A Post-Westphalian Conception of Law Brian Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. xx + 263 pages. $60.00 cloth; $22.95 paper. The discipline of is becoming more cosmopolitan, partly because of globalization. Jurisprudence, as theoretical part of as a discipline, has begun to respond to this challenge. During most of twentieth century, mainstream Anglo-American jurisprudence focused almost entirely on two forms of law: municipal (of sovereign nation-states and subordinate legal orders) and public international (largely but not exclusively treated as governing relations between states). From a global or a broad transnational perspective this focus is inadequate.1 It leaves out too much: if one were to try to sketch a broad overview of forms of legal orders in contemporary world, one might quibble about including lex mercatoria or his humanitatis or or Gypsy or Hindu or Internet (GLT; Santos 1995, 2002), but it would be difficult to justify leaving out European Community or Islamic or major examples of traditional or law.2 Yet it would be strange to try to subsume all of these under municipal or public international law. (GLT:chs. 3, 9) If one were to adopt an historical perspective, other candidates would press for attention, for example, classical Roman medieval merchant, canon to say nothing of major traditions of religious, indigenous, and chthonic law. This is not merely or mainly a semantic issue; rather it involves a judgment about what forms of legal ordering deserve sustained attention by our discipline. Mainstream Westphalian legal theory does not seem to be well equipped to answer some important questions about juridical status of particular legal orders. For example, what is juridical status of EC contemporary Islamic lex mercatoria? Is human rights merely part of public international law? Can one claim to understand in Brazil if one ignores internal ordering of squatter settlements, made famous by Santos's account of Pasagarda (Santos 1995:ch. 3, 2002:ch. 4)? Are these all law in same sense? It is tempting to try to brush aside such questions as semantic, or trivial, or aridly conceptual, but it is difficult to escape from them completely. The purpose of this essay is to consider one of first attempts to confront problems of theorizing about at a global or broad transnational level in response to challenges of globalization.3 Brian Tamanaha's A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society is bold, ambitious, radical, and challenging. My object is to summarize its central theses, to indicate why I think that this is an important work, to sketch some differences in our perspectives and positions, and to suggest some areas that are in need of development. I shall follow order of book, focusing on a few themes rather than trying to follow all of ramifications of a rich and complex argument. The first section sketches Tamanaha's background, concerns, and conception of his enterprise. The next section considers his critique of mirror theories and the social order thesis. Next, I shall consider how he pares down Hart's model of to produce a nonessentialist, nonfunctionalist concept of law.4 Rather than dwell on his interpretations of Hart and other thinkers, I shall focus on clarity and tenability of Tamanaha's own position, especially in regard to his attempt to construct a core concept of on basis of folk concepts. Finally, I shall suggest some ways of extending or refining his analysis in respect of globalization and general jurisprudence, bottom-up perspectives on law, and normative and legal pluralism. Tamanaha's and my own views are quite similar and seem to be converging. As we proceed, I shall indicate some points of divergence in our enterprises and positions, but main objective here is to clarify and assess Tamanaha's central theses. …
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