Participation In NATO Research Articles

The U.S. - German relations in political and military spheres in 2022: cooperation or competition?

Disengagement between the West and the non-West has been becoming more and more noticeable by the early 2020s. The key examples of it are the confrontations between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, the USA, its partners and China, degradation of relations between the West and Iran. In such situation cohesion between the liberal democracies should increase. But the Euro-Atlantic faced the phenomena of Trumpism and Brexit. In this regard the article tries to explore the elements of cooperation and competition for the US-German relations in political and military spheres during late February - early November 2022. The article stresses the absence of purely bilateral contacts at the highest level of the dialogue. The determination is shown in the context of the Biden administration’s policy named as «soft hegemony», the US expectations regarding the supply of German weapons to Kyiv. The paper compares the US and German approaches to manning NATO military groupings, especially Forward Presence Force. In 2022 Berlin tries to act symmetrically to the USA. Germany has taken into account the US expectations for growing European member states’ participation in NATO`s activities but at the same time skillfully realized its own ambitions as power. The article also analyses the ratio of approaches on the example of decisions of NATO`s Madrid summit (2022, June) decisions.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime-Minister of “One Canada”

A statesman of Canada, Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1918—2000), a Liberal Prime Minister in 1968—1979, 1980—1984, is the author of the “patriation” of the Constitution of 1982, which included a universal Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and of the law on official bilingualism. Trudeau defended the integrity of state from the threats of supporters of extremist forms of separatism that arose among the radical nationalists of the French-speaking province of Quebec, directing federal-provincial contradictions into the political and legal channel. Trudeau was inspired by the concept of “One Canada” and the philosophy of “Just Society”, combining the ideas of the supremacy of individual freedoms with the high responsibility of the state, social measures with equal linguistic and cultural development of Francophones and Anglophones as parts of a single political nation. Trudeau’s enduring legacy also includes the abolition of the death penalty, the end of the discrimination of homosexuals, the simplification of divorce proceedings, multiculturalism and anti-poverty measures. The foreign policy course also bore the imprint of Trudeau’s ideas of justice in a changing global world. He initiated the diversification of international relations, collaborated with socialist countries, defended detente and nuclear security, reducing Canada’s participation in NATO and removing nuclear missiles from the country’s territory.

Georgia’s and Ukraine’s Cooperation With NATO: Past, Status Quo and Future Perspective

Georgia and Ukraine have the strongest institutional, legal, and practical ties to NATO among post-Soviet states. The progressive strengthening of relations with the North Atlantic Alliance is a means for both nations to attain a future strategic objective in this direction – NATO membership. Georgia and Ukraine are implementing reforms for this purpose, displaying their dedication to democratic society's guiding ideals. Furthermore, governments are making systematic efforts to conform to Alliance military standards. Russia's growing hostility is a major impediment to Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO. The events of the war in August 2008 and the war on Ukrainian territory, which began in 2014, demonstrate that the Kremlin is willing to engage in open military aggression to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. The Kremlin's geopolitical goals have been severely hampered by Russia's large-scale conflict with Ukraine. But, despite significant help from Western governments to the Ukrainian state, including military aid, the question of Ukraine's and Georgia's participation in NATO remains open.

¿Un buen aliado? Análisis de la visión estadounidense sobre el rol español en la OTAN

The United States is the most relevant actor within NATO and has conditioned Spanish participation in the organization since its accession 40 years ago. The article analyzes Spanish participation in NATO from the US perspective. To do this, it focuses on different factors such as the public statements of US leaders in bilateral meetings, the position of US public opinion and the analysis of various objects of debate such as defense spending, Spanish strategic assets, its participation in the different missions implemented by the organization and the Spanish position on issues and regions of interest to the United States. Despite the statements by US leaders about the Spanish role and the positive image of Spain in US public opinion, there is significant room for its improvement.

ROMANIA'S DEFENCE CAPACITY, BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCES AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCES

Defense planning is a particularly important topic, which implies an analysis of the international situation, a realistic assessment of its own national security system, whichinvolves medium- and long-term decisions. The allocation of resources should follow the defense policy established following a strategic analysis process, after the strategic objectivesand level of ambition have been established. The construction of military capabilities is complex, is carried out over time and requires the allocation of financial resources and apredictable and coherent human resource policy. Discontinuous reforms, or the alteration of decisions with opportunistic, conjuncture solutions, adversely affect future programs andproduce waste of financial and material resources, as well as social convulsions in human resources. The structure of forces on which the state's defense capacity is built must beincreasingly professional to have a timely and effective responsiveness, and the resilience capacity for national defense should be based on the mental and armed resilience of thepopulation in the case of temporary occupation of the national territory. Membership of NATO and the European Union increases resilience through the commitments of the two organizationsto support the restoration of Romania's territorial integrity in the event of military aggression. The increasingly technologically evolved human society requires a rethinking of thenational mobilization system, both in terms of human resources and in terms of the involvement of the resources of the national economy. Maintaining the functioning of critical infrastructure,operationalizing industrial facilities and maintaining the capacity to provide the material and financial resources needed for the war effort are particularly important, and the workforce inthese areas cannot be made available to complement military structures. Law enforcement and civil emergency forces will be engaged in the specific missions of each of them but may formbases of resistance in the case of national occupation. Participation in NATO and EU force structures must be in line with the force structure designed for national needs, renegotiated,realistically, in the medium and long term, with sustainable promises corresponding to common standards. Allocating a 2% defense budget is not the single and sufficient solution to achievinga credible and sustainable defense capability. Difficult, socially and politically impact corrective measures are needed, but any delay will produce increasing imbalances.Keywords: Defense planning, national defense, NATO, Romania, European Union

Participation of the Czech Republic in NATO Peace Support Operations: Analysis of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Abstract NATO, as one of the most important security organisations, has been involved in a large number of operations of all kinds since its establishment. Peace Support Operations are the most common type, as they include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. Some states participate in these operations very often, others only rarely. This study aims to examine the participation of the Czech Republic, a small state that has a small but well-trained and specialised army. The research aims to determine the most common reasons for Czech participation in NATO’s Peace Support Operations. The work uses qualitative comparative analysis to determine the necessary reasons or sufficient conditions for the participation of this state. Five types of reasons – political reasons, security reasons, economic reasons, institutional reasons and normative reasons are tested. The analysis points to the fact that security reasons are the most important reasons.

Modern Germany in the architecture of NATO's nuclear deterrence

The article discusses the features of the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the NATO nuclear deterrence system. The main attention is paid to two key levels of nuclear participation - technical, related to the deployment of American missiles at German air bases, and political, consisting of state cooperation in disarmament programs. The objectives and mechanisms of nuclear participation, the attitude of leading political parties to the problem of nuclear deterrence within NATO, including the content of coalition agreements and election programs are analyzed. It is noted that there are currently no operational reasons why there is still a need for military participation in nuclear deterrence. The conclusion is made about the predominantly political grounds for Germany's participation in NATO.

Instruments of German financial participation in NATO: Disarmament Policy or Armaments?

The article examines the financial instruments used by the United Germany in ensuring the policy of disarmament at the beginning of the 21st century. The main focus is on the activities of NATO trust funds under the Partnership for peace program and various types of financial participation of Germany. The article analyzes the goals of funding funds, amounts, recipient countries, individual projects, as well as changes in approaches in the new geopolitical situation. There is a variety of financial cooperation with partner countries on the example of German arms exports. It is concluded that the approaches to financing are changing in the direction of increasing contributions to charitable organizations.

ЕВРОАТЛАНТИЧЕСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА ФРГ: ПРЕЕМСТВЕННОСТЬ И ОБНОВЛЕНИЕ

The article examines important changes in Germany’s relations with the United States and NATO; identifies new trends in Berlin’s transatlantic policy and strategy and analyses the country’s actions aimed at deepening European integration and increasing the EU's independence in ensuring its own security. German-American relations under D. Trump are experiencing a profound and protracted crisis. Therefore, the emphasis in the defense strategy and security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany began to change. On the one hand, Germany has stepped up its participation in NATO’s military activities. On the other hand, a long-standing non-partisan consensus maintained in Berlin implies that in a crisis situation primarily political and diplomatic means are appropriate and that military measures are a last resort. Close coordination with the allies is essential. In connection with the unilateral US withdrawal from a number of international agreements important for Germany, Berlin’s concern over the unpredictability and inconsistency of the US actions with their European allies is growing. As a result Berlin has adopted a “balanced partnership” strategy towards the United States. Creation of a more independent Europe and a European Union of Security and Defense has become the German policy primary goal. Despite many controversies, France remains the most important pillar of the German politics’ European vector. The central point of the new Franco-German treaty of January 22, 2019 is an obligation to move towards a convergence of the two countries’ security strategies. PESCO program became the first notable result of such policy. The program is aimed at intensifying the European countries military-industrial cooperation. Berlin sees the program as a long-term possibility to enhance the European influence in the transatlantic alliance and increase Germany’s own responsibility in the defense sphere. In connection with the well-known US and NATO requirements, the question of increasing the Federal Republic of Germany defense budget has acquired particular urgency. Basing on growing international tensions and aggravation of NATO's relations with Russia, Berlin has substantially increased its military spending. But despite this, in the foreseeable future, Germany will remain far from fulfilling the requirement to reach the 2% GDP defense spending target by 2024 (the planned figure is less than 1.5%). Nevertheless no responsible politician in Germany would claim that even in the medium term Germany together with its EU partners will be able to ensure European security without close cooperation with the United States and NATO. At the same time, there are a lot of indications that important aspects of Berlin’s transatlantic policy are undergoing serious and largely irreversible changes. They are connected not only with the “Trump factor” and the Ukrainian crisis, but also with deeper shifts, including the growing influence and “challenge” of China. About author: Alexander M. KOKEEV, Cand. Sci. (Hist.), Leading Researcher, Sector of Political Aspects of European Integration, Department of European Political Studies.

Denmark and UN peacekeeping: glorious past, dim future

ABSTRACTDenmark became a staunch supporter of UN peacekeeping during the cold war because it simultaneously served its interests and values and this winning combination meant that it relatively quickly became internalized as part of Denmark’s foreign policy identity. Denmark turned its back on UN peacekeeping when NATO took over from the UN in Bosnia in 1995. Since then Denmark has prioritized NATO- and US-led operations. The Danish shift was driven by the interest in supporting the Western great powers as well as an altruistic desire to improve United Nations Protection Force’s (UNPROFOR) dismal humanitarian record in Bosnia. This belief was also generated by the positive lessons learned from Denmark’s pioneering use of tanks in UNPROFOR. This tank deployment and subsequent participation in NATO and US-led missions created a new warrior identity. This identity and the Danish interest in maintaining a close relationship to NATO’s great powers make a major Danish return to UN peacekeeping unlikely.

Baltic States in NATO: Results of the Decade

In the post-Soviet period participation in NATO was one of the major goals of euro-atlantic integration for the Baltic states. Political leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have considered participation in the alliance as an important element of euro-atlantic solidarity which allows small - from all viewpoints - states claim decision-making over global issues. This satisfies demands of the political elites and victimized public consciousness for more security, makes it possible for elites to consider their states as bulwark against Russia. Throughout the whole decade, such reasoning has been reflected in doctrines and speeches of Baltic politicians. After joining NATO, the Baltic states became the most active supporters of a deeper integration in the military area and "open door" policy. They have continued reforming their armed forces and renovating military infrastructure. They have acquired "specialization" within NATO by establishing centers of excellence. In terms of euro-atlantic solidarity, the participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afganistan has become the most important international project for the Baltic states. However, only Estonia managed to mount their defence expenses to the level of 2% GDP. During the „Ukranian crisis" the issue of Baltic membership in NATO acquired special importance. Confrontational rhetoric and appeals to "Russian threat" in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on the one hand, make it possible for their political leaders to constantly demonstrate their importance in the eyes of Western partners and demand more activity of the alliance and, on the other hand, make ground for the political elites to consolidate the electorate, by that ensuring that the right-wing conservative forces remain in power.

NATO's European allies: military capability and political will

Contents Acknowledgments About the authors List of Tables Introduction: Will Europe lead in NATO? J.H.Matlary & M.Petersson PART I: DETERMINANTS OF THE USE OF FORCE From Mars to Venus? European Use of Force in a Historical Perspective M.Petersson A Farewell to Arms: Europe's meritocracy and the demilitarization of Europe C.Coker Towards an Affordable European Defence and Security Policy? The Case for Extensive European Force Integration S.Diesen Strategy, Risk and Threat Perceptions in NATO O.Osterud & A.Toje PART II: APPLICATION: CASE STUDIES No More Free-Riding: The Political Economy of Military Power and the Transatlantic Relationship S.Kay Between Theory and Practice: Britain and the Use of Force P.Porter France: The State with Strategic Vision Y.Boyer The Reluctant Ally? Germany, NATO, and the Use of Force B.Schreer Willing and Able? Spanish Statecraft as Brokerage D.Coletta & D.Garcia Poland's Participation in NATO Operations M.Pietras Hungary in NATO: The Case of a Half Empty Glass T.Magyarics Punching Above Its Weight: Denmark's Legitimate Peripheral Participation in NATO's Wars M.V.Rasmussen Norway: Militarily Able but Politically Divided J.H.Matlary Index

Turkey’s Contribution to NATO’s Role in Post–Cold War Security Governance: The Use of Force and Security Identity Formation

After the Cold War, NATO formulated its new role on the basis of broader political aims and new security objectives by assuming crisis management operations beyond its borders. This article argues from a constructivist perspective that keen Turkish involvement in NATO out-of-area operations constitutes a context of social interaction that has led to particular identities and certain security policy outputs for both. Turkey's participation in NATO's military operations as the sole Muslim ally, in the post–Cold War era, enabled NATO to build an identity as a global security actor in crisis management while Turkey's active role in these operations served to keep Turkey's sense of prominence in the protection of the universal values and, thus, its claim to Western identity.

“Northern Balance” and the Conditions of Norway’s Participation in NATO During the Cold War Era

The article is dedicated to the problem of defining the term “Northern balance” as a factor of stability and interaction in the north of Europe, as well as the balance of Soviet and US interests in this region. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of practical grounds for such a definition, primarily to the peculiarities in the Northern European foreign policy in relation to NATO. Besides, the article focuses on Norwegian foreign policy and the terms of the country’s membership in the North-Atlantic alliance.

Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969, by Sebastian Reyn

The historiography on United States–French relations during the de Gaulle era is a crowded field. But Sebastian Reyn, a Dutch defence official as well as an impressive scholar, has produced an extremely important book. Rather than the exhaustively-mined French angle, he focuses on the less excavated theme of US perceptions and policies. In contrast to most other works on the American side, he also covers the whole of the de Gaulle presidency from 1958 to 1969, having undertaken research into four different administrations: those of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. And, above all, he explores the US response in impressive detail, adding layers of complexity and nuance to a range of familiar issues and crises. The book comprises six chronologically organised chapters. Reyn begins with Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s reactions to de Gaulle’s ‘Tripartite’ Memorandum proposal between 1958 and 1962. He emphasises how seriously both US administrations took de Gaulle’s challenge; but he also stresses that neither president was prepared to countenance de Gaulle’s push for a major NATO overhaul, partly because both men thought it would undermine the alliance at a particularly dangerous point in the Cold War and partly because de Gaulle’s tactics seemed to suggest that he was not really serious. Reyn then devotes two chapters solely to the Kennedy years. The first simply explores Kennedy’s Atlanticist vision; but the second is crucial, for Reyn emphasises how important de Gaulle’s rejection of this vision was to the unfolding of the attitudes of the United States towards Western Europe—undermining the idea that the two ‘were part of a budding Atlantic community in which political and institutional ties were to become ever tighter’ (p. 374). Chapter Four then explores Johnson’s key role in the demise of the Multilateral Force, especially his acute awareness of the political costs of this initiative at a time when the Vietnam crisis had become his central preoccupation. But the end of the ‘last Atlantic project’ was by no means the end of the United States’ problems with de Gaulle. In Chapter Five, Reyn looks at the most visible crisis of the relationship: de Gaulle’s 1966 decision to end French military participation in NATO. The final chapter then explores the rapidly changing context of the relationship, as the US position in Vietnam deteriorated and Nixon came to office with a desire not only to pursue détente but also to listen to a French leader whose style, wisdom, and political philosophy he admired.

Canada and the MENA region: The foreign policy of a middle power

The purpose of this article is to analyze Canada's interests and policies towards the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) in the post 9/11 era. The article focuses in particular on how Ottawa has understood Canada's role in the region as a “middle power” with limited resources. Furthermore it analyses how Canada's policies have been influenced by and coordinated with the Unites States, its main economic and military ally, and the European Union, the other major external actor in the MENA region. Finally, the article offers an evaluation of the state of play of Canadian policy towards this region in light of the most recent events of the Arab Spring and of Canadian participation in NATO's operation in Libya.

How unipolarity impacts Canada's engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

This article argues that the advent of a unipolar world following the end of the Cold War changed Canada's relation to and participation in NATO. It demonstrates how Canada's engagement in NATO combat operations since 1992 has been motivated primarily by a need to please the United States. It explores Canada's role through NATO in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and Libya. The desire to be a strong ally to the United States is the major driver of Canada's shift from the role of peace keeper to peace supporter. It explores the reasons why Canada did not join the US-led coalition to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a decision that is an anomaly in post-Cold War Canadian foreign policy.

Catching the Change of Tide. Italy's Post-Cold War Security Policy

At the beginning of the 1990s, Italy went through two tectonic changes. Externally, the end of the Cold War called for a redefinition of the roles of NATO and the EU, the pillars on which Italy had built its foreign and security policy for forty years. Internally, Italy's old ruling elites vanished under the huge mani pulite corruption scandal. The new political parties that rose in their place have remained committed to NATO and the EU, but have often met with obstacles in reconciling the national, European and Atlantic components of Italy's security. While this hinges mostly on structural factors – like the rising costs of participation in NATO or EU operations abroad, including in terms of public support – the tendency of the new elites to emphasize their differences and neglect their more fundamental commonalities have multiplied the “grey zones” in Italian security policy.

Managing a conflict between allies: United States policy towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute, 1974–76

The central argument of this article is that although national interests, as perceived in Greece and Turkey in the 1970s, took priority over loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, Cold War considerations retained a certain degree of validity in their strategic thinking. Although participation in NATO did not prevent the outbreak of crises between the two allies, the US and NATO connections actually functioned as a useful framework for the prevention of escalation of this controversy to war and the establishment of a sort of equilibrium in the determination and crystallization of which Washington was able to play a crucial role.

Human Beings over Systems

In a study of Russian literature spanning one century, author Tristan Landry demonstrates, interestingly, that Stalin's great purges of 1936-38 did not come about exnihilo. Murdering people in the hundreds of thousands was made easier by a Begriffsfeld - a notional field, as Landry calls it, which had developed in successive layers over decades, and which permitted the lives of individuals to be disposed of for the sake of a common objective.1 In that context, the value of an individual's life was equated with its degree of social utility. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, for one, however, remains convinced of a noteworthy distinction between the old regime in Russia - whose in- habitants were not constrained in their choices - and communist rule in the Soviet Union - a purely criminal endeavour aimed at destroying individuals and communities alike.2Anti- individualism in the Soviet Union ran counter to the person- centred of western civilization. essence of this attitude was to reject any measure of autonomy reflected in the independence of the individual. The person [was] sacrificed, victimized in a vulgarized notion of unity and conformity, notes Russian historian Alexander Obolo nsky.3 A dichotomy between collective - economic and social - and individual rights developed in the wake of the opposition between the socialist and capitalist systems. That cleavage became particularly clear during discussions on the drafting of the universal declaration of human rights in the 1940s, the communist bloc advocating the preeminence of collective rights and western democracies promoting individual rights.One of the factors that caused the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union was certainly the that emerged from the final act of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, or CSCE, that 33 European states, including the USSR, and also Canada and the United States, signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975. That included the expression of a consciousness of-and a primitive step towards - Europe as a single entity from the Atlantic to the Urals, to borrow Charles de Gaulle's famous expression. It sprang from a belief that beyond the all-important states and across borders were human beings with their concrete and sometimes urgent needs. This article examines how the convergence of this belief in three different settings - Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union, through the pivotal role of Yuri Orlov and the group he founded in Moscow in 1976 - enlivened and nurtured that fertile spirit of Helsinki.A CANADIAN AGENDAThe conference on security and cooperation was a welcome opportunity for Canada to tighten its relations with Europe. It fit particularly well with the Trudeau doctrine, named after Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, which implied acquiring more economic and political independenee from the United States. CSCE was also an opportunity for Canada to show goodwill towards Europe after it had reduced its military participation in NATO. In addition, Canada was meant to play a creative role at the meeting because the United States saw the multilateral conference as an impediment to its preferred bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and was therefore less involved.4Canada is a land of immigration. Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin was reminded of this when he visited in the fall of 1 971 and Trudeau handed him a list of some 600 names of Canadian families, mainly of Jewish and Ukrainian descent, seeking to have relatives still in the Soviet Union reunited with them. Some 278,000 Ukrainians emigrated to Canada between 1891 and 1 971, settling for the most part in the western prairies.5In the CSCE talks, explains the former head of the Canadian delegation to the conference, Tom Delworth, aimed at dealing with problems in a practical way. As political systems collide and crush real people in the middle, we thought first and foremost of trying to smooth things up between the bureaucracies of east and west. …