Partisan Difference Research Articles

State Partisan Dominance and the Distribution of TANF Funds, 2000–2018

In this field note, we examine the changing distribution of TANF spending patterns across the states. Given the important shift from the more restrictive categorical grant of AFDC to the more flexible block grant of TANF, examining patterns of spending across program categories is an important facet for understanding states’ welfare efforts. Overall, there has been a general decrease in the percentage of state TANF spending on cash assistance. Using a new measure of party dominance, we find that Democratic states initially spent a higher share of their TANF funds on cash assistance than Republican states. However, by the 2010s this partisan difference basically disappeared with Democratic states spending patterns matching those of Republican states, focusing less on cash assistance and giving greater priority to areas less reflective of TANF’s principal objectives.

Partisan Self-Interest and Views on the Electoral College: How Electoral Inversions Activate Differences in Support for the System

Most Americans have little knowledge about why we elect the president through the Electoral College. This complex system that requires understanding the impact of 51 different elections on the outcome of the presidential election leads many Americans to desire the simple effectiveness of the popular vote method. Previous scholarship highlights a majority of Americans wanting to replace our current system with the popular vote. Political science research lacks a clear understanding of the impact of partisan self-interest on views of changing the presidential election method. In this paper we look at public opinion surveys over the last 45 years and find there was no clear partisan difference in views of changing the system before the electoral inversion of 2000. We argue that partisan self-interest was activated because of this electoral inversion. The inversion of 2016 led to a hardening of opinions on replacing the Electoral College with the popular vote.

Remove, Reduce, Inform: What Actions do People Want Social Media Platforms to Take on Potentially Misleading Content?

To reduce the spread of misinformation, social media platforms may take enforcement actions against offending content, such as adding informational warning labels, reducing distribution, or removing content entirely. However, both their actions and their inactions have been controversial and plagued by allegations of partisan bias. When it comes to specific content items, surprisingly little is known about what ordinary people want the platforms to do. We provide empirical evidence about a politically balanced panel of lay raters' preferences for three potential platform actions on 368 news articles. Our results confirm that on many articles there is a lack of consensus on which actions to take. We find a clear hierarchy of perceived severity of actions with a majority of raters wanting informational labels on the most articles and removal on the fewest. There was no partisan difference in terms of how many articles deserve platform actions but conservatives did prefer somewhat more action on content from liberal sources, and vice versa. We also find that judgments about two holistic properties, misleadingness and harm, could serve as an effective proxy to determine what actions would be approved by a majority of raters.

What to expect when you're electing: citizen forecasts in the 2020 election

AbstractPolitical divisions in the lead-up to the 2020 US presidential election were large, leading many to worry that heighted partisan conflict was so stark that partisans were living in different worlds, divided even in their understanding of basic facts. Moreover, the nationalization of American politics is thought to weaken attention to state political concerns. 2020 therefore provides an excellent, if difficult, test case for the claim that individuals understand their state political environment in a meaningful way. Were individuals able to look beyond national rhetoric and the national environment to understand state-level electoral dynamics? We present new data showing that, in the aggregate, despite partisan differences in electoral expectations, Americans are aware of their state's likely political outcome, including whether it will be close. At the same time, because forecasting the overall election outcome is more difficult, Electoral College forecasts are much noisier and display persistent partisan difference in expectations that do not differ much with state of residence.

Partisan difference in social desirability bias on anti‐immigrant sentiments: Covert and overt expression among French voters

AbstractVarious types of anti‐immigrant sentiments have been taken as the characteristic independent variable to explain specific support for radical right parties. However, some survey respondents tend to conceal their attitudes towards socially sensitive issues. To overcome this challenge, the present study used a list experiment method (item count technique) to reveal respondents' covert attitudes towards immigrants (and compared these with overt expressions) based on party support in France. Results indicated similar levels of anti‐immigrant sentiments among radical right National Front supporters and other centre‐rightist parties. In addition, comparison with the direct question method revealed that while supporters of centre‐right parties were reluctant to express their anti‐immigrant sentiment in overt expressions, National Front supporters willingly expressed it overtly more than in covert expressions. Using regression analysis, this paper demonstrates the diversity of anti‐immigrant norms and the social desirability bias gap in the French political space.

The effects of partisan framing on COVID-19 attitudes: Experimental evidence from early and late pandemic

Political polarization has dominated news coverage of Americans’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this research note, we report findings from two experimental studies, in which we present respondents with news stories about COVID-19 mitigation measures that emphasize partisan difference or accord. The stories present the same numeric facts about public opinion, but highlight either the partisan gap that existed at the time of the study, or the fact that large majorities of both Republicans and Democrats supported the measures at the time. Results from our first study, conducted late April 2020, show that a media frame drawing attention to shared concern across party lines produced a less polarized response to social-distancing restrictions than a frame that drew attention to partisan difference. Our findings suggest that the extensive media coverage about the red-blue divide in COVID-19 opinions reinforced partisan polarization. These results, however, did not replicate in a second study conducted much later in the pandemic. Qualitative data collected across the two studies demonstrate the degree to which polarization had rapidly become a dominant narrative in Americans’ thinking about COVID-19.

The partisan divide in U.S. congressional communications after the China shock

AbstractEmerging literature shows that rising import exposure resulting from the China shock devastated U.S. manufacturing and contributed to the rise of Donald Trump. However, several studies found that these recent localized economic shocks did not negatively impact the tenure of incumbent politicians, and this outcome remains a puzzle. In this paper, we examine the partisan difference in congressional communication strategies on China and trade‐related issues. We propose a theory of China‐bashing to explain how members of Congress frame the negative impacts of trade to their voters. Using press release data from members of Congress, we show that, even though Chinese import competition impacted both Republican‐ and Democrat‐held districts, Republican politicians in adversely affected districts responded by increasing their anti‐China rhetoric, while there was no similar difference among Democrats. At the same time, there was no difference between Republican and Democratic messaging on general trade issues. In doing so, Republican legislators were able to support trade liberalization during the Bush and Obama administrations while blaming its negative externalities to their constituents on China.

Does it matter for the economy to have a conservative or liberal government in Korea? Political parties and business cycle in South Korea, 1998–2019

ABSTRACT Political ideologies have gained significance in Korean politics in recent decades. We investigate whether there have been any major differences between the conservative and liberal governments in terms of economic policy and its outcome in Korea for the period 1998–2019. We take an event-study type of approach to establish some patterns, if any, and then conduct a more formal econometric analysis based on the political economy literature. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we confirm the existence of political business cycles (i.e. economic effects of the political ideology of the government) and present new evidence on the important dynamics and distinct channels through which partisan difference in economic policy positions operates. Furthermore, the pattern of the political cycles and their operational channels are different from the well-documented case of the U.S. and some industrialized democracies. Our analysis suggests that contrasting economic outcomes arising from political ideologies and their associated policy direction between conservative and liberal governments will likely be more pronounced, going forward.

Partisan Differences in Social Distancing May Originate in Norms and Beliefs: Results from Novel Data

ObjectiveRecent academic work on the coronavirus (COVID‐19) pandemic has established a persistent difference between Democrats and Republicans in social distancing behaviors. We uncover a potential explanation for this difference—social norms and beliefs.MethodsWe use a series of ordinary least squares regression specifications on novel survey data collected in April through June of 2020.ResultsWe find that Democrats are more likely to report social distancing than are Republicans, even after controlling for a range of demographic variables that might otherwise account for differences in social distancing and that these differences are found in partisans’ norms and beliefs around social distancing. Our main analysis shows that the partisan difference in social distancing disappears when we control for social norms and beliefs, suggesting their salience in changing social distancing behaviors.ConclusionOur results contribute to current research focused on mitigating the spread of COVID‐19 by highlighting a mechanism, norms and beliefs, for interventions to target.

The political economy of minimum income benefits: How parties, unions and migration influence benefit adequacy

How we treat the people most in need of support is a good indicator of the state of our societies. But we lack empirical evidence on how political parties affect minimum income benefits. The classic partisan difference theory leads us to expect opposite effects of governing right and left parties on benefit levels. The analysis of 16 OECD countries over the period of 1990 to 2009 shows that this hypothesis must be rejected as – if anything – right and left parties are associated with cuts. The inconsistent party effects point towards ‘new politics’ of blame avoidance strategies. A novel approach in the field of minimum income benefits is the analysis of the context of partisanship: how do unions and migration alter governments’ effects on benefits? The effect of migration on parties cannot be captured using the net migration rate; in the future we should look at how public opinion on migration influences policies. In line with the power resources approach, trade unions show a consistently strong association with higher benefits, but they cannot constrain right nor left parties in cutting benefits. The findings confirm that the politics of new social policies differ from the politics of old ones: (1) new politics are at work, (2) signs of negotiated retrenchment between unions and right governments are not robust and (3) no evidence of coalition building between left parties and unions was found.

Left is right and right is left? Partisan difference on social welfare and particularistic benefits in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

AbstractThis paper investigates elite-level partisan differences along the socioeconomic dimension in three developed East Asian democracies – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. On the one hand, the mainstream literature in welfare studies and party politics expects left- and right-leaning parties should vary significantly in utilizing social policy promises. On the other hand, the path dependency logic tells us that left–right difference should be found over particularistic benefits, such as agricultural subsidies or construction projects, considering that these were central means for right-leaning parties to maintain their power during the developmental state period in the three countries. Using an original bill-sponsorship data set between 1987 and 2012, we find that there has not been any substantial difference in the agenda setting of conventional social welfare bills between left- and right-wing government periods. However, a clear elective affinity can be observed between established right-wing parties and particularistic benefits. The paper shows that contextualizing key political actors' preferences can lead to a more systematic understanding of political dynamics behind the socioeconomic dimension in non-Anglo-European countries.

A National Conversation About Race? Political Discussion Across Lines of Racial and Partisan Difference

AbstractDialogue about race-based topics is essential to combat prejudice, foster mutual understanding, and improve race relations. This study describes the extent to which political conversations—especially those about race-related topics—are taking place within and across racial and political groups. This national survey with a Black oversample found racially diverse discussion networks to be more likely among Blacks than Whites, but politically diverse networks to be more likely among Whites than Blacks. Blacks were more likely than Whites to talk about race-related topics such as police treatment of Blacks (and less likely about several topics not explicitly tied to race), but by no means did Whites entirely avoid race-related topics, even in their same-race discussions. Moreover, there was evidence that discussion in cross-race dyads affected the mix of topics Whites and Blacks discussed, revealing the potential for cross-race interaction to alter political agendas. Rather than being less likely to talk about police treatment of Blacks with Blacks, Whites were more likely to discuss this topic when in mixed-race dyads, while Blacks talked about it less often with Whites than with other Blacks. Findings are discussed in the context of political disagreement and intergroup contact theory.

Partisan Media Selectivity and Partisan Identity Threat: The Role of Social and Geographic Context

There is growing concern about the polarizing impact of citizens primarily choosing sources of political information consistent with their existing partisan perspective. Although research has begun providing answers about the consequences, questions remain about what factors drive such selective use of political media. This study conceptualizes partisanship as a social identity and the decision to selectively use like-minded political media as a method for maintenance of that identity. Using the logic of the reinforcing spirals model (Slater, 2007, 2015), we investigated partisan media selectivity as a response to identity threat. We argue the partisan composition of one’s geographic locale and the presence of partisan difference in one’s interpersonal network are common causes of identity threat, which we predict will be associated with compensatory use of partisan media. Results from national survey data generally provide support for the assertion that greater partisan media selectivity is associated with the presence of various forms of identity threat, especially for strong partisans.

The Partisan Divide in U.S. Congressional Communications After the China Shock

The district-level political implications of trade competition are mitigated by the strategic behavior of incumbent legislators and the constraints placed upon them by party affiliation. In this paper, we examine the partisan difference in congressional communication strategies on China and trade related issues. We find that, even though Chinese import competition impacted both Republican- and Democrat-held districts, Republican politicians engage in more protectionist and anti-China rhetoric and policy proposals. Using press release data from members of Congress, we show that, among districts more exposed to Chinese imports, Republicans are more likely to blame China as the problem. But there is no difference between Republican and Democratic messaging on trade issues in general. We attribute this partisan shift in political communication strategy to the fact that Republican legislators are more constrained by their party platform from advocating for trade protectionism and social welfare relative to Democrats. Blaming the negative externalities of import competition on China rather than on trade policy has allowed Republican incumbents to continue to support their party’s free trade platform without alienating their constituents. This explains why candidate Trump’s protectionist message linking China and trade resonated with the Republican base much more so than proposals that were better grounded in economic realities.

Political Advertising and Election Results*

We study the persuasive effects of political advertising. Our empirical strategy exploits FCC regulations that result in plausibly exogenous variation in the number of impressions across the borders of neighboring counties. Applying this approach to detailed data on television advertisement broadcasts and viewership patterns during the 2004–12 presidential campaigns, our results indicate that total political advertising has almost no impact on aggregate turnout. By contrast, we find a positive and economically meaningful effect of advertising on candidates’ vote shares. Taken at face value, our estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the partisan difference in advertising raises the partisan difference in vote shares by about 0.5 percentage points. Evidence from a regression discontinuity design suggests that advertising affects election results by altering the partisan composition of the electorate.

Predicting and Interpolating State‐Level Polls Using Twitter Textual Data

AbstractSpatially or temporally dense polling remains both difficult and expensive using existing survey methods. In response, there have been increasing efforts to approximate various survey measures using social media, but most of these approaches remain methodologically flawed. To remedy these flaws, this article combines 1,200 state‐level polls during the 2012 presidential campaign with over 100 million state‐located political tweets; models the polls as a function of the Twitter text using a new linear regularization feature‐selection method; and shows via out‐of‐sample testing that when properly modeled, the Twitter‐based measures track and to some degree predict opinion polls, and can be extended to unpolled states and potentially substate regions and subday timescales. An examination of the most predictive textual features reveals the topics and events associated with opinion shifts, sheds light on more general theories of partisan difference in attention and information processing, and may be of use for real‐time campaign strategy.

Neoliberalism and gender equality policy in Australia

ABSTRACTAfter a Coalition electoral victory in 2013, the Australian Office for Women was returned from the periphery to the centre of government. This was contrary to the expectation that women’s policy will be given greater salience under governments of the left rather than of the right. To unpack this puzzle, we examine institutional arrangements and policy directions under successive Labor and Coalition governments in Australia, including the abolition of intergovernmental bodies concerned with gender equality. We find that the influence of neoliberalism has resulted in a blurring of patterns of partisan difference over gender equality policy. There are some continuing partisan differences but also a common pattern of increased emphasis on international and regional rather than domestic policy. The notable exception to this pattern is in the area of gender-based violence.

Unraveling public support for casino gaming: The case of a casino referendum in Penghu

ABSTRACTBy integrating the social exchange theory (SET) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB), this study unravels the factors associated with residents’ intention to support casino gaming development in Penghu in future referenda. Residents’ attitudes toward casino gaming development in their community were examined in the SET framework while their intention to support such development was investigated in the TPB framework. Despite that partisan difference did not have a significant interaction with TPB variables, past behavior exerted moderating effects determining residents’ intention to support casino gaming development through two TPB variables: subjective norm and perceived behavioral control. Implications are provided.Abbreviations: ATTU: attitude; DPP: Democratic Progress Party; ECOI: perceived economic impact; ENVI: perceived environmental impact; INT: intention to support casino gaming development in future referenda; KMT: Kuomingtang; PBC: perceived behavioral control; PPB: perceived personal benefit; SET: social exchange theory; SN: subjective norms; SOCI: perceived social impact; TPB: theory of planned behavior

Capitalizing the Crisis? Explanatory Factors for the Design of Short‐time Work across Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development Countries

AbstractThis article looks at the financial and economic crisis 2008–10 in 18 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development states and seeks to investigate explanatory paths for the subsidization of further education within short‐time work programmes. Several hypotheses are put to the test: first, a classical partisan difference argument; second, a varieties of capitalism approach proposing a successful joint rallying of employers and employees for subsidization in coordinated market economies; and, lastly, the merged hypothesis that right‐wing parties in a coordinated economic context might subsidize feeling the pressure to overcompensate an ‘issue ownership’ of left parties in the field of employee‐friendly policies.We identify four explanatory paths: coordinated economies in the sample subsidized when they were economically closed or highly indebted. The results also support our combined hypothesis, that New Zealand – a left‐governed liberal market economy – and right‐governed coordinated market economies of the non‐Scandinavian type subsidized.

Disentangling the Turnout Effect: The Case of Taiwan's 2012 Concurrent Elections

It is generally agreed that when a relatively low-profile election is held simultaneously with a high-profile election, voter turnout rate of the former tends to be higher than it would be if it were held separately. The central concern of this study is twofold. The first one is to estimate the size of this effect, and the second one is to explore whether partisan effects of voter turnout exist. The case of Taiwan’s 2012 concurrent elections is employed in our study. For the first question, we estimate that the overall effect of concurrent presidential election on legislative election turnout rate is roughly 16.7%. As to the second research question, we find that partisan effects differ depends on voter types. For those who usually turnout to vote in high-profile elections, the pull effect of concurrent election is nearly universal regardless of demographical characteristics and partisanship. For those who rarely turnout to vote in stand-alone elections but are mobilized in a highly competitive concurrent election, the pull effect does show partisan difference. Surprisingly, such effect is somewhat beneficial to the pan-Green camp in Taiwan’s 2012 legislative election. Despite the exploratory nature of this study, our findings have important theoretical implications. Future studies of partisan-turnout effects should specify the mechanism behind higher (or lower) turnout before inferring its effects. Furthermore, there may be different “layers” of voters drawn to the voting booths in a high turnout election and their voter compositions, including partisanship, may be also quite different.