Partial Cooperation Research Articles

PENGARUH UPAH, KERJASAMA ANTAR KARYAWAN, DAN LINGKUNGAN KERJA TERHADAP SEMANGAT KERJA PADA PT. OSKSA ART STUDIO BANTUL YOGYAKARTA

The purpose of this study to determine the effect of wages, cooperation among employees and work environment on morale at the Art Studio PT.Osksa either partially or in unison. Population in this study were all employees of PT. Osksa Art Studio Bantul, Yogyakarta. The sampling technique using the method of Non-Probability Sampling, then used purposive sampling. Characteristics of the sampled respondents are employees working in PT. Art Studio Osksa aged 17 years and over. The data was collected by distributing questionnaires to a sample which numbered 70 people. Result showed that the variable wages and work environment partially having a significant effect on morale, while the variable partial cooperation among the employees had no significant effect on morale. The wages, cooperation among employees and work environment simultaneously have significant impact on morale at PT.Osksa Art Studio.

Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision

Recent international climate negotiations suggest that complete agreements are unlikely to materialize. Instead, partial cooperation between like-minded countries appears a more likely outcome. In this paper we analyze the effects of such partial cooperation between like-minded countries. In doing so, we link the literature on partial cooperation with so-called matching approaches. Matching schemes are regarded as providing a promising approach to overcome undersupply of public goods like climate protection. The functioning of matching mechanisms in a setting with an incomplete agreement, i.e. a contract where only a subset of the players participates, has however not been investigated yet. This paper fills this research gap by analyzing incomplete matching agreements in the context of international climate protection. We analyse their effect on both welfare and the global climate protection level. We show that matching coalitions may bring about a decline in global public good provision and a reduction in the welfare of outsiders.

Linear Precoding and Equalization for Network MIMO With Partial Cooperation

A cellular multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) downlink system is studied in which each base station (BS) transmits to some of the users, so that each user receives its intended signal from a subset of the BSs. This scenario is referred to as network MIMO with partial cooperation, since only a subset of the BSs are able to coordinate their transmission towards any user. The focus of this paper is on the optimization of linear beamforming strategies at the BSs and at the users for network MIMO with partial cooperation. Individual power constraints at the BSs are enforced, along with constraints on the number of streams per user. It is first shown that the system is equivalent to a MIMO interference channel with generalized linear constraints (MIMO-IFC-GC). The problems of maximizing the sum-rate(SR) and minimizing the weighted sum mean square error (WSMSE) of the data estimates are non-convex, and suboptimal solutions with reasonable complexity need to be devised. Based on this, suboptimal techniques that aim at maximizing the sum-rate for the MIMO-IFC-GC are reviewed from recent literature and extended to the MIMO-IFC-GC where necessary. Novel designs that aim at minimizing the WSMSE are then proposed. Extensive numerical simulations are provided to compare the performance of the considered schemes for realistic cellular systems.

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems

This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained for the influence power measure.

The Myerson value for complete coalition structures

In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in the coalition then the coalition itself is also feasible. The union stable structures, which constitute the domain of the Myerson value, are a special class of the complete coalition structures. As an allocation rule on complete coalition structures, this paper proposes an extension of the Myerson value for complete coalition structures and provides an axiomatization.

On the Capacity of MIMO Cellular Systems with Base Station Cooperation

This paper is concerned with the capacity of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) cellular systems. We assume an equal rate constraint for all users and adopt a realistic channel model that incorporates path loss, lognormal fading and Rayleigh fading. Several bounds are derived for the minimum transmission power of such rate-constrained MIMO cellular systems with various base station (BS) cooperation strategies. In particular, the upper power bound is based on the maximum eigenmode beamforming (MEB) scheme. These power bounds are then used to obtain the corresponding cellular capacity bounds when partial BS cooperation strategies are adopted. Our results show that, allowing more users to transmit simultaneously, introducing cooperation among BSs and increasing the number of antennas (especially at each BS) are efficient ways to improve system performance.

Eating Disorder as a Psychiatric Onset of Juvenile Huntington's Disease

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Communications and UpdatesFull AccessEating Disorder as a Psychiatric Onset of Juvenile Huntington's DiseaseSara Marconi, M.D., Giovanni Rizzo, M.D., Ph.D., Sabina Capellari, M.D., Ph.D., Cesa Scaglione, M.D., Ph.D., Pietro Cortelli, M.D., Ph.D., Paolo Martinelli, M.D., Ph.D., and Sara Bonazza, M.D.Sara MarconiBologna, ItalySearch for more papers by this author, M.D., Giovanni RizzoBologna, ItalySearch for more papers by this author, M.D., Ph.D., Sabina CapellariBologna, ItalySearch for more papers by this author, M.D., Ph.D., Cesa ScaglioneBologna, ItalySearch for more papers by this author, M.D., Ph.D., Pietro CortelliBologna, ItalySearch for more papers by this author, M.D., Ph.D., Paolo MartinelliBologna, ItalySearch for more papers by this author, M.D., Ph.D., and Sara BonazzaBologna, ItalySearch for more papers by this author, M.D.Published Online:1 Oct 2011https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2011.11020312AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail To the Editor: Huntington's disease is an autosomal-dominant disorder with onset in midlife caused by an excess of CAG nucleotide repeats in the IT15 gene, codifying for huntingtin protein, and is classically characterized by motor, cognitive, and psychiatric disturbances. Juvenile forms of Huntington's disease may have an atypical presentation with different motor signs including parkinsonism and ataxia and, commonly, with nonspecific psychiatric features. Among the broad spectrum of psychiatric symptoms, little attention has been paid to the possible association between Huntington's disease and eating disorders. We describe the case of a young woman with Huntington's disease that developed with an eating disorder.Case ReportThe patient's family history was unknown because she had been adopted at birth. After a family bereavement when she was 16 years old, the girl developed an eating disorder that was characterized by fear of weight gain, frequent binge eating, compensatory behaviors, and an abnormally low body weight without amenorrhea. An eating disorder not otherwise specified was diagnosed, and she was treated with cognitive-behavioral therapy. At age 22 she began to complain of instability and disequilibrium. She experienced progressively worsening falls until age 26, when she came to our attention. Neurological examination revealed moderately depressed mood and partial cooperation; mild choreic movements in the extremities, trunk, and face; rare distal myoclonus; reduced eye-head coordination; bilateral brisk reflexes; limb hypotonia and dysmetria; and ataxic gait and balance. Neuropsychological testing revealed a low IQ (WAIS score=52). A blood examination and MRI failed to show clear abnormalities. Genetic testing revealed a CAG expansion (large/short allele: 55/17 triplets) in the IT15 gene. Treatment with pimozide, 2 mg/day, moderately improved her mood.Over the next 4 years, the patient's motor and cognitive profile progressively deteriorated, and frequent binge eating episodes reappeared.DiscussionIn our juvenile Huntington's disease patient, the eating disorder at onset preceded motor symptoms by 6 years. Although the two diseases may be a casual finding in our patient, there could be a link. Involvement of frontostriatal circuits and the hypothalamus has been reported in both diseases (1). Recent studies have focused on hypothalamic dysfunction in Huntington's disease, and hypothalamic atrophy was found in Huntington's disease patients by neuropathological analysis (2). MRI, positron emission tomography, and clinical data support a hypothalamic involvement in early Huntington's disease patients and premanifest Huntington's disease gene carriers (3). In addition, the hypothalamus plays a critical role in regulation of feeding and appetite. An alteration of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis function is known in eating disorders, and a recent functional MRI study disclosed an aberrant hypothalamic activation in eating disorder patients with binge-purge behaviors (1). Hypothalamic dysfunction could be related to the onset of eating disorders in our patient and to the reappearance of abnormal eating behavior.Bologna, ItalyThe authors report no financial relationships with commercial interests.Accepted for publication in May 2011.

Hierarchy sustains partial cooperation and induces a Braess-like paradox in slotted aloha-based networks

This paper studies a hierarchical distributed choice of retransmission probabilities in slotted aloha. In particular, we consider a wireless system composed of one central receiver and several selfish mobile users communicating via the slotted aloha protocol. The set of mobile users is split into two classes: leaders and followers. We then study the induced non-cooperative hierarchical game based on the Stackelberg equilibrium concept. Using a 4D Markovian model, we compute the steady state of the system and derive the average throughput and the expected delay as well. We start by discussing the protocol design and propose a controlled slotted aloha using a virtual controller. The virtual controller can sustain partial cooperation among concurrent mobile users when accessing the channel by making the channel lossy. This leads us to identify a Braess-like paradox in which reducing capacity to the system may improve the performance of all mobile users. We then investigate the impact of hierarchy among mobile users in such a random access protocol and discuss how to distribute leader/follower roles. We show that the global performance of the system is improved compared to standard slotted aloha system. However, slight performances slow-down may be observed for the followers group when the total number of mobile users is relatively small.

A quantitative examination of competition, coopetition and cooperation in supply chains

Traditionally, the members of a supply chain compete to reduce their individual costs. However, as collaborative supply chain approach is urged within industries to reduce the overall costs, either full cooperation or partial coopetition is considered by the members. In cooperative approach, members benefit from lower overall costs and lower cost variations. But individually, some seem better off in a competitive approach in a single period considering their local costs. Coopetition, or partial cooperation, may be suggested as a compromise to lower overall supply chain costs, while members choose alliances towards lower average costs and cost variations.A multi-stage, multi-member, multi-product and single period supply chain model is considered with deterministic demand, capacity and cost. Product prices are assumed to be constant. The objective is to minimize total production and distribution costs of the overall chain. Four distinct cases are considered, modeled, simulated and compared. These cases are complete competition, integrated cooperation, two-stage supply chain partition, and partial coopetition. Quantitative conclusions from the cost performance ratios are drawn using the simulation results.

Stackelberg problems with followers in the grand coalition of a Tu-game

In this article, a case of partial cooperation in a game theory framework is studied. The interest is on a bi-level Stackelberg problem where one of the players is the leader and the rest are the followers, involved in a TU-game. The continuity, with respect to the leader’s choice, of the Shapley value function and the core correspondence of the TU-game is investigated.

The Myerson Value and Superfluous Supports in Union Stable Systems

Cooperative games with partial cooperation cover a wider rank of real world situations than the classic model of cooperative games where every subset of a set of agents can form a coalition to execute the game. In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions which models the partial cooperation will be given by a union stable system. These systems contain, as particular cases, the communication situations and the permission structures, which are well-known both from a theoretical and applied point of view. Moreover, union stable systems are a natural framework for many other economic situations that arise in practice and which can not be modelled by these subsystems. In this paper, the goal is to make clear that there exists a close relationship between the Myerson value and the so-called conference game which player set consists of the supports of the union stable system. For that, we first analyze the relation between the restricted game and the conference game to establish later which effects a union stable system has on certain desirable properties of these games. Using the superfluous support property, defined through the conference game, new characterizations for the Myerson value are given in this context.

A tutorial on hypercube queueing models and some practical applications in Emergency Service Systems

This paper presents some extensions and applications of hypercube queueing models todescribe server-to-customer type Emergency Service Systems. The classical hypercube is a well-known spatially distributed queueing model effective in analyzing these systems, based on Markovian analysis approximations. Experience has shown that each real life Emergency Service System may have its own unique characteristics so that each system may require a particular hypercube queueing model incorporating those characteristics. Some of these distinctive characteristics are considered in the extensions presented in this tutorial such as dispatch policy based on random selection of the server to take an incoming call; partial cooperation among servers whereby depending on where the call is coming from, some servers cannot take the call; servers with additional workload coming from walk-in nonemergency customers such as in customer-to-server systems; existence of calls requiring the dispatch of more than one server; existence of more than one type of servers in the system, for instance paramedical and medical units in emergency medical systems. In this study, we present a set of these models based on the smallest non-trivial service systems. For each model, the construction of the system of equations for equilibrium hypercube state probabilities and the evaluation of particular operational characteristics are described.

The Chriz–Z4 complex recruits JIL-1 to polytene chromosomes,a requirement for interband-specific phosphorylation of H3S10

The conserved band-interband pattern is thought to reflect the looped-domain organization of insect polytene chromosomes. Previously, we have shown that the chromodomain protein Chriz and the zinc-finger protein Z4 are essentially required for the maintenance of polytene chromosome structure. Here we show that both proteins form a complex that recruits the JIL-1 kinase to polytene chromosomes, enabling local H3S10 phosphorylation of interband nucleosomal histones. Interband targeting domains were identified at the N-terminal regions of Chriz and Z4, and our data suggest partial cooperation of the complex with the BEAF boundary element protein in polytene and diploid cells. Reducing the core component Chriz by RNAi results in destabilization of the complex and a strong reduction of interband-specific histone H3S10 phosphorylation.

Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash’s best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.

New partial cooperation model for bilevel programming problems

Partial cooperation models are studied for many years to solve the bilevel programming problems where the follower's optimal reaction is not unique. However, in these existed models, the follower's cooperation level does not depend on the leader's decision. A new model is proposed to solve this deficiency. It is proved the feasibility of the new model when the reaction set of the lower level is lower semicontinuous. And the numerical results show that the new model has optimal solutions when the reaction set of the lower level is discrete, lower semi-continuous and non-lower semi-continuous.

An Effective Protocol for Rateless Coding aided Cooperative Communications

In this paper, we study the bit error rate (BER) and the frame error rate (FER) performance for rateless coding aided cooperative communications using an effective protocol over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. During the collaborative phase , t he proposed protocol adopts an adaptive demodulation (ADM) scheme considered channel state and the partial cooperation scheme depending on whether or not the partner decodes correctly. ADM schemes have been considered before by Illanko et al. , but therein the effect of channel state is not considered, because the receiver always demodulates three (or two) bits per symbol for the case of 16QAM signaling during two phases in cooperative communications. Taking channel state into consideration, the BER performance of the modified ADM scheme is investigated. The proposed cooperative protocol is studied with different partial cooperation parameters, such as 1/2, 1/4, and 1/8 . Furthermore, the validity of the partial cooperative scheme over flat Rayleigh fading channels is also substantiated by simulation results in terms of throughput and FER performance.

On the economics of interrogation: the Big 4 versus the Little Fish game

While military protocol requires that POWs provide only name, rank, serial number, and date of birth (the so-called Big 4), it is naive to think that all detainees, including terrorists, behave in this fashion. Instead, there is evidence that detainees partially cooperate with their captors by revealing a limited amount of valuable information during the interrogation process. Such a strategy makes it appear that the detainee is cooperative and, since interrogations can be costly, serves as a disincentive for further interrogation. In order to capture the essential differences between the two strategies, we model two different types of games between the interrogator and the detainee. Specifically, we compare the Big 4 game to a two-stage game (the Little Fish game) in which the detainee is permitted to reveal low-level information to the interrogator. We formalize both games, derive the optimal rules for each player, and show that the Big 4 game may not be optimal for either player or for the overall well‐being of the interrogating nation. As such, the Little Fish game can Pareto‐dominate the Big 4 game. Hence, it is possible that the al-Qaeda strategy of partial cooperation is superior to that used by most standing armies. We also show that the level of intensity selected by the interrogator must be balanced by such factors as the moral values of the society and recruiting potential of the terrorists versus the likelihood of obtaining important information.

A dynamic model of conflict and appropriation

Abstract This paper presents an extension of a static model of economic conflict analyzed by Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and Skaperdas (1992) to an infinite horizon differential game. Our aim is to highlight the strategic role of appropriation among a smaller group of agents in an intertemporal context. The model yields the conclusion that there exists a unique linear/nonlinear Markov perfect equilibrium strategy, even when strategies are defined over the entire state space. We demonstrate that “partial cooperation” can be seen as a long-run response to conflict. Moreover, a decrease in the effectiveness of appropriation, the depreciation rate of a common-pool stock, the rate of time preferences or an increase in the “degree of noise” improves the degree of “partial cooperation” and thus welfare in an anarchic society.

Game Theoretical Power Control for Open-Loop Overlaid Network MIMO Systems with Partial Cooperation

In this paper, we consider an open-loop network MIMO system with K BSs serving K private MSs and M <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">c</sup> common MS based on a novel partial cooperation overlaying scheme. Exploiting the heterogeneous path gains between the private MSs and the common MSs, each of the K BSs serves a private MS non-cooperatively and the K BSs also serve the M <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">c</sup> common MSs cooperatively. The proposed scheme does not require closed loop instantaneous channel state information feedback, which is highly desirable for high mobility users. Furthermore, we formulate the long-term distributive power allocation problem between the private MSs and the common MSs at each of the K BSs using a partial cooperative game. We show that the long-term power allocation game has a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) but standard best response update may not always converge to the NE. As a result, we propose a low-complexity distributive long-term power allocation algorithm which only relies on the local long-term channel statistics and has provable convergence property.

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.