The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission adopted as its primary punishment theory. Since the Guidelines became effective, in 1980, the role of crime-control-oriented and other non-retributive purposes has grown. But the latter trends built on earlier themes, and were not a sudden reversal of prior theory. The original version of the Guidelines, while emphasizing Just Deserts, also gave emphasis to non-retributive goals, which had strong legislative and public support. This essay will examine, first, the original intent of the Minesota Legislature, with respect to sentencing goals; second, the various theories of punishment implicit in the Commission's initial version of the Guidelines; and third, the most important theory-related developments since 1980. These developments include major appellate case law, legislative enactments, Commission-initiated changes in the Guidelines, and the sentencing of attorneys and judges. The essay concludes that Minnesota's hybrid sentencing system reflects a stable and appropriate balance between retributive, crime-control, humanitarian, and fiscal considerations. For readers accustomed to traditional discussions of punishment theory, it is important to stress a critical assumption of this essay: that analysis of sentencing purposes should be based on actual as well as on formal law and theory. What the Sentencing Commission did is as important as what it said it was doing; moreover, what the Commission said or did in certain areas may be of limited importance if attorneys and judges have done something very different. In any case, sentencing theory is inevitably shaped and elaborated in important ways by system actors. The 1978 Enabling Statute and Its Apparent Sentencing Purposes The broad outlines of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were laid down in the 1978 statute creating the Guidelines Commission.(1) The Commission was directed to promulgate guidelines regulating both the decision to impose state imprisonment and the duration of such imprisonment, based on reasonable offense and offender characteristics, while taking into substantial consideration two factors: current sentencing and releasing practices and resources, including but not limited to the capacities of local and state correctional facilities. The Commission was also permitted (but not required) to develop guidelines regulating the conditions of non-prison sentences. Parole release was abolished and replaced with a specified reduction (up to one-third off the pronounced sentence) for good behavior in prison. This earned good time reduction would then constitute a period of parole-type post-release supervision (the Supervised Release Term). The statute also implied that denial of good time reductions could only be based on disciplinary violations, not failure to participate in or cooperate with in-prison treatment programs (since all such programs were to become voluntary). Finally, sentencing judges were directed to provide written reasons when they departed from the new guidelines, and both defendants and the prosecution were given the right to appeal any sentence (whether or not it was a departure). It seems clear that a major purpose of the statute was to reduce sentencing discretion, thus promoting greater uniformity of sentences, but what broader purposes did the Legislature want such sentences to serve? Did it intend to move toward a just model, with sharply reduced emphasis on rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterence? The legislative preference for greater uniformity does not, by itself, imply a strong emphasis on retributive values: reduced case-level discretion limits the ability of courts to fine-tune their assessments, not only of each offender's treatment needs and dangerousness, but also of his or her precise deserts (making the punishment fit the crime).(2) Proponents of the theory of Just Deserts have argued that the Minnesota enabling statute suggests no particular rationale or choice between sentencing purposes. …