the draft statutes of the ECB and the constitutions of the individual European national central banks are discussed in terms of the independence they grant central bank board members from partisan influences. Furthermore, concrete country-specific suggestions for enhancing central bank independence during stage two of the gradual transition to EMU, which is to be completed by 1999, are made. It is argued that in some countries laborious constitutional reforms of central bank statutes are overdue and must be implemented in order to make these institutions fit for an anti-inflationary EMU.

Loosened Partisan Attachments and Receptivity to Incumbent Behaviors: A Panel Analysis, 1972-1976

An established hypothesis explaining the increased incumbency advantage is that incumbents reaped the benefit of the reduction in partisan identification's influence on the congressional vote. Briefly, the hypothesis maintains that as partisan identification's influence waned incumbent behavior's influence increased. The increased incumbency advantage is then the result of incumbents actively attracting voters whose decision is based less on partisan considerations and more on what incumbents offer. Using the 1972-76 NES panel study, we test this hypothesis by examining incumbent behavior's influence on voters with loosened partisan identification. The results support this premise. The interaction between incumbent behaviors and loosened partisan identifi cation increases the probability of an incumbent vote, attracting loosened challenger party identifiers and retaining loosened incumbent party identifiers. Finally, the results suggest that higher levels of incumbent activity increase the probability of an incumbent vote.

Constituency Influence on House Roll-Call Votes in the Progressive Era, 1913-1915

This research reviews techniques for measuring constituency opinion in policy congruence analyses. It introduces a new use of referenda votes for investigation of state-national policy linkages in the Progressive Era. Findings demonstrate the importance of constituency opinion and of regional and partisan influences in nationalizing major legislation in three policy areas: labor, woman suffrage, and prohibition. Analysis of historical congruency patterns also illustrates the complex interrelationships between democratic processes and policy outcomes, parallelling contemporary

Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment

We investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a Presidential administration could affect monetary policy-making. Influence could be a result of direct Presidential pressure exerted on members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), or it could be a result of partisan considerations in Presidential appointments to the Board of Governors. To investigate these two channels of influence, we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the FOMC. Our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise.

Electoral and partisan influences on Australian fiscal policy from Menzies to Hawke

I examine the controversial questions of whether or not partisanship and electoral motives shape the fiscal policies of Australian governments. I also extend the partisan model of policy choice for the Australian case. Specifically, using time‐series data for the financial years 1962–63 through 1989–90,1 explore partisan and electoral influences on the overall fiscal stance and the personal income transfer payments of the Commonwealth government Results indicate that, net of the influences of inertia in the policy process and of variations in economic forces, partisanship and elections play significant roles in determining both overall fiscal policy and income transfer outlays. Analyses reveal that fiscal policies become more expansionary across the electoral cycle while Labor and coalition governments have large but diminishing partisan effects cm policy over their terms in office.

The Influence of Party Competition on Post-War UK Tax Rates

This paper is concerned with the influence of the British system of ‘party government’ on tax policy outputs. It has been argued that parties make little difference (Rose, 1984) and have only a minimal influence on the trends in tax revenues (Karran, 1985). This paper examines the post-war trends in the rates of income tax, corporation tax and consumption taxes in the UK. It is argued that there is a relationship between the trend in tax rates and the party in office. Hence, we conclude that parties do make a difference to the distribution of the tax burden, that this difference has recently been more pronounced, that it can be important to taxpayer/voters and that partisan influences have been detrimental to the development of the UK tax system.

Representing a Territory: Constituency Boundaries for the British House of Commons of the 1980s

In 1983, the boundary lines for constituencies of the British House of Commons were revised in the light of major shifts in population since the previous of seats. A massive proportion--nearly 90 percent--of the parliamentary constituencies were changed in some way. In this analysis of the 1983 redistribution, we examine why some constituencies have so many more people than others. Our models include a variety of independent variables impinging upon redistribution biases--country (England, Scotland, Wales), rounding error in assigning seats, population density, and the dominant party in constituencies. All these variables are found to play a part in the decisions of the boundary commissions. However, although political in certain ways, we detected no significant direct partisan influences in the 1983 of seats.