Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Research Articles

PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia

This article focuses on the moderation strategy of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and its impact on the Indonesian party system. It makes the argument that PKS's moderation strategy is electorally challenging for both PKS and the Indonesian party system. PKS's moderation strategy has forced it into a difficult competition with established major parties for median voters. PKS's relative success is a product more of the poor performance of the existing Islamic parties than its moderation strategy. With PKS joining the catch-all party bandwagon, the Indonesian party system is now being shaped by dominant catch-all parties, and in the long run such a development will undermine the legitimacy of parties and will become detrimental to the process of democratic consolidation.

ISLAMIST PARTY, ELECTORAL POLITICS AND DA’WAH MOBILIZATION AMONG YOUTH: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia

The involvement of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) in the electoral democratic system in Indonesia raises a question whether it is possible for a political party with a deeply religious ideology to liberalize and entertain democracy. The decision to enter politics does not infrequently entail an abandonment of ideological purity. It represents an acceptance of the political order and power sharing-based politics. While identity and ideology are instrumental in political mobilization for PKS, it has no choice but to negotiate and interact with other political actors through coalitions and parliamentary politics. A modern party involved in a competitive and rule-based system, it is also required to broaden its electorate and reach out to non-Islamist voters. It is intriguing in this context to explore the party’s strategy to maintain its Islamist platforms and the base of support while allying itself with distinctly non-Islamist ruling elites, and engage in the pragmatic ruling coalition. Understanding the paradoxical roles of an Islamist party when involved in the on-going electoral democratic process, this paper also looks at the future of political Islam in Indonesia.

Getting culture: a new path for Indonesia’s Islamist Justice and Prosperity party?

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, The Justice and Prosperity Party) is the largest Islamist political party in Indonesia. It has roots in the religious and political and religious teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood and promotes what Oliver Roy calls "deculturized religion." The party can be understood as the political component of a larger social movement that seeks to transform Indonesian society and culture in ways that would establish Shari'ah as social, if not political, reality. It is also committed to the electoral process and to working inside the Indonesian political system in a more general sense. Until recently, the PKS has dismissed local modes of Muslim practice and much of Indonesian culture as "un-Islamic." The extent of the party's transformative agenda is unclear for three reasons: it shares the Muslim Brotherhood's gradualist approach, it is less than transparent about its goals, and it is divided into purist or "Justice" and pragmatic or "Prosperity" factions. The leadership of the Prosperity faction is currently ascendant and is attempting to reach beyond its Islamist base by sponsoring musical and dramatic performances it hopes will appeal to Muslims devoted to Javanese and other Indonesian cultural traditions. Ethnographic and web-based research indicate that these efforts are greeted with considerable suspicion.

The Militancy of the Peoples Democratic Party in Riau, Indonesia

This paper will highlight: The revival of the old communist ideology in the post-Suharto democratic society in Indonesia attracts a new fascination with the militancy ideas of Trotsky, Marxism/Leninism and the global anarchist movement. Contrary to the mainstream political view this force is ignored by the political center hence enjoying a steady growth in popularity. But, the STR/PRD in Riau poses as Marxists are in fact fundamentalists that have little comprehension of Marxism or Islam and hence qualify as a radicalized group. In Riau, like other provinces, the political struggle of the main parties created an environment of political induced violence to substitute and portray environmental and social issues as part of this new found purpose for the old communist ideals. In Riau alone the PRD counts for 25,000 members . The ideals attract an emerging group of Indonesians in a pursuit to capture local power in search of an alternative purpose in the political life of the individual. Many feel the economic model has failed them and push for more aggressive pursuits of change either using the methods of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary movement . The ideology is however a regurgitation of an unsolved past, glorification of communist and socialist ideals often promoted through foreign, militant Australians and South American doctrines disseminated through social media . The attraction to the radical teachings communist teaching is wider than compare the Jihadists since the disenfranchised, the fringe and the poor can associate with the cause, its history and endorse that violent change is needed to liberate Indonesia from its neo-colonial oppressors. And like its distance cousins, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) hypothesizing as being merely “symbolic” is a miscalculation. Militancy is easier to accept and promote as part of the “people’s struggle”. The democratic freedom in the new Indonesia allowing these new players to go unnoticed and unchallenged since government political leaders nor do the security apparatus comprehend the propensity of violent nature of these new forces. The People’s Democratic Party/PRD and its clones attract a steady flow of young radicals ready to take up the “people’s struggle” and conducting a “people’s war” to set Indonesia free from oppression and neo-colonial forces.

The Pull and Push between Central and Local Political Parties: A Case Study of Party Branch Organisation in Indonesia

With the resignation of former president Suharto after thirty-two years of oppressive rule, political parties were granted freedom in their operations more than a decade ago, most notably through the lifting of bans on grassroots operations. At the same time, new policies of administrative and political decentralisation have influenced parties to empower their local branches. This combination of political freedom and decentralisation has given parties the opportunity to establish active and functioning grassroots branches and the chance to get local communities to engage in politics. This article examines and compares the operational capacities of four different parties (Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Partai Amanat Nasional, and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) in their local branches in Malang, East Java. Focusing on the aspects of local administration and local-central relationship, the article demonstrates that although the parties have responded positively to their newfound freedom to operate locally, that same freedom has benefited parties with better local resources and better central support.

Moderating Islamism in Indonesia

This article analyzes why, how and to what extent Indonesia’s once staunchly Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; PKS) has become more moderate through its participation in democratic procedures. It also examines how this moderation process has affected the party’s electoral performance and the overall quality of democracy in Indonesia. It is argued that PKS has indeed become more moderate and that this moderation has, after initial electoral success, now posed some serious challenges to the party’s organizational coherence. The article concludes by highlighting that moderation is a process that is neither linear nor unreservedly positive for democratization.

No Turkish Delight: The Impasse of Islamic Party Politics in Indonesia

This article addresses the inability of Indonesia’s Islamic parties to launch a serious challenge for control over state power through insights obtained via comparisons with the Turkish case. By juxtaposing Indonesia’s PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperity Party) and Turkey’s AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, Justice and Development Party), in particular, it offers a political economy-oriented understanding of the limited achievements of Islamic party politics in Indonesia. The analysis places Islamic party politics in Indonesia and Turkey in the context of social-structural changes associated with capitalist development. It argues that, unlike the AKP, the PKS remains predominantly identified with an urban middle-class constituency rather than a cross-class alliance waging struggles under the Islamic banner.

Bahasa Indonesia

Indonesian politics after New Order drawing the raise of political islam movement. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Welfare Justice Party bring a newest ideological looked that rooted from Islamic value. This article tend to explore reorganizing of PKS in important periods. It capture changing the name from PK to became PKS which contained switching a fundamental movement typology from dakwah which emphasizing social and mass mobilisation to political reorganisation. This article's method is literature review. This period being critical phase that PKS has successful to maintain theiri ideology and compromise with political pathways. Indeed, PKS has one of the most influent party in the future indonesian politics.

Parliamentary Elections in Indonesia: President Susilo on the Rise

The Indonesian parliamentary elections in April 2009 have been characterized as peaceful, free, and fair. All in all, the young democracy has been stabilized. The PD (Partai Demokrat, Democratic Party), the electoral vehicle of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, won with 20.8%. It is mostly secular parties, that is the PD, Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya, Party of Functional Groups) and the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle), which now dominate the party system. Support for the Islamic parties has dwindled; only the Islamist PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party) was able to gain slightly. The rapid rise of the PD and two smaller new parties is testimony to the fluidity of the party system. The results corroborate a trend of a weakening of socio-political “streams” ( aliran). This development is due to the increasing personalization and commercialization of politics and the impact of mass media. Moreover, electoral reforms (the introduction of an “open list”) seem to have strengthened local politicians vis-à-vis party headquarters in Jakarta.

Islamisme et démocratie en Indonésie : quand la tradition se rapproche de la cause des femmes

Islamism has found a political expression in Post-Soeharto Indonesia with at least two Islamic political parties advocating an Islamization of the law. In this new democratic setting, secular and Islamic-pluralist parties have had to learn to defend their positions with a new energy and strategy. Women have been at the forefront of the battle, and they have received essential support from a political party close to Traditionalist Islam. This article takes a look at three components of the new Islamic politics : How does the Partai Keadilan-Sejahtera (PKS) act at the grass-roots level ? Its innovative dakwah activities show a strong commitment and strict organization. How does interaction take place in Parliament between secular and Islamist factions ? The stakes are high but the weak point of secularism may be the ambiguity of pluralist political parties who often dare not oppose Islamism. Traditionalist Islam under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid has emerged as a key political actor in this battle. But its fragility is undeniable, and is best seen on the ground, in the 2004 electoral results, presented here through a short analysis for the region of Central Java. Could a so-called pillar of "civil-pluralist" Islam, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama, be weaker than imagined ? A larger question is asked which touches Muslim countries in general, from Turkey to Algeria : what place do "moderate Islamist" parties take in democracies ?