Parliamentary Oversight Research Articles

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN RESTRICTING THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT RESEARCH ON INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE IN IRAQ AFTER 2005 (COMPARATIVE STUDY)

This research deals with the relationship between the ministry and parliament under the current Iraqi constitution of 2005, with a comparison to the current Egyptian constitution of 2014, which examines the role of parliament in restricting the powers of the government and achieving an institutional balance between the two authorities (legislative and executive). The importance of the research lies in analyzing the impact of the balance between the two authorities on political and administrative stability in Iraq and seeking to find solutions to improve the balance and cooperation between them to achieve the state's public interest. It also aims to study the factors that lead to balance or imbalance between the ministry and parliament in Iraq and find practical solutions to improve them to achieve more excellent political stability. The research relied on the comparative approach between the two constitutional systems (Iraqi and Egyptian) and analyzed both countries' legal and constitutional texts. It adopted the hypothesis that there is a mutual influence between the ministry and parliament in Iraq and that improving the balance between them, in turn, leads to the stability of the political system in Iraq. It showed that the executive authority is dominant at the expense of the legislative authority in Iraq, with a limited influence of the legislative authority in legislation laws. This research showed that strengthening parliamentary oversight methods can be used to achieve institutional balance and political stability.

THE ROLE OF LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BODIES IN UZBEKISTAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

This article explores the evolving role of local representative and executive bodies in Uzbekistan’s political system, with a particular focus on the increased participation of political parties in local governance. It examines the expansion of the powers of the Councils of People's Deputies, especially in relation to monitoring local executive authorities and ensuring the implementation of laws and governmental decrees. The study highlights the need for enhanced parliamentary oversight at the local level and discusses the potential impact of party groups in strengthening the socio-political framework of the regions. The article also addresses the challenges faced by local authorities in ensuring efficient governance, including insufficient use of the powers granted to political parties and the lack of a unified approach to solving socio-economic problems. Drawing on recent reforms, including experimental governance models in Tashkent, the article argues for a more robust legal framework to support local political oversight and promote greater accountability among local executive bodies. The findings underscore the importance of legal reforms aimed at enhancing the autonomy and effectiveness of local governance as a key component of Uzbekistan’s broader political and administrative modernization efforts.

Parliamentarians and the covid-19 pandemic: insights from an executive-dominated, constituency-oriented legislature

ABSTRACT Because parliaments are the cornerstone of representative democracy, we know a significant amount about how they operate in ordinary times. Covid-19 presented extraordinary challenges to the functioning and operation of national parliaments. This article explores the impact of Covid-19 on parliament from the point of view of its members. We report results from a survey of Irish parliamentarians, exploring members’ perceptions of their engagement in law-making, government oversight, and constituency representation. The results suggest an interesting paradox: Parliamentarians felt less able to perform their legislative and oversight functions but – with the aid of new technologies – felt better able to perform their representative and constituency roles. The wider implication is that Covid-19 intensified existing patterns of executive legislative relation: in the Irish case at least, the (electoral) incentives to undertake constituency work motivated continued constituency service, while the weakness of parliamentary oversight of the executive intensified.

Development in Parliamentary Oversight of Government Work in Light of the 2020 Constitutional Amendment (Algeria)

In most comparative law systems, the role of parliament is not limited to issuing various types of legislation and improving the legislative framework. It goes beyond its fundamental function of legislating to include another important role: oversight, specifically the restraining role over the actions of government members in certain cases defined by the Constitution. Parliament exercises this oversight role alongside its legislative function. It is also important in maintaining public interest and evaluating the government’s work by questioning its members on the progress and execution of agreed-upon projects. Referring to the Algerian system, we find that the Algerian Parliament, which consists of two chambers—the National People’s Assembly (APN) and the Council of the Nation—exercises oversight over the government’s actions. The first chamber, the APN, primarily does this. Consequently, this type of oversight may sometimes lead to political accountability, which can result in either the resignation of the Prime Minister or the dissolution of the first chamber of parliament. These mechanisms include the motion of censure and the interpellation process.

Intelligence Oversight and Accountability in Poland: Has Anything Changed?

The years 1990 and 1991 marked the beginning of a sea change in this particular area of the functioning of the Polish state. The following phenomena were analyzed: Over three decades on from the restitution of the Polish democratic state, how have the focal issues of key intelligence oversight institutions been addressed? How successful was the political transition in the area of intelligence services? The article is composed of four main parts. The first part provides a discussion of the “special services” concept, which determines the Polish institutional framework for intelligence oversight and accountability. Subsequent sections focus on particular forms of intelligence oversight: executive control, parliamentary oversight, and independent oversight. Our focus is on the institutional dimension of state security. The article is intended as an overview of the issue and relies on traditional historical and institutionalist approaches. Our proposal is to conduct a detailed case study to present the current situation in a country in East Central Europe, with the aim of generating general findings that could be used to guide reform efforts.

An Alternative Approach to Parliamentary Oversight of Sovereign Guarantees in South Africa

The research paper constructs and compares two structural risk models. A South African sovereign risk model and an ESKOM credit risk model. The interaction between these models explains the statistically significant causal relationship between corporate governance practices at the level of a public entity and government finance conditions between 2004 and 2019. It shows that a more effective approach to parliamentary oversight of government guarantees in South Africa can deliver better sovereign credit rating outcomes in post-COVID-19 South Africa. It will require proactive innovative measures in the application of government guarantees issued to SOEs aimed at improving institutional operational performance within a government-wide risk management framework. The paper concludes that economic transformation, with restitutive intent, is advanced with the adoption of a dynamic and evidenced-informed approach in addressing the complex interplay of prevailing socio-economic, government finance, and political environmental conditions in South Africa.

Financial Oversight of The Implementation of The Annual Sub -Budget Appropriations for Iraqi Diplomatic Missions and Representations

The importance of the study lied in two aspects, one scientific and the other practical. In the scientific aspect, the researched worked to enrich scientific research in the field of financial control over the activity of Iraqi diplomatic missions and representations, and raising the subject of studying diplomatic missions and representations in its various aspects. As for the practical aspect, the study addressed the various aspects of financial control over the implementation of financial control over the annual subsidiary budget of Iraqi diplomatic missions and representations, the responsibilities of the supervisory bodies to uncover financial violations, and the role of the administrative bodies concerned with holding accountable those who exceed financial allocations and deterring them. The study aimed to clarify the mechanisms by which financial control is carried out on the implementation of the annual sub-budget appropriations of the Iraqi diplomatic missions and representations, to avoid serious financial deviations and violations that lead to obstructing the work of the diplomatic missions and representations from performing their role in a manner consistent with the tasks and duties entrusted to them, and to attempt to alert the competent authorities responsible for diplomatic activity to the importance of financial control, and to grant broader powers and authorities to the oversight bodies to improve the effectiveness and performance of the Iraqi diplomatic missions and representations. The problem of the study was represented in the multiplicity of oversight bodies on the implementation of the annual sub-budget appropriations of the Iraqi diplomatic missions and representations, represented by parliamentary oversight and the oversight of the independent bodies, in addition to the oversight of the Audit and Internal Oversight Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The multiplicity of oversight bodies leads to an overlap in the oversight powers of these bodies, which negatively affects the implementation of the annual sub-budget appropriations of the Iraqi diplomatic missions and representations. The scientific methodology that the researcher relied on to complete this study is the analytical method, which aimed to analyze the legal texts issued to organize the mechanisms of disposing of public funds and methods of monitoring them, supported by analyzing the correspondence of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs to diplomatic missions and representations to complete the benefit. The researcher decided to divide it into two sections, and allocated the first section to the concept of financial control, which included defining financial control and explaining its importance and the objectives sought from practicing it, while in the second section , this study addressed the types of financial control, which included the types of control in terms of their connection to work and purpose, the types of control in terms of the subject, the types of control in terms of the party that practices it, and the types of control in terms of the time of its practice.

Police patrols, fire alarms, or ambulance chasers? Parliamentary oversight of European monetary policy and banking supervision

The parliamentary oversight of the European Central Bank (ECB) is frequently criticised for its lack of focus in both monetary policy and banking supervision. While Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can publicly question ECB decisions in these fields, they often use committee hearings for other purposes, such as expressing political positions on issues that may or may not be related to ECB activities. This article aims to conceptualise such variation by expanding the seminal distinction between ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ to include two novel categories – ‘planning bureaus’ and ‘ambulance chasers’. To illustrate the applicability of our typology, the article provides the first systematic comparison of the Monetary and the Banking Dialogues (2014–2021), combining a qualitative content analysis of 1,504 parliamentary questions with insights from interviews with MEPs. The findings highlight the pervasiveness of fire alarms and ambulance chasing in the parliamentary practice of overseeing the ECB.

How Misuse of Emergency Powers Dismantled the Rule of Law in Hungary

AbstractThe Hungarian government has been utilising emergencies to expand its political power instead of upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law. This strategy has given the government almost unlimited power to enact emergency decrees, even when the state and the population are not in immediate danger. The ninth amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary has raised concerns about the government's use of emergency powers, granting the executive branch even more authority during exceptional times by allowing the government to prolong the ‘state of exception’ indefinitely and maintain pandemic-related emergency measures to respond to potential consequences of the war in Ukraine. As a result, the executive body has been able to exert significant political control without proper parliamentary oversight.

Political parties and parliamentary oversight committee seats: sharing and trading the costs

ABSTRACT Political parties are important actors for making the chain of delegation in parliamentary systems work in practice, but less constructive in securing the corresponding chain of accountability that goes in the opposite direction. This article, however, argues that parliamentary oversight (accountability) conditions improve in institutionalised settings, like in central oversight committees. The article explores political parties’ strategies related to this type of task by investigating who sits in this type of committee. The expectation is that in this setting political parties will share the oversight responsibility, but that smaller parties want to trade the costs because they have fewer resources compared to larger parties. The investigation focuses on the five Nordic national parliaments with strong parties that control elections as well as the committee seat allocation. Overall, the investigation shows that institutionalisation does seem to spur joint responsibility and that larger parties take the load of this type of activity.

History and current state of parliamentary oversight in Iraq

The phenomenon of Iraqi constitutionalism traditionally arouse skepticism among researchers. This is due not only to the historical difficulties faced by Iraqi constitutionalism, but also to the lack, according to researchers, of effective mechanisms for legal protection of the constitution. Among such mechanisms is the institution of parliamentary control in Iraq and its historical predecessors that has received virtually no coverage among Russian constitutional scholars, which determines the relevance of the study. The object of the study is the history and current state of parliamentary control in Iraq. Having proposed his own periodization of the history of Iraqi statehood, the author analyzes the main sources of legal regulation of parliamentary control in each of the identified historical periods, also referring to the assessments of applying constitutional provisions practice and assessments of contemporaries. The research method is the analysis of relevant normative regulation and practical implementation of constitutional norms on parliamentary control based on the assessments of constitutional scholars. The author concludes that the institution of parliamentary control in Iraq emerged in the late Ottoman era and strengthened in the first half of the XX century, after which it was dismantled for political, ideological and legal reasons. The author analyzes the current state of the institution of parliamentary control in Iraq, including atypical control powers of modern parliament. According to the author, their emergence is a reaction of the constitutional legislator to consistent oppression of mechanisms of popular representation, which, however, led to radicalization of the role of parliament in the system of separation of powers in Iraq.

ПАРЛАМЕНТЫН ХЯНАН ШАЛГАХ БҮРЭН ЭРХИЙН ХЭРЭГЖИЛТ (УИХ-ЫН НЭЭЛТТЭЙ СОНСГОЛЫН АСУУДАЛД)

Public open hearings are organized in various ways in countries around the world to ensure citizens’ right to know, to involve the public in decision-making, to implement parliamentary oversight, and at the level of local government organizations. In our country, the Human Rights Subcommittee of the State Great Khural organized the first public hearings on the issue of “July 1” on December 3, 2009. As part of the amendments to the Constitution in 2019, a specific provision which ensures the implementation of the oversight powers of the State Great Khural, was included in the Constitution, and then the parliamentary oversight law (On monitoring and inspection of the State Great Khural of Mongolia) was enacted in 2021. Accordingly, the Parliament is organizing public hearings in order to ensure the public’s right to know about issues related to the implementation of laws and resolutions, as well as to ensure public participation in appointments and to introduce candidates to the public. Therefore, there is a need to study, observe, and analyze the public hearings of the parliament, to present the achievements and shortcomings, and to identify ways to improve them, so we have studied in this area.

ROLE AND PURPOSE OF NSICOP IN CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

On November 17, 2023, Lisa-Marie Inman, Executive Director, Secretariat, and Jennifer Kleniewski, Senior Review Analyst and Team Lead, at the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), presented the Role and Purpose of NSICOP in Canadian National Security for this year’s West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives. The key points discussed were the committee's mandate to provide increased parliamentary oversight over the activities of Canadian intelligence agencies, the content and release of its annual and special reports, and the nonpartisan and representative nature of the committee's composition.
 
 Received: 01-04-2024
 Revised: 01-26-2024

Examining the Role of the Supreme Audit Court in Budget Implementation in Iran and Comparing It with French Law

Parliamentary oversight in a political system reflects the supervision of representatives of the people over the government and the formation of a democratic structure. The independence of the legislature from the executive branch is one of the most crucial steps in political development in Iran, and legislative oversight can be regarded as a guarantee for seeking justice and holding the government accountable. According to Article 76 of the Constitution of Iran, the Parliament (Majlis) is authorized to investigate all affairs of the country. Furthermore, Article 55 of the Constitution grants the right of budget oversight to the Parliament through the Supreme Audit Court. However, there are numerous challenges in parliamentary oversight of budget implementation. Given that the structure of parliamentary oversight over the budget is carried out through the Supreme Audit Court, this research, employing a descriptive-analytical approach and a library research method, compares parliamentary oversight of budget implementation in the legal systems of Iran and France. The choice of France for comparative study stems from the fact that it was the second country after the United States and the first European country to establish a government structure based on the separation of powers and state control, influenced by Montesquieu's ideas. The findings of the research indicate that there are legal and executive shortcomings in parliamentary oversight in Iran, and on the other hand, the Supreme Audit Court also lacks a coherent legal and technical framework in its leadership domain. Consequently, these factors collectively reduce the performance of the Supreme Audit Court in the country.

Possibilities of parliamentary oversight of independent judiciary with a focus on the sub judice doctrine

Possibilities of parliamentary oversight of independent judiciary with a focus on the sub judice doctrine

Government Assurances in Zambia: An Analysis of Implementation and Challenges

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of government assurances in Zambia, with a focus on the key sectors of finance, energy, water development, and education. Government assurances represent formal commitments made by government officials in response to parliamentary queries and serve as critical tools for ensuring accountability and transparency in governance. The study primarily examines the 2023 Action-Taken Report (ATR) presented to the National Assembly of Zambia, which details the progress made in fulfilling these assurances. Drawing on Public Accountability Theory, the paper explores how parliamentary oversight mechanisms influence the implementation of public policy, particularly in developing contexts. The research adopts a qualitative approach, utilizing secondary data from the ATR, supplemented by relevant academic literature and government publications. Thematic analysis was employed to identify patterns and recurring themes related to the implementation process, such as financial constraints, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and weak inter-ministerial coordination. Through this method, the study seeks to answer key research questions, including the extent to which government assurances have been implemented, the challenges hindering their execution, and potential strategies for improving the effectiveness of public policy in Zambia. The findings reveal that while progress has been made in some areas—such as the Zambia Growth Opportunities Programme and the Lusaka Sanitation Programme—significant barriers remain. Financial limitations due to Zambia’s debt burden, coupled with delays in international funding, have constrained the government’s ability to allocate sufficient resources for public projects. Additionally, bureaucratic inefficiencies, particularly in procurement processes and inter-ministerial coordination, have led to delays in project implementation, particularly in rural electrification and infrastructure development. In response to these challenges, the paper proposes several recommendations aimed at improving the implementation of government assurances. These include enhancing domestic revenue mobilization to reduce reliance on external funding, strengthening inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, and reforming procurement processes to improve efficiency. Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of developing robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems to ensure timely tracking of project progress and to improve public accountability. By contributing to the broader discourse on governance and public policy in Zambia, this paper offers valuable insights for policymakers, government officials, and scholars interested in improving the effectiveness of government assurances in developing contexts. It emphasizes the need for comprehensive public sector reform and suggests pathways to strengthen the capacity of government institutions to deliver on their promises, ultimately improving service delivery and fostering public trust in government institutions.

Parliamentary oversight: Oireachtas committees and the Dáil Committee on Public Accounts in the twenty-first century

Abstract Strong parliaments hold the government, its departments and the wider public administration to account. Such parliaments are built on strong and active committee systems. For a long time, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was the only oversight committee consistently in place in the Houses of the Oireachtas. This article explains how the committee system has been gradually expanded and strengthened, and how its remit to oversee the actions of the government is wide. It explains the institutional factors that lead to the continued prominence of the PAC, including how it draws on the expert, independent reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General to conduct its oversight work, while noting that the PAC still faces the same challenges as other committees concerning a wide remit, finite resources and the multiple motivations of its membership. The work of the PAC is described and placed in the context of the financial scrutiny cycle which is being developed in the Houses of the Oireachtas. This is followed by a discussion of how the PAC manages its potentially wide remit to conduct ex post financial scrutiny of public expenditure, and the balance between what is referred to as ‘police-patrol’, rather than ‘fire-alarm’, scrutiny and the procedural changes which are designed to ensure that the PAC (with the authority of the Dáil) can examine and hold actors to account for the expenditure of any public money.

Parliamentary oversight of emergency measures and policies: A safeguard of democracy during a crisis?

AbstractThe article discusses the role of parliamentary oversight of emergency measures and policies in increasing democratic resilience and recovery from the COVID‐19 pandemic. The study on the Finnish Parliament is conducted by analyzing the statements of the Constitutional Law Committee, whose role is to conduct a parliamentary constitutional review of governmental bills. The main focus of the analysis is on the Committee's reviews of the constitutionality of the emergency measures and the procedures of law drafting. The research indicates that the committee considered the restrictions and exceptions of fundamental rights as proportional and necessary to prevent the overburdening of the healthcare system in most cases. However, the justifications for the emergency measures were often lacking, and the parliament's right to receive information was compromised. These deficits undermined the Parliament's capacity to oversee emergency measures and policies. The parliamentary constitutional review during the pandemic could still serve a critical complementary function by protecting fundamental rights and democratic values.

Parliamentary Oversight of the Army in Türkiye

Devletlerin en temel fonksiyonlarından birisi olan güvenliğin sağlanması için sistemde var olması gereken kurumların başında ordular gelmektedir. Güvenliğin tesisi için vazgeçilmez olan ordular ile ilgili en az varlıkları kadar kadim olan sorun ise güç kullanma tekelini elinde bulunduran bu kurumların denetimidir. Antik Yunan’da “Bizi muhafızlardan kim muhafaza edecek?” sorusuyla ortaya konulmuş olan bu sorun günümüzde de siyaset bilimi alanının başlıca tartışma konularından birisini oluşturmaktadır. Demokratik denetim başlığı altında incelenen bu alanda denetimin yasama, yürütme, yargı ve sivil toplum tarafından yapılması genel kabul görmektedir. Bu çalışmada da öncelikle ordunun parlamento tarafından denetiminin önemi, zorlukları, dünyada kullanılan denetim araçları konusunda bilgi verilecek ardından Türkiye’de parlamentonun ordunun denetimi noktasında sahip olduğu yetkiler ele alınacaktır. Parlamentoların orduların denetiminde sahip olduğu yetkiler demokratik yönetimin göstergelerinden birisi olarak kabul edildiği için önemlidir. Giraldo (2006) tarafından belirlenen parametreler üzerinden TBMM’nin sahip olduğu yetkilerde Cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sistemi sonrasında yaşanan değişimler ve demokratik denetiminin etkinliğinin ortaya konulması amaçlanmaktadır. İkincil kaynak taraması yöntemiyle yapılan çalışmada Cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sisteminde yürütmenin güçlendirilmesinin, yasama organının denetim yetkilerinde herhangi bir gerilemeye sebep olmadığı tespit edilmiştir.

Stages of Development of the Legal Basis of Parliamentary Control in the Republic of Uzbekistan

This article explores the stages of development of the legal basis of parliamentary control in the Republic of Uzbekistan. Since gaining independence in 1991, Uzbekistan has undergone significant changes in its parliamentary system, aiming to enhance the role of parliament in overseeing and controlling the executive branch. The article examines three key stages of this development. The initial years of independence witnessed the establishment of a bicameral parliament, but parliamentary control mechanisms were relatively weak, with executive dominance prevailing. Constitutional reforms in 2005 led to the formation of a unicameral parliament, the Oliy Majlis, which sought to strengthen parliamentary oversight. Provisions related to parliamentary control were introduced in the new constitution, signaling a shift towards greater accountability. The article then delves into the period from 2016 to the present, highlighting the efforts to strengthen parliamentary control mechanisms. A law regulating the activities of parliamentary committees was enacted, empowering them to conduct inquiries, request information, and hold public hearings. The establishment of a Commissioner for Human Rights further bolstered parliamentary oversight, as parliamentarians gained the authority to invite the Ombudsman to report on human rights issues. Furthermore, amendments to the law "On the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan" in 2019 granted the parliament expanded powers to review and approve government programs, budgets, and reports, strengthening its role in monitoring the executive branch. The article concludes by emphasizing that the development of parliamentary control in Uzbekistan is an ongoing process, as the country continues to refine its legal framework to promote transparency, accountability, and democratic governance. The stages of development discussed in this article shed light on the country's evolving parliamentary system and highlight the efforts made to enhance the role of parliament in ensuring effective oversight and control over the government's activities. This article describes the stages of development of the legal basis of the institution of parliamentary control in the Republic of Uzbekistan in the national legislation.