Partial Cooperation Research Articles

Hydro-Political Relations Between Turkey and Iraq Over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers: Dyadic Relationships and Structure Matter

This article addresses the hydro-political relationship between Iraq and Turkey by applying the framework of hydro-hegemony. During the Cold War, the Turkish-Iraqi hydro-relationship was influenced by both contextual and structural factors. Before the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq mainly consisted of hard power decisions. Subsequently, Turkey has relied on both soft and hard strategies, enabling it to respond appropriately to the Iraqi fluid situation. Overall, the article traces these changes and argues that their hydro-political relationship was characterised by partial cooperation.

On breadth and depth of climate agreements with pledge-and-review bargaining

This paper analyzes the effects of partial cooperation on the breadth and depth of climate agreements in dynamic games in which countries emit, invest in green technology, decide to participate in a climate coalition and participants negotiate the contract duration. When choosing emissions reductions (pledges), coalition countries apply Harstad’s (2023a) pledge-and-review bargaining and partially cooperate. We distinguish between stock-independent and stock-dependent investment costs. It is shown that narrow-but-deep agreements may be welfare superior to broad-but-shallow agreements for signatories. In addition, if the degree of partial cooperation is sufficiently high, broad-and-deep agreements and even first best can be achieved.

Climate change, tipping points, and economics

This paper discusses the response of the economics profession to a possible occurrence of tipping points in natural systems, with a drop in welfare. For a climate tipping point, the hazard-rate model is relevant, and the paper shows that in a Ramsey growth model with climate tipping, the effect on policy is increased saving and increased taxation of greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change is often seen as a tragedy of the commons because incentives to deviate undermine cooperation and prevention of climate change. However, a climate tipping point can be prevented in a Nash equilibrium or with partial cooperation if the drop in welfare is sufficiently high. In case of uncertainty about the threshold, this result remains if the uncertainty is not too large. In the conclusion, the paper makes a few remarks on including tipping points in teaching environmental and resource economics.

Malingering assessment after severe traumatic brain injury in forensic psychology with a potential embedded symptom validity indicator of Symptom Checklist 90.

Malingering of neuropsychological damage is common among traumatic brain injury patients pursuing disability compensation in forensic contexts. There is an urgent need to explore differences in neuropsychological assessment outcomes with different levels of cooperation. A total of 420 participants with severe traumatic brain injury were classified into malingering group, partial cooperation group, and complete cooperation group according to the Binomial forced-choice digit memory test. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, event-related potential component, and Symptom Checklist 90 were applied subsequently to assess the psychological status of participants. Participants in the malingering group presented lower scores in the binomial forced-choice digit memory test and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, lower P3 amplitude, and simultaneously higher scores in the Symptom Checklist 90 than the other two groups. The actual intelligence quotient of participants with malingering tendencies ranged mostly between normal and marginal damage, and they often reported elevated whole scale scores in the Symptom Checklist 90. The Cooperation Index (defined as the ratio of positive symptom distress index to global severity index, CI) was proposed and validated to function as an embedded validity indicator of the Symptom Checklist 90, and the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was 0.938. When valued at 1.28, CI has the highest classification ability in differentiating malingering from non-malingering. Combined with the CI and P3 amplitude, the area under the ROC curve for malingering diagnosis further reached 0.952. Any non-optimal effort in a forensic context will lead to unexpected deviation in psychology evaluation results. CI is a potential candidate to act as an embedded validity indicator of the Symptom Checklist 90. The combination of CI and P3 amplitude can help to identify malingering in participants after severe traumatic brain injury.

A Coalitional Differential Game of Vaccine Producers

The paper proposes a game-theoretic model of competition and cooperation, including partial cooperation, of vaccine producers. Various versions of players’ cooperation (partial and full) have been studied. The differential game has an infinite duration. For each possible coalition of players, the profits and production quantities of its members are determined. An stability analysis of possible coalition structures, as well as coalitions that are most attractive to customers has been made.

The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements

This paper investigates the impact of the timing of adaptation on the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for different levels of cooperation. This issue is addressed by solving a three-stage coalition formation game in a Nash-Cournot setting. In the first stage, countries decide non-cooperatively on their participation in an IEA. Then, depending on the timing, countries decide on adaptation and emissions in the second and third stage. The game is solved for three levels of cooperation. Countries can either cooperate on emissions (emission agreement), on adaptation (adaptation agreement), or both actions (complete agreement). When emissions are chosen first, this extension to an emission–adaptation game is a generalization of the pure emission game. However, when adaptation is chosen first, the grand coalition is stable, provided that countries sign a complete agreement. With partial cooperation, stable coalitions are small. The results establish a connection between the strategic role of adaptation, the levels of adaptation of non-signatories and signatories for the different types of agreements and the participation in an IEA. Moreover, the results indicate that the grand coalition is stable even when it significantly enhances net benefits.

Two-Population Evolutionary Oligopoly with Partial Cooperation and Partial Hostility

Two-Population Evolutionary Oligopoly with Partial Cooperation and Partial Hostility

A Bi-level model for district-fairness participatory budgeting: Decomposition methods and application

Participatory budgeting is one of the most well-known and widespread participatory programs implemented in many municipalities worldwide. Targeting poorer regions to receive a greater per capita amount of spending than wealthier regions is the most important transformational aspect of participatory budgeting. However, current approaches do not provide a precise method for achieving social justice through participatory budgeting. This paper proposes a bi-level mixed-integer non-linear optimization framework under the partial cooperation assumption to promote social justice in participatory budgeting programs. In addition, single-level reformulation and linearization techniques are presented, along with valid inequalities that speed up their resolution procedure. The single-level linear problem is solved using the Benders decomposition algorithm to find global optimality. To improve the computational performance of the proposed model on large-scale instances, a hierarchical iterative, evolutionary algorithm is proposed based on the hybrid binary particle swarm optimization and gravitational search algorithm. To illustrate the capability of the proposed model, computational experiments were conducted on both adapted examples from the literature and real-world, large-scale cases implemented in recent years in Warsaw, the capital of Poland. The results show that the proposed model is significantly more efficient, affordable, and faster than other methods presented in the literature, such as the Greedy rule and ε-district-fair lottery. In addition, the proposed model is fully operational for real-world societal problems.

A Task-Driven Sequential Overlapping Coalition Formation Game for Resource Allocation in Heterogeneous UAV Networks

A heterogeneous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) network where UAVs carrying different resources form coalition and cooperatively carry out tasks is of crucial importance for fulfilling diverse tasks. However, the existing coalition formation (CF) game model only optimizes the composition of UAVs in a single coalition, which results in disjoined coalitions. In order to tackle this issue, a sequential overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game is proposed by considering the overlapping and complementary relations of resource properties and the task execution order. Moreover, different from the traditional Pareto and Selfish orders, a bilateral mutual benefit transfer (BMBT) order is proposed to optimize the cooperative task resource allocation through partial cooperation among overlapping coalition members. Furthermore, using the preference relation between UAVs carrying resources and tasks requiring the same type of resource, a preference gravity-guided Tabu Search (PGG-TS) algorithm is developed to obtain a stable coalitional structure. Numerical results verify that the utility of the proposed OCF game scheme based on the PGG-TS algorithm increases by 18% against that of the non-overlapping CF game scheme, and the utility of the proposed BMBT order increases by 25%, compared with other orders.

Competition in Ride-Hailing Service Operations: Impacts on Travel Distances and Service Performance

Competition in the ride-hailing market can influence traffic congestion and deteriorate the quality of service. A customer can request to be matched with a ride-hailing vehicle from their preferred company, which might not be the nearest vacant vehicle. This can increase both the customer’s matching and pick-up waiting time and the vehicle’s travel distance to the customer, and contribute to traffic congestion. Recent studies focus on the long-term competition effect by considering network equilibrium. In this work, we target a shorter timeframe and investigate how competition influences the passenger–driver matching process, the consequent vehicle travel to the customer, and more globally the system at the operational level. To this end, we propose a modeling and simulation framework based on the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD). We apply the so-called M-model, a continuum approximation of the trip-based MFD. Compared with the accumulation-based approach, it explicitly monitors the remaining travel distance of all vehicles. We extend the mathematical M-model decomposition and focus on accurate dynamic estimation of trip lengths for the different vehicle states based on the immediate system state. For this, we suggest creating an additional proxy simulation framework replicating the demand requests and the service vehicle movements. We propose calibrating the matching function by sampling observations on a proxy grid network. Finally, we assess and compare different matching processes that define diverse competition scenarios: competition, cooperation, and competition with partial cooperation (coopetition). The cooperation scenario shows the best results in service performance.

Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?

We consider an asymmetric differential game of pollution control with a developing country and two developed countries. The developing country is invulnerable to the pollution in contrast to the developed ones. Assuming partial cooperation, we examine all coalition structures composed by three players and provide the stability conditions for them using two approaches: (i) Nash stability, (ii) individual stability. First, the case of nontransferable payoffs is examined. Second, a transfer payment scheme is proposed to make particular coalition structures stable.

Evaluation of the Impact of Groundwater Management Policies Under Climate and Economic Changes in Tunisia

This study develops a hydro-economic model for the coastal aquifer Mahdia Ksour Essef in Tunisia in order to analyze how external shocks (climate change, energy price increase) and management policies can affect groundwater sustainability during the coming decades. Twenty-one scenarios covering three management policies (free market, partial cooperation, and full cooperation policy) under various potential climate and economic changes are evaluated. The results of scenario simulations show the potential impact of energy soaring prices and climate change on the aquifer’s water table level, groundwater extractions, cropland areas, and farmers’ benefits under each policy option in the future. They also show that the best scenario to address the effects of climate change would need to take into account environmental externalities and efficient energy prices. The findings of this study are very important in the context of climate change and uncertain global energy markets and provide feasible alternatives to preserve the regional economy and aquifer sustainability.

Semicooperation under curved strategy spacetime

ABSTRACT Mutually beneficial cooperation is a common part of economic systems as firms in partial cooperation with others can often make a higher sustainable profit. Though cooperative games were popular in 1950s, recent interest in noncooperative games is prevalent despite the fact that cooperative bargaining seems to be more useful in economic and political applications. In this paper we assume that the strategy space and time are inseparable with respect to a contract. Furthermore, it is assumed that each firm’s strategy polygon is a geodesic polygon which changes its shape every point of time with the stubbornness strategy surface of firm’s executive board follow a Gaussian free field. This gives us more flexibility to deal with generalized geodesic cooperative games which is the main contribution of this paper. Under this environment we show that the strategy spacetime is a dynamic curved Liouville-like 2-brane quantum gravity surface under asymmetric information and that traditional Euclidean geometry fails to give a proper feedback Nash equilibrium. Cooperation occurs when two firms’ strategies fall into each other’s influence curvature in this strategy spacetime. Small firms in an economy dominated by large firms are subject to the influence of large firms. We determine an optimal feedback semicooperation of the small firm in this case using a Liouville-Feynman path integral method.

Public policy design and common property resources: A social network approach

AbstractThis paper analyzes the extent to which two factors—social networks and the severity of the scarcity of a common property resource—affect norm‐complying behavior that favors cooperation. It assumes that those who comply with the social norm exercise social pressure on defectors. We develop an analytical framework that allows us to determine the minimum (maximum) share of norm‐complying agents at which social networks start (stop) having an influence on cooperation. Knowing these shares allows policymakers to identify the conditions under which legal and/or informal enforcement policies for cooperation are effective and how different types of social networks affect the design of these policies. We find that stable steady states exist in which compliers and defectors coexist (partial cooperation), but the stability of such states requires that the costs of coordination among compliers to exercise social pressure are high. Full cooperation is another possible steady state but is unlikely to prevail if the agents do not perceive the scarcity of the common property resource as severe. A numerical study, empirically calibrated for an aquifer in Spain, shows that subsidizing the compliers' costs of exerting social pressure may impede the attainment of a steady state based on partial cooperation. Although social networks can promote cooperation, their influence is limited. The minimum share of compliers for attaining cooperation can be reduced by informal enforcement policies by not more than 26%. We show that combinations of different types of informal enforcement policies should be applied cautiously because they may cancel each other out.

Labor in the Age of Finance: Pensions, Politics, and Corporations from Deindustrialization to Dodd-Frank

Labor in the Age of Finance: Pensions, Politics, and Corporations from Deindustrialization to Dodd-Frank

Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies

We design an experiment to study the implications of allowing players to revise their actions in a Cournot duopoly game. Payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end in a real-time revision game. On the other hand, in a stochastic revision game, opportunities to adjust quantities arrive randomly, and the quantities selected at the last revision opportunity are implemented. Contrasting results emerge: while real-time revision results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented when revisions are stochastic. The results hold for different arrival rates of revision opportunities. Our findings demonstrate that the ability to revise actions can sustain partial cooperation. Although quantity adjustment choices display substantial heterogeneity, the main implication of the theory of revision games put forth by Kamada and Kandori (2020) is supported.

Optimal financing strategy in a closed-loop supply chain for construction machinery remanufacturing with emissions abatement

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Motivated by the remanufacturing practice of construction machinery, this paper examines the impacts of different cooperation financing and carbon emission reduction (CER) strategies on the operational decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) where the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) produces only new products and the capital-constraint retailer produces remanufactured products and sells both new and remanufactured products to consumers. Based on the cooperation level between the OEM and the retailer, four different financing strategies, including the non-cooperation financing (NCF), the supply chain carbon financing (SCCF), the partial cooperation with delay-in-payment financing (PCD), and the full-cooperation financing (FC), are explored. Meanwhile, we extend the proposed models by considering the CER strategy implemented by the OEM, and then investigate its impact on the optimal operational and financing decisions of the retailer. The results show that: i) Under different financing strategies, the CER strategy has no impact on the retail price of remanufactured products, but can help increase the market share of new products and strengthen the market value effect for the OEM. ii) Compared with the scenario without CER, the SCCF strategy can not only ease funding pressure than the NCF strategy for the retailer but also increase the CLSC profit under the CER strategy. iii) No matter which financing strategy is adopted, the CER strategy always has a squeezing effect on the market size of remanufactured products, i.e., the cannibalization effect. iv) The CER strategy is not conducive to the development of the remanufacturing industry, but can improve the environmental performance in terms of reducing emissions and increasing the market sales for new products.</p>

A Review of Chinese and Foreign Intangible Cultural Heritage Tourism

The study of intangible cultural heritage tourism is of great significance to deeply explore the connotation of intangible cultural heritage and promote the in-depth integration of culture and tourism, and it is necessary to grasp the research trend of intangible cultural heritage tourism. This paper takes 3329 documents selected from the CNKI database and the “Web of ScienceTM Core Collection” database as data samples, and uses Citation Space (CiteSpace software) to conduct metrological analysis to summarize the research situation of Chinese and foreign intangible cultural heritage tourism. The results show that:(1) The research on foreign intangible cultural heritage tourism started 10 years earlier than that in China, and the volume of literature was higher than that in China, and it experienced three stages: the initial period, the rapid development stage, and the deepening and expansion period. Although domestic research started late, the growth rate is fast, from 2008 to 2016, the number of publications caught up with foreign countries, and then entered a period of steady development. (2) In general, domestic and foreign authors have not formed a close cooperation network, foreign authors have partial cooperation, but domestic has not formed a stable core author group. (3) Independent research between domestic research institutions, lack of cooperation, scattered and unbalanced research geographical distribution, lack of cross-regional cooperation, high-yield research institutions are Tarim University, Guilin University of Technology, Guangxi and Xinjiang are the leading places for research. There are many cross-border and cross-regional research institutions in foreign countries. China, the United States and Spain are the research centers, and Sichuan University, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Sun Yat-sen University are the backbone of research. (4) The research on intangible cultural heritage tourism in domestic hot spots mainly includes the development, protection, inheritance and development of intangible cultural heritage tourism, the research on the authenticity and temporal and spatial characteristics of intangible cultural heritage tourism, the research hotspots of foreign intangible cultural heritage tourism focus on the comprehensive attributes of intangible cultural heritage tourism, the impact of the authenticity, sustainable development, management, protection and development of intangible cultural heritage tourism, the development model and the experience summary of intangible cultural heritage tourism in destinations, and the research on the subject’s participation attitude, emotional perception and satisfaction. In short, there are differences in the research of intangible cultural heritage tourism between China and foreign countries, and domestic research should strengthen the collaboration between research institutions and authors, continuously broaden the research content, improve research methods, and make research more scientific and objective.

A Bound on the Existence of the Maximum Jointly Invariant Set of Input-Coupled Systems

We present a set-theoretical characterization of a bound on the maximal portion that an agent can cede of its input variable to another agent. By ceding control authority, agents can decompose coupling variables into public and private parts, which is of interest in situations of partial cooperation. In particular, sufficient conditions under which the non-existence of the maximum robust control invariant set is guaranteed are provided, expressed in terms of support functions and the dominant system eigenvalue. Finally, the results are illustrated via stable and unstable example systems with different coupling.

A two-stage linear production planning model with partial cooperation under stochastic demands

A two-stage linear production planning model with partial cooperation under stochastic demands