Military historians claim with some justice that, since 1960s, Front of 1914 to 1918 been partitioned into a Western Front of history and a Western Front of and culture, latter being profoundly (Badsey 51, 39). Much of blame for this state of affairs is fairly placed on Paul Fussell's very influential book of 1975, Great and Modern Memory, which played a major part in teaching of war's literature. In Stephen Badsey claims, Fussell and his followers argue that Front can only be understood as a uniquely unhistorical event, taking place outside time (43). Brian Bond more generally blames teachers of English rather than history, who still have more influence in shaping of views on First World War, through teaching of poetry, and from a narrow selection of poems, especially those of Owen and Sassoon (Unquiet 88). I largely agree with Bond about necessity and justice of Britain's participation in Great (2-13) and see real merit in his idea that popular notions of First World in general, and Britain's role in particular, were largely shaped in 1960s, in part reflecting very different concerns and political issues of that turbulent decade, but [also] in part resurrecting 'anti-war' beliefs of 1930s (51). As a teacher of English and an interdisciplinary scholar of Great War, I admit to being shocked on occasion by historical ignorance, not only of students but of colleagues with expertise in Canadian and/or Modern literatures. At same time, I am troubled by historian's uncomplicated reliance on fact versus fiction, as when Bond takes the famous official film Battle of Somme as clear-cut evidence that the film helped to give viewers some idea of what was really like, strengthening resolve to persevere to achieve victory (13), or when he insists that authors of war literature at end of 1920s were concerned with individual experience, not with public record (26). In analyzing form of Battle of Somme, I detect a rather different in this film because of its embedment in industrial process. Poets and novelists who were quite bitter about their individual experience were no less bitter about a film that hailed mechanized temporality of industrial assembly and its denaturing of human body. cinematic thus became a synecdoche for vast changes taking place in mode of production and in conditions of modern life. Here, it seems to me, military historians will have to do far better than carp at postmodern culture (Badsey 43) for popularizing a myth of Great that has displaced truth (Bond 77)--first, by ceasing to privilege referent over form in which it appears, and, second, by asking how cultural change may be linked to changes in mode of communication. In turn, literary scholars will have to take a more dialectical approach to processes of cultural transformation in order to show how changes in mode of communication are linked to changes in mode of production, a method that I failed to consider in previous work. The Myth of War According to British cultural historian Samuel Hynes, First World altered ways in which men and women thought not only about but about world, and about culture and its expressions (xi). As he sees it, That change was so vast and so abrupt as to make years after seem discontinuous from years before, and that discontinuity became a part of English imaginations (xi). Yet, when Hynes turns to cinema, its cultural impact, like that of print in first decade after war, looks very traditional. British Instructional Films, leading producer of film, was set up in 1919 to recreate key military campaigns of Great War. …
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