Partisan Identification Research Articles

Individual–Community Misalignment in Partisan Identity Predicts Distancing From Norms During the COVID-19 Pandemic

This study investigated whether misalignment between an individual and their community in partisan identity predicted psychological and behavioral distancing from local COVID-19 norms. A nationally representative sample of Republicans and Democrats provided longitudinal data in April (N = 3,492) and June 2020 (N = 2,649). Democrats in Republican communities reported especially heightened better-than-average estimates, perceiving themselves as more adherent to and approving of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI; e.g., mask wearing) than their community. Democrats’better-than-average estimates reflected high approval and behavior in Republican communities and substantial norm underestimation. Republicans in Democratic communities did not evidence worse-than-average estimates. In longitudinal models, injunctive norms only predicted NPI behavior when individual and community partisan identity were aligned. The strong personal approval-behavior association did not depend on misalignment; there were no effects of descriptive norms. Normative messages may have limited efficacy for a sizable subpopulation in politically polarized contexts, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

End of consensus? Ideology, partisan identity, and affective polarization in Finland 2003–2019

AbstractFinland is traditionally associated with a consensus‐like political culture and low partisan hostility. Despite this, concerns about political polarization have become widespread. A possible explanation is that affective polarization, a phenomenon characterized by increasing emotional distances between political groups, is increasing. This article examines trends and individual‐level predictors of affective polarization in the Finnish electorate between 2003 and 2019, using survey data from five national election studies. Additionally, it contributes to the theoretical understanding of affective polarization in multiparty settings by introducing a measure based on the absence of neutrality towards parties. This measure focuses on individual‐level polarization, thus allowing comparisons between groups of voters. The results show a general increase in affective polarization over the period. Ideological extremity is identified as the main predictor of the phenomenon. Left‐right extremity was the strongest predictor at the beginning of the period, whereas GAL‐TAN extremity became increasingly important over time. After 2011, the effects of ideological extremity became asymmetrical: extreme left and TAN positions predicted higher levels than their ideological opposites. Feeling close to a party had a mostly consistent effect on affective polarization, albeit not as large as ideological extremity. Increasing affective polarization might undermine the prevailing consensus culture in Finnish politics. However, it might also have positive effects as a corrective to voter apathy, leading to increased participation. This makes Finland an interesting case for further studies of the causes, effects, and dynamics of affective polarization.

Like parent, like child: The impact of parental socialisation on class identity and partisanship

The theoretical foundation of electoral behaviour research is the Michigan model which emphasizes socialisation and the development of partisan identities. In Britain, this was embellished to include class identity. Across Western societies, class voting, working class jobs and strength of party identities have been in decline, but identification as working class has remained high and relatively stable in Britain. This paper develops theoretical models of parental socialisation to identify effects on class and party identities. The empirical analysis reinforces previous findings about the intergenerational transmission of class identity and partisanship, but further shows that there are some moderating effects of occupation on this transmission. Most importantly, the paper finds that parental partisanship has a substantial effect on the formation of class identity. Therefore, it shows that class identity in contemporary Britain is a strong political identity in its origins as well as its effects.

An Exploratory Study on the Nature and Origins of Social Venture Mission

Mission is central to social venturing, but little is known about the nature and origins of social venture mission. The field lacks a theoretical framework for understanding the moral content of “prosocial” missions that rely on quite different—and potentially conflicting—moral values. We engage in an exploratory quantitative study, wherein we draw on moral foundations theory and social identity theory to develop framing questions related to the moral discourse in social venture missions and the role of founders’ partisan identities in infusing these missions with moral values. We construct a novel dataset by performing computer-aided text analysis on the mission statements of over 50,000 nascent nonprofit ventures in the United States and matching founding team members to voter registration data. We find that moral foundations are frequently espoused in mission statements. We also find that the partisan political identity of the founding team is strongly associated with differences in the moral discourse in social ventures’ stated missions in ways that intriguingly differ from prior work relating moral foundations to political beliefs. Our work contributes to social entrepreneurship research by offering a new way of looking at social venture mission, a road map for future empirical studies, and practical and policy implications.

U.S. banks’ IPOs and political money contributions

This study analyses the effect of political money contributions on U.S. banks’ IPOs. We employ unbalanced panel data of 367 U.S. banks’ IPOs for the period January 1998 to December 2019. Our findings reveal that investors perceive Political Money Contributions (PMC) by U.S. banks as a proxy for political reach and connectedness. We document an inverse relationship between total PMC and the level of underpricing, which implies that both lobbying and PAC expenditure pay off on issue day as donors incur less underpricing. Initial returns decrease with PAC contributions to House of Representatives candidates, whereas the returns relate to the partisan identity of the candidates receiving PAC contributions. We document that those individual contributions by directors bring significant benefits to the IPO banks. Finally, we show that the political contributions of board members, particularly those of CEOs and founders, are associated with better returns in the long term.

Engaging multiple identity frames in political discussion

ABSTRACT Many partisans identify with social groups more typically associated with the opposing party. When both social and partisan identities are made salient in a political environment, this can complicate how people discuss politics and form opinions, as they confront multiple, often competing frames for interpreting political issues and events. This study examines how individuals negotiate cross-cutting frames from partisan and LGBT groups when communicating about political events that make both identities salient. Using a quantitative text analysis of tweets following major political events, the study compares communications from accounts associated with LGBT Republican groups to those from accounts related to other LGBT, Democratic, and Republican groups. The results show that after events that make LGBT and partisan identity salient, users associated with LGBT Republican groups depart from other Republican-associated users in their communications and are uniquely likely to adopt frames in their communication that are associated with both LGBT and Republican interests. The findings have implications for theories of framing effects, cross pressure, and the boundaries of partisanship's influence on behavior.

The Relationship Between Racial Attitudes and Perceived Economic Threat Among Whites: A Three Study Analysis

Multiple theoretical orientations propose a link between economic anxiety and racial attitudes. This article explores this link using three studies. The first study uses observational data from the 2016 CCES and ANES to determine whether or not anticipating a loss in income in the coming year is associated with negative racial affect. The second study uses observational data from the 2020 CCES to determine whether or not perceiving a greater risk of personal discrimination is associated with racial resentment. The last uses an original survey experiment from the 2020 CCES to gain insight into how priming intergroup competition shapes whites’ racial attitudes. These studies find an association between perceived economic threat and negative racial attitudes. However, the way respondents perceive economic threats seems to be largely shaped by partisan identification with Republicans perceiving greater levels of threat. They also suggest that material and symbolic threats may be mutually reinforcing. These findings support the claim that racial attitudes are deeply connected to economic anxieties and provide insight into how party identification shapes our psychology.

Who Are Leaners? How True Independents Differ from the Weakest Partisans and Why It Matters

Abstract Independents who lean toward a party constitute a plurality of Americans. Despite their reluctance to identify as partisans, scholars find that “leaners” look much like partisans with respect to their voting behavior, civic engagement, and policy preferences. Yet, existing literature does not consider the possibility that different factors lead Democrats and Republicans to opt for an independent label. We consider heterogeneity in what leads people to report that they are “leaners” and we identify important partisan differences. By introducing a novel survey measure administered on a large adult sample, we identify both the motivation for, and consequence of, identifying as a leaner. Our results reveal that modern-day Republican leaners are largely motivated by a dissatisfaction with their own party. They are ideologically more moderate and are subsequently less willing to support their party’s candidate. Democratic leaners, on the other hand, appear satisfied with their party’s ideology and candidates, but nevertheless value an independent label. Our work suggests that partisan identification is both expressive and politically contextual. Our study provides an important step in identifying distinct motivations and electoral consequences within this large and growing segment of Americans.

Perceptions and assessments of socialism versus the US System: experimental evidence

ABSTRACT We address three main research questions in this paper. Do U.S. citizens have a realistic view of the U.S. political and economic system? Do citizens have a realistic view of what socialism looks like in most other Western style democracies? And finally, are differences between perception and reality modified by partisan identification and ideology? We run survey experiments with college students in two national universities located in the South in which we randomly ask respondents to evaluate political and economic systems based on either a label (“Socialism” or “The US System”) or a reasonable description of these systems’ main characteristics. Results. Across all participants, the label “Socialism” is slightly less preferred, but respondents are neutral between descriptions of a Socialist system and the current US system. Partisan and ideological differences are evident, however, as Democrats and Liberals rank the descriptions and labels of each system equally (indicating positive perceptions of Socialism), while Republicans and Conservatives assess the description of Socialism much more favorably than the mere label. Our results suggest that partisans do not simply differ in their evaluation of Socialism, but in the conception of what Socialism is. There also appear to be discrepancies in perceptions among partisans about how the US political and economic system is organized, but surprising agreement in evaluating the system as it exists.

Age, period and cohort effects in a dealigned electorate: comparing late deciders and vote switchers

AbstractWhereas many advanced democracies experience a long‐term process of dealignment, the impact of age, period and cohort on late deciders and vote switchers is still unclear. In addition, extant research fails to systematically examine the determinants that account for the time of vote decision compared to explanations of vote change at the individual level. Drawing on pooled data that include election surveys for Portuguese legislative elections held between 2002 and 2019, this study analyses the impact of age, period and cohort on late deciders and vote switchers. The findings indicate that age has a significant impact on both phenomena, while period effects are important only for the time of vote decision. Finally, the lack of partisan identities and short‐term factors, in particular ambivalence towards the main party leaders, are relevant for explaining electoral indecision and inter‐election volatility.

Groups, Behaviors, and Issues as Cues of Partisan Attachments in the Public

What factors do people most associate with the partisan identity of others: group identity, political issue positions, or social behaviors? In this research note, we report the results of a conjoint experiment in which we test the predictive power of descriptive identities against other attributes such as social behaviors and issue positions. We find that when presented with a randomized biography to predict partisanship, people rely on issue positions over descriptive group identities or behaviors. Most issues outperform group affiliations and behaviors, with sexual orientation as the partial exception. We then compared these results to the correlation between the same factors in respondents’ own biographies and their own partisan identification. We find that political issues are far less important to people’s own partisan affiliations, while group identity is more predictive. We conclude that an understanding or perception of ideological concepts and their association with the political parties in others should be distinguished from adoption of such concepts by individuals themselves.

Spanish Far-Right Party “Vox”: Its Role in Shaping of the EU Regional Agenda

The “Vox” party has turned into an influential actor of the European politics due to its electoral success; institutional and ideological adaptation to the country’s changing party landscape; attempts to create its own institutional, organizational, informational, and creative resources; as well as its policy of forming strong alliances with European and American rightwing conservative forces. Based on the spatial approach (categories of political space and political identity) and discourse-analysis, the author tries to comprehend the policy guidelines of “Vox”; determines the place of the party in the political system and the media sphere of Spain; defines the role that “Vox” plays in shaping the regional agenda of the EU. The study focuses on the political and institutional aspects of how “Vox” strengthens its relations with similar EU parties based on partisan and ideological identity, designing alternative projects of European integration, and establishing a new, ideologized format for the relations of Spain (and more broadly - the EU) and the Ibero-American countries. The author concludes about the structuring and the formal institutionalization of communications and political interactions between the far-right political elites which carries risks for the EU’s efforts to create a macropolitical identity and the metanarrative of memory, therefore, potentially leading to political divisions in the EU.

The moral foundations of restraint: Partisanship, military training, and norms of civilian protection

How does partisan identification shape the attitudes of US military officers toward the protection of civilians in war? Drawing on unique cross-cohort surveys of soon-to-be commissioned officers in 12 Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) training battalions, we find that Democratic-leaning cadets generally prioritize norms of civilian protection more than Republican-leaning cadets when confronted with competing values of military advantage and force protection as part of a ‘combatant’s trilemma’. This gap remains partially resilient after sustained exposure to military training and socialization, including in the norms of restraint embodied by principles of combat ethics and the law of war. We attribute these partisan differences to insights from Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), which suggests that the moral values of Democrats and Republicans guide their views toward the individual use of force in combat. Our findings have important implications for comprehending the impact of political ideology and military training and socialization on attitudes regarding restraint toward civilians in war. Given the widely recognized conservative composition of the US military’s membership, these findings may help to further inform understanding of US military operations and the underlying causes of US adherence to – or violation of – the laws of armed conflict.

Priming Partisan Identities and Support for Political Violence

Individuals in the United States appear increasingly willing to support and justify political violence. This paper therefore examines whether making partisan identities salient increases support for political violence. We embed priming manipulations in a sample of roughly 850 U.S. adults to investigate whether activating positive partisan identity, negative partisan identity, instrumental partisan identity, and American national identity might lead to differences in reported support for political violence. While we uncover no effects of priming various identities on support for political violence, we replicate and extend previous research on its correlates. Specifically, we demonstrate how various measures of partisan identity strength as well as negative personality traits are correlated with acceptance of political violence.

Negative partisanship is not more prevalent than positive partisanship.

The dominant narrative among scholars and political pundits characterizes American partisanship as overwhelmingly negative, portraying citizens as more repelled by the opposing party than attached to their own party. To assess the valence of partisan identity, we use various measures collected from several new and existing nationally representative surveys and behavioural outcomes obtained from two experiments. Our findings consistently depart from the negative partisanship narrative. For the majority of Americans, partisanship is either equally positive and negative or more positive than negative. Only partisan leaners stand out as negative partisans. We pair these observational findings with experimental data that differentiate between positive group behaviour and negative group behaviour in the partisan context. We find that the behavioural manifestations of party identity similarly include both positive and negative biases in balance, reinforcing our conclusion that descriptions of partisanship as primarily negative are exaggerated.

The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence

ABSTRACT Why do voters vote for undemocratic politicians in a democracy? My chief contention is that affective polarization has become a primary factor driving support for undemocratic politicians. Once partisan identification turns into a salient identity in the hierarchy of group affiliations, it has the potential to widen inter-party distances. Such a political environment fosters positive beliefs of their preferred party and negative beliefs of the other party, which promote political cynicism, intolerance and increase partisan loyalty. As a result, crossing party lines becomes costly, even when incumbents violate democratic principles or incumbents’ economic policies do not appeal to supporters’ interests. This tradeoff enables undemocratic politicians to evade electoral sanctions for undemocratic behaviour. I created an extended version of Reiljan’s affective polarization application. The new dataset covers affective polarization scores of 53 countries calculated over 170 national election surveys. I find that increasing affective polarization is highly correlated with democratic backsliding, less accountability, less freedom, fewer rights, and less deliberation in democracies. However, ideological polarization has shown no correlation.

The Conditional Effects of Latino Candidates and Partisanship on Latino Turnout

Does the presence of a Latino congressional candidate increase Latino turnout? An ongoing debate exists regarding the mobilizing effect of Latino candidates on Latino turnout. However, scholars on both sides of this divide have, as of yet, failed to detect the critical role that a Latino candidate’s partisanship may have on Latino turnout. Using national turnout data and leveraging the exogenous shock of redistricting between 2010 and 2012, we find evidence that while the presence of a Latino congressional candidate increases turnout among Latino co-partisans, the presence of Latino congressional candidates who do not share the partisan identity of Latino voters depresses turnout. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of the reinforcing power of shared partisan and pan-ethnic identities in empowering Latinos to vote.

Learning to Dislike Your Opponents: Political Socialization in the Era of Polarization

Early socialization research dating to the 1960s showed that children could have a partisan identity without expressing polarized evaluations of political leaders and institutions. We provide an update to the socialization literature by showing that adolescents today are just as polarized as adults. We compare our findings to a landmark 1980 socialization study and show that distrust in the opposing party has risen sharply among adolescents. We go on to show that the onset of polarization in childhood is predicted by parental influence; adolescents who share their parents’ identity and whose parents are more polarized are apt to voice polarized views.

Finding the missing link? The impact of co-ethnicity, pan-ethnicity, and cross-ethnicity on Latino vote choice

Surveys show that Latinos more strongly identify with their ethnic identities (i.e. national origin) than their pan-ethnic identity as “Latino/Hispanic.” Given the primacy of ethnic identity among Latinos, what impact does shared ethnic versus pan-ethnic identity between candidates and voters have on Latino vote choice? Studies suggest that an “identity-to-politics link” exists among Latinos; however, we believe the measurement of “co-ethnicity” should be reexamined. Using a survey experiment embedded in a module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we randomize the ethnic, pan-ethnic, and partisan identification of a fictional male congressional candidate in a contest against a white non-Hispanic candidate to examine the role of shared ethnic identity on Latino vote choice. We find that Latinos, regardless of candidate partisanship, more strongly support co-ethnic candidates relative to candidates with whom they share a pan-ethnic identity. We also find that Latinos are significantly more supportive of a cross-ethnic Latino candidate compared to a pan-ethnic Latino candidate; and that Latinos are more likely to cross partisan lines to support a co-ethnic candidate. These results not only suggest that there exists a Latino “identity to politics” link, but that the extant scholarship has underestimated the size and scope of this electoral connection.

Polarization in Black and White

AbstractWhile the alignment of partisan and ideological identities—sorting—serves as a primary explanation for the rise in affective polarization, we theorize that this connection does not hold for all Americans, especially racial subgroups with unique political experiences. Using both cross-sectional and panel data, we find that even though Whites have sorted, and differences between the South and elsewhere have diminished over time, Black Americans have not sorted since 1972. However, affective polarization is just as high among Blacks as it is Whites. Thus, sorting does not appear to explain Black affective polarization. Multivariate models provide additional evidence that sorting does not adequately explain affective polarization among Blacks. Instead, we find that group norms and group consciousness (e.g., linked fate) better account for affective polarization among Black Americans. These findings provide important nuance to the sorting thesis and shed light on the relationship between sorting and affective polarization.