Partisan Effects Research Articles

Globalization and Austerity: Flipping Partisan Effects on Fiscal Policy During (Recent) International Crises

This article investigates the effect of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs during the three international economic crises of 1981–1984, 1990–1994 and 2008–2013. Encompassing 19–23 advanced democracies, the statistical analysis suggests that partisan effects have increased over time and are characterized, in the two last crises, by a “new asymmetry” whereby left governments pursued more contractionary fiscal policies than non-left governments over the course of the business cycle. Furthermore, it attributes left governments’ endorsement of austere fiscal policies to the constraining effects of financial markets in the context of high/surging debt. This is supported by qualitative analysis of select government responses to the Global Financial Crisis, shedding new light on the new austerity that started in the early 2010s. The ideological mix with political partisanship during hard times surely is confusing to ordinary citizens. The article cautiously points to a neglected yet important international economic origin of our political discontents.

Linking electoral realignment to welfare politics: an assessment of partisan effects on active labour market policy in post-industrial democracies

This article examines the political determinants of the variations in active labour market policies across advanced democracies. Specifically, it investigates the conditions under which a welfare state accommodates rather than disregards the interests of labour market outsiders. Relying on the literature on post-industrial electoral realignment, this article argues that ideological orientations not only in socio-economic but also in sociocultural dimensions dictate the policy preferences of political parties for labour market programmes. This study then hypothesizes that libertarian governments are more likely than authoritarian governments to support human capital formation of labour market outsiders. An analysis of cabinet-based periodization data of 21 advanced industrialized countries from 1985 to 2017 shows that left- and right-libertarian governments favour public spending on active labour market programmes, thereby supporting this study’s hypothesis. Furthermore, it also reveals that while left-libertarian governments increase expenditures for direct job creation schemes, right-libertarian ones do so for employment assistance and training programmes.

Who spends more? Party Ideology and Public Spending in 16 Post-Socialist Countries

Abstract The article is revisiting a never-concluded debate about the partisan effect on public spending. It explores the impact of the ruling parties’ ideological orientation, operationalised in a single-dimensional left-right scale, on budget expenditures in Central and Eastern Europe. The research is conducted within an expanded time series covering the complete period since the fall of one-party regimes in sixteen former socialist countries, where the issue has remained under-studied, especially in comparison with a number of similar studies focusing mostly on developed Western democracies. The findings moderately support the main hypothesis demonstrating that, although an ideology matters, there are also other more significant predictors of the spending among political, economic or other contextual variables related to a specific transitional framework of the countries in question. The same conclusion applies to the total consumption, as well as to the examined budget segments of social transfers and education, while the environmental spending seems to be completely unrelated to the partisan variable.

The ideological basis of antiscientific attitudes: Effects of authoritarianism, conservatism, religiosity, social dominance, and system justification

Serious concerns about public distrust of scientific experts and the spread of misinformation are growing in the US and elsewhere. To gauge ideological and psychological variability in attitudes toward science, we conducted an extensive analysis of public opinion data based on a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults ( N = 1,500) and a large replication sample ( N = 2,119). We estimated the unique effects of partisanship, symbolic and operational forms of political ideology, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), and general system justification (GSJ), after adjusting for demographic factors. Multiverse analyses revealed that (a) conservatism and SDO were significant predictors of distrust of climate science in > 99.9% of model specifications, with conservatism accounting for 80% of the total variance; (b) conservatism, RWA, religiosity, (male) sex, (low) education, (low) income, and distrust of climate science were significant predictors of skepticism about science in general (vs. faith) in > 99.9% of model specifications; (c) conservatism, RWA, (low) education, and distrust of climate science were significant predictors of trust in ordinary people (over scientific experts) > 99.9% of the time; and (d) GSJ was a significant predictor of trust in scientific experts (over ordinary people) 81% of the time, after adjusting for all other demographic and ideological factors. Implications for the role of science in democratic society are discussed.

Same Scandal, Different Standards: The Effect of Partisanship on Expectations of News Reports about Whistleblowers

ABSTRACT This experiment (N = 591) tests whether audiences adjust their standards for what qualifies as fair journalism based the transparency of news editors, the source of the news, and the target of an accusation. In the context of a whistleblower scandal, the results suggest the relationship between the audience member’s ideology and the news story publisher and target influence what details the audience thinks journalists should reveal. Additionally, we find transparency from editors can alter those perceptions.

Who Trusts the WHO? Heuristics and Americans' Trust in the World Health Organization During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

ObjectiveWhy do some Americans trust the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID‐19 pandemic, but others do not? To date, there has been no examination of trust in the WHO. Yet the global nature of the pandemic necessitates expanding our scholarship to international health organizations. We test the effects of partisanship, ideology, the cooperative internationalist foreign policy orientation, and nationalism on trust in the WHO and subsequently examine how this trust relates to preventive health behavior.MethodsMultivariate analysis of original survey data from a representative sample of Americans.ResultsDemocrats, liberals, and those with a strong cooperative internationalist foreign policy orientation are more likely to trust the WHO's competence and integrity in responding to the COVID‐19 pandemic while Republicans, conservatives, and nationalists are less likely. Even though trust in the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has the largest impact on preventive health behaviors, trust in the competence of the WHO is also an important factor. These results remain robust after controlling for other covariates.ConclusionPandemic politics in the United States is polarized along party and ideological lines. However, our results show that a fuller understanding Americans’ political trust and health behaviors during COVID‐19 requires taking the international dimensions of the pandemic seriously.

Executive Control of Agency Adjudication: Capacity, Selection and Precedential Rulemaking

While the volume of adjudication by federal agencies far outstrips the volume of cases decided by the federal judiciary, researchers have devoted relatively little attention to agency adjudication and political control thereof. We study three mechanisms of presidential control of immigration adjudication: capacity-building, selection, and precedential rulemaking. First, consistent with work on bureaucratic capacity, the Trump administration achieved its goal of increasing removals of noncitizens through an unprecedented increase in total hiring of immigration judges. Second, contrary to expectations from the literatures on judicial behavior and bureaucratic politics, we find little evidence of partisan effects in immigration judge selection. Third, we demonstrate the substantial power of what we call “precedential rulemaking” – the power by the Attorney General to select cases in which to issue binding precedent. These results illustrate the importance of incorporating mechanisms of supervisory and legal control into the study of administrative courts.

PyeongChang, Pyongyang, or Pyeonghwa (peace in Korean) olympic games? An exploration of partisan media and framing effects

ABSTRACT The PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympic Games held in South Korea drew much political attention due to its potential to resolve the ongoing political and military tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula. Given the divisive South Korean public discourse on warming ties with the North, this study uses framing theory to compare the frames employed by two partisan South Korean newspapers to cover the mega sporting event. Our analyses reveal significant framing differences between conservative and liberal sources, suggesting their potential effect on citizen attitudes and beliefs about the role of the Olympics. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.

Public Opinion About Police Weapons and Equipment: An Exploratory Analysis

Despite debates about the “material militarization” of the police, relatively little information on mass public opinion about police weapons, equipment, and gear currently exists. We analyze data from a national, opt-in panel of survey participants to assess public opinion regarding police use of 10 different types of weapons and equipment for use in confrontations with citizens. We find that public opinion defies easy classification into “militarized” versus “routine” equipment categories. Multivariate analyses indicate that perceptions of (a) police efficacy and (b) the frequency with which officers experience physical assaults on the job are the most consistent predictors of support for a range of weapons and gear, whereas perceptions of police misconduct and bias predict opposition to some types of tools. Partisan differences in attitudes between Democrats, Republicans, and Independents are less consistent predictors than broader perceptions about policing, but the effects of partisanship that are evident are substantively large.

Moderating effect of partisanship on personal experience with sexual harassment and gender discrimination on the evaluation of political figures

ABSTRACT Sexual harassment and gender discrimination have become more salient in U.S. politics in recent years due, in part, to the #MeToo movement. We conducted two surveys on Californians in the 2018 primary and general election. We find that experiencing either of these types of interactions shaped how Independent voters evaluated political figures but had a smaller effect on Democratic and Republican party identifiers. On average, experiencing gender discrimination has stronger effects on the evaluation of political figures than sexual harassment. Both experiences played out differently for Independent men and Independent women. The boost in female support for Democratic candidates was counterbalanced by a backlash vote from Independent men who reported they experienced gender discrimination, aiding the President and hurting Democratic political figures. This suggests that the pro-Kavanaugh backlash had deeper roots in male resentment towards the perceived preferential treatment of women, especially in work environments.

Joining the herd? U.S. public opinion and vaccination requirements across educational settings during the COVID-19 pandemic

With effective and safe COVID-19 vaccines beginning to be distributed across the United States, questions about who should receive the vaccine first have been the focus of public discussions. Yet, over the long-term, questions about the order of distribution will be displaced by questions about how to achieve high levels of vaccination rates. Historically, absent incentives or mandates, Americans have shown ambivalence, if not general antipathy, towards vaccinations, and vaccination rates have generally been low for many vaccines. There is evidence that vaccination requirements across educational settings are an effective policy instrument to increase vaccination rates. We administered a large national survey to assess American’s attitudes towards vaccination requirements across three educational settings (daycare, K-12 schools, and universities) in general and for COVID-19 specifically. Partisanship, gender, race, rurality, and perceptions about the appropriate role schools should play in providing health services are substantive predictors of public opinion. While Americans generally support vaccination mandates across all three settings for both types of requirements, support is consistently and significantly lower for COVID19 requirements. The effect of partisanship is accentuated for COVID-19 requirements as compared to general requirements. Drop off in support between general and COVID-19 specific requirements are driven by partisanship, gender, political knowledge, rurality, and having children in the household. Nonetheless, mandates are supported by a majority of Americans. Assessing Americans’ opinions of vaccination requirements in educational settings offers an important opportunity to explore the potential of mandates as policy instrument in the government’s arsenal against COVID-19 and guide public policy on the issues.

Personality Goes a Long Way (for Some). An Experimental Investigation Into Candidate Personality Traits, Voters’ Profile, and Perceived Likeability

The personality traits of political candidates, and the way these are perceived by the public at large, matter for political representation and electoral behavior. Disentangling the effects of partisanship and perceived personality on candidate evaluations is however notoriously a tricky business, as voters tend to evaluate the personality of candidates based on their partisan preferences. In this article we tackle this issue via innovative experimental data. We present what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that manipulates the personality traits of a candidate and assesses its subsequent effects. The design, embedded in an online survey distributed to a convenience sample of US respondents (MTurk, N = 1,971), exposed respondents randomly to one of eight different “vignettes” presenting personality cues for a fictive candidate - one vignette for each of the five general traits (Big Five) and the three “nefarious” traits of the Dark Triad. Our results show that 1) the public at large dislikes “dark” politicians, and rate them significantly and substantially lower in likeability; 2) voters that themselves score higher on “dark” personality traits (narcissism, psychopathy, Machiavellianism) tend to like dark candidates, in such a way that the detrimental effect observed in general is completely reversed for them; 3) the effects of candidates’ personality traits are, in some cases, stronger for respondents displaying a weaker partisan attachment.

Congressional Approval and Responsible Party Government: The Role of Partisanship and Ideology in Citizen Assessments of the Contemporary U.S. Congress

While scholars posit an electoral link between congressional approval and majority party electoral fortunes, it is unclear whether citizens are grounding their assessments of approval on policy or valence grounds, such as retrospective economic evaluations. Whereas it is commonly understood that there is an ideological component to constituents’ job approval of their individual members of Congress, in addition to a strong partisan effect, the ideological basis of institutional approval has not been established. Using cross-sectional and panel survey data, which allow for scaling citizens and the congressional parties in the same ideological space, I demonstrate that, distinct from the partisan basis of congressional approval, citizens’ ideological distance from the majority party has a separate and distinct effect. These results suggest that the link between congressional approval and majority party fortunes is rooted in the collective ideological representation provided by the legislative majority in an increasingly responsible U.S. Congress.

Dynamics of COVID-19 Outcomes is Driven by Political Landscape and Socio-Economic Factors at Local Level in Brazil

Background: Brazil has been severely impacted by COVID-19 pandemics that is aggravated by the absence of a scientifically-driven coordinated campaign. The decentralization and resultant conflicts in disease control activities produced different protection behaviours and local government measures. In the present study, we investigated how political partisanship and socio-economic factors determined the outcome of COVID-19 at the local level in Brazil.Methods: A retrospective study of COVID-19 deaths was carried out using mortality databases between Feb 2020, and Jun 2021 for the 5570 Brazilian municipalities. Socio-economic parameters including city categories, income and inequality indexes, health service quality and partisanship, assessed by the result of the second round of the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, were included. Regression tree analysis was carried out to identify the statistical significance and conditioning relationships of variables.Findings: Municipalities that supported then candidate Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 elections were those that had the worst COVID-19 mortality rates, mainly during the second epidemic wave of 2021. This pattern was observed even considering structural inequalities among cities.Interpretation: In general, the first phase of the pandemic hit large and central cities hardest, while the second wave mostly impacted Bolsonarian municipalities, where scientific denialism among the population was stronger. Negative effects of partisanship towards the right wing on COVID-19 outcomes counterbalances favorable socioeconomic indexes in affluent Brazilian cities. Our results underscore the fragility of public health policies which were undermined by the scientific denialism of right-wing supporters in Brazil.Funding: International joint laboratories of Institute de Recherche pour le Développement,partnership between the University of Brasília and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (LMI-Sentinela- UnB - Fiocruz - IRD), Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel(CAPES), National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).Declaration of Interest: None to declare.

Bad Motivation With Good Results: The Merit Of Filling Statewide Executive Vacancies With Same-Party Appointments

Throughout the last century, same-party requirements for filling state legislative vacancies have proliferated. Today, nearly half the states in the United States use some form of same-party appointment for filling state legislative vacancies—either instead of, or in conjunction with, special elections. But while same-party appointment requirements are widely used for legislative vacancies, they are rarely used for vacancies in statewide offices. In 2019, several Republican legislators in Kansas introduced a proposal to implement same-party appointment requirements for filling vacancies in the state’s elected executive offices, like attorney general and treasurer. But the intent here was to disproportionately limit the power of Democratic Governor Laura Kelly, not to adopt an idea on its own merits. This Article analyzes the Kansas Republicans’ proposal through the lens of the states that have already adopted, and utilized, similar same-party appointment systems. It comprehensively reviews the (highly partisan) motivations in adopting these systems in the first place, as well as how appointments have operated since these requirements have been implemented. Ultimately, it argues that the proposal introduced in Kansas should be adopted—but with a delayed effective date to minimize the partisan effects.

Will I Get COVID-19? Partisanship, Social Media Frames, and Perceptions of Health Risk in Brazil

ABSTRACTIn these polarized and challenging times, not even perceptions of personal risk are immune to partisanship. This article introduces results from a new survey with an embedded social media experiment conducted during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil. Descriptive results show that progovernment and opposition partisans report very different expectations of health and job risks. Job and health policy have become wedge issues that elicit partisan responses. The analysis exploits random variation in the survey recruitment to show the effects of the president’s first speech on national television on the perceived risk and the moderating effect of partisanship. The article presents a framing experiment that models key cognitive mechanisms driving partisan differences in perceptions of health risks and job security during the COVID-19 crisis.

Partisan Pandemic: How Partisanship and Public Health Concerns Affect Individuals’ Social Distancing During COVID-19

Rampant partisanship in the United States may be the largest obstacle to the social distancing most experts see as critical to limiting the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analyzing a total of nearly 500,000 responses collected daily between Mar 4 and June 6 reveals not only that partisanship is more important than public health concerns for explaining individuals’ social distancing, but also that the effect of partisanship has grown over time – especially among Republicans. All else equal, the relative importance of partisanship for the increasing (un)willingness of Republicans to engage in social distancing highlights the challenge that politics poses for public health.

Gender, Benevolent Sexism, and Public Health Compliance

AbstractGrowing research shows a correlation between gender, benevolent sexism, partisanship, and COVID-19 public health compliance. We show first that women are more likely than men to engage in protective behaviors to slow the spread of COVID-19. We also find that while Republicans and Independents are less likely to comply with these measures, benevolent sexism moderates the effect of partisanship and can increase compliance. These results suggest that framing public health directives in terms of chivalry and protection activates benevolent sexism, potentially offsetting patterns of noncompliance associated with partisanship. We discuss the negative consequences of these results and posit a need for bipartisan messages to reduce reliance on benevolent sexism in the future.

Do political parties matter? Evidence from German municipalities

Abstract We assess whether the partisanship of local councils affects the level and composition of local public spending by German municipalities. Our identification strategy exploits changes in the party with the absolute majority in the local council, combining an instrumental variable strategy with a matching approach to address potential selection into treatment. We find evidence for strong partisan effects: Communities with a left-wing council majority spend more on ‘people-oriented’ public goods and less on infrastructure than communities with a right-wing dominated council.

Quiet Politics of Employment Protection Legislation? Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition, and the Regulatory Welfare State

Political parties and party competition have been important factors in the expansion and retrenchment of the fiscal welfare state, but researchers have argued that regulatory welfare is not part of political debate among parties. We explore this claim theoretically, and then empirically examine it in the case of employment protection legislation (EPL) in twenty-one established democracies since 1985. EPL is a mature and potentially salient instrument of the regulatory welfare state that has experienced substantial retrenchment. We test three prominent mechanisms of how electoral competition conditions partisan effects: the composition of Left parties’ electorates, the strength of pro-EPL parties, and the emphasis put on social justice by pro-EPL parties. We find that the partisan politics of EPL is conditioned by electoral competition under only very specific circumstances, namely when blame sharing becomes possible in coalitions between EPL supporters.